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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with strategie (economic) organisation, as applied to the long-
term care system in England. This work adopts a transaction cost perspective. The main 
hypotheses are: first, that the transaction costs generated by (public sector) hiérarchies 
in social care are lower than those generated in quasi-markets. Second, that production 
costs in hiérarchies are greater than in markets. Third, that contingent contract use is 
associated with comparatively higher priées and mark-up rates, and greater net 
transaction costs. The motivation for this work is first to address perceived limitations 
of the theory in a comparative public sector application. Second, to inform the empirical 
and policy debate on social care reform. 
Following an account of the historical policy and institutional context, a multi-period, 
comparative theoretical model was developed, building on the contract theory literature. 
It underpins a systematic empirical analysis of care home services - at local authority 
and care home level - for older people in 1998 and 1999. Various estimation techniques 
addressed the skewed nature of the data and the panel design. 
The estimation results supported the theoretical hypotheses. Point estimâtes of marginal 
and average transaction costs were £6 and £21 per place per week respectively for 
hiérarchies and £41 and £56 for placements under the market governance archetype, 
statistically significant différences. For production costs, a significant différence was 
found in the other direction: £89 for hierarchy and £55 for markets at the margin. 
Overall, the total (production + transaction) costs were not significantly différent. 
Contingent contract use was associated with higher prices relative to average variable 
costs of 8% of average price compared with non-contingent contracts. The analysis 
pointed to low profitability rates and that providers are not solely motivated by profit 
(only taking 55% of potential profit). 
Policy implications were explored for both the markets-hierarchies and contracts 
analyses. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Context 
A significant proportion of ail spending on publicly purchased social care goes not to 
providing services directly but to supporting the organisational processes designed to 
commission and deliver such care. These organisational processes and arrangements 
have a significant hearing on whether the right services get produced and delivered to 
the right people at the right time, and for the lowest cost. In other words, the way that 
the social care system is organised on both a micro and macro scale is important. There 
are a great number of possible organisational forms and arrangements that could be 
used. Choosing between them is a difficult task, with implications that can be measured 
according to a range of criteria. This work attempts to unravel these complexities and 
quantify the implications. 
We have witnessed significant policy reform in the social care, health and public policy 
fields, both in England and elsewhere, that is centrally relevant to organisational 
questions (Wistow et al., 1996; Saltman, Figueras, and Sakellarides, 1998; Forder, 
2002). Economic ideas have played a key rôle these reforms, although they are certainly 
not the only ideas that have influenced relevant policy development. Moreover, in the 
world of practical policy-making, even where economic ideas do serve to underpin 
policy, those ideas have been drawn from fairly superficial and selective sets of 
economic theory, an argument developed in the next chapter. Basic textbook models of 
demand, supply and the benefits of compétition have frequently been the sole 
theoretical foundation. In contrast, some of the recent academic literature has been 
characterised by developments that take a considerably more in-depth and sophisticated 
view of the performance of alternative ways of organising and arranging economic 
activity. This literature is generally referred to as the économies of organisation (EO). It 
is a literature that provides a basis for comparative analysis of such organisational 
structures. 
The main aim of this work is to assess the impact of différent organisational 
arrangements used in the social care system in England, applying the tools and concepts 
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of the economics of organisation. Relevant organisational considerations include the 
extent to which germane economic activity is undertaken in markets between 
independently owned and controlled stakeholders (social services departments, prívate 
providers, public sector providers, etc.) or whether it is conducted in bureaucracies, 
characterised by top-down management. Another key set of organisational 
characteristics relate to the nature of fínancial and other incentives that are in operation. 
For example, on what basis do those people that provide services get paid? Are they 
salaried or do they get paid a price for their services? Are the rates set in advance or 
retrospectively? Are incentives directly aligned with the costs of the services required or 
not? A third set of organisational arrangements concern how providers (and purchasers) 
are monitored to ensure standards. Is monitoring undertaken by government agencies, 
by purchasing authorities, by individuáis, via self-regulation by professional providers, 
etc? 
Whilst a very broad range of organisational dimensions potentially apply, many do align 
and can be gathered together to form a much smaller number of governance archetypes, 
a feature that this study exploits. In particular, this work assesses the choice between 
two sets of governance archetypes that are common in the literature (although oñen 
rather vaguely defined in that literature). The first is the choice between markets and 
hierarchy governance archetypes. In this case, the finer distinction is between the 
typical 'quasi-market' arrangements used in social care - involving local government 
funding and procurement of care with purchasing from privately owned, potentially 
competing providers - and traditional public bureaucratic or municipal arrangements. 
The second comparison is between types of contract used to conduct social care 
transactions, with a particular focus on the degree of contract contingency; that is, the 
degree to which contracts directly reflect characteristics and factors relevant to the 
transaction for the service. 
Social care is a broad field. To limit the scope of this endeavour, the focus will be on 
older people's services, and in particular publicly funded residential care. The provisión 
of care home services for older people takes the largest slice of all (public) social care 
expenditure - see chapter 4 for details. In particular, this sub-sector accounted for 
£422 lm of gross spend in 2002/3 or 36% of gross local authority adult spend. 
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1.2 Structure of Phd 
Having introduced the main aims and context this work, this chapter continues by laying 
some theoretical foundations that will apply throughout this work. It also describes the 
main sources of data. We turn in the next chapter to a review of the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature, principally concerning economic organisational theory and the 
relatively modest breadth of this literature applied to social care. Having described the 
literature in some détail, chapter 2 provides an assessment of the fitness for purpose of 
the theory and empirical methodology in the literature. The chapter concludes that 
whilst there has been significant relevant work, a number of spécifié developments will 
be required to address our main research questions. 
The conceptual building blocks of this approach, and of the associated empirical 
methodology, are laid out in chapter 3. The chapter describes the fundamental task of 
organising economic activity and then goes on to define transactions as the unit of 
analysis. It describes the agreements or contraéis struck between individuáis as they 
transact, and a broad framework for handling information and influence in transactions 
(the principal-agent framework). A key contribution of the chapter is to define and 
détail the concept of a 'governance structure' - that is the set of rules, protocols, 
agreements and régulations - that frame transactions and contracting. Governance 
structures are composed çf a range of organisational dimensions, including those 
referred to above. The potential number of possible governance structures is high, but a 
much more limited number of governance archetypes can be used that have sufficient 
relevance in practice. Chapter 3 closes with an outline of the main theoretical 
propositions addressed in this work. 
Chapter 4 discusses the historical, institutional and economic character of the social care 
system in England. This discussion is framed in the language and concepts of chapter 3. 
The aim is to translate those concepts into descriptions that are meaningful in social 
care. The analysis of its historical, institutional and economic character will point to any 
spécial features of social care in England that stand out relative to the general 
comparative governance concepts in the literature. A bespoke survey of commissioning 
arrangements (see below) provides rich descriptive information in chapter 4 about how 
social services departments are currently configured along the main governance 
dimensions identified earlier (i.e. about ownership, control, brokerage/care management 
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arrangements, budget dévolution, financial flows, levels of contract contingency and 
spécification etc.). Along with (secondary) government data about activity and 
expenditure, the chapter paints a broad descriptive picture of social care organisation in 
England. 
Chapter 5 develops theory for the analysis of market and hierarchy choices. Building on 
the literature outlined in chapter 2 - and in particular the contract theory of Grossman 
and Hart (1986), Hart (1995; 2003), Kreps (1990a; 1990c) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990; 1992) - a model is developed. The aim is to simultaneously model the impact of 
multiple contract types with explicit transaction costs and information asymmetry 
within a comparative market and hiérarchies governance framework. Moreover, with 
référencé to the conclusions of chapter 2, the model seeks to accommodate comparisons 
between public sector markets and hiérarchies and also to incorporate a more 
appropriate treatment of social context and stakeholder motivation. The model is used to 
develop a set of hypotheses for empirical testing. The key resuit - based in particular on 
predicted behaviours with regard to investment, production/implementation, contracting 
and also opportunistic profiteering - is that transactions costs will be lower and 
production costs higher in public sector hiérarchies compared to (quasi-) markets. 
Chapter 6 tests these and reiated hypotheses with regard to the residential care for older 
people using data from ail local authorities in England, including costs, service 
utilisation and input prices, needs-related factors and process indicators. Three sets of 
estimations are undertaken. The primary analysis is of the covariates of transaction costs 
and is undertaken to address hypothesis that hiérarchies have lower transaction costs. 
Thereafter a model of total costs is fitted and is used to assess the overall impact of 
governance choices. Finally, an analysis of production costs is undertaken mainly to 
assess the précision of the governance variable in its impact on production costs. The 
main finding was that hierarchical, in-house local authority provision incurred 
transaction costs of about a third of those from équivalent market provision. 
Furthermore, adjusted production costs were found to be lower in markets than in 
hiérarchies, although the différence was greater than that for transaction costs. Taken 
together, the total costs in markets were found to be slightly, but not significantly lower 
than in hiérarchies. 
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Chapter 7 uses the same model foundations outlined below and adapts the model used in 
chapter 5 to focus on spécifié hypotheses concerning contract choice. The model in 
chapter 7 has parallels with that developed by Forder (1997a), but is greatly extended to 
address information, risk and cost adjustment properties of différent contracts, as they 
affect both profit making organisations and also 'non-profit' providers. The key 
hypothesis is that contingent contracts will resuit in higher prices than non-contingent 
contracts. This effect is also found for non-profits although the price différence is 
reduced. In addition to these transactions benefits implications, transaction costs were 
also hypothesised to be higher for contingent contracts. 
Chapter 8 describes the empirical spécification used to test the above hypothesis and the 
results of the analysis. The empirical work utilises data from a survey of 600 care homes 
and 12000 residents. A residual demand fiinction approach (see Baker and Bresnahan, 
1985) is used to dérivé potential and actual price-cost margins for providers operating 
with différent contracts. The results indicate that mark-up rates (surpluses and prices) 
are higher for providers with contingent contracts than those with non-contingent 
contracts, controlling for a range of confounding factors. The results also provide some 
indication of the motivation of providers, showing that providers are not solely 
motivated by profit. The results also produced some estimâtes of the économies of scale 
that exist in the care home market. The estimations suggest that transaction costs are 
higher for contingent contracts. 
Chapter 9 draws out the main conclusions of this research. It rehearses the contributions 
to the literature that have been made. It also flags some policy relevance of the key 
results. 
1.3 Theoretical background 
1.3.1 Model foundations 
The organisation of the social care system in England is complex and complicated. To 
make some progress, a somewhat stylised theoretical model is used. Whilst this 
approach inevitably sacrifices some realism, it does make the problem at hand more 
manageable. It allows us to make prédictions that in turn can be tested. Chapter two 
reviews some of the literature that covers the relevant methodological arguments (see 
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also Hodgson, 1988, for a good overall account). Clearly, there is a balance to be struck 
between realism of assumptions and tractability. The general modelling framework 
outlined below is the basis for the theoretical chapters 5 and 7 (and these chapters 
provide more detail/refinements as required for their purposes). 
There are several broad processes in providing social care services. A first is investment 
in 'production' technology and more generally the process of bringing together the 
various capital, and skilled and unskilled labour inputs. Second, contracting and 
negotiation, which can be sequential to investment but can also run concurrently (i.e. we 
do not rule out the possibility of negotiations beginning even before the investment 
starts). Essentially, contracting is about agreeing the terms for the production and 
ultimate delivery of services. It is a flexible concept and applies just as relevantly to a 
work pian agreed between a manager/employer and employee as it does to a legai 
agreement between buyer and seller in a market. Third is the production of social care 
services, where 'production' takes a broad définition and involves the readying, 
deployment and use, etc., of services by people with care needs. At some time during 
this process reimbursement will take place as agreed. 
Because there are a very wide range of relevant factors that potentially influence how 
these processes are conducted and the outcomes they produce - such as the needs 
characteristics of service users, prevailing labour and capital market conditions, 
government policy, régulation - it is important to reflect this complexity and uncertainty 
in the model. The usuai method is to assume that the above activities take place within 
one of a great many possible 'states-of-the-world', each of which has a particular 
configuration of relevant circumstances. Furthermore, the exact nature of the state in 
which stakeholders find themselves is likely to become apparent only as time goes on, 
and relevant activities are undertaken. In other words, as the future unfolds it reveals 
relevant information. 
The various elements of the modelling can be drawn together in a structured way. This 
structure détails the timing and occurrence of relevant events, and is summarised in 
Figure 1-1. We divide the whole care process into two main time phases: investment 
starting at time 1 and provision/implementation or 'effort' starting at time 2, with 
contracting occurring concurrently. Furthermore, the second phase - the effort phase -
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can be treated in aggregate or, as in the figure, can have two or more sub-periods 
explicitly reflecting repeated production following investment. 
Figure 1-1. Stylised timeline 
Time 1 Time 2 
Phase 1 
Initial investment 
A 
Phase 2.1 Phase 2.2 
Configure inputs Production Configure inputs Production 
A A A, 
A 
Nature 
chooses <p 
Nature 
chooses U| 
Signal (cp ) of cp 
Nature 
chooses 02 
Signals uf of o Signals uf of o 
Signals«, ofcoi 
and ßf o f ß i 
Signals cûj of coi 
and ßj o f ß i 
Uncertainty is framed by four parameters cp, co, u and (3. The uncertainty regarding these 
parameters can be resolved at various times during the production process. They are 
determined 'by nature' for each k= 1,..., s states of the world. 
At time 1, nature chooses cp, which represents contextual, external factors that affect 
investment e.g. local property market conditions. Investment then occurs to set up 
production with the relationship between investment and final product mediated by the 
parameter cp. Investment is at level y", and might be, for example, the construction of a 
care home. 
At time 2, u can be measured. This parameter reflects the needs characteristics of the 
user that can be measured (subject to error) by a pre-care assessment. Using the initial 
investment, care packages of inputs are put together and configured on the basis of o. 
This configuration defines the type of output, <7(7° (cp),u,p). The (3 parameter reflects 
the costs of caring for a person, given the prevailing technology and their risk 
characteristics, and it drives costs and outcomes once a person is in a care setting. It 
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depends on the user's needs profile and also how their particular needs profile fits with 
the nature of the service provided in the home. It is therefore a refmement of initial 
assessed characteristics u. In other words, stakeholders that know ß also have 
information équivalent to that in u. To give an example, a person that présents to social 
services undergoes as assessment of need. A range of criteria applies and the person's 
needs and circumstances are evaluated against those criteria. Since this assessment is 
prior to care it can only relate to the person's pre-care circumstances and needs. The 
parameter u concerns information about the relevant population at this stage. Once 
people who meet the criteria, based on u, are placed it is possible that their care needs 
will change. In addition, that person will have been in contact with the system for 
longer. Evaluation from this point will likely yield better, care-specific, information. 
Before production (after time 2) nature also chooses a parameter, CD, that captures 
factors that will affect productivity, but are beyond the control of the provider. It 
reflects, in particular, the type of factor inputs a provider uses and how these are 
combined, which has a hearing on the kinds of produci types the provider is able to 
produce. When combined with u, co also gives a good indication of ß. Düring the 
ensuing production phase providers expend 'effort ' ye to supply the care service. The 
variable D measures the extent of production output by each provider (of their chosen 
type of service q). 
Figure 1-1 indicates at what point nature détermines key parameters. Stakeholders are 
able to measure these parameters thereafter but only at a (potentially substantial) cost. 
Moreover, this cost will differ between purchasers and providers for each parameter. 
For example, the cost for purchasers to measure ß is much higher than for providers. 
Stakeholders that do not measure a parameter are assumed, nonetheless, to get a noisy 
and tardy signal of the parameter, which is denoted by an S superscript in the figure. 
This signal is insufficiently precise and anyway too late for contracting purposes. 
Stakeholders can, however, use it to gauge retrospectively the validity of reports made 
by others. When stakeholders propose a value in a report, a 'hat ' embellishment is used: 
e.g. ß,ü,(p. The recipients of the report assess its accuracy and accept the report with a 
probability inversely related to how far the reported value deviates from the signalled 
value. Assume that the stakeholder making the report expects it to be accepted with 
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probabi l i tyr 7 (o y ) ,y = <p, u , P, co where 0 is the différence between the reported and 
signalled value e.g. 6 p = p - p 5 = p - p . W e assume that the signal is a noisy but 
unbiased indication of the actual value of the parameter. If the recipient of a report 
actually measures the parameter in question then any déviation (beyond some small 
reasonable degree of discrepancy) is suffïcient for the report to be rejected. Overall 
then, r = 1 when 9 = 0. Also, rg< 0 and ree< 0. The full spécification of the costs of 
measuring these parameters, contracting costs and other are described in chapter 5. 
The number of purchasers and providers operating in the system will depend on 
prevailing organisation arrangements; the number of products i = 1 to N can vary with N 
> 1. At period 2 demand for produci i in state k is, with full information: 
(1.1) Dki = Dki{pki,-,PkN,$k,<?k,»k) 
where pki to pkN are the prices charged by the provider of the zth product in the market. 
In practice, the full information case is unlikely to occur. Purchasers, in particular, will 
usually find it prohibitive to measure P (see chapter 5). They may also not measure cp. In 
this case demand is: 
(1.2) 
Otherwise the demand function has the normal properties: dDjdp, < 0 and dDjdpi > 0 
for / = 2 ... N. 
The uncertainty that exists about the value of key parameters means that stakeholders 
with the better information - those making reports - can potentially misrepresent that 
information to less well informed parties. In accordance with standard modelling of 
informational problems (e.g. Rasmusen, 1992), any misrepresentation made by the 
agent will be detected with probability 1 - r, as defined above. What happens if 
misrepresentation is detected is important. Generally, it is assumed that the potential 
contract fails to proceed and the agent reverts to réservation utility, generally set at zero 
(and exogenous in any case). It follows that expected period 2 demand in state k is: 
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(1.3) x ^ f o H W A f l M j 
This assumes that demand is zero with probability (l - rp(p4 ^ ( t p ^ )) 
So what are the respective payoff functions? Providers are assumed to maximise a 
utility function as follows: 
where nki is provider /'s expected (second period) profit in state-of-the-world k\ 
0-5) =pAxk)xki-Cki(xkl) 
where C are costs. Furthermore, in (1.4) the tcrm v rcflccts the total cost of investment 
and production effort. Transaction costs of various forms - which are detailed in chapter 
5 - are captured by T. 
Providers derive utility from profits according to the function v(.). Marginal utility of 
income is assumed to be positive, v' > 0 . We also assume that v " < 0 , v m = 0 and 
v > |v"|. The term y is introduced to allow some degree of non-profit motivation. 
Providers are of two types, profit-maximisers and satisficers. The latter type of provider 
aims to strike a balance between profit making and being able to lower prices and so 
enable greater access to the service for users. For our purposes we assume that 
satisficers suffer disutility in proportion to (the present value o f ) prices where those are 
higher than a reasonable level - essentially if price is higher than the level that sustains 
normal profit, providers appreciate that access is more restricted than it could (viably) 
be and suffer disutility as a resuit. Should the purchaser wish to proceed with the 
contract then providers suffer disutility v|/(p), where p is the expected value of prices p 
in to the future. For profit maximisers, \\i = 0 and v|/' = 0 , and for satisficers, i[/ < 0, 
\j/ < 0 and y " = 0 (where p is greater than the 'normal' level p ). Since providers have 
(1.4) 
U, = y, [ V F A , - y-T)+ vp(p1(. )]+ y 2 [V(TC2, -y-T)+ IJ/(p2i )] + 
20 
some expectation that the contract may not proceed, the disutility term enters (1.4) at its 
expected value: vj>(p). The most straightforward functional relationship in this case is 
vj>(p)= r\\)(p), i.e. vj>(p)= H>(p) when r = 1, although see the theoretical chapters (5 and 
7) for further détails. We do, however, assume that any disutility is relatively modest 
relative to the marginal value attached to profit. Specifically: 
Assumption 7-7. That: v' + vj)' > 0, Vrc and v'(o)+vj>'<v'(oo). 
Purchasers are assumed to maximise a utility function of the form: 
( 1.6) Z = y iz(v{xì )-p{x, )*,)+.. + ysz{y{xs ) - p(xs ) 
where V is the purchasers total valuation of the output D and is sum of marginai 
valuation: 
D 
(1.7) V= p?( / ,x ;o ,cp ,ß) t fx . 
o 
1.4 Empirical analyses 
This work draws on three main sources of data: two specifically designed surveys - the 
first on providers and provision, the second on commissioning - and the routine data 
collections by the government about social care expenditure and activity. 
1.4.1 Survey of residential care provision 
A main source of data is a uniquely large and detailed national, cross-sectional survey 
of residential care and nursing homes for older people conducted in the autumn of 1996. 
It provides comprehensive information for 12,000 residents and over 600 care homes in 
21 locai authority areas in England. The principal aims of the survey were to provide a 
baseline description of homes and their users, and to explore the relationship between 
the costs or price of care and the dependency characteristics of residents. A 
comprehensive report of the survey provides détails of methodology, sample frame and 
results (Netten et al., 1998). 
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The survey covered residential homes for older people managed by local authority 
social services departments and independent sector residential, nursing and dual 
registered homes for older people. The survey included residential and dual registered 
homes for older people with mental illness, but nursing homes which catered for elderly 
people with mental illness were not included if they were recorded simply as for people 
with mental illness in the database used for selecting the sample. Small homes, that is, 
those with fewer than four places, were not included in the survey. 
Within the 21 local authorities in the survey, separate lists of ail homes in the area were 
compiled for local authority homes, private residential and dual registered homes, 
voluntary residential and dual registered homes and registered nursing homes. Samples 
were selected randomly from the list with probability proportional to home size with 
size being defined as the number of places recorded on the sampling lists. Since the 
number of homes in London boroughs tends to be small, the number of private 
residential and dual registered homes and the number of registered nursing homes 
selected in London were each doubled. Within the selected homes, individual 
information was requested for a random sample of up to 20 residents per home (or ail 
residents for smaller homes). 
The fieldwork procédure involved an initial approach by letter to the selected homes, 
which was followed by a personal interview with the home manager. Resident 
information questionnaires were left to be collected latter, as were self-completion 
questionnaires for staff (for up to 20 relevant members of staff). The information 
collected in the personal interview included background information about the home, 
information about the type of care provided, the physical features of the home, staffing, 
contractual arrangements and charging arrangements. The residents questionnaire 
covered the characteristics of residents including origin of admission, funding sources, 
and dependency characteristics. The questionnaire for staff incorporated the Sheltered 
Care Environment Scale (SCES), developed by Moos and Lemke (1992). This scale is 
designed to capture the 'atmosphère' in the home, in terms of key characteristics: the 
levels of cohésion and conflict; the degree to which residents are encouraged to be 
independent or to disclose their feelings; the organisation of the daily routine; the 
influence residents have on the rules of the home; and the physical comfort of the home. 
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1.4.2 Survey of commissioning 
A 2001 survey with a sample frame of ail 150 local authorities in England was also a 
major source of data regarding commissioning arrangements (see MEOC Team, 2001). 
This survey utilised a postal questionnaire design, with letter and téléphoné follow-up. 
The questionnaire was structured and predominately involved closed-end categorical 
responses, some with detailing sub-questions. The questionnaire design drew on 
experience with two similar, but smaller sample surveys conducted in the mid and late 
1990s. 
The survey covered the following areas of commissioning: the extent and nature of 
purchaser - provider séparation in local authorities; in-house and external purchasing 
process differentiation; budget holding; price setting (both for external and internai 
providers); typical price levels; relative purchasing power; perceived competitiveness; 
accréditation and review arrangements; contract types, and contract spécification. 
Figure 1-2 shows the overall response rate after this multiple follow-up process. Some 
92 out of the 150 SSDs in England responded, a rate of 61 per cent of the population. 
There was some régional variation, ranging from 43 per cent in the West Midlands to 80 
per cent for the East région. Analysis of potential régional effects did not find 
statistically significant différences for the main variables of interest - see section 4.5.3 
of chapter 4. 
Figure 1-2. Commissioning survey, response rates from sample frame of 150 LAs 
"B2~ 
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50»/ LAs 
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1.4.3 National data 
The national PSS data collections by the Department of Health were heavily utilised. 
These are validated sources available publicly on the Department of Health website and 
offer information about activity and expenditure for each local authority in England -
each of the 150 "councils with social care responsibilities". Activity data are drawn 
from the collection: Community Care Statistics - residential personal social services for 
adults, England, which covers the number and types of care homes registered in 
England (i.e. capacity). Data on the number of places that local authorities fiind is 
available from: Community Care Statistics - supported residents (adults), England. 
These data are currently available at: 
http:/Ayww.publications.doh.gov.uk/public/work social _care.htm#catadult. Expenditure 
data are drawn from the PSS EX 1 and R 0 3 returns that form the Personal social 
services current expenditure in England collection. These data are currently available 
at: http://www.publications.doh.gov.uk/public/work expenditure.htm. Details of each of 
these data sources are given in subséquent chapters. 
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Chapter 2. Economie theory, empirical findings and 
comparative governance: a literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter charts the organisational économies literature as a precursor to its use in 
addressing comparative organisational questions. The chapter describes the progress of 
this literature and considers its application to the social care questions of this research 
thesis. It is worth being clear at this stage about the need for the theory to be explicit 
about the institutional and organisational context in which economic activity takes 
place. Moreover, if we are to use theory in this work it must support overt comparisons 
between différent institutional, organisational or 'governance' frameworks. Much of the 
mainstream économies literature has concerned the economic activity within market 
contexts, and even then with a very stylised treatment of market forms of organisation 
that downplay their institutional character. There are, however, a number of new 
schools of economic theory that are better suited, theories that go beyond neo-classical 
theory - the so called économies of organisation. This is a relatively new area of theory 
and as such is somewhat under-developed, without a consistently agreed core. 
Nonetheless, there is significant new work that is adding to the corpus of theory. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The theoretical literature is described in the section 
2. Section 3 offers a critical assessment of these theories in regard to their application to 
evaluating governance in social care. The fourth section considers the finding of this 
research in social care. The last section has conclusions. 
2.2 Baseline theories 
2.2.1 Neo-classical 
Standard neo-classical economic theory is concerned primarily with exchange and 
production within markets. The high paradigm version is général equilibrium theory 
(Arrow and Hahn, 1971; Varian, 1978). Essentially, the général equilibrium model is 
the multi-period, multiple commodity version of the economic textbook perfectly 
compétitive market model. Its relevance to questions of governance extends only as far 
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as considering when this stylised market might fail to arrange efficient complété 
contracts. The standard market failures are imperfect market structure, économies of 
scale, information problems and externalities (Bator, 1957, 1958; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980). 
Neo-classical économies has a fondamental set of assumptions, including the 
extemalisation or exogeniety from the model of institutional effects, individual's tastes 
and preferences, social relationships (the social environment), and the technology of 
production.1 This position is summarised in Figure 2-1. Another key assumption is that 
of rational maximising behaviour, meaning that: a décision maker can order 'states of the 
world'; preferences between these states of the world are transitive; and that décisions are 
made to maximise the utility obtained between différent states of the world. Hence, the 
individual is assumed to possess exception information and computational powers. 
Figure 2-1. Basic system diagram 
These assumptions add up to a very limited and abstract treatment of institutional 
frameworks. The market process is often abstracted to the theoretical construct of the 
Walrasian auctioneer (for a governance perspective see Arrow and Hahn, 1971; Sawyer, 
1993) i.e. Adam Smith's invisible hand. The outeome is a complete contingent claims 
contract, which spécifiés ail stakeholders' actions (production and exchange) and 
payments for ail contingencies, both current and future. These assumptions are not 
1 These can be described by what Musgrave (1981) calls domain assumptions. 
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supposed to reflect reality, being a convenience that allows attention to be focused on 
the allocation of goods and services. 
The idea of non-market organisation extends as far as a considération of (prívate) firms, 
and even these are conceived as 'black boxes' in this paradigm. The organisation is taken 
to act as an indivisible decision-making unit, behaving in an analogous fashion to an 
individual entrepreneur. The objectives of this 'entrepreneur' and the organisation are 
treated as synonymous since the former is assumed to exercise full and effective control. 
2.2.2 Institutional/behavioural 
Within the behavioural tradition the interaction between social relationships and 
institutions is seen as paramount in explaining the behaviour of individuáis. 
Organisations are not treated as 'black boxes'. Rather they are seen as a coalition of 
individuáis each with their own goals (Cyert and March, 1963). Interaction between these 
individuáis is treated as endogenous to a dynamic decision-making process that involves 
continuai, implicit or explicit, bargaining and renegotiating. These decision-making 
processes are rooted in Herbert Simon's concept of 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1955). 
Although a difficult concept to define precisely, it broadly means that individuáis cannot 
engage in informed optimisation, being limited in both information and computational 
skills. Rather, their behaviour can be regarded as some non-optimising decision-making 
process, often termed 'satisficing'. 
The behavioural approach provides a rich descriptive picture of the behavioural patterns 
that are likely to emerge within organisations such as prívate firms. But there are 
limitations; this corpus of theory under-emphasises extemal relationships. So whilst 
compétition and the external regulatory environment will impact on internai behaviour, 
the response to actors within the organisation is limited by their resolution of internai 
conflict. Behavioural models have a focus away from the question of why non-market 
organisations exist. The approach is not truly comparative with regard to organisation. 
The original work also suffered the problem of not being very rigorous; rigor was traded 
for a relaxation of some of the more 'distasteful' assumptions found in many neo-
classical models. More recent developments in evolutionary theories, for example 
Nelson and Winter (1982), do address some of these shortcomings e.g. with theoretical 
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concepts of short-run production routine and the longer-run process of search to find 
better methods to characterise the firm. 
2.2.3 New institutional économies: TCE 
Encompassing the assumptions of rationality of the behavioural approach, New 
Institution Economies takes a further step from neo-classical économies by relaxing 
assumptions about the institutional framework in which décision are made. Building on 
the pioneering insights of Ronald Coase, institutional choices are made to économisé on 
the (transactions) costs of organising production (Coase, 1937). Coase explained the 
existence of the capitalist firm as a voluntary response to the high costs of using the 
price (i.e. market) mechanism. This transaction cost-economising is the basis of Oliver 
Williamson's more général theory of alternative institutional forms (Williamson, 1975, 
1979, 1985a, 1986; Williamson, 1994). New institutional économies (NIE) locates its 
analysis in transactions between individuals. In this way, the theory seeks to explain the 
institutional patterns that prevail by explicitly considering how alternative forms of 
economic organisation come into existence. Moreover, it recognises the importance of 
social relationships, and endogenous technology. It is closer to what might be called a 
system view. This is described in Figure 2-2 (see Hodgson, 1988). 
Figure 2-2. Endogenous system 
The assumptive base of transaction cost économies is what Williamson (Op., cit.) calls 
human factors: bounded rationality and opportunism (or human nature). Following 
(Simon, 1955), individuals are bounded rational because they do not possess sufficient 
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computational abilities to process relevant information, or find such computation too 
costly. Opportunism is a form of human behaviour in which (some) people act in self-
interested ways, and are prepared to misrepresent relevant information if it promotes their 
own interests. 
These assumptions - particularly bounded rationality - lead to a central tenet of 
transactions costs economics, that long-term contingent claims contracts will always be 
incomplete. To begin with, stakeholders cannot anticipate all feasible contingencies that 
might arise in the future, and so cannot make provision for them. Also, calculating the 
appropriate responses (for example, reimbursement structures that account for cost 
variations; pump-priming money for investments etc.) may be beyond the cognitive 
abilities of those people involved. Even if contingencies can be anticipated, actually 
specifying meaningful, clear and unambiguous terms that define both the contingency 
itself and how all parties might respond, particularly so that it is verifiable and 
enforceable legally (Hart, 1985), is at least very costly, and most likely impossible for 
all foreseen contingencies. 
Consequently, there is a need for some process between the involved parties that enables 
them to arrive at an acceptable course of action to deal with non-contracted contingencies 
as they occur. Some form of adaptive bargaining and re-negotiation will be required. This 
agreed course is effectively an extension or refinement of the original contract, but it 
generally need only relate to the 'contingency' that has actually arisen, rather than all 
possible contingencies. A number of options present themselves (see Williamson, 1985, 
chapter 3). They can be primarily characterised by where the authority to make adaptations 
lies between parties to a transaction (more of this below). In hierarchical arrangements one 
party defers most authority to the other party to make decisions about adaptation to 
uncertain events. The firm is a good example of a pure hierarchy where an employee 
accepts to undertake actions specified by his or her employer. 
There are serious questions as to why a person would give up their control to take orders 
from others, but unified control does mean that extensive prior agreements can be avoided. 
In bilateral arrangements parties to a transaction have no formal agreement (beyond the 
external legal framework) as to how uncertainty should be resolved. Instead they make 
adaptations by internal agreement, perhaps guided by convention or historical behaviour. 
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They agree new clauses in largely the same way as they did when agreeing the initial 
contract. A third category is the trilatéral arrangement. Here a third party is granted 
powers of authority or arbitration to resolve unforeseen contingencies. The décision of the 
arbitrator - whose powers are specified in the contract - is usually enforceable according 
to provisions in contract law. The latter two options are generally conflated into one, since 
in practice resolutions are not entirely bilateral or trilatéral, but are some mix of the two. In 
his earlier work, Williamson (1975) distinguishes between hiérarchies and markets, with 
bilateral or trilatéral arrangements as a subséquent refinement of market arrangements. 
A key contribution of the institutional économies approach is the idea that transactions 
are conducted within governance structures. More speeifieally, Williamson defines a 
governance structure as "the institutional matrix within which the integrity of a 
transaction is decided" (1994, p. 102 or 1979 p. 233). It builds on the concept of an 
institutional arrangement, an idea with longer heritage, being "an arrangement between 
economic units that governs the ways in which these units can cooperate and/or 
compete" ((Davis and North, 1971), p 5-6.). More generally, North (1990) defines 
institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (p. 3). 
These constraints take "the form of rules and régulations; a set of procédures to detect 
déviations from the rules and régulations; and, fïnally, a set of moral ethical behavioural 
norms which ... constrain the way in which the rules and régulations are specified and 
enforcement is carried out" (p. 233). Furthermore, formai institutional constraints 
include "politicai (and judicial) rules [and] economic rules.. ." (p. 47) where the latter 
"define property rights, that is the bündle of rights over the use and the income to be 
derived from property and the ability to alienate an asset or a resource." (p. 47) (see also 
Coleman, 1990b; 1990a, on the rôle of rights in his theory of social action). Property 
rights, conferred in law, give the owner of assets involved in a transaction control about 
how they are used, particularly when non-contracted contingencies arise (Swedberg, 
1994). 
The other key contribution is the idea that choices between governance arrangements -
e.g. between markets and hiérarchies - have ramifications for how transactions are 
conducted, and speeifieally, the size of production and transaction cost they generate. It 
follows that choices between these governance arrangements are made to minimise the 
sum of production and transaction costs. The explicit treatment of transaction costs is the 
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real departure in this literature from that before. Annex 2-1 summarises the main features 
of Williamson's theory. 
What then determines the size of the transactions eosts? Williamson describes three 
factors. First, asset specificity, the extent to which resources used in a specific transaction 
have a higher valué in that use rather than another. It means that assets - physical or human 
- will become committed to particular uses with consequent adverse effects on 
competition. As well as for physical or technological reasons, asset specificity can accrue 
through use or familiarity; competition between a large number of competitors can be 
'transformed' into limited number competition as assets in use gain a comparative 
advantage. 
Asset specificity is an important cause of hold-up problems. Hold-up describes a situation 
when parties renege on prior agreements (particularly non-contractual promises) and 
forcé re-negotiation with the intention of securing more favourable terms. Specific 
investments tie a party into a bilateral relationship and undermine the credibility of their 
threat to walk away from the transaction when the less restricted partner proposes a 
renegotiation. There is an efficiency problem when, in anticipation of potential re-
negotiation, under-investment occurs because the investor expects to lose some of the 
benefits of specific investments. Where specific investments would yield considerable 
production cost savings some form of hierarchical governance mechanism would be 
appropriate. Under unified control, the problem of hold-up becomes irrelevant and 
investment benefits can be gained. 
The second factor is uncertainty, which is broadly defined to include a lack of information 
about contingencies that can, in principie, be anticipated, those that cannot, and those for 
which it is too costly to collect accurate information. It includes asymmetric information 
situations where one party to a transaction has more information than the other(s). Clearly 
uncertainty goes hand in hand with bounded rationality. Indeed, it is both the complexity 
and lack of information that limits rational decision-making. 
The third factor is the frequency of a transaction. Frequently repeated transactions allow 
the cultivation of on-going relationships between stakeholders. These relationships will 
have an impact, in turn, on how future transactions are conducted. 
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These factors affect the size of transactions costs (Coase, 1937). Uncertainty and bounded 
rationality combine to increase the cost of long-term contracts in markets that would 
require a relatively full spécification of complex future contingencies. Such transactions 
would be less costly where uncertainty could be absorbed in a sequential manner, i.e. with 
hierarchical arrangements. In addition, asset specificity and hence restricted compétition 
combine with opportunism - especially with relatively infrequent transactions - to push up 
the net transaction costs of market based contracting (for an empirical analysis of spécifié 
assets in the fuel industry, see Joskow, 1987). Again, hierarchical organisation could 
circumvent these hold-up problems. 
2.2.4 Contract theory 
Contract theory - or perhaps more precisely, /«complété contracts theory - extends the 
neo-classical model by treating the governance framework within which décisions are 
made as endogenous and accepts that both the governance structure and the institutional 
environment affect the economic behaviour of stakeholders. Contract theory also 
relaxes the neo-classical assumption of rationality, employing instead a (sometimes 
uneasy) blend of bounded rationality and hyper-rationality assumptions (see below). 
Contract theory is the vehicle by which governance ideas from institutional économies 
have been formalised mathematically (see Hart, 1995, for a fuller account of the issues).2 
Under this broad epithet there are (at least) three theoretical developments or components 
that are especially central to this overall approach. First is the Grossman and Hart model of 
property rights in the context of incomplète contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
Grossman and Hart's model attends specifically to the problem of hold-up. It directly 
indicates efficiency advantages of hierarchical governance forms. Second is Milgrom and 
Robert's (1990) bargaining costs theory. This approach has its roots more firmly in 
principal-agent theory of neo-classical économies and is more attentive to the value of 
2 David Kreps (1996) contends that contract theory has developed from an attempt at a mathematical 
rendering of transaction cost économies. He sees an inevitability to this given the fondamental rôle of 
mathematical modelling in mainstream microeconomics ((Simon and Blume, 1994)). Those he argues with a 
mathematical inclination would no doubt argue that, because transaction cost économies is not specified 
formally, it is difficult to precisely determine transactions costs especially when the relevant human and 
environment factors act simultaneously (for example, (McGuinness, 1992)). Kreps (1996) argues that whilst 
mathematics does reduce problems to manageable proportions, dangers exist in missing the nuances of 
Williamson's work and the essence of the behaviouralist/institutionalist approaches (see below). 
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contracts (especially short-term contracts) and the reasons why these contracts might break 
down. The third is Kreps-Simon on réputation (Kreps, 1990b, 1990a; Kreps, 1990c, 1996; 
Simon, 1951). The Kreps-Simon model tackles the problem of motivating parties to 
transactions characterised by imperfect information. 
2.2.4.1 Property rights and incomplete contracts 
The seminar contribution to the literature is the concept of the incomplete contract 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 2003). In particular, because it is hard to foresee and 
contract about the uncertain future, contracts cannot embody ail relevant courses of 
agreed action for ail possible contingencies. Moreover, when non-contracted 
contingencies do arise, their resolution depends significantly on who holds property 
rights i.e. ownership of the relevant asset. In particular, the owner of an asset has 
residuai rights of control over how that asset is used. 
There are two basic assumptions in the Grossman and Hart model. The first is that the 
supplier or provider can undertake an investment to reduce production costs that 
nonetheless ties them into a bilatéral relationship with a less restricted partner. 
Moreover, the subséquent value of the produci to the buyer depends on the prevailing 
demand circumstances, which are known only after the investment. The second 
assumption is that at the time of the investment the purchaser and provider cannot write 
a contract that commits them to a sale price specified for each possible contingency. 
They must wait until actual demand and other relevant circumstances are revealed and 
then bargain a price. As before, bounded rationality is invoked to just ify this 
assumption; the required contract at the investment stage would be too complex to 
write. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) consider the hold-up problem as outlined above. When a 
non-contracted contingency occurs after an investment, parties to the transaction have to 
negotiate a contract extension to cover this contingency. Absent property rights, the 
investing party expects at the time of investment for some of the benefits of their 
investment to be appropriated in negotiation over non-contracted contingencies, and so 
reduce their investment. However, ownership improves bargaining power and therefore 
investment incentives. In particular, if one party owns the investment assets as well as 
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the production stage, that is, the transaction is conducted in a unified or hierarchical 
governance structure, then the hold-up problem becomes irrelevant; the owner has full 
rights to control and receive all (or most of) the returns of the asset. See Annex 2-2 for a 
(more) formal model. Here an example can illustrate the main points. 
Suppose a purchaser wishes to buy residential care services. A provider is faced with 
the decision about the degree of investment in specialist equipment and home 
conversion. The benefits of the investment - and so the price the purchaser is willing to 
pay for placement - then depend on the needs of residents, demand conditions, local 
labour market dynamics, funding policy, regulatory environment and so forth. This 
complex situation effectively rules out the purchaser and provider from agreeing a 
complete contract in advance. Suppose that every £1 of investment lowers cost by £1.50 
(or improved outcomes by £1.50). However, because the final price is set according to 
the difference between the purchaser's maximum valuation and the cost of the product, 
the provider can only expect to see a return of £0.75 (a half share). He therefore does 
not invest. Both parties therefore lose the return of £0.50 on every £1 of investment that 
might otherwise have taken place. Furthermore, if the cost of buying the provider's 
production equipment is less than this amount, it would be efficient for the purchaser to 
also become the owner of the means of production - a hierarchy. 
2.2.4.2 Bargaining cost theories and short-term contracts 
In the context of incomplete contracts, governance structures emerge to guide new 
adaptations to and re-negotiation of existing contracts. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
argue that it is the bargaining costs of such adaptation that can cause market 
(governance) failure. In the absence of such costs, short-term contracts will be efficient. 
The pivotal feature of their model is that short-term contracts can efficiently allocate 
rights to a return from investment between stakeholders. As a result, Milgrom and 
Roberts show that were bargaining costs at zero, a series of short-terms contracts can, 
given a number of conditions, produce the same outcomes as a complete contract (e.g. 
no hold-up). This result is demonstrated in Annex 2-3 using the formal model developed 
for the Grossman-Hart theory (in Annex 2-2). 
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We can continue the above social care example to also show this result. In this case, at 
the point of investment the purchaser and provider agree what they expect the benefits 
of the investment to be in the future (of course they may turn out to be different because 
the world is complex, but that does not matter if the investment has already taken 
place). Suppose for simplicity that the future net benefits are shared equally. Then at the 
time of investment the stakeholders write a (short-term) contract - conditional only on 
the current investment level - where the purchaser pays for £0.50 of each £1 of 
investment. This means that the provider only has to spend £0.50 to invest with an 
expected return of half of £1.50 or £0.75. When the actual placement characteristics are 
known the purchaser and provider write another contract to agree the final price. Hence 
the investment goes ahead efficiently under a bilateral or market governance 
arrangement. 
Milgrom and Roberts argue that the costs of agreeing and writing short-term contracts 
constitute all the transaction costs of market governance. An assumption made here is 
that binding short-term contracts can be written over the initial investments. This 
assumption is a crucial difference between the Milgrom-Roberts and Grossman-Hart 
models. When contracts can be written concerning initial investments, then there are no 
residual control issues and ownership becomes irrelevant. The only aspect of our 
example that has changed is that the stakeholders can write a binding short-run contract 
on the investment. Only the costs of this activity would impede reaching an efficient 
agreement. 
Milgrom and Roberts' theory proceeds from the basic Coasian idea that when the costs 
of organisational decision-making are zero, negotiation always leads to an efficient 
outcome (Coase, 1960). They, nonetheless acknowledge a growing bargaining literature 
that does not (fully) support this claim (see surveys by Lyons and Varoufakis, 1989; 
Kennen and Wilson, 1993). In particular, when there are no obvious points of symmetry 
(Nash, 1953) around which to split a surplus, problems of hold-up and delay can occur 
as parties try to jockey to appropriate larger shares. In extreme cases where there are 
multiple players, bargaining may fail completely to provide a solution. 
In addition, the theory described above embodies a number of more restrictive 
information assumptions. What happens when these are relaxed? The basic model has 
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been extended to show that short-term contracts can also produce first best outcomes, 
absent short-term bargaining costs, with risk-averse stakeholders and moral hazard (or 
ex post) asymmetric information problems (Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom, 
1990).3 Information problems relating to adverse selection are problematic and do 
render contracts inefficient. When one party to a transaction has ex ante private 
information about some factor that is relevant to the transaction, a first-best efficient 
contract cannot be designed. An example of this sort of information advantage is where 
a provider knows their underlying cost structure, but the purchaser does not. 
Incentive compatibility (for truthful revelation of private information) is only achieved 
at the cost of some informational rent, a result from the mechanism design (adverse 
selection) literature (Baron and Myerson, 1982; Baron, 1989; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; 
Forder, 1997a). In other words, the provider can be induced to give information about 
costs to the purchaser, but only at a price. Specifically, more cost efficient providers 
will be allowed to under-invest (to lower costs) because they have an initial cost 
advantage over other providers and can use this to cover poor investment/productivity. 
For example, a residential care provider might have a less intensive (and so cheaper) 
staff training programme if it already had very low cost physical assets. 
Following this account, bargaining costs include: the opportunity cost of bargaining 
(time, writing contracts...), costs of monitoring and enforcing the agreement (contract) 
and any (efficiency) "losses from failure to reach the most efficient agreement possible 
in the most efficient manner" (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, p 65). The last of the three 
components includes (a) coordination of bargaining failures and (b) information rents 
that accrue to adverse selection problems. 
2.2.4.3 Reputation 
When negotiating over non-contracted contingencies, stakeholders face a trade-off 
between the transactions costs associated with the process of adaptation and the risk of 
being exploited. These transaction costs include collecting information, monitoring, 
determining and then bargaining in respect to the best course of action, etc. Parties to a 
3 Other required conditions are that intertemporal transfers are possible and a number of technical 
limitations on common knowledge and the utility function. 
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transaction may decide to forgo or limit these activities. For example, individuals may 
be willing to defer authority and decision-making to a superior in a hierarchy (and hence 
reduce the costs they incur in dealing with uncertainty) if they believe the risk of 
exploitation by the hierarchical superior to be small. Likewise, a purchaser of services 
using a bilateral market contract can reduce transaction costs by reducing quality 
monitoring if he does not expect the provider to exploitative. 
Mostly however, uncertainty is rife and so the opportunity for exploitation is high 
(anecdotally, this is a good description of most social care transactions). Why then do 
parties cede control rights and put themselves in potentially exploitative situations? 
Kreps (1996) believes that Simon's (1951) paper on the employment relationship is the 
seminal reference in this case. The central proposition is that an individual will cede 
some control to another because they are protected by the threat of mutually harmful 
exit by the employee should that person become convinced of exploitation. Put another 
way, the employer will refrain from exploitation in order to safeguard his or her 
reputation. 
Kreps (1990a) argues that reputation provides a glue that permits mutually beneficial 
transactions to take place, where otherwise they would be too costly. Indeed, Kreps 
(1990a; 1990c; 1996) formalises these ideas using the folk-theorem from game theory 
(Fundenberg and Tirole, 1992). Essentially, this theorem shows that long term 
abstemious behaviour netting a modest payoff over many repeat transactions (for which 
a player attracts a good reputation and therefore secures repeat transactions) can be 
more attractive than short-run exploitation (which is likely to result in contract 
termination). In that case monitoring by the potentially exploited party can be reduced 
to the point where the expected short-run gains accrued before detection of exploitative 
behaviour, are just less than the long-run gains from behaviour that safeguards 
reputation. 
To illustrate how this theorem applies to governance choices, consider two parties A (a 
manager) and B (a home-help worker) who have agreed an (incomplete) contract. 
Suppose that as the future unfolds they arrive at a contingency that is not specified in 
their contract. Moreover, A has relevant information about the event (e.g. a change in 
the financial regime), and the authority to take decisions, and B does not. Then, in a 
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dynamic (repeated) scenario, A may accrue a réputation for being an honest and flexible 
manager such that B accepts what A tells him as the truth and is happy to concede 
authority. 
In this case A need not be altruistic or moral or somehow constrained to be honest and 
act responsibly. Indeed, it is in A ' s interest to tell the truth and not exploit the situation 
because he conjectures that B will 'punish' him by terminating the contract (i.e. 
quitting) if A lies. So long as the value of a responsible use of authority outweigh the 
value of exploitation (and subséquent costly repercussions), a réputation equilibrium 
can hold.4 
Here then an implicit convention is being followed: A does not exploit the situation for 
short-run gains and allows B some flexibility in fulfilling his contractual obligations. In 
return B can focus on the task at hand, work productively, without needing to establish 
(costly) safeguards on A, nor to duplicate work in collecting information or making 
calculations relevant to determining appropriate actions. In effect, a mutually beneficiai 
gift exchange has taken place (Miller, 1992). 
Whilst we consider the general shortcomings of contract theory below, there are two 
important conditions for the réputation model to work. First, it must be the case that 
each party can verify the actions of the other. Second, it must be the case that each party 
recognises and understands the actions of the other parties and knows how to respond in 
order to protect their réputation. Thus, each player must know what convention they 
will be playing and what the appropriate actions are in complying with this convention. 
If one party does not know what the appropriate 'comply ' action is, then the réputation 
equilibrium may fall apart. 
4 Réputation appears to be able to overcome many forms of potential transaction failure (See Rasmusen, 
1992, for a description of the infinitely repeated réputation game that he calls the 'grim strategy'). Early 
applications of this idea to product quality is Klein (1981)). However, a conceptual problem often dubbed 
the chainstore paradox (Selten, 1978, 1975) does complicate réputation models with finite répétition of 
transactions. Briefly, if the game has a definite endpoint, at that time a player's réputation is irrelevant 
and so he will exploit the situation if able. In anticipation, the other party will quit the game one 
transaction early, which means that the penultimate transaction is actually the last transaction. The game 
then unravels and the coopérative outcome is lost. The introduction of a small degree of uncertainty about 
the employer's type (i.e. perhaps the employer really is altruistic and therefore will not exploit) can 
overcome this problem (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Kreps and Wilson, 1982). 
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2.3 Critical application to comparative governance issues in social 
care - conceptual issues 
2.3.1 Theoretical foundations for analysis of social care 
In this section we consider the application of these broad theoretical approaches to 
social care with two principal and inter-linked aims. First, to review what the literature 
has provided by way of attempts to solve the governance problem. Second, to form 
some conclusions as to what the best theories are for the job, and thereby to point to 
required developments of the theory for our purposes. 
2.3.2 Neo-classical 
Neo-classical theory does not directly address the comparative governance question. 
What it does explain in detail is where markets might fail. Moreover, that markets can 
fail can be taken as an implicit case for alternative forms of governance. Traditional 
welfare economics has generally assumed this alternative to be 'government' (Atkinson 
and Stiglitz, 1980). The non-profit sector has also been considered as an alternative 
form of governance within neo-classical economics (Weisbrod, 1975, 1988). 
'Standard' theoretical causes of market failure - imperfect competition, economies of 
scale, information asymmetry etc. - are well known (Bator, 1958; Barr, 1993) and need 
little rehearsing here, except, perhaps to point out the re-interpretation of the perfect 
competition condition as instead the need for perfect contestability (Baumol, Panzar, 
and Willig, 1982). 
There have been a number of analyses of social care markets that draw on (neo-
classical) industrial economics approaches (e.g. Forder, Knapp, and Wistow, 1996; Le 
Grand and Bartlett, 1993). A distinction is made between structural imperfections and 
information imperfections (Knapp et al., 1994; Forder, Knapp, and Wistow, 1996). The 
former concerns imperfect market contestability and competitiveness and the latter 
covers uncertainty and asymmetric information. In relation to asymmetric and 
incomplete information between purchaser and provider, there are many examples to 
draw on in social care (see section 2.5.1.2 below). Barriers to entry and exit are less 
significant. Regulation imposes some costs, but the relevance of sunk costs (Dixit, 
1980) in a labour intensive industry is generally low (see section 2.5.1.1). 
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According to the neo-classical model these types of imperfections lead to market failure 
and imply high market governance costs. But how secure are these inferences? As we 
noted above, there are a number of areas of concern in using neo-classical theory as a 
basis for comparative governance évaluation. To begin with, neo-classical theory does 
not provide an account of why particular forms of governance are chosen; the 'required 
conditions' of this theory - i.e. textbook market failures - are joint necessary conditions 
for the existence of a textbook perfectly competitive market, and a first best outcome. 
But beyond this, the theory is largely silent, even as regards the conséquence of one of 
the necessary conditions failing to hold. It tells us that either a complete contract can or 
cannot be written (which is of little practical relevance), but not the conséquences of 
some degree of failure. 
Furthermore, individuals' tastes, preferences and social relationships (embedded in a 
social environment) are also exogenous. As a resuit, a considération of the feedback 
between social relationships and individuai's preferences and values, on the one hand, 
with institutions or raies of the game, on the other, is precluded f rom the analysis. 
These are not criticisms per se but rather a récognition that neo-classical micro-
economics was not designed for comparative organisation purposes. Moreover, despite 
other criticisms (e.g. about rational maximisation assumptions - see Evers, 1993), the 
neo-classical approach, with its 'simplifying' assumptions, has been defended on the 
basis that it is meaningless to talk about the realism of assumptions because theories, 
being abstractions, cannot exhibit, nor are designed to exhibit complete realism 
(Friedman, 1953). 
The question of whether a theory is realistic 'enough' , it is argued, can only be settled 
by seeing whether it yields prédictions that are good enough for the purpose in hand or 
that are better than prédictions from alternative theories" (Friedman, 1953, p41 ; but see 
also Hodgson, 1988). 
2.3.3 Transactions cost économies 
2.3.3.1 Applications to social care 
Casual empiricism suggests that transaction cost économies (TCE) has significant 
relevance in social care. Most local authorities currently retain an in-house service that 
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has many features consistent with hierarchical governance from the TCE literature (e.g. 
unified public ownership, top-down management, salaried employees etc.). 
Furthermore, as detailed in the next two chapters, councils also 'contract out' many of 
their services to prívate providers. These market transactions bear the relevant 
hallmarks: separately owned purchaser and provider, voluntary bilateral contracting for 
service, residual rights of control for providers, a residual claim by providers on 
financial surpluses etc. 
Bartlett (1991) asserts that transaction cost économies represents a significant 
improvement upon the neo-classical approach in application to health care. In 
mainstream applications of neo-classical theory, transactions are relatively 
straightforward and have few of the conditions that cause high transactions (market 
governance) costs. In other words, even where contracts are incomplète, transactions 
can be undertaken efficiently with a sequence of short-term contracts in market settings 
(see Williamson, 1985, fig 2-1 and Kreps, 1990b, fig 20.1). However, the complexities 
of health and social care transactions combined with assumed bounded rationality 
suggest a role for alternative governance and henee the use of alternative theory 
(Bartlett, 1991, p53). Bartlett then goes on to review the basic transaction costs 
framework and considers its application for the study of the reforms and more 
specifically contracts choice in the NHS internai market. 
Using a transaction cost économies approach Ferguson and Keen (1996) consider the 
transaction cost implications of stratégies to improve information flow in the NHS (by 
using information and communication technologies - ICTs). They begin by interpreting 
transaction costs as similar to a per-unit tax on service provision (transactions). This 
' tax' causes a sub-optimal level of output and therefore implies a deadweight efficiency 
loss. Specifically, these deadweight losses are bargaining efficiency losses. Ferguson 
and Keen themselves define transaction costs as the costs of acquiring information 
(search costs), the costs of bargaining and decision-making (negotiating costs) and the 
costs of enforcement and monitoring. They argue that information technology might 
reduce these types of transaction costs. 
Two aspects of the transaction cost économies approach that Lunt et al., (1996) argue 
make it relevant for an analysis of community care are its concepts of atmosphère and 
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asset specificity. The former is a concept that addresses the importance of attitudinal and 
ethical considerations in transactional relations. Lunt et al. (1996, p 376) note that 
Will iamson's concept of atmosphere is used to capture the effects of the moral or value 
basis of transactions. Reference is made to altruistic motivations and reciprocity (e.g. 
see Titmuss, 1970). The social care relevance of atmosphere most clearly stems from 
the presence of voluntary sector providers in community care. As will be reviewed 
below, there is evidence that voluntary sector providers in social care have motivations, 
values and expectations that deviate substantially from those assumed in standard 
market theory (Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Forder, 2000). This hypothesis seems 
particularly apposite regarding voluntary organisations that have primarily campaigning 
and advocacy role (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; 6 and Forder, 1996). In addition to the 
volutary sector, there is also evidence that ostensibly for-profit, private sector providers 
exhibit motivations that depart from pure profit maximisation (Forder, 2000; Forder et 
al., 2004; Kendall et al., 2003). This suggests a blurring of the boundaries between the 
voluntary and private sectors. 
Whilst there are many opportunities for specialisation in social care, f rom finance 
officer to care assistant, these are not transaction specific. There is a pool of people with 
relevant skills to draw on, and although some specific training would be required the 
costs are relatively low, as are the costs of people moving to similar jobs (there are 150 
local authorities to choose between). Nonetheless, there will be some examples of 
highly specialised training for specific purposes where the costs of training for that 
individual purpose are large (Lunt, Manion, and Smith, 1996). In addition, physical 
assets tend to be more specific e.g. specially designed buildings (to meet the needs of 
disabled people). Also 'social capital' in the form of trust or reputation (Fukuyama, 
1995) tends to be specific to a particular setting. 
2.3.3.2 Broad criticisms 
The transaction cost economics/new institutional economics literature, especially the 
early writing, is generally not presented in the same formal/mathematical style as 
mainstream economics. In part of course this approach reflects its departure from the 
methodological tradition of neo-classical economics, particularly with its use of 
theoretical concepts that do not easily lend themselves to a formal treatment. But this 
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approach is open to challenges concerning its internal consistency. It is also difficult to 
develop precise predictions for testing. 
There are also more specific criticisms. One of the main arguments deployed in 
explaining hierarchical forms of organisation in TCE is that assets relevant to a 
transaction are highly specific. However, the contract theory approach (e.g. Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1990) shows that with appropriately crafted short-term contracts, asset 
specificity need not lead to inefficient outcomes (e.g. hold-up) in markets. The 
argument therefore is not whether transactions have specific assets, but whether 
enforceable short-term contracts can be written. And because short-term contracts are 
sufficient - with no need to agree complete contingent contracts - such contracts could 
be a practical proposition. The transaction cost of market activity is then the cost of 
deploying appropriate short-term contracts. 
Another issue rests with the under-development of the transaction cost of hierarchical 
governance. Whilst Williamson is, for example, clear about the importance of 
recognising the limitations of feasible alternatives, and that alternative governance 
structures have their own costs and benefits, his account of hierarchical governance 
costs is somewhat limited. For example, the treatment of effort and the power of internal 
incentives could benefit from development. Moreover, Williamson makes reference to 
'authority' in hierarchies that seems to go beyond the simple ceding of control to 
managers. Reputation and trust theory provides insights, but this area still feels 
incomplete - see section 2.4.1 below. 
Another plank of TCE is the relevance of the social context of transactions. Context and 
social convention can influence how parties act when undertaking transactions. 
Granovetter (1985) criticises transaction cost economics on this point, arguing that 
Williamson does not sufficiently account for the social construction of behaviour and 
preferences: Williamson's 'atmosphere' goes some way but needs further development. 
Indeed, (Lunt, Manion, and Smith, 1996) recognise the importance of contributions by 
economic sociology in its contribution to identifying key influences on economic 
exchange. However, the authors argue that sociological approaches lack the coherence 
of an overall model, and should be seen as complementary to economic theories rather 
than substitutes (p. 380). 
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2.3.4 Quasi-markets 
Although perhaps not a full theory as such, a significant, empirically grounded approach 
that has been applied in social care is described in the quasi-markets literature (Le 
Grand, 1991, 1992; Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993; Forder, Knapp, and Wistow, 1996). 
This approach suggests five 'conditions for success' - market structure, information, 
transaction costs and uncertainty, motivation and cream-skimming - that characterise 
the net benefits of quasi-markets. In this regard it has a neo-classical flavour, but 
beyond methodology, draws also on concepts from transaction cost economics. This 
quasi-market approach is explicitly concerned with public sector quasi-markets (rather 
than private market places). In having an essentially neo-classical methodology it shares 
the weakness of not really being comparative (see above). Failure to achieve the success 
conditions implies that alternative feasible organisational structures may have 
comparative advantages, but their costs and benefits are not considered. This literature 
does acknowledge the second best problem (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) - whereby if a 
success condition is violated, second best efficiency need not be achieved when the 
other conditions are met - but does not suggest a solution (which are generally very 
complicated - see Spulber, 1989). 
Quasi-market analysis suggests that the nearer a contract is to being complete - and 
thereby having larger ex ante transaction costs - the less ex post transaction costs will 
be. Contract theory has a different perspective: not all feasible future contingencies need 
to be written into a (short-term) contract ex ante for the sequence of short-term contracts 
to be efficient ex post. Indeed, according to Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p 68) the 
agreement need specify only the immediate actions the parties will take and how they 
will be compensated. Therefore far fewer prevailing factors need to be explicitly 
accounted for in the contract, which greatly reduces ex ante bargaining costs (and so ex 
ante transaction costs). Some of the 'conditions for success' do not actually have to hold 
in this case; appropriately crafted short-term contracts could still produce good 
outcomes, despite apparent failings of some of the conditions. 
Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) list transaction costs as a separate condition for success 
and identify ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Compare this to the definition of 
transaction costs in contract theory, where efficiency losses and therefore transaction 
costs are caused by violations of quasi-markets success conditions. Some part of total 
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transaction costs is exogenous, but the other part is endogenous. Overall, either a broad 
defínition of transaction costs should be adopted in which case its dependence on the 
other success conditions must be explicit. Or, a narrow defínition is used, but with 
transaction costs cast as one element only of a comparative governance analysis. 
2.3.5 Contract theory 
Contract theory departs from neo-classical accounts with its prohibition on the writing 
of complete contracts (Hart, 2003). Contract theory is particularly promising because it 
is explicitly comparative and offers a formal account in the tradition of micro-
economics. Nonetheless, with regard to social care governance questions, the bulk of 
incomplete contracts theory has been about the prívate capitalist fírm as the alternative 
to market transactions. Only very recently has this theory developed to consider 
public/government hierarchies as alternatives to markets - or more precisely to quasi-
markets where public purchasers buy in markets (Hart, 2003; Besley and Ghatak, 2001). 
Even then, these developments tend to focus only on specific problems e.g. provisión of 
public (i.e. non-rival, non-excludable) goods (Besley and Ghatak, 2001) or on 
comparing types of public-private partnership with prívate providers and/or investors 
and only funding from government sources (Hart, 2003). One of the main theoretical 
contributions of the present work will be to develop the theory around the question of 
public hierarchical provisión versus quasi-market provisión (see chapter 5 in particular). 
The empirical relevance of incomplete contracts theory - in advancing a combination of 
uncertainty, bounded rationality and transaction costs as the cause of incompleteness -
is high. By contrast, although information imperfections in neo-classical theory - i.e. in 
the information economics branch of that literature - can lead to ineffíciency, 
replicating some of the predictions of incomplete contract theory, this theory also 
indicates that rational actors can often write efficient incentive-compatible contracts. 
The problem is that these very sophisticated contracts are very rarely seen in practice. 
So, whilst the (complete contracts) information economics literature can provide useful 
insight and has provided a number of UK social and health care related works (e.g. 
Levaggi, 1996; Forder, 1997a), on balance the incomplete contracts approach has the 
greater promise. 
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2.4 Remaining problems and missing pieces of theories of 
comparative governance 
There is a good foundation of theory available to address the main questions in this 
work. Nonetheless gaps and shortcomings do remain. Before considering two in more 
detail, it is worth re-iterating a main shortcoming of the above theory: its focus on 
private sector markets and firms. Public sector (quasi) markets and hiérarchies have 
significant parallels but are clearly not completely analogous. This is an issue to be 
picked up in what follows of this work. 
2.4.1 Rationality 
For Williamson human rationality is of prime concern in understanding choices between 
methods of organising economic activity. In particular, he sees people as often unable to 
make the sophisticated and information-demanding calculations that are usually 
required to make markets efficient. Herbert Simon's séminal contribution of bounded 
rationality has a great deal of intuitive appeal. However, its current weakness (at least 
from the mainstream économies point of view) is its lack of precise définition for 
(mathematical) modelling purposes (but see Rubinstein, 1998). Transaction cost 
économies and contract theory invokes bounded rationality for the purpose of 
precluding complete contingent claims contracts, without which there would be no need 
for any form of governance of transactions. 
It is important to note at this point that, according to the (hyper-rational) property rights 
school, some approximation to complete contracts need not rule out hierarchical 
organisations (firms) (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
particular, the firm is seen "as a nexus for a set of contractual relationships among 
individuai" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976m p. 310). According to this orthodoxy, there 
is no concept of 'authority' that goes beyond that provided under contract. This position 
is totally at odds with the economic sociology view, particularly the Weberian notion of 
authority and power (see a translation of Weber by Wittich and Roth, 1978). According 
to Weber, behaviour is affected in a way that is distinct from the constraints of 
economic 'market' power (as given by the contract) and is described as deriving by 
virtue of authority i.e. power to command and duty to obey (see also Hamilton and 
Feenstra, 1995). For Jensen and Meckling, the firm is nothing more than a legal fiction 
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that serves as the nexus of contracts. Buchanan (1986) proceeds to criticise the 
transaction cost approach on this basis. 
Lyons (1996) summarises the critique of the hyper-rational approach taking a practical, 
empirical perspective. Not only is the hyper-rational assumption somewhat distasteful in 
itself, when used it rules out empirically relevant phenomenon like conflict, hold-out 
and indeed, not instant resolution of contract negotiation, even when they are subject to 
asymmetric information between parties (Lyons and Varoufakis, 1989). There is also 
now a considerable body of experimental economics that finds widespread evidence of 
non-(hyper) rational behaviour (Roth and Schoumaker, 1983; Kagel and Roth, 1994). 
All the comparative governance contract theory models also employ the bounded 
rationality construct to drive predictions of non-market governance. However, Kreps 
(1996) has highlighted a modelling weakness in its use. In transaction cost economics, 
bounded rationality works in three ways to prohibit complete contracts. First, that it is 
impossible to anticipate all the likely complicating factors that might affect a 
transaction. Second, that calculating the appropriate responses may be beyond the 
cognitive abilities of those people involved. Third, actually writing contract 
contingencies in a legally binding manner is, at the very least extremely hard and costly, 
and at worst it is impossible. 
All three forms are (anecdotally) relevant in social care. Consider the example of a local 
authority purchaser setting up an agreement with a for-profit organisation to provide a 
specialist rehabilitation service for people with mental health problems. The example is 
pertinent to each of the three elements of bounded rationality. First, anticipating the care 
needs (and so costs of service) of all potential clients will be very difficult. Hence some 
contingencies will be unforeseen. Second, the contract needs to balance the incentives to 
provide good quality care, whilst not putting too much (net income) risk on the 
provider, and also to secure against any hold-up problems that might accrue to specific 
assets (equipment, staff training) in the transaction. Therefore an efficient contract may 
be very hard to calculate and negotiate. Finally, all clauses need to be written in an 
enforceable manner. This requirement in particular means objectively defined outcome 
and quality measures, something that has proved elusive in social care research (Knapp, 
1984; Challis, 1992; Forder, Knapp, and Wistow, 1996). 
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Kreps notes that incomplete contract theory cites bounded rationality as a reason why 
complete contracts cannot be written, but also assumes that people are sufficiently 
rational to anticipate what decisions to take for the range of expected future 
contingencies. Their current behaviour is based on those expectations. These 
assumptions do not sit very comfortably with the above forms of bounded rationality, 
especially the first two. If all three forms of bounded rationality held precisely then 
writing short-term contracts at the time investment was occurring, in anticipation of the 
distribution of future outcomes, would be very difficult. And without confidence in this 
contract, hold-up problems are likely. Nonetheless, the actual short-term contract 
requirement is that both parties at the investment stage are happy that all reasonable 
contingencies are addressed, especially if the investment is somewhat i u m p y ' (i.e. not 
smoothly differentiable) as it often the case.5 
More generally speaking, the boundedly rational decisions of individuals at any given 
time need not always amount overall to inefficient outcomes. If people can differentiate 
good outcomes from bad outcomes when they happen, then heuristic or rules of thumb 
behaviour can with repetition approximate the outcome of hyper-rational decision-
making (Rubinstein, 1998). 'Natural selection' arguments are a good example. People 
who make the 'right' choices are more likely to 'survive' for the very reason that they 
are efficient. Tractable models of near rational behaviour should then be good at 
predicting behaviour at the limit. 
2.4.2 Embeddedness and motivation 
Granovetter (1985) levels an important criticism at economic theories of organisation. 
He argues that social relations in markets are more important, and those within 
hierarchies are less important, than suggested by economic theory of organisations (see 
also Dow, 1987; Perrow, 1990). Notwithstanding, Kreps's (1990a) work on reputation 
and ceded control in hierarchies, much of the new institutional economics literature 
supposes some intrinsic degree of 'authority' within hierarchies that motivates 
5 Then the investment decision becomes a gamble and full investment can stili go ahead if parties believe 
that some potential contingencies have not be fully figured into calculations, so long as the risk of these 
contingencies is small. 
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employees. By contrast, the classic view of markets is of self-motivated actors pursuing 
exchange opportunities. 
Putterman ( 1986) comments that we should not only look at the boundary between 
market and hierarchy (to see where this lies), but also to see both market and hierarchy 
as woven into the cloth of the wider economy. Others argue that Williamson places too 
much emphasis on the law as the institutional context of both governance structure and 
individuai transaction (Hamilton and Feenstra, 1995). Also, by making hierarchy 
synonymous with authority in Weberian sense (see above), "the boundaries of economic 
organisation are determined by the reach of authoritative power and are not arbitrarily 
equated with the firm" (p. 62). In other words, it is inappropriate to see only activity 
within hiérarchies as affected by (exogenous) social context; indeed, the distinction is 
too strongly drawn. 
An essential point underlying these commentaries is that individuals are guided by 
general social values and norms (to some extent) in how they tackle (complex) 
transactions undertaken in any governance structure. Indeed, the importance of these 
experiences increase in proportion to the complexity and potential level of risk of a 
transaction: the less information an individuai has about the specific transaction 
(particularly the type of player who he/she is dealing with) the more actions are likely to 
be tempered by broad social principals. Miller (1992) recognises this in the context of 
employment relations when he says that " 'rational choice' in such a setting may move 
an employee to make a 'gift ' of costly effort simply because the ultimate effects of 
déviation from the norm may be large, uncertain and negative" (p. 206). 
Grannovetter describes how transactions are embedded in conventions that exist in an 
individual's social network (see also Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Taylor and Hoggett, 
1994a). In this way it is logically possible that a conflict can exist between, on the one 
hand, short-run gains that would be reaped by an 'instrumentally rational' person and, 
on the other hand, (instrumentally abstemious) behaviour of not flouting wider social 
conventions. Taylor-Gooby (1997) notes that the longer-run ramification of adhering to 
social conventions - that is maintaining a trust relationship - often yields higher 
efficiency: trust économisés on transaction costs, particularly monitoring governance 
activities (Sako, 1992; Fukuyama, 1995). 
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There is also a related view that the institutional context is closely bound up with 
individuáis' motivations - that the latter are endogenous to some degree. To caricature 
Le Grand (1997) somewhat, if policy treats people as instrumental (as being 'knaves' as 
Le Grand puts it) then we risk transforming trusting and altruistic people ('knights') into 
acting in instrumental or 'knavish' fashion. This effect works through the influence of 
policy on the social environment (see also Frey, 1997a, 1997b; Kendall, 2001). 
Social environment and a departure from self-interested behaviour appear to be 
particularly relevant in social care. Not only are professional valúes of particular 
importance, but also caring valúes (Forder, 2000). Many voluntary organisations - and 
most notably smaller, local organisations - operating in social care would seem to defy 
instrumental rationality (Kendall, 2001; Taylor and Hoggett, 1994b). In health care, 
there is clear recognition of the organisation and the professionals within it, and 
between the organisation and its context. It follows from an application of 
organisational theory (McNulty and Ferlie, 2002). Health care organisations in England 
operate in a context of wider political and administrative management culture, which 
impinges on behaviour of the organisation, and can heavily influence change of the 
environment in which it works, for example forcing organisational change, mergers and 
re-structuring (Fulop et al., 2005). 
The above arguments are persuasive but are by definition hard to model. A balance 
needs to be struck between being able to derive the essential results of economics of 
organisation theory - i.e. comparative governance propositions - and recognising how 
embeddedness and motivation will nuance these propositions. Kreps' (Op. Cit.) work on 
reputation in hierarchies is a very useful step forward in this respect. To a certain extent 
this approach also addresses the endogeneity of motivations, and if not of fundamental 
motivation then at least endogeneity of what a person expects to achieve, and their 
willing to trust others. An example is the 'grim strategy' in game theory whereby trust is 
maintained as long as it is reciprocated, but if not then an individual takes on a far more 
cynical or 'grim' position (Fundenberg and Tiróle, 1992). Furthermore, a more flexible 
specification of motivation allowing non-profít objectives is also a component of the 
developing set of theory. This leaves more fundamental notions of (non-instrumental) 
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trust to address. Can this be incorporated or will attempts to do so lead to arbitrary or 
even tautologous prédictions? 
2.5 Critical application to social care II: methodology issues 
Two broad methodological approaches to the empirical application of the above theory 
are discussed in this section. First, is the failure-performance approach, which covers 
analyses that have sought to evaluate prevailing governance structures by assessing 
whether the theoretically determined 'required conditions' hold. For example, the quasi-
markets programme - see section 2.3.4. 
The second approach looks at Outputs or at least process indicators directly. For 
example, studies that look at process indicators such as the flexibility of domiciliary 
care services (e.g. are they provided at times that people want?) when these services are 
provided in markets by independent sector organisations as compared to the previous 
hierarchical arrangements (Lewis, Bernstock, and Bovell, 1995; Lewis and Glennerster, 
1996). Others look at the attainment of public policy goals directly, by eliciting the 
views of key stakeholders i.e. purchasers and providers (Wistow et al., 1996, chapter 7). 
The second approach has the advantage that it (generally) needs to make fewer 
assumptions in order to link its process measures with outcome and efficiency 
conclusions. The failure-performance approach needs to infer how imperfections affect 
behaviour and how behaviour in turn has implications for efficiency. Ideally, analyses 
would determine how costs and final outcomes change with governance alternatives. 
Final outcomes refer to the fundamental benefits that are conferred, such as 
improvements in people's well-being, Utility, quality of life etc. In practice, however, 
these outcomes are very difficult to measure. In the main, the empirical literature has 
employed the first approach. There are a few examples of the second. Netten and 
colleagues have used conjoint analysis to develop a older person's Utility scale (Netten 
et al., 2002), but this has not yet be used in comparative studies. A number of studies 
have used intermediate outcomes, rather than final outcomes. For example, Forder 
(2000) considers the différence between the profitability and propensity to seek profits 
of providers of mental health services organised in différent forms of market 
governance. In particular, non-profit providers operating in more network like 
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arrangements made less profit, and sought less profit than other providers operating in 
regular quasi-markets. 
2.5.1 Inferring governance costs: imperfections approach 
The failure-performance approach includes the literature that has commented on the 
prevailing degree of imperfection (regarding the 'required conditions') in social care. A 
distinction can be made between structural imperfections and information imperfections 
(Knapp et al., 1994; Forder, Knapp, and Wistow, 1996). Literature relevant to 'human 
factors' i.e. rationality and motivations in social care is also reviewed. 
2.5.1.1 Structural imperfections: competitiveness/contestability 
Taylor and Hoggett (1994a) argue that the stratégies of local authorities in purchasing 
community care could decrease diversity of supply and perhaps market contestability. In 
particular they have concerns that small voluntary sector organisations will find the cost 
of market entry very high compared to their expected income. An example given by 
Taylor and Hoggett is insurance costs. Another example is the very high contracting 
cost organisations must bear once they enter the market (Gronbjerg, 1990). Case studies 
have identified high start-up costs, again especially difficult for smaller, specialist 
organisations, but suggest that the market is relatively competitive for the mainstream 
services (Hoyes and Means, 1993). Hoyes and Means also note that market failures can 
occur through overbearing use of monopsony power by local authorities as they push 
prices too low (see alsoForder et al., 2004). 
A number of papers employing econometrie techniques have explored the relationship 
between market structure and price. To use observations of market structure (i.e. 
numbers and types of providers) to comment on possible inefficiency, assumptions have 
to be made about the relationship between market structure and behaviour as well as 
between behaviour and efficiency. Econometrie analyses can be used to estimate the 
former relationship rather than make assumptions about it. Forder and Netten (2000b) 
analyse data on residential and nursing home care for mainly elderly people. They find a 
statistically significant, but modest relationship between price and market structure, 
suggesting that competitiveness is relatively high. There have also been a number of 
studies of prices, demand and competitiveness in the US nursing home sector (Nyman, 
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1994; Nyman, 1989, 1985). Competitiveness appears to be lower in the US markets; 
however, entry into those markets in particular is more tightly regulated than in the UK. 
Studies of health care in England suggest evidence of a compétition effect (Propper, 
1996). There is also evidence that compétition can reduce the quality of care in UK 
hospitals (Propper, Burgess, and Green, 2004). 
2.5.1.2 Information imperfections 
The potential for information imperfections in social care appears high. Forder (1997a) 
considers the relationship between information problems (specifically, moral hazard 
problems relating to misrepresentation of client service cost characteristics) and the 
incentives embodied in current social care contracts. Data from a sample of residential 
care homes for older people are consistent with information efficiency shortfalls 
generated by providers operating under certain types of contract (see also Donaldson 
and Gerard, 1989). 
Hoyes and Means (1993) draw on case study investigations; they comment that local 
authorities appeared to have poor and overly centralised information systems. Contract 
clauses often did not make reference to relevant factors of the transaction, particularly 
about quality. We might conclude that information search and monitoring governance 
activities are low and therefore that information imperfection remains significant. There 
are also more direct examples of poor information (Knapp et al., 1994). They found 
deficiencies in purchasers' knowledge of providers' prices and types of services. 
2.5.2 Rationality and motivation 
Kendall (2001) offers a number of différent theoretical perspectives on motivation and 
provides evidence of motivations from a sample of residential care providers. In 
interviews, respondents more often reported professional and 'caring' (altruistic) 
motivations than profit or income related motivations. Forder (2000) shows the 
importance of motivations for efficiency and hence net governance costs. Data on 
providers of services for people with mental health problems casts serious doubt on the 
profit maximisation assumption. A comprehensive investigation of the motivations of 
home care providers in England cornes to the same view (Matosevic et al., 2001; 
Kendall et al., 2003). 
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2.6 Conclusions: Theory and empirical techniques for evaluating 
social care governance 
This literature review began with a description of the baseline economic theory 
contenders for an analysis of comparative governance in social care: neo-classical 
économies, transaction cost économies, and contract theory, the latter two constituting 
économies of organisation theories. The aim of this chapter was to consider the 
applicability and usefulness of the différent economic theories in addressing the 
comparative governance and efficiency questions of this work (see chapter 1). 
Neo-classical theory is to be rejected on these grounds. Its central weakness in this 
regard is that it treats governance and institutions (including formai and especially 
informai, social institutions) as exogenously determined. Moreover, where implications 
for governance can be inferred indirectly, for example, relating to the conditions 
whereby markets fail (to generate first-best efficient complété contracts), prédictions 
have been poor. Many commentators have questioned the core assumptions of the neo-
classical model, especially hyper-rationality and exogenous preferences. 
Economies of organisation theory treats the organisational or 'governance' structures in 
which economic activity or 'transactions' are undertaken as endogenous. Governance 
matters in these models because complété contingent contracts of neo-classical général 
equilibrium theory are ruled out (generally by the bounded rationality of individuals and 
the prohibitive transaction costs that would be involved). The analysis concentrâtes on 
the nature of the processes and activities required to complété a transaction, rather than 
on the terms of production and exchange relations per se (as in the neo-classical 
paradigm). The choice of governance structure affects the costs of undertaking an 
efficient transaction (e.g. of collecting relevant information, determining and writing 
contracts, and monitoring for compliance...). Moreover, this relationship between cost 
and governance choice is taken according to certain attributes of a transaction (the 
initial information distribution and level of uncertainty, specificity of investments and 
so forth). 
The central tenet of the theory is that transactions, which differ in their attributes, are 
aligned with governance structures in some discriminating manner. In fact, the key 
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criterion in this literatura for discriminating between governance structures is an 
efficiency one: the minimisation of net transaction costs. This approach therefore has 
significant potential in addressing our research question. 
Two broad approaches in the économies of organisation are distinguished. The first is 
transaction costs économies (TCE). Although having long antecedents, TCE has 
introduced a new rigour of (economic) thinking about the existence and fonction of 
forms of economic organisation. The chapter also reports some recent developments, 
which although heavily rooted in TCE literature, go further in a number of ways; in 
particular, contract or rather incomplète contract theory, which uses formai 
(mathematical) modelling. In doing so it also addresses some shorteomings over the 
définition and cause of transaction costs in TCE. 
This theory provides a sound foundation for this work. Nonetheless, it too has 
weaknesses to be addressed in the following chapters. First and foremost, contract 
theory has very largely to date been concerned with comparisons between privately 
owned firms as hiérarchies and the (private) market. Our focus, however, is publicly 
funded activity: quasi-markets and public hiérarchies/ bureaucracies. 
Second is the issue of the treatment of stakeholder motivation and the influence of 
social context on transactions, drawing on concepts from economic sociology. There is 
a need to strike a balance between being able to derive the essential results of the theory 
- i.e. comparative governance propositions - and recognising how social context and 
motivation will nuance these propositions. David Kreps' work on réputation in 
modelling trust, particularly in hiérarchies, is a very useful step forward in this respect 
and will be used below. To a certain extent this approach also addresses the endogeneity 
of motivations, and if not of fondamental motivation, then at least the endogeneity of 
what a person expects to achieve and their willingness to trust others. The theory in 
subséquent chapters will also adopt a more flexible spécification of motivation, 
explicitly allowing non-profit objectives. This leaves more fondamental notions of (non-
instrumental) trust to address. Can this be incorporated or will attempts to do so lead to 
arbitrary or even tautologous prédictions? 
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Third, contract theory is somewhat selective in its treatment of bounded rationality. 
Complete contracts are ruled out by this assumption, but individuals are still able to 
form rather comprehensive expectations about the future. In what follows, we will take 
the approach of Milgrom and Roberts (1990), allowing a certain degree of rationality 
initially but modelling bounded rationality through the build-up of transactions costs. 
For example, stakeholders do not write complete contracts because the transaction costs 
of doing so are prohibitively high rather than due to a simple preclusion that comes 
from bounded rationality. 
Turning to (empirical) methodology, two approaches were identified in the literature. 
The first - the failure-performance approach - involves observing the attributes of 
transactions within the prevailing governance structure to infer behaviour and therefore 
efficiency. The second approach attempts to directly measure behaviour and infer 
efficiency on that basis. Although the first approach has the advantage of a much easier 
measurement problem, it has the distinct disadvantage of having to make an additional 
layer of assumptions. These assumptions are required to infer behaviour from the 
observation of transaction attributes. Overall, the second approach appears more 
promising, particularly when under-pinned by a developed contract theory model. 
Annex 2-1. Transaction cost economics 
Williamson (1993) summaries the crucial feature of transaction cost economics: 
(i) The transaction is the basic unit of analysis; 
(ii) Economic actors can undertake farsighted contracting but stops well short of hyper-
rational extremes by conceding that all complex contracts are incomplete; 
(iii) The critical dimensions of the transaction as mentioned above are frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity; 
(iv) Williamson identifies 4 structures: market, hybrid, private bureau and public bureau; 
(v) Each generic mode of governance displays discrete structural differences of both cost 
and outcome (benefit) according to nature of the transaction (item iii); 
(vi) There are costs of selective intervention. These costs mean that interventions between 
semi-autonomous parts of a hierarchy do not always occur when there is an 
opportunity for expected net gain. Because hierarchies are unable to intervene 
selectively, they are unable to replicate market (high powered) incentives 
(Williamson, 1985b, chapter 6; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). 
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(vii) Each generic mode of governance is supported by a distinctive form of contract law; 
(viii) Williamson argues that transactions that differ in their attributes (item iii) are aligned 
with governance structures, which differ in their costs and benefits (item iv), in a 
'discriminating - mainly transaction cost economising - way'; 
(ix) As stated above, transactions and governance structures are also embedded in a social 
environment (North, 1990; Miller, 1993). Changes in the nature of that e.g. in norms 
or conventions change the costs and benefits of particular governance structures; 
(x) Williamson stresses that transaction cost economics is an exercise in comparative 
institutional analysis, concerning feasible alternatives. 
Annex 2-2. The Grossman-Hart model. 
Consider a general framework that has two stakeholders and two periods. Stakeholders 
make some relevant action in each period that affects their final payoff. Conventionally, 
the first period's actions by each party, x/ and x2, are some form of investment decision. 
Actions in the second period, yi andj>2, are implementation actions. At the outset before 
any actions are undertaken, stakeholders can agree an allocation of control rights over 
the second period implementation decisions, yi and y2. These control rights are assigned 
contractually. If the implementation decisions refer to physical assets then a ceding of 
control rights can be achieved by one party selling the assets to the other party. 
Suppose the cost of action jc, is x„ i = stakeholder 1, stakeholder 2 and the same for >7. 
The total benefit that accrues is S(x],x2,yi,y2',C), being dependent on actions taken 
and the circumstances C that prevails in time 1. Because the number of possible 
circumstances is so high, Grossman and Hart assume a contract on xj and x? in the first 
period cannot be written. Only in time two when the actual C is known, can 
stakeholders contract. Because stakeholders cannot contract in the first period, 
individual expected benefit will depend on the distribution of period 2 benefits between 
stakeholders that occurs after action x,-. Grossman and Hart suppose that benefits are 
shared equally in some un-specified negotiation process. Hence, at time 1, each player 
can expect total payoffs of: nj = Ui + EVj . Here U, is period 1 payoff, which equals 
the cost of the investment. Also, EVj is period 2 expected payoff, which will be half the 
total benefits less the cost of the period 2 action, i.e. EVf = \S(x^,x2,yi,y2)~ yf. 
Consequently, each players' expected payoff is: nj = -xi + ,x2,y],y2)-yi. In 
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period 1 therefore, each player will invest to maximise expected payoffs i.e. 
071,/dx, = - 1 + \ SX; = 0 or SXi = { . 
Grossman and Hart compare this bilateral ownership outcome with a hierarchical or 
unified ownership case. Then total costs and benefits are as before, so the owner 
maximises: n = S(xx,x2,yity2)-x, -x2 - yt - y2 and so investment in this case is 
Ô7rjjdxi = - 1 + SXj = 0 or SXj = 1. Since it is assumed that benefits S are strictly 
increasing in x, with marginal benefits greater than marginal costs, this analysis implies 
that investment and so net benefits are greater under unified ownership. 
Annex 2-3. The Milgrom-Roberts model 
In contrast to the model in Annex 2-2, the two players can contract in the first period 
over investment decisions, xj and x2. It is specifically because bargaining costs are zero 
that stakeholders can do so. The players will work out what efficient agreement would 
be reached for any circumstances C in the second period. These expectations are then 
the basis on which the first period contract is determined, that is investments made and 
costs of the investments shared. Each player can calculate how much their and the other 
player's expected benefit is compared to each player's investment cost. The total costs 
of investment in period one can then be shared in proportions consistent with a half 
share of the total net benefit. Each player's expected payoff is 
ni =Uj (x, ,x2 )+EVf =Ut ( X Ì , X 2 ) + e [ w Ì {S{xx,x2,yx,y2\c),y^,y2^c\ where Wj is 
the proportion of the second period surplus that accrues to party i (and depends on the 
realisation of Q . In period 1, a contract will be written that is conditional on xj and X2 so 
that the total payoff is shared, i.e. 
jr. = 1 [f/, + (S, yx,y2 }c]+U2 + e\w2 (S,y} ,y2 )|c]]. To illustrate this point 
suppose that the common belief was that each player's investment (cost) -x, would yield 
the same marginal (expected) benefits S = SX2. Then 
n. = {[¿'(x, ,x2 ,y, ,y2 ) - x , - x , - j , - y 2 ] and so optimal investment is given by 
d^./Sx, = + \ Sx = 0 or Sx = 1. In this case each stakeholder would pay for half the 
investment. Note that this contract will not specify terms for the second period and 
therefore does not need to be contingent on all possible values of C. 
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Chapter 3. Analytical concepts and theoretical foundations 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers how economic activity is organised. It develops concepts and 
frameworks that will be used to describe how the social care system (in England) is 
organised, drawing on the literature discussed in chapter 2. The organisation of a social 
care system concerns issues such as the ownership and control of key functions (i.e. of 
funding, assessment, care planning, purchasing, providing, monitoring etc.), how 
resources are allocated between stakeholders as they undertake these functions, how the 
system is regulated, and so forth. There are a great many options for how systems can 
be organised along these Unes. For example, are purchasers and providers separately 
owned and controlied, are market forces and compétition introduced, or are top-down 
bureaucratie methods used (Saltman, Busse, and Mossialos, 2002). 
This and subséquent chapters focus on the implications of organisational choices in 
social care for efficiency, in particular, the impact on net transaction costs of 
organi sational choices. Since choices about the organisation of public services such as 
social care need not be solely motivated by maximisation of efficiency, the analysis is 
not as such a positive analysis; it will not predict what organisation form (or more 
specifically, governance structure) should exist given relevant prevailing conditions. 
However, from a normative perspective conceming efficiency - or value for money, 
best value, or however it is labelled - the analysis will suggest whether the most 
efficient governance structure is currently being used. It is worth noting that in the case 
of publicly funded services, it is politicians and mainly central government politicians 
that decide the general organisational structures to be used in social care. And they may 
référencé criteria such as equity, politicai expediency, social rights etc. as well as value 
for money/efficiency, in making their choices. In the case of private economic activity, 
it is consumers, entrepreneurs, regulators and so on that determine what organisational 
structure prevails (Coase, 1937). 
The developing set of économies of organisation (EO) theory has much to offer in 
addressing comparative organisational questions as noted in the last chapter. It explicitly 
recognises that the way systems are organised has a strong hearing on how they 
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perform, and that this form of organisation is not simply given, but instead chosen. 
Second, building on this récognition, the theory is continuing to refîne its définition of 
forms of organisation. Third, the question of who makes choices about organisation, and 
to what ends, are centrai. 
This chapter begins to develop the économies of organisation - especially the approach 
adopted in Milgrom and Roberts (1990; 1992) — for an application to social care 
organisational alternatives. Essentially it builds up in detail the concepts used in EO 
theory, applies them to social care, and then uses the result to assess the comparative 
efficiency properties of actual organisation arrangements used in social care. As to the 
structure of this chapter, after this introduction the chapter proceeds by defining 
efficiency in a way that is relevant to assessing organisational alternatives. It then turns 
to the question of what the basic elements or building blocks are of an 'organisational 
form'. The fourth section then casts this thinking in terms relevant to the social care 
system in England. The fifth section outlines theory that helps to determine the 
efficiency characteristics of organisational choices. This analysis is used to infer the 
comparative efficiency properties of différent organisational arrangements and in this 
way underpins the empirical analysis conducted in subsequent chapters. 
3.2 The problem of economic organisation 
Organisation is the central concept in this chapter. Economic organisations are "created 
entities within and through which people interact to reach individuai and collective 
goals" (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 19). But why do they exist? A fundamental 
observation about the economic world is that people can produce more, and réalisé 
economic gains, if they spécialisé in activities to produce goods and services, 
transacting with one another to acquire needed components and also final products and 
services. Whilst these gains to spécialisation can be massive, they can only arise if 
people's actions and décisions are coordinateti and people are appropriately motivated. 
3.2.1 Coodination and motivation 
The complexity of production of many services, not least social care services, gives rise 
not only to benefits of spécialisation, but indeed, the absolute need for it. Going back to 
Adam Smith, it is clear that the volume, value and diversity of goods and services that 
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can be consumed by individuals is very many times greater than if ail individuals were 
entirely self sufficient (Blaug, 1986). The provision of social care has individuals 
devoting themselves to particular elements of the many stages of production. Of central 
importance is that this spécialisation requires organisation. 
The fundamental problem of organisation is twofold. First, is the coordination problem, 
that is, people must know what tasks need to be undertaken, how they should be 
accomplished and who should do what. For example, what kinds of social care services 
should be provided; how should they be produced and delivered to users; and who 
should do the commissioning and producing? The problem of organisation also involves 
a motivational problem, which is to ensure that the various individuals involved in these 
processes willingly do their parts. They should both accurately report information to 
implement and operate the right plan and also act as they are supposed to in order to 
carry out the plan. 
3.3 Organisational forms - building blocks 
3.3.1 Transactions and contracts 
Spécialisation leads to organisations that embody a myriad of interactions, negotiations, 
exchanges, and so forth, between people. It is these interactions or transactions that are 
at the core of EO theory, being the largest unit of economic activity that cannot be 
subdivided and performed by several différent people (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
The transaction is the process whereby individuals plan and implement activities to 
produce services, and agree terms of the exchanges of resources. The agreements struck 
between individuals as they coordinate within the organisation are contracts. These 
contracts are far broader than the formai légal agreements of the corporate world. 
Indeed, contracts can be informai, verbal, not enforceable or even verifiable by a third 
party. They do however specify each party's actions and rewards for each of a range of 
circumstances or contingencies. Contracting can be a continuai process with new 
agreements being reached as new contingencies arise. 
3.3.2 Principals and agents 
Another theoretical building block of organisation économies is the classification of 
people or parties involved in transactions. Because transactions can be characterised by 
61 
an imbalance of information and by contestability problems, there is likely to be a 
dependency relationship between the parties involved. In particular, one party to the 
transaction often has either more information and/or better bargaining power than the 
other party. In particular, the principal is a party who wishes to secure provision of 
some good or service but does not have the necessary specialised knowledge, skills or 
assets. The principal employs an agent to undertake this task and in the process 
delegates some control to that party (Grossman and Hart, 1983). 
The problem for the principal in securing some service from the agent is either not 
knowing the true value of the benefits of the service, or being forced to accept those 
'benefits ' the agent wishes to supply. Either way the information imbalance or 
contestability problems make it difficult for the principal to motivate the agent to act, to 
a reasonable degree, in the interests of the principal. Although, the transaction will be 
mutually beneficial, (or why would it happen?) there may be an imbalance as to how the 
spoils are shared. In fact, the problem may be so significant than in the process of 
splitting the metaphorical pie, some of the pie can be wasted. These concepts are (gross) 
simplifications of the real world. But, when cast in these terms, theory can take us a 
long way - with predictive success - without being bogged down in spurious detail 
(Joskow, 1987, 1988; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Baker and Hubbard, 2001, 2003). 
In what follows we make the distinction between purchasers and providers in social 
care. This distinction is detailed in the next chapter within the historical context and 
current social care system in England. At this stage it is worth outlining the essential 
features using the terms of the principal-agent framework. Local authorities have a duty 
to provide social care for eligible users. To secure appropriate services the local 
authority acts as service commissioning or purchaser (the latter term has a slightly more 
narrow meaning) on behalf of the individual with care needs (even if the authority is 
commissioning its own in-house providers). This task involves an assessment of needs, 
a determination of an appropriate package of care (or more generally, care planning), 
and a determination of the person's and any carer's eligibility for local authority support 
with the funding and commissioning of those services. It also involves the (corporate) 
financing and 'buying' of eligible services. Local authorities can purchase from 
independent sector providers - by contracting out - or they 'purchase' from in-house 
providers. 
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Purchasing does not pre-suppose a framework for organising social care transactions. So 
purchasing can involve instructions to in-house providers to allocate services to 
individuals. The more traditional concept of purchasing is relevant when local 
authorities buy services from external providers. Nonetheless, whether it is the 
authority's contracting unit or other middle management grouping, in markets, 
hierarchies or other, local authorities are purchasers of public funded social care. In the 
above terms, the local authority purchaser is the principal in social care transactions. 
References to 'the purchaser' mean the operational manager of the purchasing function 
- he or she need not be the overall manager or chief operating officer of the social 
services department. Moreover, we are entitled to expect that the principal's 
motivations, preferences and constraints, will in some part reflect those of the most 
senior management and also of the elected members of the council.6 
Providers are those organisations that supply contracted services. Independent sector 
providers supply under contract to the local authority purchaser. In-house providers are 
those organisational divisions within the local authority that specialise in the production 
of care. In large bureaucracies that conduct both purchasing and providing the 
distinction is often somewhat blurred e.g. senior managers can be responsible for both 
functions. Nonetheless, conceptually speaking, the operation of a social care system 
involves purchasing and providing function whatever governance arrangements are 
used. References to 'the provider' in most cases mean the main manager or decision-
making within the providing unit i.e. the person responsible for operation of the 
production process. The provider is the agent in social care transactions. We need to 
take a moment to consider the role of (informal) carers. The above account should in no 
way be taken as underrating the importance of informal care. Nonetheless, informal care 
by definition involves transactions with a familial, household or close friends grouping, 
and whilst very interesting, is outside the remit of this work. 
3.3.3 Governance arrangements 
Individuals working in the social care system expend time, effort and resources in 
determining and discharging contracts in addition to direct production activities. There 
6 This potentially opens another set of (hierarchical) principal and agent relationships. However, these do 
not involve the direct transaction of services and will be more strategic in nature e.g. defining the 
principles under which the purchaser operates. This is interesting but beyond the scope of this work. 
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is a clear conceptual distinction between an individual's activities of production of 
services - e.g. caring for residents in a care home - and negotiating the care contract 
with the local authority and/or the resident. The ways these governance activities are 
carried out depends on the governance structure, which, as outlined in the last chapter, 
is the matrix of rules, regulations, protocols and conventions that pertain to the 
transaction (North, 1990; Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1994). 
Whilst the idea of governance structure is relatively simply, actually defining such a 
structure is much less so. The literature as outlined in chapter 2 has attempted to draw 
out relevant dimensions. These include: ownership, control and agency (brokerage and 
devolution) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1983, 1986; Coleman, 
1990a; Williamson, 1975, 1985a); contract form and reimbursement incentives (Forder, 
1997b; Hart, 1995; Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom, 1990; Laffont and Tirole, 
1993; MacNeil, 1985; Lyons and Mehta, 1997); regulation (Spulber, 1989; Stigler, 
1971 ; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988); and social environment (Hamilton and Feenstra, 
1995; Granovetter, 1995; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). These dimensions/concepts can 
self-evidently be applied in social care, although a detailed classification is left to the 
next chapter. Institutional nuances particular to social care in England are important as 
outlined in the next two chapters. Nonetheless, the main theoretical propositions of this 
work can be laid out 'barebones' style, as below, and then fleshed out later. 
3.3.3.1 Definition 
Two of the above dimensions of governance structure are particularly important and so 
warrant elaboration. The first dimension concerns the degree of integration of 
purchasing and providing roles, and the ownership of the associated infrastructure. It is 
very useful to distinguish between ownership and control (Coleman, 1994). The former 
concerns, in particular, who owns the apparatus and assets of the purchasing function 
and who the providing function in social care. Put another way, are the principal (in this 
case the purchaser of social care services) and the agent (in this case the provider of care 
e.g. a care home) part of the same organisation or are they in separately owned 
organisations? As to the latter, ownership need not dictate the distribution between 
stakeholders of control over the various functions. An organisation with unified 
ownership may, for example, internally separate purchasing and providing. Or the 
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owner of one set of assets may voluntarily pass or cede control to the owner of another 
set. In fact, the location of control is perhaps the key factor in explaining strategie 
performance, as is clear in incomplete contract theory. 
The second dimension is contract design, which has a fondamental hearing on the 
opération of economic systems in general (Laffont and Tiróle, 1993) and social care 
systems are no exception (Frank and Gaynor, 1991; Ma, 1994; Propper, 1995; Forder, 
1997a). Oliver Williamson distinguishes types of incentives as either high- or low-
powered (Williamson, 1985a). High-powered incentives are defined with reference to a 
stakeholder who "either by agreement or under the prevailing définition of property 
rights, appropriâtes a net revenue stream, the gross receipts and/or costs of which stream 
are influenced by the efforts expended by the economic agent." (Williamson 1985, 
p 132). In other words, incentives are high powered when an individual can keep all the 
profits resulting from their efforts. Low-powered incentives feature some dilution of the 
relationship between profits/surpluses and efforts. Salaries are examples of low-
powered incentives - individuáis receive income that is only indirectly related to their 
efforts. As Williamson notes, the power of incentives depends on whether providers 
have control over their own actions and efforts and have the right to appropriate net 
income, either as a resuit of ownership or because this right was ceded contractually. It 
is a dimension that is closely aligned with ownership and control as described above.7 
A closely related feature of contracts is whether agreed reimbursement is contingent on, 
i.e. tied to, the exogenous drivers of production cost. When stakeholders are salaried 
employees do not bear production costs and so their wage does not fluctuate (directly) 
with cost-relevant variation. When stakeholders are residual claimants however, the 
degree of contingency is relevant. If reimbursement is largely non-contingent, then 
providers are likely to experience significant variation in their net income. 
3.3.3.2 Governance archetypes 
Even restricting our attention to the above dimensions creates a multitude of possible 
governance structures. However, in practice choices along particular dimensions tend to 
7 There is a significant literature on reimbursement incentives in contracts, including the optimal design 
of incentive power (Laffont and Tiróle, 1993; Forder, 1997a). One practical development is the 'soft 
capitation' contract that employs a mix of high and low powered incentives (Frank and McGuire, 2000). 
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be correlateci and can be grouped to reduce the number of alternative govemance 
structures to just two main types (also see below on this point). 
Markets have separately owned and controlied means of provision and purchasing. 
Contracts are determined in voluntary (bilateral) exchanges and contract adaptations are 
negotiated and resolved by both parties. Payment incentives are often high powered 
since ownership usually confers the right to appropriate residuals. It is however possible 
for lower or mixed reimbursement incentives to be embodied if parties cede some of the 
rights to income in the contract. 
Hiérarchies are characterised by decision-making authority (regarding adaptations to 
the contract) that is vested with one party (the hierarchical superior e.g. managers) being 
ceded to them by the other party (the subordinate e.g. employees), who accept the 
instructions of managers. Contracting is undertaken in a unified way and hierarchical 
subordinates are usually paid on a salary or équivalent low-powered incentive basis. 
Hiérarchies commonly feature unified ownership, although that is not always the case 
since human assets can be hierarchically arranged but not owned by another (precluding 
slavery!). Employees can always leave if they wish. 
These and other relevant features are summarised in Table 3-1 below. The table also 
includes a third combination, loosing termed 'network' governance. It is included to 
illustrate how many of the commonly attested features of networks in the literature can 
be re-produced by combining features of markets and hiérarchies. For example, 
ownership is dispersed as in markets but control is often mostly ceded by one party 
voluntarily to the other party (the provider). Grant payment is very common. This form 
of payment mixes incentives regarding individuai transactions. Although providers 
receive a lump-sum award and can keep the residuai, this is usually spread over many 
transactions so allowing cost cross-subsidisation. Moreover, there are often 
circumstances that allow rétrospective adjustments to the payment. 
Some commentators distinguish 'networks' as a substantive separate category of 
governance structure (Powell, 1990; Rhodes, 1997, p 52). The argument often concerns 
the role of trust in transactions. Whereas hiérarchies are characterised by top-down 
authority and markets by arms-length contracts, networks are characterised by trust and 
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co-operation. Others comments reject this distinction, emphasising that markets and 
hiérarchies are also embedded in social networks and that the rôle of trust in these 
structures is not systematically différent (Granovetter, 1985). The relational contracts 
literature indicates that firms operating in (competitive) markets often engage in co-
operative behaviour for mutuai benefit (Dore, 1983; Sako, 1992; Kitson, Michie, and 
Sheehan Quinn, 2001). The formulation of the market governance archetype is centrally 
constructed around the idea of bilateral (rather than hierarchical) relationships and 
therefore it encompasses many of these concepts. Networks can be seen as either 
essentially bilateral/market or as hybrids between market and hierarchy. For these 
reasons, in what follows, only the markets and hiérarchies archetypes are considered 
(which also makes the problem much more manageable!). 
Table 3-1. Governance options 
Dimension Hierarchical 'Network' Market (bilateral) 
Ownership-control-agency 
Ownership Integrated Dispersed Dispersed 
Control Unified Separate/relational Separate/de-centralised 
Brokerage Purchasing agent Agent Individual 
Devolution Strategie (central) Tactical Tactical (local) 
Contract design 
Incentive type Low-powered 
(salaried) 
mid-powered 
(grant) 
High-powered (provider 
keeps profits) 
Spécification Minimal, informai Minimal, informai Detailed, formal 
Length (duration) Short, frequent Short, frequent Long, infrequent 
Timing Rétrospective Rétrospective Prospective 
Contingency (linkage 
between payment 
High, costs and 
reimbursement linked 
Intermediate Low, fixed prices 
and cost) 
Monitoring 
Contract-specific Low - informal 
arrangements 
Low High - monitoring for 
compliance w.r.t. 
spécifications 
Supply-side 
régulation 
Low - self-regulation Low High - Regulär 
inspection 
Social environment 
Alignaient of 
motivations by social 
High High Low 
convention 
3.4 Comparative governance 
The économies of organisation theory offers a set of tools for addressing the 
comparative efficiency of différent governance structures. This task is achieved in a 
number of ways. 
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First, the theoretical analysis provides a basis for defining governance choices. This 
assessment involves at one level simply interpreting organisational changes using the 
theoretical building blocks developed above. The theory is then used to understand why 
and how the organisation elements - which together form governance structures -
impact on transaction outcomes. 
Second, theory then frames the normative or comparative evaluative analysis of this 
work. In principle, différent (sets of) governance arrangements can be compared against 
a nurnber of criteria (e.g. equity implications, their public choice implications etc.), but 
their efficiency implications are the subject of this work. The degree to which 
coordination and motivation can be achieved détermines transaction benefits, which in 
turn has a bearing on efficiency. Broadly speaking, when comparing alternatives, 
transaction benefits are the production costs of the service that is produced adjusted for 
the value/quality of the production outcomes. Transaction benefits need to be set against 
transaction costs. Standard évaluation approaches can be adopted; in particular cost 
benefit analysis (Mishan, 1976). 
Transaction benefits are measured as: V - C , where F i s the total value of the final of the 
product and C is the production cost. Transaction costs are G and so net transaction 
benefits are: 
(3-1) (V-Q-G 
The costs - production and transaction - can be measured in monetary terms in a 
relatively straightforward fashion. The outcomes V, however, incorporâtes the buyer's 
utility valuations of the product, and measuring this valuation in monetary terms is 
fraught with difficulties as the willingness to pay literature will testify (Donaldson, 
1990). Instead, it is possible to take a shortcut by making certain assumptions. The 
approach adopted is to extrapolate production costs for each alternative given that the 
same outcome was achieved. Then the actual valuation of F is irrelevant and net 
transaction benefits are given by adjusted production costs i.e. c ( v ) (see Knapp, 1984). 
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The relevant comparison is therefore: 
(3-2) V-C, ( F ) - G, - [F - C2(v)~ G2]= (C2(7)+ G2)~ (C,(F)+ G,) 
where the subscripts dénoté the alternatives being compared. If this fonction is positive 
then alternative 1 is the preferred choice. The Fterm drops out of (3-2) as noted. The 
difficulty with this approach is the need to find proxies for F that fully account for the 
implicit relationship between C and V. These quality proxies may be hard to find, 
although their spécification is much easier that having to place a value on Fdirectly. 
This issue is explored in the relevant empirical chapters below. 
Governance structure choices do not directly impact on benefits and costs; rather these 
choices affect the actions of stakeholders as they work within these structures: 
(3-3) V K ( g ï , . , g ï ) - C K ( g i , . , g ! ) - G K ( g ? , . . , g ! ) 
where K is prevailing set of governance choices. The relationship between activities g 
and V, C and G will differ for each K. The fonctions, V*(.), CK(.) and G%), for example, 
will reflect how well the motivation and co-ordination problems are solved in each 
governance set K. EO theory spécifiés these fonctions, and so in turn underpins the 
development of propositions for empirical testing and frames the empirical analysis. 
The key theoretical proposition is that a relationship exists between governance 
structure choices and outcomes, mediated by the features of the transaction and the 
principal-agent configurations involved. 
In summary, our analysis of the comparative governance efficiency requires us first to 
define theoretically the conceptual building blocks. This task is used to develop 
archetypes or discrète sets of governance options. Then to use the theory to develop 
conjectures as to how people will behave within these différent archetypes/sets. The 
second part is empirical; to identify these archetypes, measure transaction costs and 
adjusted production costs, and then to test the relationships between archetype/set 
indicators and these costs. 
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3.5 Main propositions 
Two of the most relevant dimensions of governance choice are ownership/control and 
contract type. The former is centrai to distinguishing between market and hierarchy 
archetypes. With regard to contract type, the focus will be on the degree of contract 
contingency - the degree to which reimbursement rates reflect the specific costs of 
production - see section 3.3.3.1. Within market governance, we do in practice see a 
significant variation in contract contingency. Whilst the power of reimbursement 
incentives (see page 65) is also relevant in theory, in practice it tends to be highly 
correlated with the choice of market or hierarchy. 
In care home markets, providers are almost exclusively residual claimants of one form 
or another, whether payment is contingent or not. In hiérarchies, providers tend to have 
much lower powered reimbursement. Provider staff mostly receive a wage and although 
they often have a pre-determined budget, under-spends are retained at the centre, not by 
the provider unit. Over-spends are generally met by centrai reserves although persistent 
over-spends will tend to have ramifications for the employment status of the provider 
manager. These reasons mean that we focus only on contingency choices in markets and 
so avoid problems associated with the corrélation with market or hierarchy choice. 
In what follows, the main arguments and proposition with respect to these two choices 
are outlined. This constitutes an introduction to the analysis detailed in chapters 5 to 8 -
where the ideas below are fiilly fleshed out - and aims to provide an overview. 
3.5.1 Markets and hiérarchies? 
Hiérarchies are characterised by top-down management decision-making. Planning the 
organisation's activities, such as what should be produced and how, is undertaken by 
the principal - see section 3.3.2 above - and these décisions then govern actual 
production. The principal is assumed to be a manager with key operational authority. 
We need to be clear, nonetheless, that this managers) will be working within a broader 
corporate and politicai context since we are referring to public sector commissioning. 
As outlined in chapter 1, we have taken purchasers as wishing to maximise the value of 
services provided (net of costs) - see (1.6). This is likely to be the consistent motivation 
of ofïicers and members alike, particularly under cabinet local government 
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arrangements, which feature a social care lead cabinet member. In practice, nonetheless, 
the function in (1.6) might not fully reflect the preferences of members even after they 
have sought to direct officers. For our purposes, as long as this influence activity is 
relatively stable and so (1.6) remains unchanged, we can leave this process to one side. 
The planning function is undertaken in a unified way by managers and ceded by 
employees, who accept the plans of managers. By contrast, in (quasi-) markets the 
separation of purchasers from providers leaves each with a set of overlapping decisions, 
an overlap that can lead to some duplication of planning effort. Primarily to protect their 
usually different interests both purchasers and providers must each gather relevant 
intelligence (e.g. about users' need characteristics) in order to contract. Stylising the 
process, production requires an investment task and an implementation or 'effort ' task, 
both of which can be very complicated (see chapter 1). Without a contract, effort, in 
particular, is unlikely to be of a level and type that is of mutual interest to the parties to 
the transaction. 
In hierarchies, managers make decisions and instructions are passed to employees by 
fiat, restricting the costs of developing a 'contract'. Nonetheless, posturing, haggling 
and disagreement can occur between divisions of a hierarchical organisation, and are 
described as influence activities (see last chapter and Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In 
markets parties must make explicit, objective contracts over a far wider range of 
contingencies. This contract determination is very expensive, comparatively speaking. 
Plans will need adaptation when non-contracted contingencies arise. In hierarchies 
current activities can be adapted in a unilateral way, whilst in markets a further round of 
joint intelligence gathering and re-negotiation is required. A disadvantage with markets 
is the cost of these management activities; the contract is more costly to generate in 
markets than in hierarchies (Williamson, 1975, 1985a). 
An integral part of modem complex organisations is the communication of information 
between relevant parties. It is a vital part of contract determination. The price 
mechanism can be a very efficient method of communicating relevant information 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Bureaucratic means of communication tend to operate on 
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a quantity and quota basis and are less efficient.8 In this respect markets might have a 
transaction cost advantage. 
3.5.1.1 Co-ordination 
There are a number of options for parties to contract over investment decisions in 
markets. Essentially, the buyer and provider can choose to agree (cost-sharing) contracts 
in relation to investment decisions or, as is more common, the provider unilaterally 
makes investment decisions and bears the costs. The latter has problems, however, 
because although the provider bears the costs, they end up sharing the benefits with the 
buyer. The prospect of lower (marginal) value from investment may lead providers to 
under-invest. This problem is a form of hold-up as described in sections 2.2.3 and 
2.2.4.1 of chapter 2. A sequence of short-run, cost sharing or incentive contracts could 
be agreed on investment, improving investment levels (section 2.2.4.2) but also 
generating greater transaction costs. 
Hierarchies also have potential investment problems. Although there is no hold-up -
because investment decisions are made by managers who are also the 'buyers ' -
employees/providers need to trust that they are not being exploited by managers (in 
respect of accepting reasonable instructions from managers). Even fears about 
exploitation may lead employees to interpret investment-related orders in a conservative 
fashion. Trust, reputation and social network effects as discussed above (especially 
section 2.4.2) all bear on the (expectation of the) likelihood of this exploitation. In 
addition, many commentators have noted politically determined limitations on 
investment funding in public sector hierarchies {viz. PPP and PFI policies). 
Managers themselves may also be relatively under-motivated and so take low risk 
investment decisions. Public hierarchy managers are not exposed to the same 
performance incentives as providers in markets; much of this turns on the reward and 
failure regimes between hierarchies and markets respectively. Anecdotally, public 
organisations have tended to get 'bailed-out' if performance is poor up to a point. 
Thereafter, the risk of losing their jobs presumably offers a more robust source of 
8 One corollary is that price mechanisms tend to be somewhat brittle, that is when incorrect information is 
transmitted the effects are often more serious than in a quota system. 
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motivation for managers. Overall, it is difficult to say a priori whether investment will 
be higher in markets or in hierarchies. Much will depend on the asset specificity of 
investment, since it is the underlying cause of hold-up problems, as noted in the last 
chapter. Complexity is also a prime factor because it makes contracts particularly 
difficult and expensive to write. 
Turning to the implementation or effort decision, the theory is clear on differences 
between markets and hierarchies. Incentives for providers to supply effort are high in 
markets; providers are residual claimants and so benefit directly from reduced costs. 
Effort is therefore induced in markets relative to the product contract, where this 
contract maintains quality. Without the product contract effort is likely to be 
misdirected relative to what the purchaser wants from the product as providers simply 
choose the least cost production strategy. The costs, therefore, of securing effort in 
markets are the costs of writing a well-specified product contract. These costs will be 
high and also a large component of the total cost will be fixed: to get even basic 
applicable effort a complex product specification is needed. But once the contract is 
specified then marginal bargaining costs for further directed effort are far less. The 
outcome for markets will be high (directed) effort - i.e. high transaction benefits - but 
also high transaction costs. Complexity and frequency of transactions play important 
parts because they increase the costs of writing product contracts in markets. 
Competition is also a prime factor because it potentially reduces negotiation costs (that 
stem from bargaining over terms in bilateral monopoly situations). 
Unilateral efforts to cut costs (or improve quality) are not directly rewarded if providers 
are salaried, as is usually the case in hierarchies. Instead, managers offer instructions 
and effort is forthcoming to the extent that employees/providers adhere to those 
instructions. How much effort will depend on: how extensive are the instructions from 
managers, how reasonable employees find the instructions (i.e. are they being 
exploited?), how closely compliance is monitored and what sanctions there are for 
failure to comply. Overall, this implies low fixed, but high and rising marginal 
transaction costs. Optimal effort, therefore, is likely to be lower than in markets. But, 
this also implies lower total transaction costs associated with effort. 
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Another relevant co-ordination problem concerns the distribution of risk between 
purchaser and provider organisations in markets. The delivery of care services to people 
with a great variety of characteristics is fraught with uncertainties. The ability of 
providers to cope with the résultant income risk is inversely related to the size of 
organisations - big organisations can pool and spread risks more easily (Hey and 
Lambert, 1987). It follows that big organisations should optimally take on the majority 
of this risk. Public purchasers e.g. local authority social services departments are large, 
but often place most of the risk on providers by imposing fixed prices on the market 
(see next chapter and Wistow et al., 1996). Hiérarchies have fewer such problems 
because risk can be spread and pooled throughout the organisation (by internai 
transfers). In markets inappropriate allocation of risk does occur and results in under-
supply and excess prices. 
3.5.1.2 Motivation 
Turning to motivation problems, providers often have better information about their 
production processes and costs than purchasers or managers. Purchasers/commissioners 
may not be able to base their instructions (their contract terms) on relevant, but hard to 
measure factors such as for example, provider productivity or production effort. 
'Shirking' behaviour can then disguised amid the usuai ups and downs in output that 
resuit f rom external conditions. It is a problem in hiérarchies with their lack of 
incentives for effort (low-powered incentives). The problem is an extension of the cost-
cutting co-ordination problem described above. The co-ordination problem of 
hiérarchies hinged on the comprehensiveness of instructions to providers to improve 
productivity; the motivation problem rests with managers not being able to determine 
whether their instructions are being followed (or perhaps the inability of providers to 
specify their instructions in a way that is verifiable). 
Shirking on effort is not a problem in markets because providers, who are residual 
claimants, make effort décisions - there is nothing to be gained by misrepresenting 
effort to purchasers. However, shirking on quality can be a problem. Even if quality can 
be written in contracts in a satisfactory manner, purchasers may not now be able to 
verify compliance (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000; Klein and Leffler, 1981 ; Propper, 
Burgess, and Green, 2004). 
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Poor information about the characteristics of service users and how those characteristics 
affect service costs can lead to problems in markets. This information problem largely 
depends on how providers are paid, specifically the degree of contingency of contracts. 
Cost-exaggeration can occur where reimbursement is related to some indicator of 
service cost (e.g. resident characteristics) and involves providers having incentives to 
overstate these cost-related indicators (see below and Forder, 1997a). Alternatively, 
when reimbursement is not contingent, providers may be inclined to over-select low-
cost people, claiming to purchasers an average mix of users' needs. This cream-
skimming behaviour stems from the availability of alternative providers, the choice of 
which accommodates selectivity. With hierarchies, where no alternative supplier is 
available, the problem is irrelevant. Since providers are salaried - i.e. reimbursement is 
non-contingent - there is also no incentive for cost-exaggeration in hierarchies. 
All information problems will depend closely on the degree of complexity of the 
transaction. The more complex, the more opportunity there is for private information to 
be exploited. Frequency of transaction is also very relevant. Frequent interactions allow 
for reputation effects to develop, potentially mitigating adverse information problems 
(see last chapter). 
3.5.1.3 Transaction benefits 
Adjusted production costs - i.e. transaction benefits - (3-2) are a function: 
(3-4) CK(yaK,yeK,VK, <oK 
where yaK is investment, yeK is effort, ß is indicative of mis-representation, co of 
shirking and r| is allocation of risk. Suppose that the first two terms have negative 
differentials, the latter two, positive differentials. We can then anticipate the 
propositions that are made in chapter 5. Based on the above discussion about likely 
investment, effort, risk etc., we cannot unambiguously say whether CM <CH although 
this seems likely. In particular, the effort effect should overwhelm the other effects in 
social care. A range of mediating factors, explored in chapter 5, will affect the exact 
nature of this relationship; the competitiveness of markets is particularly important. 
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3.5.1.4 Transaction costs 
Summarising the above, there are four main sources of transaction cost: investment 
contracts, securing effort (by either direct contract or product contract), monitoring for 
information asymmetries and addressing risk: 
(3-5) G ^ / M f V W 
Types of transaction cost include measurement, bargaining and monitoring. Again, there 
is a priori ambiguity about the likely size of transaction costs under markets and 
hiérarchies. However, the relative costs of determining and using product contracts in 
markets to induce effort, rather than using 'instructions' in hiérarchies, is argued to be 
the telling source of différence as discussed above. Hence the proposition is: GM > GH. 
The two propositions are detailed in chapter 5 and then tested in chapter 6. 
3.5.2 Contract contingency 
There are significant interdependencies between governance dimensions (see Table 3-1) 
With regard to contract design for example incentive type is strongly correlated with 
ownership. However, contract contingency varies within the markets archetype and so 
this corrélation problem should be avoided. We could also consider contract timing but 
contracts are almost exclusively prospective in markets. Contract spécification does 
vary significantly in social care 'market' arrangements, but spécification is difficult to 
measure and catégorisé empirically. The most relevant theory to develop is therefore 
regarding contingency. 
3.5.2.1 Transaction benefits 
The literature offers a solid body of theory on provider reimbursement in a procurement 
or 'out-sourcing' context (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Différent information-related 
opportunism, risk adjustment and the impact of cost-shocks are the main implications of 
choices about contract contingency. The theory is developed in chapter 7 and here we 
rehearse only the main arguments. Suppose that in purchasing care from a provider, the 
local authority purchaser either agréés a contract price that broadly reflects the cost of 
care for a person with given needs characteristics/case-mix - denoted P - or one that 
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does not. The degree of contingency of the former contingent contract is important. To 
benchmark, the degree of contingency can be measured relative to the impact of ß on 
actual marginal cost: = ^ cß , where h is the degree of contingency parameter. The 
problem is that the purchaser does not known Cß with certainty, which we can model 
more simply as the purchaser having only a noisy estimate of ß. The purchaser assesses 
the user and so has an estimate of the referred case-mix ß7, but does not know ß 
precisely, nor the size of c(ß ; ). This situation potentially leads to opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of so-inclined providers. Under a contingent contract - with a 
sufficient degree of contingency - they might overstate reports of ß to secure a higher 
price (i.e. cost-exaggeration), so that reported case-mix is higher than actual case-mix: 
ß > ß = ß'. Under a non-contingent contract, the provider might deliberately select users 
with lower than average case-mix (i.e. cream-skimmig) but claim that they are not being 
selective i.e. ß = ß' > ß. In both cases ß > ß, and since payment is dépendent on ß and 
costs on ß, such behaviour generates an information rent. There are limitations to this 
behaviour; the greater the différence: 9 = ß - ß, the more likely this opportunism is to 
being detected and suitable punitive action taken by the provider (e.g. terminating the 
contract and switching to a new provider). Also, in practice the cream-skimming 
strategy may be restricted because providers face limited demand - they will not be able 
to attract a sufficient number of low cost users and would rather take a high cost user 
than risk a 'void' i.e. an unfilled place. Cream-skimming without free-replacement will 
be more limited than cost-exaggeration. 
The main problem with non-contingent contracts is that they foist case-mix risk onto 
providers. This can be a particular problem when providers are insufficiently large to 
spread risk. The adverse conséquence is either overpaying for all users (except those 
with the very highest need) or risking poor outcomes for users. The latter may manifest 
in the longer-run with 'unlucky' but perfectly good providers becoming unsustainable, 
with some form of quality shirking for high dependency users, or more generally a two-
tier system where it is difficult to place high cost users. 
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The final issue relates to systematic (unforeseen) cost shocks that affect ail providers. 
Over time, the average dependency of users in care homes has been increasing (Forder 
and Netten, 2000a; Darton, Netten, and Forder, 2003). If prices are measured at a time 
when population dependency is higher than originally anticipated, the average price 
charged by providers with contingent contracts will be higher than those with non-
contingent contracts. 
Overall, in the short-run the production cost to the purchaser (i.e. price) is likely to be 
higher with contingent contracts, assuming that risk adversity is not overwhelmingly 
large. In turn, this implies that transaction benefits are higher with non-contingent 
contracts. The timeframe in question is however important. Providers with non-
contingent contracts exposed to increasing risk and rising dependency can for a while 
absorb these cost pressures, but not indefinitely. If the use of non-contingent contracts 
means that providers leave and purchasers are very slow to respond in increasing prices, 
then the long-run transaction benefits of contingent contracts could be higher, despite 
cost exaggeration, and where prices for non-contingent contracts are actually lower. 
Furthermore, providers with contingent contracts are likely to have higher dependency 
users (because they do not cream-skim), a valued outcome for purchasers. Contingent 
contracts therefore have lower cost to outcome efficiency (i.e. high costs), but also 
outcomes of higher value to purchasers. 
3.5.2.2 Transaction costs 
In terms of transaction costs, we would anticipate that contingent contracts are more 
expensive to determine. It is clearly simpler (in the short-term at least) for purchasers to 
operate with a single fixed (i.e. non-contingent) price. In chapters 7 - 9 we develop 
spécifié hypotheses along these lines and test them empirically. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Given the complexities of social care systems and so the substantial opportunties for 
spécialisation, policy-makers are faced with a great many choices regarding appropriate 
arrangements for governance. These choices range from stratégie issues about 
ownership and control of the apparatus of purchasing and provision, through choices 
about contracts and incentive structures, to ways of monitoring and regulating to ensure 
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standards. Governance arrangements facilitate the production of care. Good governance 
gets the right services produced and delivered to the right people at the right time, and at 
the best cost. But governance activities also divert resources and so have a cost. 
This chapter has drawn on économies of organisation (EO) theory to lay out the 
theoretical concepts with which to tackle comparative efficiency questions relating to 
the organisation of social care systems. The chapter introduces the main building blocks 
of such an analysis, including the transaction as unit of analysis, the définition of 
contracts, the principal-agent framework and the notion of governance structures and 
governance archetypes. These concepts frame the empirical strategy of this work: to 
ascertain comparative transaction benefits and costs of the différent organisational 
arrangements we see in the social care system. In particular, the chapter defines and 
distinguishes market and hierarchical governance structure archetypes as they apply in a 
social care context. It also identifies the contract design dimension, which covers 
reimbursement incentives, price contingency, contract duration and so forth. 
As a precursor to the chapters that follow this one, EO theory was used to provide an 
overview of the main propositions to the tested. These relate, first, to the choice 
between market and hierarchical governance and second to the choice between 
contingent and non-contingent contracts. As to the former, the basic contention is that 
whilst production will be more efficient in markets, the costs of writing product 
contracts in particular, will mean high transaction costs. In hierarchical forms of 
organisation, employees tend to cede décisions to managers - which has risks for 
productivity - but results in lower transaction costs. Markets have greater relative net 
benefits when there is potential for high compétition, investments do not tie providers to 
specific purchasers, and complexity and uncertainty are relatively low. 
As to the latter choice, contingent contracts are clearly more (transaction) costly to 
determine that non-contingent versions. Their relative transaction benefits hinge on the 
value of a better handling of risk set against the greater potential for cost exaggeration 
they embody. 
79 
Chapter 4. Governance: an orgariisational économies 
interprétation 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we outlined concepts relating to governance arrangements and 
choices. In this chapter we discuss the historical, institutional and economic character of 
the social care system in England. This discussion is framed in the language and 
concepts of chapter 3. The aim is to translate those concepts into descriptions that are 
meaningful in social care. In turn, in subséquent chapters the implications of an 
économies of organisation analysis can be couched in terms that are pertinent to social 
care policy. In addition, the analysis of its historical, institutional and economic 
character will suggest features of social care in England that are spécial or particular 
with regard to the général comparative governance concepts in chapter 3. For example, 
the public funding, political influence at a stratégie level, and the significant brokerage 
function in social care at a micro-level will affect the inferences we are able to draw 
from a général deployment of the theory. Finally, this chapter will feed into the 
identification of relevant empirical indicators in social care that can be used to test the 
propositions developed in this thesis. 
The chapter is structured as follows. After this introduction, in section 2 a brief (recent) 
history of social care in England is provided. The main intention is to describe key 
historical events which led us to the social care system today, and in particular referring 
to the previous chapter, how we arrived at the current set of governance arrangements. 
Inevitably this task will entail some positive analysis as to why certain choices were 
made. Indeed, it becomes clear that whilst economic efficiency has been a priority it is 
certainly not the only - or even the main - objective that policy makers have been 
pursuing in shaping the organisation of social care. This conclusion is particularly 
important because, even if decision-makers were rational, it would imply that the 
majority of organisation choices in social care might not be the most efficient. 
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In section 3, our attention narrows onto the organisational and economic character of 
social care. In particular, we present a description of the key stakeholders, sources of 
funding, service and other activity, régulation and so forth. Section 4 provides the 
empirical description. In particular, we look at essentially distinguishing characteristics 
of markets versus hiérarchies, namely, ownership and control. Then we turn to a 
description of reimbursement, contracts, and contract contingency in social care in 
England. 
4.2 History and policy context 
The social care system in England inherited by the Labour government in 1997 reflects 
the legacy of at least two major sets of reforms/re-organisations. The first was the local 
government re-organisation of 1970 and the establishment of unified social services 
departments (SSDs) on 1 April 1971, both a resuit of the Seebohm Report in 1968 and 
the 1970 Local authority Act. The second was the sériés of reports and subséquent 
législation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including in particular, the Audit 
Commission report of 1986, the Griffiths report of 1988 and culminating in the NHS 
and Community Care Act 1990. 
4.2.1 Seebohm 
Düring the period from 1948 - when health and national assistance iunctions were taken 
from locai authorities - to 1971 when social services departments were established, 
locai authorities operated services in what many considered to be a fragmented and 
overlapping fashion (Timmins, 2001). The composition of statutory services we know 
currently as the personal social services did not exist, even conceptually, prior to the 
mid 1960s. A diverse range of other non-government organisations also provided 
services. Indeed, many of those services that became statutory responsibilities were 
originally provided by voluntary organisations (Kendall and Knapp, 1996). From their 
inception, SSDs combined the previous locai authority children's departments, the 
welfare department and, in particular for mental health services, functions of the health 
department. They were to be headed by directors of social services who held statutory 
responsibilities on behalf of the Secretary of State. The set of service responsibilities 
included residential care, home care, meals, day centres, aids and adaptations, social 
work/counselling, and child protection. These unifìed SSDs were vested with complete 
responsibility for the needs of their areas, covering not just statutory provision, but also 
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needs going beyond it. SSDs would address not only the specific needs of individuals 
and families but would also work at the level of the local community. 
Social services were therefore to become 'universaliste ' if not universal - anyone with 
need could access the system - and generic in terms of their professional outlook. The 
Seebohm report was a grand and comprehensive vision, but it came apart when funding 
tightened significantly in 1975. Other tensions were also to arise. Indeed, in keeping 
with its Poor Law origins of the 16th Century and essentially unaltered by the 1948 
National Assistance Act, Social Services Departments presided over the provision of 
residential social services, in particular, that were orientated to the poor, having a 
welfare focus, and being means-tested.9 Nonetheless, the Seebohm report did mark a 
significant leap forward for social care, in terms of its intention to comprehensively 
address the needs of the poor, the deprived and the distressed and in its re-organisation 
of social services. 
Despite means-testing of people going into local authority homes, the significant 
increase in scope, availability and demand for social services, coupled with the tight 
controls over public expenditure, significantly stretched council resources. Pressure 
built up for alternative funding, particularly funds from central government. As a result, 
in 1979 an important change was made in the regulations governing social security so 
that payments - supplementary benefit for those on low incomes — became widespread 
in meeting the costs of residential care. 
Supplementary benefit was eligible income to be assessed against the means-test for 
local authority homes. For those on supplementary benefit, their income would be 
brought up to the equivalent of the retirement pension and they would be charged this 
amount minus a modest personal allowance, and the local authority would make up the 
difference in the cost of care. For example, in 1991/92 the basic retirement pension was 
£52.00 per week and the personal allowance was £10.40. The resident would have to 
9 The Poor Laws provided general assistance to the poor in Britain. From the 16th century parishes were 
responsible for providing for their poor and levied a local rate to do this. The National Assistance Act 
1948 separated responsibility for social security which became a Government responsibility and welfare -
e.g. residential care - which remained with local councils. 
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pay the balance (£41.60) from their income, with the council making up the remaining 
total cost. 
Supplementary benefit was also available to meet the costs of people moving into 
independent sector homes, a policy that has great significance for the mix of governance 
arrangements we see in social care today. Whilst the availability of this benefit was 
means-tested - for example in 1983, anyone with less than £3,000 in capital was eligible 
to apply for supplementary benefit to meet the costs of independent residential or 
nursing home care - no assessment of need was required in order to qualify for benefits. 
Moreover, the supplementary benefit system was part of the non-cash limited social 
security system. Consequently, with local authorities' own budgets cash-limited and 
despite the availability of some supplementary benefit for LA homes, the availability of 
these payments fuelled a major expansion of the independent residential and nursing 
home care sector. The effect on the numbers of placements in the independent sector is 
detailed below. But in terms of spending, in 1979 supplementary benefit to people in 
independent care homes cost £12m (12,000 claimants). By 1992, this cost had risen to 
over £2,500m (Laing, 1993). This arrangement for publicly supported residential care 
was essentially a non-needs-assessed voucher system. In other words, a system of 
market governance with individual commissioners, supported where relevant (according 
to the income test) by a voucher. 
Before 1983, the amount of the supplementary benefit varied according to the price of 
the independent sector home chosen. In a modest attempt at rationalisation, a number of 
national price ceilings were imposed in 1983. These ceilings soon became the de facto 
price of state-supported independent residential care. A different ceiling price was set 
for London and non-London authorities and for each of the main clients groups (older 
people, people with mental health problems, learning difficulties etc.). For the older 
people client group (only) a price distinction was also made between 'standard' and 
especially frail people i.e. the price had a limited degree of contingency with respect to 
resident dependency. 
4.2.2 Community care reforms 
The start of the second major set of reforms, the effects of which reach us today, are 
marked by the House of Commons Social Services Select Committee report Community 
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Care in 1985, and shortly afterwards by the 1986 Audit Commission report, Making a 
Reality of Community Care. These two reports were highly critical of the status quo. 
There were many criticisms10: 
• That the supplementary benefít/ineome support payments for independent sector 
residential care created perverse incentives to over use residential care in favour 
alternatives such as domiciliary care 
• Organisational fragmentation and poor managerial responsibility 
• Poor workforce planning 
• Poor management, organisation and financing of the transfer of resources from the 
NHS to community care, including a lack of bridging money. 
• A central government grant system that penalised local authorities in attempting to 
support additional spending using local tax (rates) revenue. 
• At worst, a claim that social services were leaving many vulnerable people 'without 
care and at serious personal risk' 
One of the key recommendations of the Audit Commission report was that the 
community care system needed urgent review. The then Secretary of State for Social 
Services, Norman Fowler, commissioned Sir Roy Griffíths, by that time the Prime 
Minister's special advisor on health care management, to conduct the review that was to 
be published in 1988. It concentrated on: the perverse incentive of the supplementary 
benefít arrangements - funding residential, but not domiciliary care - along with the 
lack of assessment of need; poor management and the supply-led nature of services. 
There were three main recommendations that have a strong bearing on the shape of the 
system we have today. First, addressing the question of who should run the system. The 
need to consolídate the system was clear, but a number of choices were available. 
Broadly, the system could be run by: the NHS, by local authorities or by a new body. 
Griffíths choose to keep social care services with local authorities, reflecting a belief 
that the 'social model', not the medical model, was the most relevant. A main element 
of this consolidation was that the budget for (new) supplementary benefits/income 
support claimants should be transferred to local authorities, as a partially ring-fenced 
grant, but ultimately to form part of the council's overall (cash-limited) budget. 
10 See Wistow et al. (1994) and Timmins (2001) 
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Second, Griffiths recommended a system focused on the needs and preferences of users, 
rather than of the system. This would involve, principally, user assessment, care 
management, care planning and review. The intention was to put the users much more at 
the centre of the process, to allow systematic assessment and care planning around those 
needs, in a far more coherent and holistic fashion. Where people with more complex 
needs were involved, a care manager would act as commissioner to determine a package 
of care. These recommendations were adopted and care managers are now an everyday 
feature of social services. However, their working has in practice departed somewhat 
from the original conception. Today's care managers do act as commissioners for users, 
but they have large caseloads and more often act in the spirit of 'gatekeepers', rationing 
against eligibility criteria set by the local authority, rather than brokers acting for users. 
Nonetheless, care managers are, in this role, commissioners and not providers of 
services. They determine a person's care requirements and the budgetary implications, 
and establish ex ante demand for those services, independently of supply 
considérations." 
An emphasis on commissioning leads to the third set of recommendations. With its first 
set of recommendations, the Griffiths report was effectively a vote of confidence in the 
ability of local authorities to manage the system. But Griffiths was not, at the same time, 
giving a vote of confidence to the traditional bureaucratic/hierarchical model of locai 
authority provision of services. Instead, in reflecting a theme that was developing across 
the Thatcherite welfare state reform agenda, the report argued for the establishment of a 
mìxed economy of care and the concept of the enabling authority. This concept of 
enabling is particularly relevant to the present analysis. There are a number of 
interprétations of 'enabling' as applied to social care. A relatively early conception, 
essentially stemming from Seebohm, was of social services departments mobilising care 
resources from the community and voluntary sector, and also from informai carers. 
However, the concept used by Griffiths and adopted centrally in the White Paper Caring 
for People that was to follow, was concerned with the processes used to deliver services 
'1 When this arrangement also involves separate, voluntary bilateral relationships between commissioning 
care managers (or at least the middle managers with oversight of individuai care managers) and providers, 
then together this characterises (quasi-) market govemance. As an alternative, after initial assessment, the 
care manager directly refers the client to the provider, e.g. the home care service, and it is the provider 
who works out the détails of the care pian. This arrangement falls in the hierarchy category. 
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rather than the scope and development of care in the community. In particular, enabling 
as used at the time was synonymous with the use of market mechanisms to delivery care 
even when the purchaser, funder and decider of required services was a public body 
(Wistow et al., 1994; Lewis and Glennerster, 1996; Timmins, 2001; Means, Morbey, 
and Smith, 2002). 
This defínition of enabling, as noted, resonated with the broad brush of newpublic 
management that pervaded health, education as well as social services. A crystallising 
forcé was the Secretary of State for the Environment, Nicholas Ridley. His publication 
of The Local Right: enabling notproviding (Ridley, 1988), argued that efficiency and 
effectiveness benefíts would be forthcoming for councils who contract out service 
provision to potentially competing providers. New public management (NPM) retains 
universal public funding and ownership, and therefore is distinct from welfare reforms 
involving wholesale privatisation (with the State in a residual, funder-of-last resort, 
role). NPM does, nonetheless, embrace the main idea of privatisation, which is the 
erosión of previous monopoly or near-monopoly provision, but with the public sector in 
a funding and enabling role. Examples in health care run from the adoption of prívate 
sector management techniques to full scale re-organisation and merger activity (Fulop et 
al., 2005). 
NPM was consistent with thinking from the US most readily exemplifíed by the work of 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and their well-know designation of the State adopting a 
"steering" role - i.e. arranging, designing and purchasing services - rather than 
"rowing" i.e. providing. By having, on the one hand, to manage such 
'contractualisation' and, on the other hand, to compete with independent providers for 
contracted out services, the public sector would, it was argued, be forced to become 
more market-oriented and more enterprising. It would, in the words of Osborne and 
Gaebler, make governments more "entrepreneurial". These concepts resonate very 
closely with the governance concepts of chapter two. Movement from a rowing to 
steering role is consistent with a change from public hierarchy to (quasi-) market. 
Historically speaking, 'markets' have been a feature of the social care system to a much 
greater extent than has been the case for other public services. This situation reflects to a 
large degree the role of voluntary organisations in the social services (Kendall and 
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Knapp, 1996). Indeed, the early 'social services' were mainly voluntary sector 
organised and funded. Only later did local authorities assume a more dominant position. 
Although it is a stretch to describe the early voluntary sector arrangements as market 
governance as we know it now - indeed those arrangements might be more likened to 
private hierarchies - they did entrench the concept of non-government, voluntary, and 
diversely owned provision. Having a large and viable non-government provider sector 
during a period when funding responsibilities were shifted to public sources, 
accommodated a substantial mixing of governance arrangements. And unlike other 
public services such as health care, the public sector assumption of responsibility for 
social care was not complete. 
The White Paper, Caring for People, which set out the main policy groundwork to be 
legislated subsequently as the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act, endorsed the vision 
laid out by Griffiths. In particular, it included "the separation, to at least some degree, of 
purchasing and providing functions within social services departments; the development 
and support of increased levels of activity by private and voluntary providers; and the 
regulation of provider agencies in all sectors ... through procedures of service 
specification and contracting" (Wistow et al., 1994, p. 21). Also endorsed were the dual 
functions of needs assessment and care management.12 The Act was to be implemented 
from 1 April 1993, although the funding transition from central social security budgets 
to local councils was to be phased over 3 years. 
Although the Department of Health provided guidance as to a range of options for a 
purchaser - provider separation, no particular model was imposed. Moreover, the 
Government was explicit about not forcing a rapid change of pace. In practice, as will 
be discussed in more detail below, local councils made varying interpretations of how 
far to take this separation, some of which reflected local political preferences. 
12 Subsequent policy and practice guidance clarified, for implementation, the concept of a purchaser-
provider separation ((Department of Health, 1990,1991)). This guidance also laid out a number of 
additional policy components for social services departments to operate in the enabling role. First, the 
devolution of budgets to staff responsible for assessment and design of care packages for individuals in 
need (a shift away from historical service-led budget allocations). Second, the use of service 
specifications to describe the context, objectives, quality, inputs, process, outputs, outcomes and 
monitoring of services. Third, the use of contracts to indicate prices, terms and conditions and 
specifications of the service to be provided. The service specification was to be a statement about how a 
social services department wished a particular service to be delivered. It constituted the starting point for 
the determination of the actual contract specification, which would be finalised through negotiation with 
the provider. Another component in the guidance was the monitoring of contracts for compliance. 
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Nonetheless, the degree to which councils were adopting internal market-like 
arrangements pre-dated this decision, at least for residential care. After all, many 
councils had, pragmatically or otherwise, seen the benefits of shifting cost burdens onto 
the social security system for residential care, although this of course meant the use of 
the independent - and mainly private, for-profit - sector. Some councils had also been 
contracting out using their own funding prior to the widespread use of social security 
funding. By the time that councils took full responsibility for commissioning publicly 
funded residential care after 1993, the ratio of public to private provision varied 
substantially across the country. Some councils went further after 1993 and became, if 
anything, only residual providers of residential care. Others retained a majority of in-
house provision, and in the years to follow the 1993 implementation date had not shifted 
substantially from the traditional public bureaucracy model. 
4.2.3 The New Labour approach 
By the time Labour came to power in 1997, the local authority-commissioned market 
was well established. The 1998 White Paper, Modernising Social Services, stressed 
individual independence (including greater user influence), more effective prevention 
and rehabilitation, and a broadening of the supply-side regulation of services. The 
Labour government were not wedded to public sector provision, with the then Secretary 
of State, Alan Milburn stating: 'it is no longer who provides the social care that matters. 
It is the quality of care that counts'. But neither did that mean an unfettered embracing 
of markets. Instead, consistent with the developing agenda on public sector reform, the 
virtues of a 'third way' were extolled (Blair, 1998; Giddens, 1998). With reference to 
chapter 3, the third way can be likened to a network governance structure emphasising 
long-term partnership arrangements between commissioners built on trust (Osborne, 
1997; Rhodes, 1995). Adopting a "third way" of running the NHS was described, at the 
time, by the Prime Minister as "a turning point for the NHS. It replaces the internal 
market with integrated care". It was said to constitute an explicit rejection both of the 
"old centralised command and control systems of the 1970s" and of the "divisive 
internal markets systems of the 1990s". This, however, does not represent the 
wholesale replacement of one governing structure by another (as it certainly turned out 
in the NHS). 
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Regarding social care, the Department of Health published an Agreement, Building 
Capacity and Partnership in Care in 2001, which laid out the aim to provi de "a 
framework for future working relationships between providers and commissioners 
locally, geared to delivering the services that people need and expect" (p. 5). In 
particular, "to promote the establishment of close and harmonious working 
relationships, good communication, and to foster constructive co-operation between ail 
parties involved in providing care and support services for adults." (p. 5/6), and "to 
establish a way of working that: . . . promotes mutuai trust" (p. 6). 
As argued in the last chapter, differentiating 'networks' from markets is problematic. 
Markets of almost any type require at least minimum amounts of trust. It is therefore 
difficult to see whether this new policy direction produced a systematically différent set 
of behaviours. Whilst it is the case that the majority of large care home providers did 
sign up to the Agreement, macro-level behaviour at least did not appear to change 
materially. Indeed, concerns about the level of prices in the market, and about the 
impact of régulations following from the Care Standards Act 2000, were still significant 
among providers (Laing, 2004). Market analysts Laing and Buisson indicate that, 
although slowing, the rate of home closures was still significant after 2001 (Laing and 
Buisson, 2003). 
4.3 Where does this leave us? 
These policy developments have left what might be described as a somewhat eclectic 
system. It still has significant origins in the Poor Law and its successor, the 1948 
National Assistance Act, in that local authorities have a responsibility to provide 
accommodation and services to people who are "substantially and permanently 
handicapped by illness, injury or congenital deformity" subject to a means-test. The 
reforms of the 1970s Consolidated the social services responsibility of councils and 
constituted an attempt to make a universalistic service i.e. potentially open to anyone to 
use (but still means-tested). 
As regards residential care for older people specifically, the establishment of Social 
Services Departments in itself did not much change the nature or leve! of provision. 
Departments continued to provide residential care under part III of the 1948 Act. The 
loosening of social security rules to allow funding of residential care placements did 
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represent a significant change however. For a start, the (publicly funded) demand side 
now included not only local authorities (and the NHS) but also individuals effectively 
purchasing their own care and drawing on social security funding. Furthermore, on the 
supply side, these arrangements really presented an opportunity for expansion of private 
sector provision. 
Whilst local authorities have regained the position of being practically the sole 
demanders of publicly funded care - the legacy of the 1993 changes - the rôle for 
independent sector as suppliers is now fully established. Indeed, independent sector care 
home places constitute the largest share. In effect, therefore, many councils from 1993 
inherited voucher forms of quasi-markets (Le Grand, 1991). With their own provision 
significantly run down and with a responsive independent sector, council purchasers had 
no (economic) choice but to contract out a significant amount of care to the independent 
sector. It has meant that we have running in parallel an in-house (hierarchical) system 
and a (quasi-) market system, both of which, as yet, are far greater than being 'residual' 
special cases. Moreover, both are funded from the same source - local authority budgets 
- which removes a key 'degree of freedom' from any comparison of governance 
arrangements. So whilst there was a flourishing private market in the 1990s, this was 
substantially funded by an entirely separate social security system, which operated on 
différent principles - a différent means test, no real assessment and test for need, a 
multitude of buyers - greatly complicating any comparison. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the comparative governance structure analysis outlined in the last chapter will be 
between council-funded contracting out - the 'market' governance structure - and 
council-funded in-house provision - the 'hierarchy' governance structure. 
A further fortuitous characteristic of the present eclectic system is the wide variation 
between the 150 locai authorities with social services responsibilities in terms of the 
balance between quasi-market and in-house arrangements. As noted above, although 
there is perhaps some corrélation between the politicai flavour of councils and their 
choices regarding this balance, there are also some significant legacy affects. Moreover, 
the décision criteria - although beyond the scope of this thesis - are far from dominated 
by ideology. For example, Hampshire county council have just embarked on a 
substantial programme to increase their in-house provision. 
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Where markets are in use, one of the conséquences of the NPM approach has been an 
increased awareness of the rôle and conséquences of choices about contractual 
relationships between councils and the independent sector market. The Department of 
Social Security (DSS) voucher market, involving relationships between individuals and 
their choice of home, operated with what amounts to fixed price spot contracts, 
otherwise known as call-off contracts (see below for more detail). Although the system 
is now différent, this 'voucher' system had, and still continues to have, an important 
legacy. Many authorities continue to purchase care on a call-off basis with a limited 
tariff of prices (as is outlined in more detail below). In some cases, for older people's 
placements, councils simply took the standard DSS rate as the price they would pay. 
Some councils retained the DSS 'enhanced' rate distinction, applying it specifically in 
cases where, in addition to physical dependency, residents also had significant mental 
health problems (generally beyond baseline levels of depression and/or dementia). Few 
councils chose to operate with a variable price determined, not in advance for a categor 
of resident, but set according to the needs of the particular person to be placed (Wistow 
et al., 1996). 
In general then, after 1993 contract contingency was limited in scope and categorical in 
nature rather than continuòus. Moreover, there were few catégories - often just two -
and then quite widely spaced. As a resuit only homes that were prepared to cater for a 
relatively wide range of needs of residents actually experienced any contingency at ali 
(Netten et al., 1998). Homes that catered for frail older people without significant 
cognitive impairment ofìen worked with a single non-contingent price. 
After 1993 the spot or call-off contract was the normal model, and largely continues to 
be today (more detail can be found below). Put another way, block contracts - where 
capacity is purchased in advance and paid for whether in use or not at a given time -
were rare (Netten et al., 1998). The exception was in relation to council homes that 
'flóated of f in the immediate period before 1993. Very briefly, in 1991 and 1992 a 
window of opportunity existed whereby residents in a council home that transferred int 
the independent sector would become eligible for additional social security support to 
help meet costs.13 Councils that floated off homes - often into 'trusts' with the locai 
13 See Wistow et ai., 1994 chapter 6 for a full and excellent account. 
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management fully retained - could benefít from a sizeable cost shunt to non social 
service budgets. Subsequently, and contentiously from the point of view of the wider 
independent sector, these trusts often attracted block contracts from the council. 
Furthermore, in the years to follow, more commissioners and providers carne to see the 
general benefíts of block contract arrangements. Nonetheless, the proportion of total 
independent sector places purchased under block contract remains small as described 
below. 
Figure 4-1. Social care stakeholders and processes 
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4.4 Principáis and agents in social care 
Having briefly outlined the main historical developments in the care market, we can 
now look at how the system is currently configured in more detail. Figure 4-1 identifies 
four key stakeholders and shows the processes that link them. It is a very stylised 
picture but does frame some of the descriptive analysis reported below. 
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A typical example of the social care process would be of an older person who has had a 
short-term crisis - perhaps a fall - and decides, with others, that they can no longer 
manage at home. The local council Social Services Department is funded by central and 
local taxation to provide services or support for people who cannot afford services 
themselves. The council will act as the main commissioner. First, a social worker/care 
manager undertakes an assessment and develops a care plan with the person and their 
family. Second, the council procures a placement in the care home of the individual's 
choice (broadly speaking). In this example, the provider is likely to be an independent 
sector care home. 
4.4.1 Users, need and demand 
Formal services are provided to users and carers. In theory, social services in England 
are 'universalistic' as noted above in that anyone can approach their council for help 
with social care needs, although most people will not need such help in their lifetime (or 
necessarily qualify for council financial support). Councils then have a statutory duty to 
assess the individual's needs and circumstances. Then, subject to financial and other 
constraints and in accordance with a means-test for user contributions, to make 
available services to meet the individual's needs (or to make a direct payment). Table 
4-1, reproduced from table 2 of Comas-Herrera et al. (2003), describes the prevalence of 
functional dependency in the UK. It reports the percentage of people that are unable to 
manage activities of daily living (ADLs), and instrumental ADLs (IADLs). The former 
include activities such as bathing/showering, washing, dressing, feeding, and toileting. 
The latter include shopping, laundry, cleaning, cooking etc. 
Population dependency levels are good indicators of need. In particular, people with 
difficulties relating to two or more ADLs would benefit from social care, including 
residential care. The demand for services is affected by many more factors including, 
importantly, available funding. The data show a positive relationship between age and 
greater functional dependency. For example over a quarter of all men and two-fifths of 
women aged 85 or more experience difficulties with 2 or more ADLs. There is currently 
an important debate - beyond the current remit - about how need changes with the 
ageing of the population, and whether morbidity will become 'compressed'. 
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Table 4-1. Estimated percentage of the older population of the UK with different 
levels of functional dependency, 2000. 
None IADL 1 ADL 2+ADL 
Males 
65-69 85 4 4 7 
70-74 83 4 6 7 
75-79 73 9 7 11 
80-84 55 13 16 17 
85+ 45 12 15 28 
Females 
65-69 82 4 5 9 
70-74 75 6 8 11 
75-79 62 6 15 17 
80-84 45 12 17 26 
85+ 25 17 15 43 
All 67 8 10 15 
4.4.2 Commissioning and funding 
The main commissioners in the care market are councils, individuals themselves (and 
their families), the NHS and to a minor degree charitable and corporate organisations. 
There are 150 councils with social services responsibilities (CSSRs), ranging in size 
from small London Boroughs to large Shire counties, and they are the main 
commissioners. Many councils have a distinct Social Services Department (SSDs), 
although some combine housing and social services and others have delegated some 
social care responsibilities to their partner PCT (or care trust). Some are single tier like 
the London Boroughs and unitary authorities, some are two-tier having both county and 
district administrative levels. Some SSDs organise themselves on a client group basis, 
some on a geographical basis. In any case children's services are now separate. 
Although the exact arrangements vary, a subset of council members have a specific 
responsibility for social services and oversee the work of the director of social services 
(under cabinet style arrangements there is usually a single lead member for social 
services). Again local arrangements vary - and more detail is provided below in section 
4.6.1 - but most authorities operate with two broad types of commissioner. First, a 
contracts unit that secures services via contracts at a strategic level. Second, care 
managers who work directly with service users calling-off services as required. 
Commissioners principally undertake two functions - the assessment and care-planning 
function and the purchasing function. They are also involved with funding, at least in 
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the allocation of funds. Assessment and care-planning is the process of determining and 
understanding an individuali needs and the risks they create, and translating these into 
a plan about what services could be used to ameliorate the risks. Councils are required 
in law to undertake an assessment of needs. Currently the framework laid out in Fair 
Access to Care (Department of Health, 2002) provides a range of domains of 
dependency and risk that can be used to determine care needs. Once need is established 
commissioners can work with the person to decide what services would best address 
those needs. Care planning takes financial considérations into account, both the assessed 
personal resources of the care recipient and also the relevant budgets of the 
commissioning organisation (various legai test cases have established that councils are 
able to take account of their financial situation when determining service eligibility -
see LA social services letter LASSL(1997)13). Once a care pian is established 
commissioners need to 'purchase' the required services. 
Purchasing will differ according to the governance arrangements that are in opération, 
but essentially involves a spécification of requirements, a tender for providers (in a 
market arrangement), agreeing a contract, monitoring for delivery and compliance, 
invoicing and payment, and finally any revisions to arrangements. It is not concerned 
with the technology and opération of care production, only the characteristics of 
services, the implications for users and the costs of those services (Wistow et al., 1996). 
The spécification of requirements - in effect a détermination of demand - involves 
définition and mapping of need, and décisions about what constitutes eligible needs and 
therefore the relationship between need characteristics and service demand. A stock-
take of current resource availability both in terms of current capacity/service cost and 
budgetary constraints is also part of the purchasing task. Together this information can 
be used to determine the extent and type of services to be purchased, or procured (Audit 
Commission, 1997a). 
Funders may or may not be distinct from commissioners. Where public support is 
available, a layer of public administration is required to determine funding levels in total 
and to allocate these funds to commissioners. For care that is privately funded - e.g. in 
entirety or as user charges - the individuai is the funder. 
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4.4.2.1 Public funds 
As of 2004/5 Government in England funds about £10.5 billion of adult social care f rom 
the public purse. This funding level is determined by Department of Health and HM 
Treasury Spending Reviews, comprising analysis of baseline pressures and new policy 
requirements. Spending reviews work on a 2/3-year cycle. The last was in 2004 and 
covered spending for 2005/06, 06/07 and 07/08, although the last year of review period 
can be modified by the subsequent spending review (due in 2006). 
Almost all public spending on social care is now made via local councils (with a small 
amount of long-term care spending by the NHS - see below). Most is allocated in the 
Revenue Support Grant to councils with a proportion also made up from council tax.14 
44.2.2 Charges 
Councils also raise money from charges to people using services. This will raise total 
adult social care spending to over £12.5 billion by the end of the 2004/5. In the case of 
care homes, for people with very significant medical needs, N H S continuing care is 
available. Recipients of NHS continuing care pay no fees (although they do lose or have 
reduced main state benefits - e.g. pension - after a short period). Otherwise, for people 
with social care needs there are a number of options that apply in the long-term. People 
with assets in excess of £20,000 are required to pay the full price of care themselves.15 
They are effectively private purchasers. At a minimum they will be paying £300 per 
week, probably much more. 
14 During the spending review process the Government works out the total required spending for each 
service the council provides (not just social care) and adds this up to give total council spending. A 
calculation is also made as to how much as council is expected to raise through local council tax and 
through business rates. Government grant - the Revenue Support Grant - to councils is the difference 
between total council spending and expected revenue through local taxation. The RSG presently accounts 
for about two-thirds of total spending. However, it is then up to councils, not central government, as to 
exactly how to divide their funds between services. A small proportion - only about 2% of total social 
care spending - is in the form of specific 'ring-fenced' grants that must be spent as dictated by the central 
government. As it happens, the total amount of public money on adult social care that councils have been 
spending recently is very nearly the same as the government's suggested figure. But in principle, if 
central government changed the amount it contributes on paper, councils need not actually make the same 
change in practice (although this would clearly create local resource pressures). 
15 This and associated rates are for 2004/5 but are normally uprated on an annual basis. 
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In all other cases where people have capital of less than £20,000 the council will make a 
contribution and purchase on behalf of users. Indeed in these cases the council can limit 
the total price it will pay for care.16 
Essentially therefore, support for care homes is a safety net system. People pay for their 
own care entirely until those costs impoverish them. Thereafter the State pays the excess 
of cost over the person's income. The average gross cost of an older person looked after 
in residential and nursing home care to the English councils in 2002/3 was £360 per 
week. The average client contribution was £125 per week of this total. It is worth noting 
that many older people rely on the state pension system to provide them with income, 
some of which is then used to pay charges. Until recently (Oct 2003), people moving 
into independent sector homes could claim Residential Allowance (RA) of about £60 a 
week to use towards their charges. The RA was not available for people moving into the 
local authorities own homes.17 
Local authorities - as commissioners and funders, not providers - have their overall 
performance assessed by the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI). There are 
currently six broad domains in the assessment criteria, addressing council processes and 
outcomes for users and their families (see Social Services Inspectorate, 2004). Councils 
are star-rated as a result of the assessment process, and a number of improvement 
incentives and sanctions are then applied according to the rating a council receives. 
4.4.3 Provision of services 
Providers are organisations that produce the agreed services for the user. Providers can of 
course be distinguished according to the services they provide, for example, home care or 
16 Where people have capital of less than £20,000 both their capital and income are taken into account. If 
capital is less than £12,250 this is ignored as is any income it produces. If capital is between £12,250 and 
£20,000 the actual income is ignored, but for each £250 of capital an income - called "tariff income" - of 
£1 per week is assumed. The tariff income is added to the rest of the person's income in order to calculate 
their care charge. Because total income including tariff income can exceed the value of ali actual income 
a person has coming in, the idea is that the person will have to divest of some capital to secure the extra 
income required. Eventually, capital will fall to the lower threshold (£12,500) and tariff income will 
become zero. Individuais with assets below £20,000 are required to contribute ali their income (plus any 
tariff income) as fees less an allowance for person income, currently £18.10 per week. The locai authority 
and the NHS pay the rest. The NHS will pay a fixed amount in three bands towards the cost of nursing 
care needs that residents may have. In the short-term - up to 3 months - the value of a person's home is 
disregarded in the means test (only their current income and other assets are taken into account), making 
it easier for people to keep their old home for a while should a person wish to return to the community. 
17 Generally, after a short period, people claiming Attendance Allowance lose their eligibility on entering 
a care home. 
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residential care. Indeed care homes fall into two groups - those that provide nursing care 
(by registered nurses) i.e. what were called nursing homes and those without nursing 
care (providing only personal care) i.e. those that were called residential care homes. 
They can also be distinguished according to how they are operated and by whom. There 
are four main provider sectors. First, the public sector that includes mainly local 
authorities but also others such as the NHS. Second, the voluntary sector which 
comprises formal organisations independent of government that, although they may 
earn profíts, are bound by a non distribution constraint, which means that they cannot 
distribute profíts to any owners or shareholders. Many voluntary organisations - and 
most in the social care sectors - have charitable status, conferring certain tax advantages 
(Knapp and Kendall, 2001; Kendall, 2003; Kendall and Knapp, 1996). Third, the prívate 
sector, which is not constrained in is distribution of profíts. In recent years, the prívate 
sector has become a much more important provider of social services, especially in 
residential care (see below). Finally, there is the informal sector, principally composed 
of individual carers (family members and others). Generally, for informal care no 
contingent payment is made.18 
With regard to care homes, standards of care are laid out in the provisions of the 1984 
Residential Care Act and subsequently in the Care Standards Act 2000. Standards 
relating to staffing inputs are probably the most important, although there is a range of 
domains covering individuáis' choice, health, personal care, daily activities, complaints, 
environment and management. Homes need to be registered to receive public funding. 
New homes must complete a registration process. Once established homes are inspected 
by CSCI, currently on a bi-annual basis, with respect to the above domains. 
4.4.3.1 Providers 
There is a considerable diversity of providers in terms of home size, ownership and 
legal structure. Table 4-2 reports the average number of places per home, by home type. 
Nursing homes are bigger on average than residential care homes. The PSSRU survey 
of care homes - a large and comprehensive survey of the industry - provides figures for 
average home size and range of sizes as was the case in 1996 - see Table 4-3 (Netten et 
18 Our focus here is on formal care services. Nonetheless it would be remiss not to mention at least the 
contribution of informal care. Informal care remains a very important substitute for formal services 
(Pickard et al., 2000; Hirst, 2001). 
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al., 1998). The legal structure of independent sector providers spans commercial for-
profit, limited companies, through partnership, sole-proprietors, small community non-
profits to National Charitable organisations. Laing and Buisson provide information 
about major providers - any London Stock Exchange company or other organisation 
with 3 or more homes. Major providers market share of the for-profit home sector was 
34.5% in April 2003. Whilst this has grown recently in terms of market share, major 
provider holdings of bed numbers has not changed in the recent period (Laing and 
Buisson, 2003). Overall, small businesses continue to dominate the sector. Major not-
for-profit providers command a much higher market share at around 65%. Unlike for-
profit major providers who focus on nursing homes, not-for-profit major providers tend 
to operate more in the residential home market. 
Table 4-2. Average places per home, older people, England, 2001, all homes 
Home type Homes Average places 
per home 
Year 
Nursing1 2414 39 2003 
Independent residential -
excluding small homes2 
7008 23 2001 
LA residential 1116 35 2001 
Notes: (1) Laing and Buisson, 2003 
(2) Department of Health Statistical bulletin, 
Table 4-3. Size of home by home type (PSSRU survey, 1996) 
Number 
of places 
Local 
authority 
Private 
residential 
Voluntary 
residential 
Dual 
registered 
homes 
Nursing 
homes 
All 
homes 
Mean 35.0 20.0 30.3 39.2 37.7 27.5 
Minimum 12 6 8 9 9 6 
Maximum 66 56 100 77 180 180 
N 167 148 122 76 159 672 
4.5 Expenditure and activity 
We now turn to the question of what this system spends and produces. 
4.5.1 Expenditure 
Local authorities are the main sources of social care expenditure. Local authority social 
care spending has been increasing significantly in real terms, having more than doubled 
in the last 10 years (Table 4-4). Total public spending has not increased as rapidly 
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however because in the 3 years from 1993, much of the increase in local authority 
spending was through an inheriting responsibility for people who would have 
previously been funded using social security payments. The corresponding DSS budget 
was transferred to councils in a staged process - the special transitional grant was made 
over a period of 3 years. The social security system retained responsibility for those 
people who were receiving the income support payment before 1993. However, by 
2002/3 very few of these 'preserved rights' cases remained and those who did were 
transferred to the local authority system. The latest figures in the table give a good 
indication of total public spending on social care, although they are a slight under-
estimate of the grand total because there are two further, albeit modest, sources of 
public support: NHS funding and private spending that is supported by universal social 
security payments such as attendance allowance (i.e. not private spending backed by 
private means). Exact figures on the social security supported expenditure are not 
available but we can nonetheless conclude that total public spending on all social care is 
more than 1.4 per cent of GDP. 
Table 4-4. Personal social services gross expenditure - England 
Year Cash terms 2000/01 Prices % GDP 
£ billions £ billions 
1986-87 3.1 5.4 0.7% 
1987-88 3.4 5.7 0.7% 
1988-89 3.8 5.8 0.7% 
1989-90 4.2 6.1 0.8% 
1990-91 4.7 6.4 0.8% 
1991-92 5.1 6.5 0.8% 
1992-93 5.5 6.6 0.9% 
1993-94 6.3 7.3 0.9% 
1994-95 7.5 8.7 1.0% 
1995-96 8.4 9.4 1.1% 
1996-97 9.3 10.2 1.1% 
1997-98 10.0 10.7 1.2% 
1998-99 10.8 11.3 1.2% 
1999-2000 12.0 12.3 1.3% 
2000-2001 12.8 12.8 1.3% 
2001-2002 13.6 13.2 1.3% 
2002-2003 15.2 14.3 1.4% 
Source: DH Gross PSS expenditure 
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In this study, we focus on services for older people, which constitute the largest client 
group. Gross spending on older people's services by councils was £6860m in 2002/3, 
which is some 45% of the total spend (or just under 60% of total adult spending i.e. 
excluding services for children). Table 4-5 gives a break down of spending, 
distinguishing council and private spending for older people. Estimates suggest that 
purely private spending - where the council makes no contribution - are in the order of 
£ 1575m for residential care or nearly two-fifths of the (supported) PSS gross spend. 
Table 4-5. Expenditure on social services for older people - England 2002/3 
fmillions Total Non-residential Residential Assessment 
PSS gross 6860 1990 4250 620 
PSS net 5070 1740 2710 620 
User fee 1790 250 1540 
Private 2000 425 1575 
TOTAL 8860 2415 5825 620 
Notes : PSS expenditure data are from DH Statistical Bulletin 2004/02. 
Private expenditure data are unpublished PSSRU estimates (with thanks to Raphael Wittenberg). 
Private and user fee costs are partly met from disability benefits. 
NHS costs (including nursing care in nursing homes for privately funded residents) is excluded. 
Laing and Buission provide estimates of the proportion of care home residents by 
source of funding - see Table 4-6. Their estimates are for the UK rather than England 
but should apply (with perhaps a slightly higher proportion of self payers in England 
than for the UK as a whole). The NHS pays for about 5 per cent of residents in 
independent care homes, nearly all of them in nursing homes. Laing and Buisson 
suggest that the NHS currently funds just over 50,000 long-term care places in the UK, 
mostly for the care of long-term geriatric and psycho-geriatric patients. Some 20,000 
places are purchased from the independent sector with the rest provided in-house (Laing 
and Buisson, 2003). Unlike local authority funded care, this NHS 'continuing care' does 
not involve any contribution from patients (even to cover 'hotel' costs), although 
patients do lose some or all of their state benefits such as state retirement pensions and 
attendance allowance. There is a fine - and controversial - line between eligibility for 
fully-funded NHS continuing care and means-tested nursing care - essentially hinging 
on whether the resident's primary need is for healthcare. 
Income support preserved rights cases are included in the table but entries for 2003 are 
zero because, as noted above, the remaining few preserved rights cases were transferred 
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to local authority funding. As to self-payers, exact numbers are not routinely available. 
Generally, they are determined by subtracting state-funded residents from the total. The 
Department of Health did carry out two censuses of self-payers in nursing homes, 
finding 42,700 in June/July 2001 and 41580 in Dec 2002. These figures when grossed 
up to the UK level match the Laing and Bussion figures in Table 4-6 closely. 
Table 4-6. Sources of finance for residents in the private and voluntary nursing 
and residential care homes for elderly and physically disabled people, UK 2003. 
Nursing homes Residential homes Both 
000s % 000s % 000s % 
Income Support (preserved 
rights) 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Local authority 97 56.7 151 70.2 248 64.2 
NHS 20 11.7 0 0.0 20 5.2 
Self-pay 54 31.6 64 29.8 118 30.6 
Total 171 100.0 215 100.0 386 100.0 
Source. Laing and Bussion (2003) 
Table 4-7 shows that in real terms PSS spending on older people has increased 
significantly since 1994/5, being over half as much again by 2002/3. However, the rate 
of increase was not quite as great as for total social care spend. Beyond any special 
transitional grant legacy effects, from 1997/8 to 2002/3 real spending has increased by 
24% for older people. 
Table 4-7. Older people's spend 94/5 to 02/3 
Year Gross PSS expenditure - older people 
Market prices Real (2000/1 prices) 
1994..95 3567 4128 
1995.-96 4070 4563 
1996..97 4575 4983 
1997..98 4912 5203 
1998..99 5216 5405 
1999..2000 5644 5771 
2000..2001 5899 5899 
2001..02 6173 5982 
2002..03 6860 6454 
Source. Personal Social Services expenditure and unit costs: Department of Health 
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Table 4-8 provides détails of expenditure on services to older people supported by the 
local authority. Residential and nursing home care command the lion's share of 
expenditure for older people. The share of resources going to residential care has 
remained largely constant in recent years. The proportion used to firnd nursing home 
care rose significantly after 1993 but largely due local authorities taking on 
responsibility for funding nursing homes. In real terms, since 1997/8 gross expenditure 
on care homes has increase by just under 30% to 2002/3. 
Table 4-8. LA expenditure on services for older people - England, £000s and % 
1994/5 1997/8 2002/3 
Assessment and care 355,386 10% 428,519 9% 622,471 9% 
management 
Nursing home placements 405,290 11% 1,026,491 21% 1,479,751 22% 
Residential care home 1,455,888 41% 1,877,345 38% 2,741,712 40% 
placements 
Supported and other 38,290 1% 37,908 1% 24,522 <1% 
accommodation 
Direct payments 10,698 <1% 
Home care 947,123 27% 1,119,895 23% 1,395,093 20% 
Day care 155,527 4% 185,899 4% 286,905 4% 
Equipment and adaptations 67,254 1% 
Meals 95,469 1% 
Other non..residential costs 209,319 6% 235,491 5% 
Other services to older people 136,598 2% 
TOTAL OLDER PEOPLE 3,566,822 100% 4,911,549 100% 6,860,472 100% 
Source: Government R03 and PSS EX1 Gross PSS expenditure data 
The focus of the empirical work is residential and nursing care homes for older people. 
It concerns the £4221 m spent in 2002/3 (or 36% of gross local authority adult spend). 
4.5.2 Activity 
There have been significant changes both in the total number of residential and nursing 
home places and in the nature of which organisations provide those services. Table 4-9 
shows the numbers of places available over the last two decades and more. It refers to 
the total number of registered places by sector and represents total capacity, not the 
number of places actually purchased by various commissioners (see below for the 
number of such 'publicly supported' places). 
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Düring the early part of the time sériés reported, the national data combined places for 
older people with places for younger physically disabled people, although the latter 
constitute only a very small share (e.g. about 2% in 1994). Data on nursing homes has 
generally been available by type of nursing home rather than client group. Nonetheless, 
some attribution of bed/place has been made to older people (by Department of Health 
statisticians) and this data is given in the table. The data reported are those collected by 
the Department of Health. After 2001, collection of data on registered homes - rather 
than those publicly purchased - was passed to CSCI. The data collection by CSCI has 
not been on exactly the same basis as before, and was patchy during the transition 
period. Nonetheless, the latest totals produced by CSCI are very much in line with the 
data reported in the table (i.e. 371328 places for older people in 2003). The market 
analysts Laing and Buission undertake an annual survey of care home places in the UK. 
When scaled down to the England population total residential places are slightly lower 
(by 13,400 or 6%). 
Figure 4-2. Places in care homes for older people - by provider type, 1970-2001 
LA homes Independent residential Nursing homes 
Figure 4-2 shows the places in care homes over time. The key comparison is local 
authority residential and independent sector residential places. As regards the former, it 
is clear that from the late 1980s and early 1990s - at the time of the Griffith Report and 
subséquent législation - the number of places declined from being relatively constant. 
The dip in residential care places is due to the removal from the time sériés of younger 
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disabled adults. Figure 4-3 shows how the number of residents that are supported by 
locai authority has changed sirice locai authorities took on responsibilities for new 
residents who otherwise would have been funded by the social security system. 
Figure 4-3. Locai authority supported residents, people over 65 (all client group 
I i i ü iMul 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
• Registered care homes: 
Independent Nursing 
• Registered care homes: 
Independent Residential 
I Locai authority staffed homes 
The numbers are also provided in Table 4-10. The data show a very significant incre 
post 1993. Much of this growth represents the transfer of care responsibility from th 
social security system to locai govemment, although after the three year transition 
period supported placements continue to grow. 
Table 4-10. Locai authority supported care home places, over 65s, England 
Ali home types Locai authority Independent 
Supported 
Total 
Places Supported 
Total 
Places 
Residential 
Supported 
Nursing 
Supported 
Total 
supported 
1 
P 
1993 92,710 78,000 14,710 0 14,710 
1994 112,939 402,002 58,297 67,401 31,530 23,112 54642 3: 
1995 142,994 404,124 54,773 ; 62,443 48,347 39,874 88221 3< 
1996 168,962 399.809 51,028 60,155 65,089 52,845 117934 3-
1997 190,145 409,961 48,276 54.680 81,082 60,787 141869 3: 
1998 202,725 M 2 5 , 2 3 f f 45,350 § § 2 , 7 3 ^ 89,925 67,450 157375 3" 
1999 2 0 5 , 3 2 5 4 1 9 . 5 0 1 4 1 , 2 5 5 49.112 96,520 67,550 164070 3' 
2 0 0 0 2 0 7 , 9 2 0 4 1 1 . 4 S ' ) 3 8 , 5 5 5 4 5 . 2 1 0 1 0 1 , 7 9 5 67,570 169365 3< 
2 0 0 1 2 0 4 , 0 7 0 4 0 3 . 3 2 1 3 4 , 3 8 0 4 1 , 8 3 2 1 0 4 , 2 1 0 6 5 , 4 8 0 1 6 9 6 9 0 3< 
2 0 0 2 2 0 6 , 1 9 5 3 0 , 2 4 5 1 1 0 , 1 2 0 6 5 , 8 3 0 1 7 5 9 5 0 
2 0 0 3 2 1 7 , 6 4 0 2 8 , 1 3 0 1 2 0 , 2 3 5 69,275 1 8 9 5 1 0 
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The use of local authority homes - in-house providers - declined sharply in the couple 
of years to 1994 but thereafter has declined gradually. There is some sign that this trend 
is now flattening out. 
4.6 Governance arrangements 
Services are generally easy to identify and distinguish. Governance, being a far more 
strategie and wide-ranging concept, is less so. As discussed in the last chapter there are 
a range of distinguishing factors to illustrate governance choices - see table 3-1 in 
chapter 3. 
A number of empirical indicators are used to give these theoretical concepts some 
practical meaning. The indicators are drawn irom four data sets (see also chapter 1 
section 1.6). The first dataset is secondary data on activity and expenditure, as described 
above, which is available from routine Department of Health collections. Second, the 
survey of residential care data that provides information on commissioning 
arrangements from a provider's perspective. The third source is the PSSRU 
commissioning survey. The fourth is the data from the small LA sample broad mixed 
economy study. These data can be used to describe organisational structures and 
contract reimbursement incentives. 
4.6.1 Organisational structure 
As noted in the last chapter it is useful to distinguish, conceptually, between the 
distribution of ownership of the purchasing and providing iunction on the one hand, and 
the distribution of control over those processes on the other. The former distribution is 
most easily measured by the relative size of independent sector supply. In addition, 
where the residential care sector is characterised by extensive public provision, it is 
likely to imply unified ownership. Some councils have almost no in-house residential 
care for older people and clearly rely totally on market arrangements. Others have a 
mix, and the average numbers are given in the above tables and charts. 
Ownership need not diciate the distribution between stakeholders of control over the 
various functions. In theory, at least, a public fiinding body could, for example, cede 
purchasing functions such as user assessment to independently owned providers, 
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creating an organisation that could at least partially be described as a privately owned 
hierarchical organisation. In practice, local authorities are required by law to assess and 
so make arrangements to meet assessed needs (subject to eligibility etc.) and so remain 
public sector purchasers in governance terms. Effectively therefore only public 
hiérarchies are possible where the public sector organisation jointly 'purchases' and 
provides. 
The other, more relevant, possibility is the (public sector) 'internai' market. In this 
variant there is public ownership of both the means/resources of commissioning and 
also provision. However, control is dispersed within the organisation. Provider units are 
managerially separate and do not account to purchasers. Moreover, purchasers have 
some freedom to choose différent (public sector) providers, perhaps in-house providers 
from other local authorities. This model has strong market-like features (although does 
retain some hierarchical elements e.g. providers often have relatively low powered 
incentives as they are only partial residual claimants). It is, nonetheless, sufficiently 
différent from the (pure) hierarchical model to have différent behaviour implications. 
We need therefore to see how relevant this model is in an empirical sense. 
In multi-tiered organisations (i.e. social services departments) where an agent or 
'broker' works on behalf of the service users, choices are available as to the location of 
that purchasing decision-making. Often purchasing functions are spread across différent 
management tiers in the organisation, but the key issue is the location of operational 
control and purchasing budgets. Authority to sign-off on budgets may be held centrally 
or devolved to local agents, such as care managers (Davies, 1992; Wistow et al., 1996). 
The degree of dévolution and the location of budgets helps us to understand whether an 
internai market is in opération, or whether a more traditional hierarchical model is in 
place. For example, as we discuss below, in many cases budgets can be devolved 
directly to in-house provider managers. Clearly, this arrangement implies that the 
process for commissioning care from the independent sector is systematically différent 
from the process to secure in-house provision since the latter are directly allocated a 
budget, and the former have services purchased under contract. Or put differently, it 
rules out the processes from buying from in-house and independent sector being exactly 
the same. 
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The PSSRU commissioning survey posed a number of questions that allow inferences 
about these arrangements. Some 90 councils (of 150) responded to the questionnaire. 
We fírst asked about the location of the purchaser provider separation within councils. 
The majority of respondents (42 or 47%) began the separation of functions at the third 
organisational tier i.e. below Assistant Director level. Thirty-one councils indicated the 
second tier, with the rest (17 or 19%) at fourth tier or below. Whilst the particular 
organisational arrangements in LAs differed considerably, this information is suggestive 
of whether control is, on the whole, de-centralised or unifíed. Indeed, where the social 
services department is separated at AD level we might expect greater de-centralisation 
than a separation at lower management tiers. 
We also asked whether the process for arranging care from independent sector providers 
that councils operated was different from the process of arranging similar care from in-
house providers. There are clearly a number of levels to which this question can apply. 
Where respondents state there is a difference this response is sufficient for us to reject 
there being an internal market. A nuil response, on the other hand, need not indicate the 
existence of an internal market because respondents could interpret this question to be 
about just assessment and care-planning, not including contracting as well. For these 
reasons it is likely that Table 4-11 underestimates the number of authorities with 
different processes (i.e. a third). 
Table 4-11. Is the process for arranging care from Independent sector providers 
different from the process of arranging similar care from in-house providers? 
Number Percent 
No difference in arrangements between independent and in-house 
providers 54 60% 
Yes; securing in-house and external services involves different 
processes 27 30% 
Not applicable/don't know 9 10% 
Total 90 100% 
Because the question about processes may underestimatc the number of councils that 
have hierarchical arrangements for the purchase of in-house services, we can also look 
at where respondents stated they had located budgets for securing in-house services. 
Table 4-12 reports this information from the survey. We can see that around two-fifths 
of councils allocate budgets directly to providers, which rules out their operating an 
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internai market. Taking the results from these two questions together, the data suggest at 
least 60% of councils have hierarchical arrangements for in-house services - see Figure 
4-4. 
Table 4-12. Typical location of budgets for securing residential care 
Care manager External lnternal/in-house 
LA or SSD finance level 11 14% 12 17% 
Purchasing team manager 49 61% 16 23% 
Care manager 0 0% 0 0% 
Providing team manager 1 1% 28 39% 
Other 19 24% 15 21% 
Total 80 100% 71 100% 
Source: Commissioning survey 
Figure 4-4. Proportion of LAs with no différence in the processes for securing in-
house from external provision - by location of budgets for securing in-house 
provision 
100% • 
80% 
60% 
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4.6.1.1 The relationship between control and ownership 
In practice, décisions about ownership and distribution of control are very unlikely to be 
made independently. The unit production costs of in-house providers have been 
consistently higher than those in the independent sector. If councils are willing to 
operate as though in a market with their in-house providers, the next step to actually 
outsourcing is rather small, and likely to be comparatively more efficient in that case. 
Purchasing Other Finance Providing Total 
team Level team 
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We therefore hypothesise that the proportion of supported places retained in-house by 
local authorities is positively related to an absence of an internal market (see Table 3-1). 
This hypothesis can be tested by comparing, for each local authority, the proportion of 
total placements made in-house (rather than in the independent sector) with the 
indicators of control distribution described above. Multiple régression was used to 
estimate the simultaneous relationship between this measure and the indicators of 
control distribution. Since décisions about out-sourcing are also influenced by a range 
of local authority specific factors, such as politicai control, historical supply etc, a 'local 
authority type' control factor was also used. Local authorities are categorised as one of 
five types: shire, metropolitan, unitary, inner London and outer London. Data on control 
was available for 71 local authorities from the PSSRU commissioning survey. The 
clearest indicator of unified control was used - that is, whereproviders directly hold 
budgets i.e. the 28 of 71 councils described in Table 4-12. The dépendent variable - an 
indicator of (integrated) ownership - is the ratio of supply by in-house providers to total 
residential care home supply, with high values indicating high integration. Supply is 
measured as the number (actually, incidence) of (supported) placements by provider 
type. See Table 4-13 for descriptive statistics. 
Table 4-13. Ownership and control variables - descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Prop. res care LA 0.285 0.154 0.004 0.670 
Unified control: In-house budgets held by 
provider manager 
0.386 0.490 0 1 
Linear régression was used to estimate the relationships. Although testing could not 
reject the normality of the dépendent variable (Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data,/? = 
0.29), in view of the relatively small sample size (71 cases) the estimation was also 
bootstrapped (1000 répétitions). Since these ownership and control indicators of 
hierarchical governance are a priori jointly determined, an instrumental variables 
régression was also undertaken with indicators being instrumented by the proportion of 
places supplied in-house lagged one year. A Basmann-Sargan test could not reject the 
null hypothesis of correctly specified instruments in the IV régression (p = 0.504). OLS 
was also conducted for comparison. 
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Table 4-14 reports the results of the estimation. The unified control variable is 
significantly correlateci with the ownership ratio, in both the linear model and in the 
models allowing for simultaneity. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervais also indicate 
that the relationship is significantly différent from zero. Beyond that, variation in the 
ownership ratio is significantly associated with the politicai control of the council, with 
labour councils more likely to have centralised ownership. A number of locai authority 
type dummies and a property prices variable were included to account for council 
prosperity and costs. 
Table 4-14. The relationship between 'ownership' and 'control' indicators of 
governance choice (n = 71) - dépendent variable: centralised ownership 
2SLS1 
Bootstrap 
95% CI 
Coeff t-stat lower upper 
3SLS 
Bootstrap 95% 
CI 
Coeff t-stat lower upper 
OLS2 
Coeff t-stat 
Unified control 
Lab seats (% total) 
London LA 
Property prices (log) 
Coastal LA 
Const 
0.47 3 0.16 0.78 
0.27 1.81 
-0.24 -2.44 
0.34 3.12 
-0.24 -1.64 
-3.91 -2.92 
0.49 3.56 0.19 0.80 
0.28 1.95 
-0.25 -2.58 
0.35 3.46 
-0.24 -1.76 
-4.03 -3.27 
0.10 2.59 
0.18 1.88 
-0.16 -2.45 
0.15 2.61 
-0.16 -1.73 
-1.54 -2.22 
Notes 
1 Basman-Sargan test for instrument spécification (Chi, 8, 0.95) of 15.51 
2 Reset spécification test: p > 0.66 and for heteroscedasticity, p > 0.64 
Unified control corresponds to an increase in the proportion of placements made in-
house, other things equal, of nearly 50 per cent for both the instrument variable models. 
The magnitude of the relationship supports our use of ownership as a proxy of an 
indicator of hierarchical governance. 
4.6.2 Reimbursement contracts 
Table 3-1 in the last chapter described a number of governance dimensions concerning 
contracts such as timing, length, spécification etc. Of arguably the most empirical 
relevance is contract contingency. To establish the use of contingent contracts in the 
residential care market, we have two sources of data. First, local authority reporting of 
the types of contracts they o f f e r - and specifically their responses to the commissioning 
survey. Second, providers' views as to the types of contracts they have. There is some 
potential for disagreement between these sources, not only because the samples are 
différent, but also because there are many options as to how contracts can be contingent, 
e.g. by client group, by case-mix, by severity etc., and only a subset need apply to any 
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particular provider. In chapter 8 we use the latter since we are interested in how 
providers respond to différent contingencies, and this will depend on their own 
perceptions. Partly because provider's perceptions are covered later, and because that 
data is much more specific, here we will cover the results from the commissioning 
survey in more detail. 
The survey asked a sériés of questions about exactly how LAs set their prices for 
purchase of care from independent (and also in-house) providers. The survey had a 
response from 92 local authorities on these issues. The first question was: how are 
prices determined for the purchase of (publicly funded, long-term) care from 
independent sector (private and voluntary) providers? There were three options: 
OPTION 1 a single price that is invariant across différent (publicly-funded) providers in the 
authority (and so is also invariant with respect to clients/residents) 
OPTION 2 a price that can vary by provider, but does NOT vary by (publicly-funded) 
clients/residents served by the provider 
OPTION 3 a price that can vary by (publicly-funded) client/resident (and so can vary by 
provider) 
Figure 4-5 describes the responses. For residential care from external providers the most 
common option was the first. However, the distribution across the three options was 
fairly uniform. The figure also shows the responses to a number of follow-up questions. 
Those respondents that selected options 2 or 3, were asked whether the price typically 
reflects residents' dependency levels? In the case of option 2 it would be the provider 
level price that varies with client dependency, implying either some average 
dependency level effect, or more likely the client group spécialisation of the home, 
particularly relevant for those homes that spécialisé in caring for older people with 
dementia or other cognitive impairment. For those selecting option 3, prices may clearly 
vary on a per client basis. Altogether, just over half (53%) of the 92 respondents worked 
with prices that did reflect dependency (within the older people's client group). We also 
asked those selecting option 3, whether their prices were determined at the time of 
placement, being specific to the particular resident (i.e. not set in advance). This 
question tries to distinguish between tariff based pricing systems and those apparently 
more rare cases where prices are truly individuai resident specific. For independent 
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sector residential care 20% of councils reported this arrangement, which might
nonetheless be a little on the high side. The corresponding level of contingency for
internal arrangements with in-house providers is far lower as shown in figure.
Figure 4-5. Pricing options and dependency contingency: contracts with
independent sector (external) and in-house care homes - percentages of LAs within
the sample, 2001 (n = 92)
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The survey also asked about the quantity contingency of contracts i.e. whether average
reimbursement per unit depends on the total quantity purchased. Block contracts are
quantity contingent in this way because payment rates are tied to the total quantity
purchased. Spot or call-off contracts make little or no such allowance - payment rate is
constant regardless of the total amount purchased. Cost and volume contracts represent
something of a hybrid of the two types. Figure 4-6 shows that spot contracts constitute
the very significant majority. Moreover, although a fifth of councils also report using
block contracts, it is likely that at least some of these contracts are for independent trusts
and specific charitable providers (see page 91). For mainstream average sized
independent sector homes the likelihood of block contracts being used is small.
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Figure 4-6. Types of contact used to secure residential care, and contract durations 
- % of authorities and contracts, 2001 
Res Res 
Internal External 
In chapter 8 we analyse contract contingency from a provider's perspective. We use the 
Survey of Residential Care, which provided a response from over 600 homes in 
England. Among a wide range of other questions (see Netten et al., 1998) the survey 
asked about pricing arrangements with the locai authority purchaser. In particular, 
homes were asked whether they operated with a price that was "pre-set by locai 
authorities dépendent on the type of resident (e.g. level of dependency)". Table 4-15 
describes the responses. Overall, 38% of homes regarded price as being affected by 
client dependency. 
Table 4-15. Perceived user dependency contingency of price - independent sector 
homes, % of homes by type of home 
Sector % of homes N SD 
Residential 
Private 46.4% 112 0.50 
Voluntary 35.9% 78 0.48 
Nursing home 31.0% 113 0.46 
Ali types 38.0% 303 0.49 
Source: PSSRU survey of residential care 
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We can make some comparison with the Commissioning Survey funding, but with a 
number of caveats. First, the commissioning survey was undertaken about 5 years after 
the homes survey and we might expect the underlying trend to be an increasing use of 
contingent contract arrangements. Secondly, homes' perceptions are based on their own 
specific 'market' of types of residents, whereas the local authority covers the whole 
local spectrum. Third, homes in the home survey were drawn from a sub-sample of 
local authorities. Nonetheless, there was a high consistency between the commissioning 
survey results and the two-fifths of homes reporting contingency in the provider survey. 
It specifically depends on whether we take as the most relevant comparator from the 
commissioning survey, the 35% of LAs that reported option 3 (i.e. client level 
contingency) or the overall level of dependency contingency (which includes inter- but 
not intra-home contingency), which just over 50% of LAs reported. 
4.6.3 Response rates 
As noted in chapter 1, the commissioning survey data showed some regional variation 
in response rates. To test for potential problems as a result, we tested for significant 
differences between the 9 administrative regions of England for the main variables of 
interest. Fisher's exact test was used and the probabilities are as follows. 
• whether LAs had an internal market (p = 0.345) 
• whether there was a different commissioning process for in-house compared with 
independent providers (p = 0.865) 
• key budget holder - in-house residential (p = 0.011) 
• key budget holder - external residential (p = 0.031 ) 
• external pricing options (p = 0.214) 
• Internal pricing options (p = 0.152) 
In most cases no significant difference was found with the exception of key budget 
holding. This has potential implications for our 'internal markets' variable - see above. 
However, the internal market variable is based on budget holding information, and it 
was not significant. Therefore, along with closer inspection of the data, we infer that the 
significance of the Fisher Exact test in this case was due not to regional differences in 
budget holding by providers, but due to differences in budget holding at purchasing 
team level rather than at a more strategic level. This finding does not undermine any 
conclusions about control and ownership relationships. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter outlines some of the main historical antecedents to the current social care 
system. Three are most relevant. First, the local government re-organisation of 1970 and 
the establishment of unifíed Social Services Departments (SSDs) on 1 April 1971 as a 
result of the Seebohm Report in 1968 and the 1970 Local authority Act. Second, the 
series of reports and legislation of the late 1980s and early 1990s, including in 
particular, the Audit Commission report of 1986, the Griffiths report of 1988 and 
culminating in the NHS and Community Care Act 1990. Third, the 1997 White Paper 
and New Labour policy that prompted a shift away from the unfettered market, but was 
not a return to municipal bureaucracies of the 1970s. 
These policy developments have left what might be described as a somewhat eclectic 
system. Although the reforms of the 1970s consolidated the social services 
responsibility of councils and constituted an attempt to make a 'universalistic' service, it 
remained means-tested and rooted in the provisions of the 1948 National Assistance 
Act. Social services were not viewed as a universal service because the majority of 
people could go through their lives and not use social care. The loosening of social 
security rules created, for a time, a more diverse demand-side but now the vast majority 
of state-supported care is LA-purchased. Nonetheless, these arrangements did result in a 
far larger and more diverse supply side. The legacy therefore is a present system with 
wíde variation between the 150 local authoríties with social services responsibilities in 
terms of the balance between quasi-market and in-house arrangements. Furthermore, a 
consequence of the new public management policies, and thereafter New Labour's third 
way has been new approaches and variety in the contractual relationships between 
councils and the independent sector providers. 
This chapter has described the variety of organisational and contractual arrangements 
empirically by looking at changes in expenditure and activity over time, and also by 
describing a number of cross-sectional indicators of ownership and control, and 
reimbursement arrangements. If pushed to generalise, the residential care system in 
England is typically composed of market governance arrangements, with even some 
indication of internal markets in some areas. Nonetheless, hierarchical arrangements do 
remain a signifícant minority arrangement, perhaps covering a fífth of publicly funded 
residential care for older people. 
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Chapter 5. Markets and hierarchies 
The institutional arrangements that govern the undertaking of transactions are many and 
varied. As described in chapter 4, social care is no exception, involving very 
complicated transactional arrangements by most standards. Nonetheless, as indicated in 
chapter 3, many of the relevant dimensions are aligned around two archetype 
governance structures, markets and hierarchies. This chapter considers the economic 
advantages and disadvantages of this choice in efficiency terms - a normative 
judgement as also described in chapter 3. As such this chapter underpins the 
development of relevant empirical hypothesis regarding the likely transaction and 
production costs of markets and hierarchies in social care. 
This chapter attempts to make more formal the arguments made in chapter 3 about the 
comparative net benefits of markets and hierarchies, using the concepts developed in 
that chapter and underpinned by the model outlined in chapter 1. The claims advanced 
in chapter 3 - that in comparison to markets, hierarchies have lower transaction costs 
and higher production costs - are analysed. The aim is to detail the problem formally, 
explore the internal consistency of the arguments and so develop testable propositions. 
The analysis below throws up many nuances and particularities that significantly colour 
our consideration of the choice between market and hierarchical governance. 
Chapter 3 described the particular features that distinguish market and hierarchical 
governance structures. It emphasised the need, when comparing markets and hierarchies 
to comprehensively compare their benefits net of their costs, including net transaction 
costs. As outlined in that chapter, there are transaction costs and benefits in terms of 
both the co-ordination and motivation problems, where in practice, economic activity is 
not perfectly co-ordinated or motivated. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, it develops the model described in 
chapter 1 to characterise market and hierarchy governance structures. Second, it draws 
out the net transaction benefits of each. Third, it considers a range of mediating features, 
and in setting these in a social care context, infers the likely effects on transaction and 
production costs of choices between social care markets and hierarchies. Fourth, it 
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considers how governance tasks will be carried out in each governance structure. Fifth, 
the net transaction and production costs are assessed on this basis. Finally, empirical 
propositions are advance and discussed. 
5.1 A model 
As noted in chapter 1, the theoretical model has two time periods. In this chapter we 
need only consider an aggregate second 'provision' period. This slightly simplified 
structure is given in Figure 1-1. 
Figure 5-1. Stylised timeline 
T i m e l Periodi T i m e 2 p e r i o d 2 
Initial investment, 
/ (<P) 
A 
Configure inputs, Final production, 
v 
n f 
Nature 
chooses cp 
Nature 
chooses o 
Nature 
chooses co 
and P 
Signal (cp ) of (p Signais (u ) of u Signais (or) of CD 
The nature of uncertainty is the same as in chapter 1 i.e. uncertainty exists regarding the 
state of world, which is summarised by the parameters (p, co, u and P, and resolved at 
various times during the production process. To briefly recap, at time 1 nature chooses 
cp, which we can think of as contextual, external factors that affect investment. 
Investment occurs to generate inputs into the final product with the relationship between 
investment, y", and the final product mediated by the parameter cp. Investment is 
assumed to have a proportional cos t ,y . 
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At time 2 u can be measured and shortly thereafter ß. The former parameter reflects, for 
example, the user's needs characteristics that can be measured (subject to error) by a 
pre-care assessment. The latter term ß reflects the costs of caring for a person (for given 
outcome). It depends on the user's needs profile and also how their particular needs 
profile fits with the nature of the service provided. It is therefore a refinement of initial 
assessed characteristics o (i.e. knowing ß is sufficient to also know the value of u) - see 
section 1.3.1 on page 15 and thereafter. 
Ideally investment should be geared to u to allow the best 'care technology' to be in 
place. However, since this parameter is not chosen by nature at the point of investment, 
only a general investment 'type' is possible (at some given expectation of u). Using the 
initial investment, care packages of inputs are put together and configured. In turn, this 
configuration defines the type of output, q(y" (q>),u,ß). The benefit fonction R measures 
how well these care packages fit the characteristics of users, given the initial 
investment, y". We assume that configuration involves a fixed cost, which without loss 
of generality, can be set at zero. After the care packages are put together they are 
implemented for users in the home, with type as above, and to an extent D i.e. the 
number of care packages, or simply, 'output'. The nature of the 'product' will depend 
on how well residents actually respond to care package, and this is in part indicated by 
the parameter ß. So a home might provide places that are aimed at people with, for 
example, more severe needs. However, the final configuration of the service will 
depend on the characteristics of the people actually placed. So if more people than 
expected have behavioural problems, or nursing care needs, or whatever, the actual 
service provided will adapt to meet those needs (e.g. a changed staff mix, even changes 
to the physical environment). 
The costs of producing the care package depends on a level of effort, ye, made by 
providers, as well as the characteristics of the care package and the provider type, co. 
The cost of effort to the provider is e(ye) and its effectiveness ("productivity") depends 
on the parameter co. 
This chapter is concerned with alternative ways to organise social care transactions. The 
'transaction' is therefore the focus, and as a resuit, our attention is on the relationship 
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between the purchaser and provider undertaking the transaction. We therefore refer to 
'the' (single) purchaser and provider. 
Transactions produce an exchange surplus to the stakeholders involved: 
(5.1) TS = v(ya, D; o, q>, p ) - c(ya ,ye, D\o, <p, p, o>) 
where the level of investment is y", and output levels are D. The function V is the total 
value of the final produci to the purchaser, and total surplus ( T S ) is this value less the 
total costs of its production, C. The latter are affected by the degree of cost cutting effort 
employed by the provider. 
To be more explicit about the functional form of (5.1), we can define total value as the 
integrai of output x from 0 up to level D\ 
D 
(5-2) V = , q, x; u, <p, 
o 
where Ro < 0. Costs are assumed to take the form: 
(5-3) C(D)= c{d)D 
to allow, to some extent, for économies of scale, and in particular, we assume, CD > 0. 
We will also assume that average costs fall relatively slowly such that RD<cD< 0, VD, 
and that CDD < 0 and CDDD = 0. We re-write surplus as: 
D 
(5-4) S = ]/?(/, q, x; u, <p, - C(y" ,ye,D; u, q>, co, p) 
o 
where the optimal, x = D is the output level such that = CD, and so where 
SD = R - CD = 0. The above is simple (cardinal) statement of net benefit. People derive 
value from services provided. The amount of value will depend on their preferences 
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(although we need not be concerned with the exact impact of preferences), but will be 
offset by the (opportunity) costs involved. 
Purchasers are budget limited and so the number of care packages can increase when 
costs fall. Function (5-4) can also be written as follows, being explicit about service 
type q: 
5.1.1 Effort and investment tasks 
The 'investment' and 'effort ' actions here are conceived to be complex and multi-
dimensional. They are ongoing projects rather than one-offs and therefore require a 
string of décisions and spécifications. As described in chapter 3, the opportunity to 
spécialisé leads to a distinction, in model terms, between purchasers and providers. In 
this framework, production is characterised by effort, and is made (only) by providers, 
primarily involving labour/human assets. In theoretical terms, providers are agents. In 
practice, there are also labour inputs into purchasing tasks, and these tasks have costs. 
However, these tasks are closely concerned with management, being a statutory duty of 
authorities, and can be treated as undertaken by the principal. Furthermore, ail councils 
organise these purchasing activities under the same broad governance arrangements (i.e. 
hiérarchies), whether or not they use markets or hiérarchies for care production. For 
these reasons we do not need to construct principal-agent relationships in purchasing. 
We therefore sidestep issues of organisation of labour and effort in purchasing.19 
Prior to discussing governance structure issues, we need to be clear how governance 
tasks could be arranged in relation to production effort and investment. As is common 
in the literature, we suppose that it is impossible to write a contract directly on effort, 
although a 'contract' specifying instructions as to how efforts should be directed is 
possible. If a purchaser wished to develop such a contract they would have to negotiate 
with the provider. Instructions would have to be made in a way that was clear and, to be 
effective, minimised the chance of misinterpretation by providers - deliberate or 
19 In cost terms, purchasing activities are also much smaller than in magnitude. 
o 
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otherwise. With relevance to these ideas, we divide costs into two types. First, in 
making appropriate measurement of relevant circumstances. And second, in undertaking 
(unilateral) planning to draw up instructions. Third, in 'contracting' with providers to 
convey these instructions. Often the latter two are conflated into one 'contracting' or 
'bargaining' cost category (e.g. see chapter 2), but here the distinction is useful. In 
particular, if the provider unilaterally undertakes effort then they need to measure and 
plan, but not contract. If the purchaser wishes to convey instructions, however, they 
would have to measure, plan and contract. 
As regards investment, we are primarily referring to the process of putting in place 
physical assets. Again a stream of décisions and spécification are required in this task. 
In this case, either purchasers or providers can unilaterally decide investment levels and 
contracting need not be required. Measurement tasks would be required by the investing 
party as well as the need to plan, but there is no contacting activity, so no contracting 
cost. Alternatively, purchaser and provider could undertake investment together. Since 
they are organisationally distinct, some form of coordination would be required - they 
would, in short, have to agree an investment contract. Both would have to measure and 
plan, and both would have to agree a verifiable contract in this case. In theory, the 
investment process does involve some labour input and hence a potential need to 
contract in relation to effort. However, since this would apply whatever the govemance 
arrangement - unilateral or contracted investment - we can ignore it from the analysis 
below. 
In the main, these individuai governance tasks have a fixed and variable cost element. 
To limit the complexity of our problem, we will assume that measurement tasks are 
(mainly) fixed. The others are variable: they increase with the size of the effort or 
investment task, albeit to a diminishing degree. In other words, to write and monitor a 
contract for any amount of investment or effort involves a signifïcant cost. Beyond the 
initial (large cost) level, marginal increases in costs diminish rapidly (for example, as in 
Figure 5-2). 
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Figure 5-2. Contracting costs 
Table 5-1 summaries the various governance costs outlined above in relation to effort 
and investment tasks. 1t lists the options for how effort or investment could be 
organised. Below we will describe how these various costs - T for measurement, W for 
planning and B for contracting/bargaining - can differ for each option according to the 
governance structure - market or hierarchy - that is in opération. 
Table 5-1. Governance costs 
Provider Purchaser 
Measure Pian Contract Measure Pian Contract 
Effort 
Provider undertakes jVK Wr 0 0 0 0 
unilaterally 
Purchaser instructs 0 0 By A > 0 jy L Wy ByL 
(contracts with) the 
provider 
Investment 
Provider undertakes 
jiy'K Wr 0 0 0 0 
unilaterally 
Purchaser undertakes 0 0 0 jy-'L wy 0 
unilaterally 
Purchaser and provider 
rpy K wy ByK y\vJL Wy ByL 
contract 
The two options regarding effort both involve an (equal) planning cost. Because this 
cancels out in comparison, we simply set it to zero below. Treating measurement costs 
as fixed, it then means that the marginal transaction cost of a provider unilaterally 
undertaking effort is zero. If the purchaser instructs the provider, however, the marginai 
d\ByK + Byi 
transaction cost is —1L J . Planning costs for investment also cancel out and so 
dye 
are dropped. Again this simplifies the analysis by making unilateral actions - here 
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investment - have a zero marginai cost. When parties contract on investment, marginai 
costs are non-zero. 
5.1.2 Product contracts 
Contracts can also be written on product characteristics (type and output) - called the 
product contract, denoted the g-contract. The costs of determining product contracts are 
assumed to be very similar in profile to those of effort or investment contracting i.e. 
initially high but then diminishing. The rationale for this assumption is detailed below. 
At this stage, it is worth being explicit that we are dealing with a complex product and a 
contract that can be potentially verified by a third party. Not all contracts need to be 
verifiable of course (again, this is discussed below). But when referring below to a 
product contract, it means a verifiable one. Clearly, the cost of determining a contract 
will depend on what that contract is designed to achieve. The more detail that is 
included, the less is the chance for mis-interpretation later, particularly as the state of 
the world reveáis itself. We suppose that to set up negotiation, to commit to an 
agreement, to draft a legal (or legalistic) document etc., means high initial costs, even 
for a minimally specified contract. In addition, it is likely that some 'criticai mass' of 
spécification will be required if a product contract has any chance of being robust 
against potential challenge later.20 
5.1.3 Non-contracting activities 
As discussed, contracts need not be agreed between stakeholders for investment and 
effort to be made; the stakeholder actually undertaking these actions may decide to do 
so unilaterally. Of any total investment or effort, some proportion may be undertaken by 
contract and some, the residual, may be non-contracted. In notation, respectively, we 
have: 
(5-6) y = yJC + yjN ,j=a, e 
20 The detail does not need to be in each individual contract. In social care, broadly speaking, the public 
sector as overall commissioner has put in place a whole raft of inspection and régulation against a set of 
standards - as laid out in the Care Standards Act 2000 and subséquent régulation. We could certainly 
interpret these as part of a product contract. Individual commissions may not have to bear these costs, but 
taken as a whole the public sector in commissioning services fiom the care market, certainly does. In the 
past, moreover, the équivalent régulation did not apply to in-house providers. 
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where the j superscript refers to either investment (a) or effort (<?). In terms of notation, 
we need to be clear that any activity that is indirectly induced by a contract is regarded, 
nonetheless, as contracted (otherwise, no effort would be contracted effort). 
Product spécifications can be written in a (potentially verifïable) contract, qck , left 
subject to a non-contracted agreement, denoted qk, or not agreed at ail. Because 
contracted and non-contracted agreements should not overlap, we can assume that: 
(5-7) qk=qCk+qNk 
Contracted product spécifications can vary. For example, contracts could have precise 
détails as to the required product, i.e. high qck , or could be very loosely or informally 
defined i.e. low qk . When relevant spécifications are left non-contracted or not agreed 
at ali, producers have residuai control. 
This conception of product contracts is at a high level of abstraction. It also implicitly 
assumes a framework of contract law and conventions exists in the wider economy to 
underpin the use of product contracts. The aim is to capture the idea of a general choice 
between a highly specified but expensive contract, or a loosely specified, cheap 
agreement, both of which have been used in social care markets in England (see 
chapters 3 and 4, and Wistow et al., 1996). We also want to capture the distinction 
between a legalistic, verifiable contract and a 'relational', informai contract (Sako, 
1992). 
5.1.4 Transaction costs 
To be precise about these transaction costs, we use notation that is explicit about the 
governance structure in use. We define B'J as the bargaining cost in governance structure 
i = M, H (market or hierarchy) and to stakeholder j = K, L (provider or purchaser). We 
assume that: 
126 
(5-8) B'j = B ( i J ( f c ) + B r i / ^ + f ^ B f 
t=i 
that is, total bargaining costs are the sum of any bargaining on investment (yaC) and 
effort (yeC), and also produci type q, for each relevant state of the world. Stakeholders 
only realise one investment and effort project, so although bargaining costs of these 
activities might differ by state, there is no need to sum them across states. Bargaining 
costs increase with the level of the contracted action, that is, ôBfv{yaC)/dyaC > 0 and 
ôB[ '' {y'c)/d yeC > 0 . Unilaterally undertaken actions, as noted above, require no 
bargaining costs. 
In addition we can also be more explicit about who bears (fîxed) measurement costs.21 
In order to ascertain the nature as described by the parameters, cp, U and OD, of the 
current state k, stakeholders must pay measurement cost 7^, w h e r e , / i s the parameter to 
be m e a s u r e d , / = cp, u , co, in governance structure i = M, H (market or hierarchy) and to 
stakeholder j = K, L (provider or purchaser). To contract on investment requires 
information on cp. To contract on q (and D) requires cp and u, as do instructions 
regarding effort. 
5.1.4.1 Notation 
Regarding notation with respect to the parameters, I - cp, u, co, ß, a signal is denoted Is. 
To re-cap, a signal is information a person receives without properly measuring so it is 
late and imperfect. A report from a party that has measured I to the other party that has 
not, is written / . 
In what follows we distinguish between behaviour that is first-best and that which is 
optimal given transaction costs or other local constraints. In particular, ye*F denotes first 
best effort (in this case), ye denotes the optimal level, generally for markets and ye* 
21 This distinction is made because people can of course measure the state of the world without having to 
contract. In theory measurement could be treated as variable, with a variable rather than fixed cost. This 
added complication does not however add to the comparison of markets versus hiérarchies assuming 
that any stakeholder optimises a measurement décision, the resuit of a lower marginai measurement cost 
under one governance structure compared to another is just a différent total measurement cost. This is 
how it is included in the model. 
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denotes alternative optimal level - for hiérarchies - where comparisons between 
optimal levels are warranted. 
Stakeholders are initially assumed to be risk neutral. The implications of this 
assumption are explored latter. Nonetheless, in that we are dealing with organisations 
rather than individuáis, risk neutrality might be argued to be appropriate. 
5.2 Optimal governance 
Governance choices involve a considération of both organisational structure and 
contractual arrangements. As was discussed in previous chapters, a key dimension of 
organisational structure is not so much who owns the means of purchasing and 
providing, but rather who controls them. In particular, the defining characteristic of a 
hierarchical transaction is that one party (the "subordinate") is Willing to cede 
considerable control of actions that directly affect them to the other party ("super-
ordinates"). Market or bilateral transactions are characterised by a sharing of this 
control, where décisions are subject to mutual agreement. 
The types of contractual arrangements used between parties tends to be related to the 
choice of organisational structure - see 3.3.3.2 especially of chapter 3. Nonetheless, 
whilst this chapter considers explicit choices between market and hierarchy, it does 
consider a range of relevant contractual arrangements, particularly for market structures. 
In hiérarchies, stakeholders cede control over the spécification of actions and price 
setting to hierarchical super-ordinates (managers). The super-ordinate then collects 
information about (p, u and possibly ©, and determines contract spécifications when 
they are needed. In this way, transaction costs are low: only super-ordinates have 
measurement costs. Bargaining costs are minimal because bargaining is one-sided and 
single clause (that is relating to only one state of the world, the current one). The 
subordinate will have to accept reports about relevant circumstances from managers, 
although they can valídate these reports to some extent retrospectively when, through 
expérience, they gain signais of state-of-the-world parameters. 
In markets, stakeholders negotiate over ali product characteristics and prices {q, D,p}; 
each has a stake in these décisions and a share of control rights over agreements about 
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them. In other words, control is dispersed. Stakeholders may also contract over 
investment and effort actions, although this depends on the transaction costs of doing 
so. In order to exercise control shares, stakeholders need information on circumstances 
pertinent to ail actions and prices. Ail stakeholders must have some information about 
circumstances cp and o. If a stakeholder were to rely totally on reports of these 
circumstances, they would be ceding control over associated actions, and transaction 
would effectively be hierarchical. 
This chapter is concerned with social care services transactions between purchasers and 
providers. To re-cap, in hiérarchies, the 'purchaser' is the super-ordinate instructing the 
provider - as subordinate - about the actions required to produce social care. We are 
concerned with the interface between care planning and production, and it is 
transactions across this interface that are hierarchically organised. Super-ordinates need 
not map directly onto traditional management organisational forms. Indeed, here the key 
function of super-ordinates is that they collect information about (p and o, and so they 
need not be 'senior managers' as the terms is commonly used. More likely, middle 
managers that might secure this information from other, non-provider subordinates (e.g. 
care managers), are super-ordinates. 
5.2.1 Market 
Each stakeholder collects information o and cp. The purchaser and provider negotiate 
over the product contract (in q, D and P), but the provider makes décisions about effort, 
ye. In many cases, the provider also makes décisions about investment, y", although 
there are situations where purchasers and providers might directly contract on ya. 
Generally, therefore, in addition to measurement costs, the main transaction costs 
concern the bargaining costs of determining the product contract. These costs will be 
large. 
The général expected utility function for providers is (1.4) in chapter 1. Here we expand 
some of the terms in that function (detailing transaction costs T and B, and also overall 
costs to include provider effort as while as other production costs) so that provider 
expected utility in markets will be: 
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(5.9) U=±yk[-y; - T'"MK + ( p k - c k ( D k ) ) D k r ^ - e ^ - T ^ - BMK+^(pk)rMK} 
k = 1 
The superscripts on 7* refer respectively to the circumstance for which information is 
collected, u or cp; whether it is collected under market, M or hierarchy, H; and whether 
collection is by the purchaser L or the provider K. Thus, for example, TkMK is the cost 
of collecting information about circumstance (p under market governance by the 
provider. The term B is the cost of contracting, and depends on the type of contract used 
- see next section. In most cases it will be sizeable. 
The utility fonction includes a term, rMK, which is the probability that, in this case the 
provider, will have their report of relevant information accepted (and therefore have the 
transaction proceed) - see section 1.4.1 in chapter 1. It allows for the provider to mis-
report information if they wish, but with an attendant risk of losing the contract. This 
probability will depend on how much information the purchaser collects, and therefore 
what basis for comparison they have with the provider's report. In particular, 
r w(ß,ß,o) ,ö)] < 1 if the report differs from the actual value (where we have assumed 
that the purchaser's signal is unbiased): either, ß ^ ß or co * co. If the misrepresenting 
party, in this case the provider, is caught then we assume that payments are forfeit: the 
purchaser expresses zero demand (D = 0), otherwise demand is Dk - see chapter 1. 
Therefore, in the above utility fonction, with probability rMK, the provider's output is D 
with unit revenue p. Expected demand is xk = rMKD. 
The term ij> reflects disutility from excessive pricing, which limits access to the service. 
Changes in prices, beyond some baseline price, increase disutility: v/ < 0 . Nonetheless, 
increases in profit per unit output, and so price, always yield net marginai increases in 
utility, other things equal, that is: \ j / ( o o ) > - 1 (assumption 1-1 - see chapter 1). 
To sum up, provider utility is expected profit (price, p, minus production cost c for each 
unit expected output x) minus investment cost y", minus expected effort cost e(ye), 
minus contracting/bargaining costs, B, minus measurement costs T and finally adjusted 
for disutility \\i. 
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Overall then in state k, provider utility is 
JJ — _ y " _ f'PMK _ JivMK JJ II 
(5.10) 
where U" is second period utility. 
For the purchaser utility is: 
(5.11) Z = ± l k rMK )Rk{x]dx-PkDM\-rMK)z-Tr-Tr-B 
The purchaser's utility depends on whether the current provider is discharged (for 
misrepresentation). If the provider is not discharged then output is D; otherwise, it is 
assumed that the purchaser can fmd a replacement provider, and secures utility z. As a 
shorthand we can write Z° = (l - rMK ]z . 
5.2.1.1 Contract types 
Consider first adaptive contracîs, where stakeholders wait until ali output relevant 
parameters of the state of the world can be measured. In the present model, this means <p 
and u, and so contracts are agreed at time 2. In other words, the provider makes a 
unilatéral décision about investment, without having agreed a contract. When they are 
determined, these 'CA' contracts take the form of a service spécification q, D, and 
payment for provision. Since most relevant information is known at time 2, the market 
appraisal (giving cp) and the (pre-care) assessment (giving u) have already been 
undertaken, service spécification is straightforward; the contract only has to cover the 
current situation, not ail possible circumstances. Bargaining costs are thus low 
compared with having to make spécifications for ail possible contingencies. Payment 
involves a division of period 2 surplus. We assume, in particular, that stakeholders write 
contracts based on the expected utilities (in state k) at the end of period 2, which are 
respectively: 
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(5-12) U" = {pk -ck)xk + rMK\\i{pk)-rMKe{yl)— BMK 
for the provider, and 
(5-13) Z"=rmDjRk{x)dx-rMKpkDk+Z0-BML =- )xk(p)dp + Z° - BML 
0 P=R(rr\) 
There are many ways that the purchaser and provider could agree how to share the 
transaction surplus.22 In markets, we will assume a Nash bargaining model ((Nash, 
1953)). Bargaining over price occurs to allocate the exchange surplus between 
stakeholders. To simplify the problem, assume (innocuously) that v|/(p^ ) = DxiJ(pk ) i.e. 
that disutility of excessive prices is felt per unit output.23 The standard result is the 
sharing of surplus is according to a share parameter n e (0,l). Surplus, in this case, is the 
sum of second period utility i.e. I f + Z from (5-12) and (5-13). Using (5-5) we have: 
(5-14) U" =ìxrMKS + ìi(rMKxV-rMKe{/)+Z°-BMK-BML) 
and 
(5-15) Z" = (l - + (l - n ) ^ - rme(ye)+ Z° - BMK - BML ) 
In other words the provider gets a share ¡a of the surplus with the purchaser gets the rest. 
A full derivation is in Annex 5-1. State k total utility, from (5.9), is 
Uk = u" - y\ - rMK - rMK, or substituting the above: 
(5-16) Uk =vrMKS + \x{rMKy-rMKe{ye)+Z*-BMK-BML)-yak-rMK -rMK 
This is just adding the investment and measurement costs that are borne at time 1. This 
means that total purchaser utility is: 
(5-17) Zk = ( l - M > ^ + ( l - 4 r m y - r M K e { y e ) + Z ° - B m k -Bml)-T:ml-T?ml 
< 
22 It is important that they share the surplus efficiently, but the material result is that they do share, and 
not so much by how much exactly. 
23 Assumption 1-1 means: \(>'(p/t) = D4J'(pit)>-l (see chapter 1). 
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The second option is the full contingent contract that involves determining a sériés of 
spécifications and associated reimbursements for ali potential states of the world. This 
type of contract is really only a theoretical possibility. As is universally assumed in the 
literature, the transaction costs of actually producing a full contingent-claims contract 
are prohibitive (see chapter 2). We will set it aside at this point, although for 
completeness, this form of contract is detailed in Annex 5-2. 
A third alternative is the cost sharing or incentive contract. It is based closely on the 
contract type discussed informally in section 2.2.4.2 and Annex 2-3 where individuals 
do write a contract to cover investment costs at the time of investment because they can 
anticipate and agree on what benefits each will accrue from that investment and so share 
the its costs accordingly. 
This 'CS ' contract has two parts. At time 1, stakeholders contract on investment 
agreeing to share investment costs in accordance with their expectation of net utility 
accrued for each possible o , given the investment in the first period (and circumstance 
<p). At time 2, once the actual value of u is known, parties contract for produci 
spécification and prices given period 1 investment. 
The first period problem is to choose the shares, <{>c = 1 - <|)Ä for provider and purchaser 
respectively, of investment cost ya, over utilities at time 1, which are 
(5-18) U12 = -tfcya +e[u"(/ jjoj - T v M K - T M K 
(5-19) Z / 2 = H > V + 4 Z ' 7 ( / ) | U ] ~ T " M L ~Tn M L 
and <|>c +<|)Ä = 1 (the superscripts mean state ' I ' and version '2 ' of the fiinction to 
distinguish the CA contract case). Expected utility in period 2 is given by (5-14) and (5-
15) respectively to give: 
(5-20) u'2 = -<|>cy + nn(/((|)c))- rMK - rMK 
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and 
(5-2i) z / 2 = - < | > V + ( i - ^ ) n ( j f l ( ( j ) c ) ) - r , p W i -TnML 
where n = rmS + rMKy - rMKe(ye)+ Z° - BML - BMK ,24 Differentiating these functions 
respectively with respect to the share gives: 
and 
ÔZ'2 
which simply indicates how the purchasers or providers utility would change if their 
share changed. Now, y" = yac —— = -yac and <|)* = 1 - <|>c, so: 
^ d Z ' 2 S Z ! 1 36* „ x c « » r r <. n » (5-24) — r = = -ylc +tcylc +y'+n.y'e - j in 
Suppose we are comparing this situation with the CA contract situation (where <(>c = 1). 
There are two options. First, the purchaser will happily take a share of the investment 
ÔZ12 dZn 
cost so long as —— < 0 . However, when —— = 0 , the provider is likely to see 
9cj) d<|> 
ÔU'2 
— — < 0 i.e. the provider stili has gains to make. The second option is therefore for the 
ô<j> 
provider to offer further compensation to the purchaser in return for a higher cost share. 
This could continue until, 
d U ' 2 d Z ' 2 n (5-25) — _ + — = 0 
24 Just to clarify the notation, strictly some of the bargaining costs in the/i 's are incurred in the first 
period and so n includes not only expected second period profit, but also first peri od bargaining costs. 
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At a share of <j>c, any small change in <|>c implies a gain to one party that is completely 
dU12 \ dZ12 \ 
offset by the loss to the other: — ) + — — (<|>cj= 0. Put another way, at values 
dty d<|> 
~ dU12 dZ12 
<|>c * <t>c, then we would have — - - * — p - and it would be possible for one party to 
d<|> dty 
compensate the other party for their loss as a resuit of the change in <|>c and stili gain. In 
other words (noting the transaction costs), the CS contract allows purchaser and 
provider to jointly maximise their utilities. 
5.2.2 Hierarchy 
Hiérarchies are characterised by top-down management as decision-making authority is 
vested in managers and ceded by employees, who accept the plans of managers. 
Planning the organisation's activities, such as what should be produced and how, is 
undertaken by mangers and these décisions then govern actual production. Generally, 
subordinates retain only décisions about their own effort. 
In terms of the model, managers (purchasers) collect information (p and u, and 
determine D, q and p. Indeed, that 'providers' do not collect information cp and u is 
what meaningfully differentiates hiérarchies from markets. To not collect this 
information and rely on reports from other parties, is to be effectively ceding control 
over décisions to that party, being unable to verify with any certainty the actual 
conditions that pertain. A central characteristic of hierarchical arrangements therefore is 
the lack of duplication of governance tasks, particularly, measurement and bargaining, 
as both parties collect relevant information and contract accordingly (Kreps, 1996). 
Managers in hiérarchies make décisions about investment, y", and bear production costs, 
c. They also provide instructions to producers that have a direct bearing on effort y . 
These instructions concern activities that employees undertake that both produce the 
desired quality and quantity of service and determine the costs of production. However, 
as transaction costs are positive, there are always some residual, un-contracted aspects 
of effort. Henee, the producer/employee has some control over y . Hiérarchies differ 
from market-based transactions in that an explicit product contract is not (usually) 
agreed. Since control is ceded to the super-ordinate who plans the nature of the required 
product, q, there is no bargaining required to determine it, and therefore no duplication 
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of effort as in a market. Instead, a 'contract' in the form of instructions to subordinates -
conceived here as directions regarding efforts - serves as the means to secure output. 
These instructions are by fíat and often adaptive and so, whilst subject to influence, are 
likely to have much lower transaction costs than formal product contracts.25 
Utility for the purchaser is: 
(5-26) 
z = ±yk )Rk(x)dx-ckDk -{jpk-ck)Dkj-Tf"-y¡ -TkHL 
+ 
i = l 
LÌ 
or writing zw = ^Rk{x)dx-ckDk ~{pk -ck)Dk, it is more succinctly, 
o 
(5.27) Z = X y k [rHLzw - TkvHL - y°k -T;hl - BHL + (l - rHL )zM ] 
k=1 
The main difference here compared to the market case is that now the 'purchaser' - i.e. 
the hierarchical super-ordinate - directly bears investment and production costs. In 
period 1, the purchaser pays cost TkHL to determine state 9 and cost y"k to make an 
investment of that level. In period 2, the purchaser informs the provider i.e. the sub-
ordinate of production requirements. If the sub-ordinate complies then the payoff for the 
super-ordinate is less the non-wage costs of production cD and the 'wage 
rent', which is pwkDk = (pk - ck )Dk. 
Hierarchical purchasers direct the provider's efforts. Although the state of the world is 
known - so that instructions only need to cover current circumstances - like investment, 
production effort is complicated and multi-dimensional, and spécification and 
25 In relation to the literature (i.e. Kreps, 1990a) we are dealing with ceding of control as in the employer-
employee relationship, and not with the case where the purchaser/principal cedes control to the provider 
(although the same principles hold of reducing transactions costs against the chance of being exploited). 
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monitoring of provider actions will be a costly task. The term BHL represents these costs. 
We assume that this cost varies according to how thorough the instructions are 
regarding how the provider is to deploy efforts. To model this feature, suppose that total 
effort has two components, effort that is contracted, yeC, and effort that is not, yeN , so 
that: 
(5-28) ye=yeC+yeN 
Note that transaction costs are increasing in contracted effort: B1"',. > 0 . 
/ 
5.2.2.1 Public sector hierarchies and publicly funded services 
The probability that the sub-ordinate will comply with instructions depends on how 
truthful the super-ordinate is about relevant prevailing circumstances (i.e. about (p and 
o). Since the provider/sub-ordinate does not collect information about 
prevailing circumstances at this stage, instead receives only a (noisy) signal cp5 and v s , 
there is an opportunity for the purchaser to misrepresent its value and thereby reduce the 
subordinates payment, and hence their utility given circumstances cp and u . In practical 
terms this assumes that the purchaser undertakes the assessment and then reports the 
results to the provider. The provider will gain information later during the provision of 
care, but at this stage relies on the purchaser 's report (along with the noisy signal).26 
The super-ordinate's choices regarding such 'exploitation' turn on what happens when 
the provider detects misrepresentation, the utility consequences of which are 
Providers that detect misrepresentation have two options. First, they can simply quit. 
Second, they can stay on but scale back effort i.e. to shirk on effort by not complying 
fully with manager 's effort instructions. Shirking involves subordinates misrepresenting 
the value of OD, in order to hide reduced effort. Super-ordinates could in theory measure 
this private information co and therefore automatically detect shirking. However, doing 
so involves substantial transaction costs T , ìHL. Also, even if they do measure, super-
ordinates may stili prefer not to sack 'shirkers' because to attempt to do so when the 
26 There are of course principal-agent problems as between the 'management' super-ordinate and the staff 
actually conducting the assessment. These staff are employees but not providing employees and this 
distinction is important in a comparison with providers in markets. 
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purchaser is misrepresenting cp and/or u, is likely to damage its réputation. When 
fighting dismissal or attempting to gain some compensation it is very much in the 
interest of ex-employees to broadcast their grievances regarding the exploitation by the 
super-ordinate. There may also be other safeguard to protect the employee e.g. in 
employment law (see in particular Williamson, 1994) and/or from unions. The 
conséquence is that even when measuring ©, some employees could shirk and keep 
their jobs. 
If shirkers are dismissed this occurs before production but the adverse conséquences to 
the super-ordinate's réputation will mean to hire replacement employees will cost more 
than wages paid when there is no misrepresentation of (p and/or u (see next section for 
détails of how subordinates are replaced). The same situation applies when providers 
decide to quit themselves (the first option above). If shirking occurs, sub optimal effort 
will mean lower utility for the super-ordinate, or if re-hiring (or renegotiation of 
employees rémunération packages) occurs this will involve a re-contracting cost/higher 
wages. 
Overall then these assumptions are to convey that managers face a potential cost if they 
try to exploit their employees too much. These assumptions are really a question of 
degree, but it seems reasonable to assume that at some point, exploitation goes too far 
and the repercussions affect the organisation. We make these assumptions because any 
résultant shirking or re-hiring cost will be ineffïcient relative to the first best situation, 
and of course in comparison with markets. 
In model terms, the utility the super-ordinate can expect if their misrepresentation of cp 
and/or u is detected will be less than that level they would have accrued had no 
misrepresentation taken place. We denote this différence as ms{o" ) for the shirking 
case or \ for the renegotiation/replacement case where 
mk(QH)> 0,VBH > 0 ,k = S,R noting that the size of super-ordinate's misrepresentation 
is 0 " = QM(cpf (cpt ), cp*, vsk ), òk), with QH = 0 being no misrepresentation.27 In the limit 
27 Within hierarchies common ownership and employment, and continuous, adaptive and often relatively 
informai and inter-personal interaction between super-ordinate and subordinate will facilitate the 
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case, the costs of detected misrepresentation may be so large as to make the hierarchy 
untenable so that the fiinder switches purchasing to market-based providers (see chapter 
3). Then super-ordinate utility will be at their réservation, Z°. Whatever the final 
outcome, it is also reasonable to expect that the cost m will also be non-negatively 
related to QH: m d > 0 . 
If purchasers do not directly measure co - because, say, measurement is too expensive -
they must rely on a noisy signal. This gives providers a (further) opportunity to shirk on 
effort, claiming in their report rô, that ìo is more adverse than the purchaser believes. 
We will stylise this process somewhat for convenience. At the beginning of the 
production period, providers make their report ©. This is accepted with probability of 
rm (co5,cò)e [0,l], in which case the current provider goes on to produce output D with 
instructions y e C , based on circumstances co. Otherwise, the provider is dismissed, and a 
new sub-ordinate is hired, who in turn makes a report ò . 
Providers that quit because they have detected purchaser misrepresentation receive 
utility UM = Ü(d" = 0), the utility of a market based provider given conditions (p and u. 
Providers that are released because their shirking was detected find other employment to 
receive utility if ; moreover because they get a 'bad reference' since they were sacked 
rather than resign, iß < i f 1 . In this case, when providers detect misrepresentation by the 
super-ordinate, iß is higher than when no detection occurs because the credibility of the 
purchaser's bad reference suffers in the former case. Providers that are not released 
receive wages w*, payable in arrears (which can be written wk = pMkDk, the unit wage 
rent pk by output). Their utility is uw = (w-e(y^)+ vj/{pt}), wages less the disutility of 
both effort and excessive prices. Wages are the subordinates share of the transaction 
surplus, and so do not change underlying costs. Changes in wages, in other words, do 
not change optimal output. 
The provider's utility is: 
development of social relationships between stakeholders. As such super-ordinates may suffer direct 
disutility from the deliberate exploitation of fellow workers. 
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(5.29) U =±yk{r»L(r™(Wk 
k=\ 
or, writing uw = vf/jp^,}), and considering just state k, 
(5-30) Uk =rHL(rHKu,v +(ì-rHK)iI0)+(\-rHL}/M 
To clarify somewhat, if there are no information shortfalls, the provider 's utility is 
Uk = uw = (w- e{yek )+ \|/{pA}) i.e. wages less effort costs and any disutility the provider 
feels about service user ' s access to services. Using (5-4), surplus can be distinguished 
D 
by payment, i.e., ^R{x)dx - pD + {p- c)D = S . Substituting wage rent into (5-26) 
0 
gives, 
(5.31) Z = ¿ y j r - f e - wk)-yl -IT -Bhl +(\-r"L)zM} 
k=1 
5.2.2.2 Ceded control and misrepresentation 
In hierarchies in period 1, the super-ordinate (i.e. the manager and in this case the 
purchaser) measures cp, chooses investment/1 , and makes a report (p to the provider. To 
be able to hire subordinates - given a good reputation - the super-ordinate needs to at 
least equal the provider's opportunity utility. Assuming some form of market does exist, 
the utility a provider could expect if they moved to providing in that market serves as a 
good benchmark. This benchmark applies given subordinates perceptions of the values 
of (p and u , opportunity utility is a function of super-ordinate reports about the state-of-
the-world or equivalently misrepresentation, 9 , that is: £7(0") . This is an ex ante 
determined value and is assumed to be taken as Constant during the ensuing 
deliberations of hierarchical stakeholders. 
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This level sets the wages paid in arrears to the provider:28 
(5-32) uw =Ü{üH) 
and so, 
(5-33) w ^ e ^ + e ^ - y 
The maximisation problem where super-ordinates rely on a signal of to is: 
(5.34) maxZ = - w k ) - y ¡ - T * H L - T ? H L - B H L +(l-r,i!{dH))zM 
subject to 
w>Ü{eH)+e(y¡)- V 
Substituting for w gives: 
(5-35) m a x Z = rHL(QH\sk-u(Q")-e(y¡)+y)-y¡-TkvHL-T?"1 -Bhl +(l-rffl(e"))z" 
If providers accept the claims of purchasers about circumstances (p and u, their utility is, 
from (5-32), u = Super-ordinates have an incentive to claim that prevailing 
circumstances were deleterious so that providers should only expect a low payout and 
so low 
Suppose that the chance of avoiding detection r is a decreasing 
function of QH, such that r ^ < 0 , for all QH. Then the choice for the purchaser regarding 
9 ; / can be found by differentiating Z with respect to 0 ; / . 
28 Strictly, because providers might shirk, be detected and so dismissed, the amount the purchaser/super-
ordinate expects to pay is: r"Ku" + (i _ ynKuw + (i _ r"K )2 r"Ku"' + (l - r"K )\"Ku"' +... or 
summing, 
¿T-
= „"'. It is this function that is set to: 
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The value of Z will depend on whether subordinates detect misrepresentation, and if so, 
how they respond, as outlined above. To make these considerations clear, we can write 
the relevant functions i.e. s(q,&), e(e,è), zw(e,d) and Z w ( e , e ) being explicit about 
their dependence on, respectively, actual misrepresentation and misrepresentation 
detected by the subordinate, the latter being 0 . 
(5-36) max Z = rHL (eH )zw (oH , o ) - y[ - T»m - T»HL - Bm + (l ~rHL (o" ))zM (oH , 0" ) 
where, zr(0",o)= s(/(e",o))-£(o" )-<?(/ *(e'/))+x|/(e//)S s{ye *)- w(e",/ *), 
noting that when providers do not detect misrepresentation they put in optimal 
instructed effort:29 s(y'(e",o))=s(/ *). In other words, z^B^o) is the super-
ordinate's utility given that subordinates do not detect misrepresentation of <p or o, and 
so super-ordinates can expect their effort instructions to be followed, where the required 
effort levels are optimal.30 Thus, for each 0 w t h e subordinate is happy, prior to 
production, to accept wifò" ,ye *), the wage decided by the super-ordinate. 
Alternatively, if misrepresentation is detected after the super-ordinate decides payment 
w(9H ,ye *), so that it is treated as fixed, then the subordinates can be expected to shirk. 
Thus, utility in this case is the no (detected) misrepresentation level less m s(Q" ) as 
outlined in section 5.2.2.1 i.e., 
ZM = zw-mk(Q") 
29 Although optimal, / * , we show below that effort is not first best ye*F 
30 Note that 6W is the degree of misrepresentation - it does not affect the actual value of underlying 
Parameters, <p and u. Other things equal optimal values of effort would be based just on the actual value 
of these parameters. However, it may be the case t h a t / choices are (potential) signais of 8", but is only 
follows if the impact of effort on S is mediated by <p and u. If instead, <p and o simply shift the S function, 
then y''* is not a function of q> and o and no is no signalling effect. It is an innocuous simplification to 
assume the latter case to hold. Even in the former case, a lot is assumed by way of knowledge of precise 
functional relationships by subordinates for them to appreciate the signalling effect. 
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Assuming that purchasers make optimal decisions about investment for ali 9", i.e. 
Z,, + ( 1 - ^ ( 9 " ) ^ = 0 , t h e n Z ^ / * ) ^ = 0 , a n d s o , 
(5-38) J ^ =r»!-z>v(eH,0)+r"%, + ( l - r ^ Z M ( 9 " , 9 " ) 
or using (5-37), 
(5-39) W = ' " * ) _ r " ' " r " 
or 
Alternatively, if purchasers simply re-set wages to no misrepresentation levels if 
misrepresentation is detected, then the differential is31: 
(5-41) = 
Thus, in either the no detection or detection case payment w to subordinates is reduced 
in line with claimed circumstances (p and u that imply 0H. However, in the latter case, 
subordinates reduce effort in response, and so surplus S is also reduced. Indeed, along 
with the expected replacement costs m, the fall in S is the penalty the super-ordinate 
faces if misrepresentation is detected. 
31 In practice, there are significant costs to re-setting wages. First, working relationships with providers 
are already soured and increasing wages may be insufficient to rectify the damage. In other words, 
providers may stili shirk even with increased wages. Second, restoring wages might be difficult (a) 
because it sends out clear signais of purchaser's exploitative behaviour to government, users and potential 
employees. And (b), to restore effort, wages would have to rise to a level higher than the no-
misrepresentation level (so as to overcome the trust deficit), and this might not be feasible within budget 
constraints. Therefore, unless shirkìng has a very detrimental second order effect on S, these significant 
costs - meaning that mR > ms - suggests that super-ordinates would prefer to let subordinates to shirk. We 
will suppose this to be the case in what follows. 
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What then is the sign of (5-40)? At Qn = 0, by definition, rHL = 1 and raf = 0 , and 
ÔZ 
therefore 
m" 
= - w „ > 0 . This follows because w H < 0 (see (5-33)); super-
ordinates lower payment to subordinates below the agreed tariff under the guise that 
circumstances, (p or u are worse than then subordinate expects. Indeed, the benefits of 
misrepresentation are to reduce the share of exchange surplus that goes to the provider. 
Overall at 0W = 0, there are marginal benefits to misrepresentation. In turn, there is a 
positive probability that either providers shirk or have wages above market rates in 
public sector hierarchies. 
But how much will super-ordinates represent QH > 0? As regards the first term of (5-
40), when QH > 0 we have: 
s(/* (e" ,o))- w(e", / * )- zw (e", e" ) 
= s(ye' (e" ,o))- s(ye(gjh ,9'" ))+ ms (qh ) 
> 0 
When misrepresentation occurs providers shirk and so effort is not at its optimal level 
and net surplus is less than is optimal value. Also, r"„L < 0 by construction for dH > 0 
and so the first term in (5-40) is negative when QH > 0 (and zero when 8 " = 0). The 
second term remains positive. Replacement cost m is positive, and non-negatively 
related to 0. Detected misrepresentation induces shirking so ye6„ < 0. The marginal 
effect of a fall in effort is to reduce surplus, S > 0 , which means that the last term is 
negative. Overall, for small increases in QH above zero, the sign of (5-40) is ambiguous. 
For more significant increases, because of its second order effect r"HL H < 0 , the first 
term will dominate and the differential Z^will reduce to zero. Also, as —» 0, we have 
£ (g",)'*))^ < w8 < 0 . This follows because providers are likely to shirk to an extent 
such that effort savings at least corresponds to their loss in income (just prior to the 
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production phase) when payment is set at the level given QH with expected optimal 
effort i.e. when provider utility is: 
(5-43) uw ={w{%",e (y l* )ye(y l ) + y) 
To restore their utility with a change in effort, we have = w0 -e^y e Q - 0 . 
Furthermore, because effort is then sub-optimal, marginal benefits of effort exceed 
marginal costs: S^. (o", j / ) > e given the assumed second order effects. Hence, we 
have 
(5-44) 5 , ( e w , / ) ^ < w e < 0 
since y'e < 0 . 
Brushing over the detail, the above indicates that hierarchical managers face a trade-off. 
They benefit from using their better information to paint the world as more adverse than 
it really is, and so get more out of providers for less. But they always accept there is a 
chance that this ploy will backfire. If it does the result is production that falls short of 
the most efficient i.e. reducing the surplus that the purchaser values. This begins to 
convey that inefficient behaviour can occur in hierarchies even before any consideration 
of transaction costs. 
The problem for purchasers as modelled above is entirely instrumental. However, in 
addition to the penalties in m (which apply only if the stakeholder is caught), purchasers 
may intrinsically dislike exploiting providers (even modestly).32 This effect may be 
32 Reputation effects will strengthen the negative marginal effect. Suppose the cost m represents not just 
chance of losing the current surplus, but also all potential future transactions and associated net surpluses. 
Unless discount rates are very high, or expected repeat transactions very low, the present value of the 
opportunity cost m stream will be many multiples higher than the single period m. This is a standard folk 
theorem result (see Fundenberg and Tirole, 1992; Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Furthermore, super-ordinates 
may intrinsically dislike opportunistic behaviour. Its discovery could damage social relationships, or 
simply cause a 'loss of face' for super-ordinates. In this model, the purchaser is an agent for users 
collectively and indeed, the population of users of care services would benefit from opportunistic 
behaviour by the super-ordinate, through some combination of quantity and quality of service. In this 
regard therefore, for the super-ordinate to suffer disutility from misrepresentation, they are introducing 
imperfections into the agency relationship with users. Nonetheless, organisation theory would indicate 
that social relationships within organisations can develop to create these effects (for a pertinent overview 
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modelled as akin to a transaction cost in the purchaser's utility fonction, Z, with this 
transaction cost an increasing fonction of 0 e.g. Bm(oH) where (0" ) > 0 . Then even 
at Qh = 0, (5-40) reduces to: 
(5-45) 
ÔZ 
m" = -wa„ +B" 
which need not be positive if the intrinsic dislike is strong. 
5.2.3 Where no one undertakes governance tasks 
Above, we have shown how governance structure alternatives are distinguished 
according to the allocation of governance tasks. The implicit assumption is that some 
level of governance tasks is worth undertaking. In particular, that it is worth someone 
measuring the state of the world and writing a product specification. We could imagine 
a provider unilaterally investing and producing some generic product based only on 
expectations of (p and u, and then selling it in a simple transaction to the purchaser. The 
problem with this case is that the product is likely to be very ill-fitting with the actual 
state of the world, and thereby of low value to the purchaser, such that they may not 
wish to buy the product at any price that covers its cost. Moreover, both investment and 
effort levels will be below first best levels. Overcoming these problems could certainly 
justify the transaction costs, especially for complex and multi-dimensional products 
where the efficiency shortfalls will be large. 
5.3 Transaction benefits and costs 
5.3.1 Co-ordination 
Hierarchies are characterised by poor incentives to cut costs and to be responsive to 
changes in demand. These efforts are not rewarded (at least not directly) if providers are 
salaried, as is usually the case in hierarchies. Likewise, altering supply (e.g. from 
residential to home-based care) generates few (direct) benefits for providers but all the 
see Smelser and Swedberg, 1994). Also, note that whilst the purchaser's efforts are ultimately to satisfy 
the objective of best value for users, lines of accountability for purchasers are (at present) hierarchically 
arranged with central and local government as super-ordinates. Such a configuration is entirely consistent 
with purchasers wishing to maximise their surpluses, but can allow opportunities for purchaser's own 
preferences to work through. 
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costs. In markets the converse is trae: efficient, targeted production is rewarded with 
higher profits, at least in theory. The size of the problem in hiérarchies depends 
crucially on how closely providers are managed. If their instructions include explicit 
activities to eut costs or to adapt supply then the problem is minimised. But will 
managers have incentives to put in sufficient effort to make these detailed instructions? 
Also, managers can expect 'influence' from the provider division that will require 
efforts to appease. In any case in hiérarchies individuai initiative is likely to be under-
rewarded, relative to markets, and therefore under-supplied. 
Providers operating in markets would appear to have better incentives to make 
investments that improve net benefits. However, these providers may be much less 
eager to invest if those investments tie the provider to particular purchasers; that is, 
supply becomes dedicated to the purchaser - see chapter 2. The resuit would be the 
hold-up problem, described in chapter 2 i.e. under-investment. In hierarchical 
organisations the provider division operates under manager's instructions and so the 
level of investment is not (directly) a provider issue. Hierarchical providers may still not 
have incentives to make the investment at least cost, but under-investment for the above 
reasons is less likely. Public hiérarchies may face external constraints on investment in 
the form of difficulties in raising the required capital. 
Some of these ideas can be formalised using the models developed above. We can use 
as a baseline, the nature of coordination and motivation in a world without transaction 
costs. Absent transaction costs, ail parties collect information <p, u ß and co once they 
are revealed by nature. Motivation problems disappear since misrepresentation is fully 
detected. 
Using utility fonctions (5.9) and (5.11) and where ? = 1 V/ and 7* = 0 V/ welfare can 
written: 
(5-46) 
Wk=Uk + Z, = {pk - ck )Dk - yak - e(yî)+ i|/(pt ) + \ri{x)dx - pD 
o 
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We would have exactly the same resuit if we combined hierarehical purchaser and 
provider utilities (respectively, (5-26) and (5.29)) under these conditions. Differentiating 
this fonction with respect to investment and effort gives first best conditions: 
(5-47) ©]) - l = 0 
(where £[.] is the expected value of the as yet not revealed parameters) and 
(5-48) ^ L { f t * r ) - e = 0 
dyk 
We now turn to considering markets and hiérarchies where transaction costs are 
nonzero. 
5.3.1.1 Investment 
In markets, the provider makes décisions about yak and y[. We can consider différent 
market arrangements according to contracting options chosen. First, adaptive 
contracting which has the provider making the investment décision based on expected 
utility for each u, and on the understanding that the purchaser will procure a share of the 
benefits of the investment. Taking expectations over u of provider utility (5-16), gives 
E[uk\u] = E\irmS + v.(rMKy-rMKe(ye)+Z«-BMK - B M L ) - y a k ~ r m - r M * | u ] . The 
provider alone makes investment décisions and therefore B('J = 0 in (5-8). (At this 
stage the purchaser need not make a measurement of cp, but since this information will 
be needed in negotiating produci contracts in the second period, they will need to do so 
at that time). Furthermore, purchaser and provider have to contract only on one state of 
the world in the second period, so bargaining costs (but not measurement) will be very 
low. In any case, second period bargaining costs are irrelevant to investment décisions. 
Therefore, differentiating with respect to y"k, gives the first order condition: 
(5.49) = 0 
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which involves no marginal bargaining costs. Nonetheless, this level of investment is 
inefficient using (5-47) as a benchmark. Since we assume that S . . < 0 , this implies 
>i>'t 
that y". *' > y" i.e. investment is below the first best level. Moreover because S „ > 0 
* ri 
for all y then S*F >S. The inefficiency of CA contracts with regard to investment is 
due to mainly to the problems of renegotiation. Parties in this case do not write binding 
contracts at time 1 as in the complete contracts case (in order to avoid the very high 
bargaining costs) and essentially wait until after the investment when u is known to 
agree terms. By time 2 the provider's investment costs are sunk and do not enter into 
negotiations about future surplus division. Nevertheless, future surplus at time 2 is 
dependent on the nature of the first period investment. Therefore, the provider bears the 
full costs of the investment but can expect only a share of the benefits, in accordance 
with the agreed division of transaction surplus. 
Since investment is made before o is known and so on the basis of expectations about u, 
an alternative is for stakeholders to commit to a contract written at time 1 on expected 
product characteristics and associated prices, E[{q,x,p}], a so called generic contract. 
Such a contract would certainly save transaction costs since it would be a single state 
contract. Two problems arise however. First, when the actual value of o is known, it 
might be so different from the expected value that the purchaser would benefit from 
renegotiation of the contract for ideal specification at this time {¿/(o),x(u),/>(u)} even 
though they would lose the sharing of investment costs. In anticipation, providers would 
under-invest. In particular, suppose the vector Qe = E[{q,x,p}] represents the generic 
contract. Moreover, this generic product is optimal for ue (expected o). Then, expected 
surplus is: 
(5-50) (Qe\<2e)]=±yks(y:* (iQe\Qe;»k)<s(yr (Qe)<2e;ve) 
k=1 
This inequality follows because for all states Q * {x>k Qe, except by chance a state 
where v k = v e . If the shortfall in surplus is large, then conceivably, 
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(5-51) s ( > ^ ß * ( u 4 K ) > 4 s G i * f e ' i ö ' ) ] 
in which case the provider would be better off making unilateral investments without a 
contracted product exchange terms. The latter is the CA contract outcome with 
investment level yak . We are trading higher levels of investment against poorly tailored 
services. Given the diverse and user specific nature of social care, the likelihood of (5-
51) is reasonably high. 
Second, even if the first did not apply, it may be that vérification of the product is 
context specific. For example, it might be very difficult to write a spécification that does 
not make reference to the state of the world for which it was designed. Ascertaining 
compliance in a différent state would then call for abstract judgements. Any of this may 
undermine the safeguards that inhibit the purchaser from renegotiating the contract. 
Absent transaction costs, complete contraéis would give first best investment levels. 
However, the transaction costs are so high as to make this type of contract a practical 
irrelevance - see Annex 5-3 for détails. 
The final contract type is the investment cost sharing or incentive contract. Such a 
contract involves far fewer transaction costs than complete contracts because, like CA 
contraéis, in the second period only product spécifications and pnces based on 
prevailing u are determined. Unlike CA contracts however, in the first period parties 
contract on initial investment. In particular, the purchaser and provider agree to share 
the initial investment cost and write a contract accordingly. The utility fonctions are (5-
20) and (5-21), where <j)C and are the respective provider and purchaser shares, such 
that <j)c + <(>* = 1. Differentiation of (5-20) indicates the level of investment the provider 
wishes: 
(5-52) = „ = 0 
Ôya 
Similarly the purchaser wishes investment to be at a level given by: 
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(5-53) ^ = = - ( i - ( ( ) c ) + ( i - ^ ) n = o 
(Tv y > 
At time 1 both parties anticipate the value of which indicates expected sharing of the 
transaction surplus at time 2. Given |a, the desired optimal level of investment for each 
will depend on <|>c because this is the share of the marginai cost of the investment each 
will bear. At time 1 each party will need to come to an agreement about (j)C. A failure to 
do so puts them in the situation of a CA contract. With zero transaction costs of 
determining the investment contract, doing so will be the best option for both. The net 
gains from improved investment can be shared. In particular, the provider can fully 
compensate the purchaser for sharing some of the originai investment costs and stili 
gain. The purchaser likewise knows that by sharing some of the investment cost, the 
provider will be induced to improve investment and therefore the purchaser will be 
sharing a larger surplus at time 2 (by an amount given by |i). 
In fact, as noted above, the parties could agree to go beyond this point, until the joint 
gains are exhausted (this was option 2 for the CS contract). From a CA contract baseline 
(where effectively (|)C = 1), this mutually beneficiai situation will continue so long as the 
dUn dZn 
absolute value of — — exceeds — — because in that case, the purchaser could be fully 
5(j) 3c() 
compensated for any loss, should there be any.33 Using (5-22), (5-24) and (5-52) in (5-
25) gives: 
(5-54) 
dUn dZn a[. \ a 
1 n 
33 This requirement certainly holds at <j)C = 1. Now, = ? v<j>c making use of (5-52). Also, at <|)c = 
3<|)c 
I, we have ^ f ( l , c = l ) = v" + v"r 1 < y" ' noting that / > 0. Initially, the share of the gains from 
a|»c ; ' ' * U J 
improved investment will likely exceed the share of costs the purchaser bears. 
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It is clear therefore that we have the equality <|)c = ^ at the optimal sharing level i.e. for 
dU'2 dZ 
— — + —— = 0. With sharing at this level, the purchaser also chooses investment 
ö<t> d<|) 
y a K . Substituting for <|)c in (5-53) gives: 
dya v ; V ' y y dya 
Differentiating n , we have II = rMKS - - B"'k . By assumption, 
n . „ =rMKS „ , < 0 . Since n . = <bc /u,then n <J>r > 0 it follows that y" < 0 . So y"y y y y ' y 9 f 
how does investment with this contract compare to the first best? At the chosen sharing 
level, the level of contracted investment, yaC, is given by differentiation of first period 
utility: 
(5-55) 
dUn _ dZ' 
dyaC 
=n „c = -B„c-BMKC -1 - dyaC -
= rMKS a-BCML~By:cMK ~ 1 = 0 
dya 
Here = 1 (differentiating (5-6)) because the provider has no incentive to make 
unilateral investments if a cost share can be agreed with the purchaser, as follows. Even 
when there are no motivation problems (i.e. rMK = 1), contracted investment levels still 
fall short of first best levels as a resuit of the bargaining costs of the investment 
contract. At y a C where n „( ( j a C ) = 1, it is the case that rmSf 1. Where 
transaction costs are very high it may be the case that 
( / ) > rMKSv„ {yayB^L(ya)-B^K{ya) for a l l / , and therefore both parties 
are better off reverting to a CA contract with no pre-contracted investment. However, 
since marginal bargaining costs are high initially and then reduce quickly relative to 
surplus, either the provider unilaterally invests at the beginning (as a CA contract) or 
not at all under a CS contract. Total investment y" = y " c + ya N will remain below first 
best levels because, in any case, rMKS „ {ya )> 1 . 
152 
In hierarchies, investment is under the control of the purchaser whose interests are 
represented by the maximisation problem above. In this case, with optimal decisions 
about 0H, we have purchaser utility, from (5-36), of: 
(5-56) Z = r"L (e" \s(/ * (e" ))- w{o", / *))- y"k - TkuHL - T?'L - Bw + (l -rHL (9H ))zm 
The first order condition is: 
(5-57) Zy<l=rf,Lz^-ì + (\-rHL(QH))z^=0 
Because investment is undertaken (unilaterally) by the purchaser, there are no marginai 
bargaining costs (planning costs were set to zero to simplify comparisons with markets). 
dS 
Now zwa = — - in this function, but what of ZM„ ? When misrepresentation of QH > 0 
' dyt 
occurs and it is detected, ZM is given by (5-37). Thus, Z^ = - m^ ). The value of 
m depends on whether or not replacement has an adverse effect on the (marginai) 
benefits of investment. Clearly, if inefficiencies are so large that the hierarchy becomes 
untenable and the locai authority switches funds to market-based providers then the 
benefits of investment will be affected. Suppose that the hierarchy becomes 
(completely) untenable with probability a H . Then, m can be written: 
(5-58) m = (l - )m0 (d'" )+ aH (zw (eH ,0)- Z° ) 
so that if after shirking in response to super-ordinate misrepresentation, subordinate are 
fired, but the effects on reputation then make the hierarchy untenable (which, ex ante, is 
ascribed a probability aH), the result is m = zw^>" ,o)-Z°, and so Z^ = Z°, the 
purchaser's reservation utility. Regarding investment, we have m a = aMS „, which 
makes (5-57), 
(5-59) Z = Sr. -1 - (l - rHK }yHSy„ = 0 
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If purchasers do not exploit provider/subordinates, that is, do not misrepresent 
prevailing circumstances then rHL =1 and (5-59) is equivalent to the first-best condition 
(even then . It is also first best when aH = 0 for any rHL. Above in section 5.2.2.2, we 
have argued that misrepresentation does occur however. 
Whilst above we have implicitly referred to generic hierarchies, final investment in 
public hierarchies will depend on the costs of capital and the influence of any higher 
layer of government. If local decision-makers face an unconstrained supply of capital 
funds then the above arguments hold without further qualification. However, public 
hierarchies are often constrained to access capital via centrally determined public debt 
conduits. Although this means that the costs of capital are relatively low (since 
government issued debt is very unlikely to default), the extent of borrowing is subject to 
centrally determined protocols. These protocols are unable to fully account for local 
contexts and tend to act to the lowest common denominator with a consequent 
conservative assessment of the need for capital locally. Moreover, such funding is 'on 
balance sheet' counting against PSBR and so carries a political imperative to keep it 
low. Under these arrangements whilst S . (cp, u ) remains unchanged from a local 
perspective the marginal costs of investment may not just be a linear function (i.e. not 
just equal toy"), instead increasing for big projects, in which case relative to the first 
order condition (5-59), we have S" „(<(>, o ) > 1, even when rHL = 1 ,3 4 
5.3.1.2 Effort 
In markets there is no need to directly contract on effort however as it shown below; 
providers unilaterally decide effort levels and purchasers need only to form expectations 
of © and ß. In hierarchies, purchasers (as super-ordinates) induce effort decisions 
(because only they have measured (p and u). The precision of purchasers' instructions 
34 These arguments hold if investment in iunded by central public capital mechanisms. However, they 
need not be the only mechanisms available to public hierarchies. First, capital projects may be 
administered locally, perhaps via an issue of municipal bonds as is common in the US. This approach 
would alleviate centrally determined limits on borrowing. Second, investment projects may be out-
sourced to the market so as to reduce cost inefficiencies. Third, some form of PFI or PPP arrangement 
could be used where the investment project is made in the market with the new assets leased to the public 
hierarchy. These alternatives would change the cost of investment for hierarchies relative to markets. 
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regarding effort is improved with knowledge of o (henee requiring its measurement). 
Otherwise, the purchaser relies on the signal co5. The degree of uncertainty associated 
with the latter allows providers to misrepresent, to some extent, effort and so costs, in 
order to improve their ineome (their surplus share). The exact form of such 
misrepresentation depends on the prevailing governance structure. 
In markets, efforts are made in period 2, by which time (p and u are known and price 
and output are finalised (indeed, purchasers may already have paid the provider). 
Providers decide the actual level of effort and this determines the costs and the 
quality/type of product being produced: q = q{ye', co), where qyC > 0 . After the contract 
is determined and prices are fixed, providers do not intrinsically value product type, 
although they are concerned to produce quality suffícient to meet contractual 
obligations. Moreover, we will assume that —•— > 0 i.e. there is greater marginal effort 
dq 
cost in producing high quality/type services. In that producing quality/type requires 
effort, providers will select the product type that minimises the effort to cost 
relationship within the confines of the product spécification in the contract. With no 
contract, providers would choose q = 0. Purchasers will want to induce effort levels by 
creating a product contract spécification, subject to the bargaining and measurement 
costs of making such refinements. The purchaser values quality/type and, although they 
incur transaction costs in securing quality, at the margin the extra value is greater than 
the extra bargaining costs. This assumption is especially valid when the product is very 
complex and the range of feasible types/qualities is very broad, because then zero 
quality/type is practically useless; the purchaser would simply not pay for such a low 
quality of product. If bargaining costs were very high at the margin these producís 
would not be produced. Therefore we assume: Vq > Bq (which holds at the very least for 
quality/type up to the level q < q * F ) . 
In a zero transaction cost world, purchasers will write a contract that completely and 
unambiguously spécifiés the optimal product quality, q*F. Providers will then select 
optimal effort, subject to producing q*F. However, where marginal transaction costs 
accrue to agreeing a verifiable contract spécification, purchasers can expect effort to fall 
below first best levels. Even if purchasers set prices at the first best level, providers will 
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use the ambiguity of an incomplete contract specification to select the least effort-cost 
product type. In anticipation, purchasers optimally reduce prices to that consistent with 
ye < ye*F. 
Utility for the purchaser at time 2 is then Z" from (5-15). Without provider 
misrepresentation of P i.e. with rMK = 1, this is: 
(5-60) Z" = ( l - \x)rmS + (1 - -e(ye)+Z°-BMK- BML ) ^ U" 
Differentiating this function by yeC, the amount of effort induced by the product contract 
gives: 
( y )_ g _ iß^MK + B<fML 
V e 1 ' / c [ q 1 'dyeC 
(5-61) 
= y-ËÎ c - e - ( b " C m k + = 0 
i dyeC y'c /C ^ " " >dyeC 
Purchaser and provider agree a product contract35 that implies a required effort y e C . 
This (contracted) effort level will be at the first-best level only when marginai 
bargaining costs are zero (see (5-48)). So when these costs are positive, contracted 
specification is: qc < q*F and so yeC < ye*F . After contracts are determined at time 2, 
the provider's utility reduces from (5-14) to: 
(5-62) V"' =P{yeC)-c{ye)-e{ye) 
where product type qc and implied (contracted) effort yeC have already been 
determined. Payment, P, will be a function of shared surplus, production costs and 
bargaining costs. Differentiating gives: 
35 Note that q in this case is the minimum product type/quality that can be achieved from writing contracts 
with bargaining costs, B 
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du'" 
- C y \ r ) - e y \ r ) = - c y \ r ) D - e y { r ) 
(5-63) 
df 
which means that the optimal ye ye *F . Providers do not supply effort unilaterally at 
qc,yeC. In the case of complex products: 
Failing to achieve a first best with an incomplete contract is a commitment problem, 
which is common in the contracts literature (see chapter 2). Nonetheless, there are 
commitment mechanisms other than the enforceable contract. For example, the 
purchaser may trust that the provider will not act opportunistically, trust that the 
provider could value and wish to earn. In this case, contracts were have far less 
spécification. Such relational contracts would have lower transaction costs37 but trust 
ensures the provider's efforts are greater than the case absent trust (see chapter 2). 
Overall, we assume that to induce any effort, some kind of formai contract spécification 
is needed (at the very least to determine a price) and so ß(o) > 0 . To induce greater 
36 If (marginai) bargaining costs were very high, the differential in (5-64) couid become positive, 
implying that providers were content to unilaterally supply effort. In any case, the purchasers are unlikely 
fili111 de to forgo any sort of product contract. Without one, quality would then fall to zero: = i l < q, 
which would only happen if ßfM (o) > Vq (o) • 
37 Even with relational contracts some bargaining costs are incurred. First, there are the costs of 
establishing contracted spécifications, however minimal these are. Second, although not laid out in an 
explicit contract, purchasers stili have to communicate some preferences regarding the types of service 
they wish to be produced. One would imagine these costs to be very much lower than the costs of 
establishing detailed highly specified, legally binding product contracts, but they stili exist so the first-
best solution is not obtainable. Moreover, both parties need to undertake some form of measurement of 
the prevailing state of the world, i.e. u, in order to place their preferences in context. 
dq 
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levels of effort, formai contracts can be successively augmented by less costly, more 
d2(B«m+b«ml) 
informai provisions, and so — — — < 0 . 
dy' 
Hierarchical providers choose their efforts according to instructions from managers and 
receive utility (5.29), with a wage income w. Managers supply instructions about yeC 
and can monitor for compliance with probability rHK. Décisions about instructions about 
yeC are made by the purchaser to maximise their utility Z in period 2, after uncertainty 
about tp and o is resolved. Based on (5-56), purchaser utility is: 
(5-65) ZHU ={sk+\\i- e(yk ))-£/- 2?m 
Here BHL are total transaction costs that the super-ordinate faces at time 2. They include, 
in particular, the costs of contracting to generate instructions.38 
Differentiating gives: 
(5-66) | 
Instructions by managers, even if fully complied with, will not generate first best levels 
of effort if marginal contracting costs are greater than zero. Indeed, at yeC* = ye*F , 
8ZH!i / 
-^r(ye*r)=-B"'c < 0 using (5-48). Since, by définition SyC/ < < 0 , we have 
yeC* < ye*F. What is the provider's utility at this stage? The value will depend on 
whether super-ordinates are opportunistic. Provider utility is given by (5-30). If 
misrepresentation is detected it is only relevant to the question of provider effort in the 
case where providers do not quit. Purchasers may be content to let providers shirk in 
these circumstances because their alternative is to re-negotiate the wage structure and/or 
38 They also could include social utility costs on super-ordinates in leveraging effort from subordinates 
with whom they have personal/social relationships. If the super-ordinate is fearful that imposing more 
'work' on subordinates could damage social relationship they value, effort levels will be suffer relative to 
those levels considered appropriate absent such concerns. 
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sack and re-hire workers, and this course of action is very expensive. Above we defined 
the super-ordinate's Utility as Z^ if exploitation is detected - see (5-37). Moreover, if 
ZmR is the utility where renegotiation is needed and ZmS when providers shirk, then 
we may find that 
(5-67) Z ^ - Z ^ ^ S ^ J - ^ y ^ ^ - m ^ e ^ J - I s ^ J - ^ . ^ ^ - m ^ e ^ ^ O 
noting that by assumption mR(dH)> m s ( e N ) and w ( o , / c * ) > w(q" ,yeC*). Ingenerai, 
purchasers will either allow shirking or will re-negotiate depending on the relative size 
of these factors. If the former is chosen by the purchaser, the maximum size of 
additional shirking is given when ZM" - ZmS = 0 . At this point, effort under the 
shirking option will be less than yeC*, i.e., 
(5-68)?sCi41 e { / c : s ( / C i * ) - w ( o , y « * ) - mR(ö" )- [s(yeC* )- ^ e " , / 0 * ) - ^ " ) ^ o) 
dZH" 
In this case effort will be allowed to fall below that level implied by ¿ r = 0 as given 
by (5-66) (even if the purchaser knows ß and to). The purchaser would anticipate the 
possibility of this shortfall in effort, and it would affect the size of B"lc in (5-66). 
In relation to costs, in hiérarchies we assume that instructions yield essentially 
9 2 j h i / \ 
proportional bargaining costs so that, 5- « 0 , and that B (0) = 0 . 
dy' 
5.3.1.3 Pricing and monopoly 
The above model assumes two stakeholders to a transaction, but a transaction 
characterised by efficient bargaining given bargaining costs (cf. the effects of 
compétition below). Howe ver, the literature is replete with models that accommodate 
inefficient bargaining (see Lyons and Varoufakis, 1989, for a good survey). The 
outcome is often deadweight efficiency losses, the classic example being the non-price 
discriminating monopolist. Nonetheless, the root cause is in many ways the existence of 
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contracting costs, as in the investment problem, since contingent contracts can in theory 
be written to alleviate the coordination failures (given the contracting costs). In relation 
to the classic monopoly problem, stakeholders could agree contracts with non-uniform 
pricing ((Vickers, 1996)). The purchaser simply makes a lump-sum transfer to the 
provider equal to the excess profit the provider would reap from imposing an inefficient 
bargaining solution (i.e. from restricting supply), and then agréés terms consistent with 
the efficient solution. There are some timing issues and concerns about renegotiation 
but these can be solved. As before, the real impediment is the cost of producing a 
complété contract. 
5.3.1.4 Risksharing 
A final co-ordination problem concerns the distribution of risk between purchaser and 
provider organisations in markets. The delivery of social care services to people with a 
great variety of characteristics is fraught with uncertainties. This can have differential 
conséquences in markets and hiérarchies, depending largely on the size of organisations 
bearing the risk and stakeholder reimbursement arrangements (which affect the 
distribution of risk). Generally speaking, where organisations are risk averse, expected 
utility of a stream of profits is less than the utility of the expected value of that stream 
i.e. Eu(n) < u(e(tî)). However, the size of the différence is negatively related to the 
number of transactions that can be expected within a period i.e. Eu(n) —> m(£,(k)) as n 
-> oo. Annex 5-4 demonstrates this resuit. Relative to large organisations that conduct 
many transactions, smaller organisations are likely to suffer lower expected utility other 
things equal. Hiérarchies tend to be large, market providers relatively small. The latter 
might therefore require compensation, often in the form of higher prices per transaction. 
5.3.2 Motivation 
Information pertinent to a given transaction falls essentially into two classes. Relevant 
factors may be external to both purchaser and provider e.g. the assessed dependency 
characteristics of referred users. Information (p and o are of this type and so VMK « 
for j = tp, u. Other relevant factors concern the spécifié circumstances of either the 
purchaser or the provider, and is private information to use the term f rom information 
économies. For example, the implications of the care technology utilised by the 
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providers. Information co and ß fall into this category. The former concerns the 
provider's productivity, which we assume is set by nature. The latter relates to the 
experienced characteristics of residents (and is to some extent under the control of 
providers, in that in some arrangements providers are able to select and reject particular 
users). 
For private information, either ß or co, measurement cost to the purchaser is much 
higher than to the provider: TjMK < VML, for j = co, ß. In fact, the différence is often very 
sizeable, to the point where the net benefits to the purchaser of measuring these 
Parameters is in question. Nonetheless, there are generally adverse conséquences of 
relying only on signais, and these vary according to the governance structure in use. W e 
explore the détails in chapter 7, although we consider the problem in general here (see 
also Forder, 1997a). We first consider asymmetric information about ß and then about 
5.3.2.1 Misrepresentation of care (cost) type 
In social care the cost and effectiveness of services depend closely on the specific 
characteristics of users of those services, and in particular, how they interact with the 
care technology of the provider (Netten et al., 1998). Private information about ß can 
give rise to two problems in markets. 
The first problem, cost exaggeration, involves providers exaggerating their report of ß 
to purchasers. The provider claims that the costs of the care package of the required type 
for the resident i.e. ß are higher than the purchaser 's estimate. The second information 
problem is cream-skimming, whereby providers try to select clients who have expected 
care costs below the purchaser 's estimate but claim that these clients have an actual cost 
in the région of the purchaser 's estimate (Forder, 1997b). This is a form of adverse 
selection (Glennerster and Matsaganis, 1993). 
In the model, the purchaser makes an assessment of the client - and so ascertains o. 
Furthermore, this in effect provides a signal of ß. However, uncertainty remains about 
the final costs of care since assessment tools cannot fully predict the costs of care on an 
individuai basis. The signal of ß allows purchasers to make a judgement on the validity 
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of the provider's report. In partieular, we assume that they accept the provider's report 
with aprobability r, where, given the déviation, 0 = p ~ p = p - p 5 , w e assume that 
r ( 0 ) = 1, and that re< 0 , re0 < 0. In other words, the chances of misrepresentation 
being detected increase (exponentially) with the size of the distortion 9. 
The implications depend on how misrepresentation affects (net) provider income. As 
noted in chapter 4, contracts can be contingent on user characteristics (in as much as 
these affect the costs of care). The initial assessment - yielding parameter u - can 
provide relevant information, although parameter p is the better information in this 
regard. Contracts can be directly contingent on p with prices set after an initial 
placement period in negotiation between the purchaser and provider. Altematively, a 
price tariff according to dependency might be pre-determined. Often, the criteria for 
classifying users are very vague. In this case, even where prices are initially contingent 
on o, there is typically scope for revision after the initial (trial) period of a placement, 
whereby prices become contingent on the refined information in p. Both give 
opportunities for cost exaggeration. In other cases, if the estimate in o turns out to be 
greater than actual dependency as measured by P, the provider may withhold this 
information from the purchaser. 
Contracts can also be non-contingent in this regard, in which case cost exaggeration 
would not affect provider income. In this latter case, cream skimming would be 
expected - lowering the actual value of P would reduce costs, given prices.39 In either 
case, the general effect is that misrepresentation of 0 has positive effects on the share of 
surplus accrued by the provider. 
At time 2 at the point where prices and outputs are agreed, the provider's utility is, using 
(5-14), 
(5-69) U" = n r ^ P , ô ; P, <o)+ ^ r ^ t y - rMKe(f )+Z°-BMK- BML ) 
39 We explore the détail of these behaviours in chapter 7. 
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where S can be written <S(0) a fonction of information différence 9. If we differentiate 
(5-81) by 0 to represent either of these forms of information exploitation we have: 
The first term is negative since re < 0 and for providers to be in business, surplus less 
disutility and effort is greater than zero. Overall, the second term measures the benefits 
of misrepresentation to the provider, where this distortion is not detected. Sq measures 
the effect of an increase of 0 on the perceived value of the output by the purchaser -
which translates from the provider's perspective to an increase in prices - and/or a 
reduction in costs. A change in 9 is likely to have repercussions for optimal effort -
although this is not figured into the product contract because in this case the purchaser 
accepts the provider's report. Moreover, because the purchaser does not directly 
measure effort and since the provider determines actual effort we need only consider the 
case where = 0 . The provider will only change effort if it is beneficial to do so; if a 
strategy of misrepresentation increases utility without an effort response, then if the 
chosen optimal effort response is also figured in, it cannot decrease the benefit of 
change. The second term of (5-70) then reduces to: 
Suppose we are considering changes in misrepresentation from 0 to 0 ' , where 0' > 0 . 
With unchanging effort and so marginai costs, 
(5-71) ^ ( S e ^ + ^ e ) 
(5-72) 
S(9%,. = f % ( 0 ' , * > / * - C ( 0 ' ) 
= f fV(e'M(e)]¿r + 
s(e\, + f(V(er)-*(e)]&+ 
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The inequality holds because R(&,x)>Cx, Vjc e [Z)(9),£>(9')), and at jc = Z)(9'), we have 
Cx. So we ean state that SU > 0 by virtue of an assumed smoothness of 
the benefits funetion. Furthermore, by assumption, vj/(co)> - 1 , and therefore, 
•SqI^  + ypPo\y< = 1 + H'p > 0 . This inequality follows because S i s divided between 
purchaser and provider by price so that, where D0 > 0 , it follows given y that 
0 < pG < Se. Therefore (5-71), which is the second term in (5-70), is positive. 
Since the first term of (5-70) is negative whilst the second is positive, we cannot in 
general sign this differential. However, at the point where there is no misrepresentation, 
we have r ( 0 ) = 1. Moreover, although ree(o)< 0 and re(o)< 0, 9 > 0 , at 9 = 0 we 
might expect that r6(o) = 0 , or is at least very small. In other words, the chances of a 
small degree of misrepresentation being detected are almost negligible. But of course as 
the size of this distortion increases so the chance of detection increases (and after some 
point, where misrepresentation is flagrant, detection is more or less certain). 
Suppose that r6(o)= 0 , then we can write (5-70) as 
which of course means that 9 = 0 is not a solution and that some exploitation of 
information is optimal. The benefits for the provider will come from the purchaser 
believing that surplus S is greater than it actually is, given actual ß, and consequently 
paying the provider more to make up the provider's share. Chapter 7 provides a detailed 
considération of incentives, contract types and information problems, showing that 
contract contingency is particularly important. 
In hiérarchies, employees do not have wages that are contingent on reported ß. 
Exaggerating this parameter would not have direct positive conséquences (on income). 
Moreover, since providers have ceded control there are no opportunities to reject and 
replace referred clients. Consequently, providers cannot cream-skim clients to reduce 
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effort (given effort instructions based on signalled ß). Although there are no (direct) 
benefits to exaggerating the care costs of the prevailing cohort of users - since wages 
are set in advance, based on the average - there may be some indirect benefits of 
misreporting of ß to compound uncertainty about co, and so further enhance the benefits 
of shirking, which we consider next. 
5.3.2.2 Productivity 'shirking' 
As described above in section 5.3.1.2, in hierarchies even when purchasers/managers 
(and providers/subordinates) have perfect information about co, coordination problems 
can arise because there are costs in developing and applying appropriate sets of 
instructions. However, the problem is compounded when purchasers do not measure co. 
Not only will instructions be incomplete, but the provider might also be motivated to 
shirk on those instructions, yeC*, that have been specified. A truthful report of co is 
consistent with full compliance with instructions yeC*. However, misreporting implies 
provider efforts away from this value. Therefore, we can conceive rHKr as measuring the 
deviation of yeC f rom the instructed value. Using (5-30), those providers remaining in 
the industry after they make a decision about whether the purchasers is being 
exploitative have utility (i.e. they have chosen not to opt for alternative utility i f ) of: 
(5-74) UH" = rHKÌw(eH,f *)- e{/)+ v|/)+ (l - rHK 
where x indicates whether or not the provider detected misrepresentation by the 
purchaser. Where such misrepresentation was detected x = 1 and 
RHK\ _ RHK j ^ c s u c h t h a t r t fK | 0 j _ j a n d RMC > q W h e r e misrepresentation is 
not detected (or does not occur) rHK0 = rHK {yeC - yeC*}. As indicated in section 5.3.1.2, 
yeC* > yeC*. 
In the case of no detection of super-ordinarte misrepresentation, if shirking yeC < yeC* is 
detected by the super-ordinate then the subordinate is dismissed and will receive utility 
i f 0 . This utility is that accrued in a market alternative (at QH = 0), but with some penalty 
for having a 'bad reference' . It is in any case less than 
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u (eH,o) = w(ew , / c*)-e(y e C*)+\¡i . In the no shirking case,yeC = yeC\ at which point 
rHKo = i if we differentiate (5-74) with respect to yeC we find: 
(5-75) U™ =-rHK\,c +r»™(wk-e(/c)+y-UM) 
At yeC = yeC *, rHK0 = 1 and so: 
(5-76) U»y» = - V +r»r(Wk-e(/c*)+y-U™) 
The fírst term is negative, but the second is positive. In all likelihood, at yeC = yeC*, 
the marginal change in the probability of detection will be very small, making the 
differential negative. In that case providers will engage in a modest amount of shirking. 
However, for higher levels of shirking given the non-linear nature of the detection 
fiinction, the sign of this function is likely to revert to positive. 
The corresponding case is when super-ordinates misrepresent (p and o i.e. when x = 1. 
In this case, providers are allowed to 'shirk' to effbrt y e C *. Then, rHKy < 1 only when 
effort is below this allowed level, i.e. when j / c < y e C *. Differentiating at y e C* we 
have: 
which has an ambiguous sign as before. Arguably we might find that l f x is slightly 
higher than U00 if only because a super-ordinate who is misrepresenting information has 
less creditability in supplying a 'bad reference'. Alternative providers might be willing 
to give the benefit of the doubt to dismissed subordinates in that case. Hence we might 
find slightly higher shirking from the agreed effort level when x = 1. 
The r"c term reflects the sensitivity of purchaser monitoring of deviations in effort 
from instructed levels. If for very small deviations from optimal effort the chance of 
(5-77) 
166 
detection changes very little (from no chance of detection) then overall, U 
and U cr (ye C*)< 0 , which implies that effort will be below the levels given in section 
5.3.1.2 i.e. below yeC* < ye*F and yeC* < ye*F . Together with the subordinate lacking 
the motivation to unilaterally supply effort, i.e. yeN = 0, this implies that actual effort is 
below the first best level ye < ye*F. 
In markets, misreporting of co brings no benefits because the contract is already 
determined based on expected co. If © was known by providers before contracts were 
determined then there would be a potential benefit in misleading the purchaser about 
productivity and so affect the terms of the agreement. This effect would be akin to the 
cream-skimming result discussed above. 
5.4 Mediating features 
5.4.1 Timing - frequency, duration and longevity 
Frequency and duration are key features of transactions since they affect opportunities 
for reputation to have a bearing on behaviour. Reputation is a very powerful transaction 
cost economising mechanism: in repeated transactions stakeholders can have an 
incentive to maintain a good reputation (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1982; Roth and Schoumaker, 1983; Fundenberg and Tirole, 1992). In particular, a 
person can accept the truthfulness of claims by other people if the good reputation of 
those others would be undermined if they cheat, lie or misrepresent, and if loss of 
reputation is harmful. If the transaction is repeated frequently enough and if a good 
relationship would continue indefinitely then long-term truthfulness is more beneficial 
than short-term opportunism. 
This mechanism is central to the operation of hierarchies where subordinates (e.g. 
employees) are willing to cede control (and thereby risk exploitation) because the 
employer has a reputation to protect (Kreps, 1990a; Kreps, 1996). Reputation is needed 
to ensure that employees can expect a reasonable share of the surplus generated by the 
relationship. A similar argument applies to the use of minimum specification, adaptive 
'relational' contracts since concerns about reputation commit stakeholder to act 
reasonably with reference to non-contracted contingencies. 
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The central benefit of réputation in these cases is the low unit measurement and 
bargaining costs they entail. Where control is ceded duplication of measurement is 
avoided. In addition, because one party is given authority voluntarily, protracting 
bargaining is unlikely. Reputation also reduces transaction costs in markets, for 
example, by reducing the need for monitoring to combat misrepresentation of private 
information (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Forder, Knapp, and Wistow, 1996). 
5.4.2 Complexity, uncertainty and private information 
Unit transaction costs of ail three types - measurement, bargaining and monitoring - are 
positively related to the degree of complexity and private information relating to the 
transaction. In particular, where complexity is high, bargaining costs especially will be 
substantial. When information is asymmetrically distributed i.e. much is ex ante private, 
measurement costs will be high. The relative extent of private information and 
complexity is likely to have repercussions that depend on the type of governance 
structure that is used. From a governance point of view, hierarchical arrangements are 
often the better option when dealing with the more complex transactions. Hiérarchies 
have lower measurement costs Overall. Also, their top-down managerial arrangements 
mean that they can adapt at relatively low cost to new contingencies in contracts. 
5.4.3 Compétition and asset specificity 
Levels of competitiveness are important in a number of regards. First, bargaining costs 
depend on the level of competitiveness. If there is only one provider then negotiation 
can become protracted. But add one more provider and haggling and bargaining can be 
eut short by the threat of the purchaser playing suppliers off against one and other, so 
reducing unit bargaining costs. In relation to the above model, we have sidestepped this 
issue by assuming efficient bargaining, but where it is an issue, it will add to transaction 
costs. Second, when compétition is healthy, prices in markets are good mechanisms for 
transmitting information, which acts to reduce measurement costs (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). Hiérarchies use quantity adjustment mechanisms, which are less 
efficient. 
168 
Compétition levels will also affect coordination and motivation. First, high levels of 
compétition largely undermine rent-seeking behaviour since compétition forces 
providers to act efficiently in order to survive (Tiróle, 1988 ). For example, absent other 
costs, the under-investment problem is addressed since, even with CA contracts, the 
threat of the purchaser switching provider will force a higher level of inves tment / . 
Similarly, where a purchaser can easily switch providers, there is a lesser need to write 
safeguards in contracts, and therefore reduce its bargaining costs for ail levels of effort 
and investment. If a provider does not supply an appropriate product then absent legally 
binding contracts and third party enforcement, the purchaser can threaten to switch the 
contract to an alternative provider. Second, compétition can help address some shirking 
(and slacking) problems by allowing benchmarking of competitors, that is by allowing 
principáis to compare agent/provider's observed behaviour - i.e. yardstick compétition 
(Schleifer, 1985). 
Asset specificity - where the use of certain assets is tied closely to a particular 
transaction - reduces potential compétition with the implications as indicated above, 
specifically causing under investment problems. Asset specificity is a problem that 
largely applies to physical assets and therefore is absent in hierarchical govemance 
structures where both production and purchasing (physical) assets are under unified 
ownership (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Networks would partially address these 
problems since control is often ceded to one party (even if ownership is still separate). 
For these reasons healthy compétition acts to reduce the comparative net transaction 
costs of hiérarchies compared with markets. One counterfactual relates to the problem 
of cream-skimming, which is driven by the availability of alternative providers. 
Compétition generates choice that accommodâtes selectivity. With hiérarchies where no 
alternative supplier is available the problem is irrelevant. 
5.4.4 Social context 
Social context is also highly relevant to health care transactions as outlined in chapter 2, 
section 3.6.2. Grannovetter and others describe how actions that arise in specific 
transactions are embedded in conventions that exist in an individual's social sphere 
(Granovetter, 1985; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Hamilton and Feenstra, 1995). These 
conventions may work against narrow economic considérations. For example, parties to 
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transactions in societies that value personal honour may be less like to exploit their 
position - to cheat - than societies with more 'pragmatic' values (Sako, 1992; Hodgson, 
1988; Granovetter, 1985). Social capital or more generally inherent trust can produce 
very similar effects as réputation (Kreps, 1996). Trust is essentially deterrence-based: 
i.e. "people do what they say they will do because they fear the conséquence of doing 
otherwise" (Doney, Cannon, and Müllen, 1998, p. 605). Trust is sustained insofar as 
there is a visible sanction likely to be applied where trust is violated. 
An alternative perspective sees trust as not so calculative, stemming instead from a 
more inherent alignment of motivations, as a 'presumed reliability' (Giddens, 1990). 
From this alternative perspective, the instrumental conception of trust (e.g. as 
réputation) reduces trust misleadingly to a matter of risk assessment, and misses the 
point. As Giddens puts it, trust in general is largely "blind trust" (1990, p. 33). Where 
trust is high for whatever reason net transactions costs will be considerably reduced. In 
markets with high trust relations, many of the formai mechanisms of arms-length 
contracting become redundant. 
5.5 Net (optimal) effects and (variable) transaction costs 
What are the likely transaction benefits and costs in social care between différent 
governance archetypes? The comparison can be made in a number of pertinent 
dimensions. 
5.5.1 Efficient contracts and market power 
At a given level of investment and effort, and state-of-the-world, the transaction 
between purchaser and provider generates a certain surplus that can be allocated 
between parties. The final product cost to the purchaser will include the share of surplus 
that goes to providers and appears as profit. For comparative purposes between markets 
and hiérarchies, we have assumed that, at the baseline, hierarchical providers can expect 
to achieve utility U , ali other things equal, which is the level of utility perceived to be 
achieved in markets given the same set of circumstances. Therefore, if the comparator is 
a competitive provider market then hierarchy providers will also perceive the fallback to 
be the representative utility of a provider in a similarly competitive market. Hence, 
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distributional considérations in relation to market power are precluded for our 
40 purposes. 
What this assumption implies is that for the same levels of investment and effort, and 
state-of-the-world, the production cost of hiérarchies and markets would be identical. In 
practice when markets are very competitive, and the comparator is a public hierarchy, 
politicai control might be expected to give hierarchical workers some protection and 
therefore, a slightly higher proportion of the surplus. 
We have assumed efficient bargaining between purchaser and provider in the above 
analysis. As noted in section 5.3.1.3, in markets, there is a potential for classic 
monopoly deadweight loss. However, with relatively modest transaction costs this 
problem can be overcome e.g. non-uniform pricing. Also, as reviewed in section 2.2.4.2, 
there are examples of efficiency shortfalls concerning distributional issues (e.g. strikes 
and hold-outs). There is no particular reason to suppose that markets are more or less 
susceptible to these problems compared with hiérarchies. In the former there is less 
unionisation, but in the later there is less bargaining (because employees cede control). 
5.5.2 Investment 
Adaptive contracts (CA contracts) do not involve any contract spécification at the time 
of investment and so no bargaining costs are incurred at this stage. However, as 
indicated above, without a contract, providers can expect purchasers to appropriate a 
share of the investment surplus, and this induces under-investment. Total surplus is 
therefore reduced. Figure 5-3 shows investment décisions as undertaken in markets and 
in hiérarchies with hypothetical cost and benefit functions for illustration. In the figure 
the investment level for CA contracts is, in this case, y" (CA). The alternative is for 
stakeholders to employ cost sharing or incentive contracts (CS contracts). Since these 
contracts involve directly contracting on the investment task, transaction costs are 
incurred. However, precluding transactions cost, these contracts secure first best 
investment levels. In the figure the implied investment level is ya (CS). In practice, 
40 In practice, we might assume that hierarchical providers under-estimate the competitiveness of 
alternative markets. This is purely an empirical proposition based on the observation that in practice 
residential care markets have been very competitive, perhaps more that locai authority purchasers have 
expected. This proposition would imply that: |i w < p M => UH i.e. provider market power is lower than 
hierarchical stakeholders assume, which in turn affects their perception of a reasonable opportunity utility 
for hierarchical providers. 
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market stakeholders will choose between CA and CS contracts according to which 
generates the greatest net surplus, which is given in the figure as the area under the 
relevant benefit curve (up to the corresponding investment level) less the area under the 
associated transaction costs curve. We assume that the transaction costs of writing 
complete contracts (CC contracts) is greater than those for CS contracts. Therefore, 
given the benefits function is the same, stakeholders would always choose CS or CA 
contracts - as such CC contracts are not shown in the figure. 
In hierarchical arrangements, investment décisions are internalised so that given 
investment costs, first best levels of investment can potentially be achieved. The 
limiting factor is if after investment hiérarchies become untenable as a result of 
excessive (detected) exploitation of providers. Since some (small) degree of exploitation 
is optimal, investment will fall below first best levels. Therefore, if costs of making the 
investment were the same as in markets, hierarchical investment levels would be a t y 
(HI) in the figure, above the market level (and also generating more surplus). 
Figure 5-3. Investment décisions 
However, we can question this assumption of the same (marginai) investment costs. We 
have not assumed that any 'effort ' or productivity is involved in investing in the model, 
although if we did, then for the reasons stated in the previous section, the marginai costs 
of investment are likely to be higher in hierarchies. This is an argument often used to 
support PFI programmes (Grout, 2003). If we accept that (marginai) investment cost is 
higher, then as shown in the figure, x > 1 and hierarchical investment levels would be at 
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y" (H2). Moreover there will be some value of % such that net surplus from investment 
could be increased by out-sourcing investment to the (private) market sector. 
The investment cost ineludes not only the construction and training costs (direct costs), 
but also the costs of debt. Public sector projects can usually secure lower debt costs than 
private sector counterparts, and so when projects are outsourced if their transaction 
costs and direct costs were the same as for market projects, investment levels in public 
sector projects would be greater (Grout, 2003). 
5.5.3 Effort 
In hiérarchies, when misrepresentation occurs, sub-ordinates might choose (and be 
allowed) to shirk b e l o w / * * . Actual net surplus would correspond to the lower level of 
effort, but the instructions given to sub-ordinates - for the purposes of generating effort 
yeC* and baseline from which they shirk - would relate to yeC* and transaction costs 
would be at this higher level. In effect per unit of effort, transaction costs would be 
increased by b,f up to actual effort level ye. In Figure 5-4 contracted effort, as given by 
(5-66), i s / c (H) ( = y c * ) . However, with the possibility of 'a l lowed' shirking 
depending on (QH) and also the relative size of m sand mR, actual effort will fall 
below this level and so expected actual effort is ye (H). At this level, S , -eyt need not 
equal B , ( / / ) + £ , ( H ) since shirking behaviour reduces effort below the optimal. 
Transaction costs as measured by the area under B (H) are stili incurred up to effort 
yeC (//), with the additional component from ye (H) to yeC (H) équivalent to the area 
J ( ^by! (H)dye .41 Net surplus will however be given by the area under SyC - e ,, 
between 0 and ye (H). Net surplus less transaction costs is the area between 5 - e 
and Bf (//)+ byi. ( / / ) from 0 to / (H). 
41 Note that incurring these additional transaction costs per unit of effort, purchasers may wish to increase 
effort beyond yeC (H) in anticipation of shirking. However, sub-ordinates will not increase effort further 
with given wages w. 
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Figure 5-4. Effor t décisions 
Marginal 
surplus and 
transaction 
cost 
- B: (H) + b/ (H) 
/ ( H ) / C ( H ) 
/ ( M ) Effort 
Effort is induced in markets rather than instructed as in hiérarchies. Inducement comes 
from the product contract that involves a price for providing the service as specified and 
allows providers to keep the residual after costs as profits. Effort impacts on costs and 
on product spécification q. Without the spécification of required service characteristics 
effort may be misdirected. Indeed, where the spécification allows some scope for 
interprétation (is not complete) after prices are fixed, providers will apply effort in 
producing the absolute basic product that has the lowest cost to effort relationship. 
Directed effort as relevant to S requires a product spécification, and indeed, the greater 
is its specificity, the more likely that optimal levels of directed effort are applied and the 
desired product quality produced. But greater specificity means greater transaction 
costs. Moreover, marginal transaction costs will be large with respect of low levels of 
directed effort, and dimini shing thereafìer; even to get basic applicable effort, for a 
reasonably complex service, a complex product spécification is needed. Writing such a 
spécification has a large fixed cost component. 
Figure 5-4 shows these bargaining costs of effort in markets as being high initially and 
then diminishing. Two relevant features apply in this case. First, the marginal 
bargaining cost function is likely to diminish more rapidly than the marginal net 
surplus, at least initially, as bargaining is practically a fixed cost of inducing effort. 
Second, marginal net surplus initially exceeds this marginal transaction cost otherwise 
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projects would be unfeasible overall. As a resuit, at the optimal effort, marginal 
bargaining costs are likely to be very close if not at zero, and indeed lower than 
marginal contracting cost for hiérarchies. With the same marginal net surplus function 
as between markets and hiérarchies therefore, effort is hypothesised to be at a higher 
level in markets than in hiérarchies. 
Despite marginal bargaining costs in markets being below those in hiérarchies at 
optimal effort, because they are high initially in markets bargaining costs in total could 
certainly exceed those in hiérarchies. For this reason it is difficult to say whether the 
total net utility (welfare) that is generated from effort is unambiguously greater in 
markets. 
The problem of shirking is especially significant in public sector hiérarchies where 
managers themselves are unlikely to benefit substantially from efforts to be creative in 
motivating employees. In particular, there will be much reliance on the threat of 
outsourcing of provision, but even then, many managers would retain their positions. 
Sanctions on social services directors will come from local electorates (weakly) and 
from central government performance assessment. Where SSDs with predominantly 
hierarchical arrangements are under-performing an option for directors is to increase the 
proportion of care purchased externally in the market. Nonetheless, these incentives are 
indirect and so shirking levels in public hiérarchies could be expected to exceed even 
those of private hiérarchies. The resuit in the model is not only low productivity but 
could also be products with inappropriate characteristics. Translated in practice, the 
resuit is high unit costs and services that are supply-led and non-responsive to local 
needs (Savas et al., 1998). 
Overall, the empirical hypothesis is that effort is greater in markets and so production 
costs will lower (other things equal), but that transactions costs are lower in hiérarchies. 
5.5.4 Motivation 
One of the key problems with using markets in social and health care is the inherent 
information complexity of these services that can give rise to problems whereby 
providers misrepresent key characteristics (including the cost and type of service 
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provided). Above we saw that in theory some degree of misrepresentation is optimal in 
markets. Below it is shown that such misrepresentation increases production costs 
(because purchasers think they are getting a higher valué service than is actually the 
case). 
There is no specific transaction cost consequence as such, unless purchasers decide to 
monitor providers more than they would do otherwise. Monitoring is generally 
expensive and quite lumpy in its application, so unlikely to be undertaken unless 
purchasers otherwise expect significant misrepresentation to occur. Overall, in markets 
either production costs are pushed up or monitoring transaction costs are increased 
relative to the no misrepresentation case. The anecdotal evidence (see previous chapter) 
is that social services purchasers do not engage in much monitoring, but it is diffícult to 
establish what the baseline is compared to say hierarchies. 
Shirking occurs in hierarchies. As described above there are circumstances in which 
super-ordinates may 'allow' some shirking in order to retain staff. Beyond this level 
shirking can occur because information about effort is costly to collect. As with 
misrepresentation in markets, monitoring may be undertaken specifícally to address this 
problem - i.e. to measure co - however for the above reasons there must be some 
expectation of considerable shirking otherwise. 
5.5.5 Risk 
Risk management is generally facilitated by large size - so risks can be spread and 
pooled - as shown above. Hierarchical organisation of services then has the better risk 
management characteristics, at least in regard to the benefíts of size. In theory, in 
markets the purchaser could design contracts that effíciently allocate risk to providers 
(i.e. retain most of the risk) but in practice this appears not to happen, and in any case it 
requires greater contracting transaction costs. We would anticípate that market 
providers eharge a premium to carry this risk i.e. that overall production costs are higher 
than in the risk neutral case. In theory, hierarchies avoid these premiums, although in 
practice, this characterisation of public sector hierarchies may be a little strained. It is 
not inconceivable to imagine that risk averse provider managers, who are instructed to 
stay within budget, might keep a little back to cover unforeseen contingencies. 
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Nonetheless, overall hiérarchies are in a better position to deal with risk and should 
have lower production costs, ceteris paribus, as a resuit. 
5.6 Fixed transaction costs (measurement) 
In addition to the variable transaction costs just considered, there are also sizeable fixed 
transaction costs resulting mainly from measurement activities. 'Purchasers' in both 
markets and hiérarchies have to measure ail relevant information, i.e. TvML and "F*11 
regarding (p and T'ML and T jHL regarding u. Providers in markets also measure this 
information, i.e. > 0 and T,MK > 0 but those in hiérarchies do not: TpHK = 0 and 
rjVHK _ Q 
It is difficult to form ex ante judgements as to the relative sizes of VllK compared to "PMK 
for each j = (p, u. However, it would seem reasonable to assume that because hiérarchies 
do not have a purchaser-provider distinction as such, and that 'purchasers' i.e. managers 
are diffused throughout the organisation that the costs of measurement are slightly lower 
than in markets. This argument is particularly relevant to the u parameter where 
'provider-side' insights are especially helpful. 
5.7 Net transaction costs 
Based on the above sections, the following table summarises our hypothesis about 
transaction costs faced by purchasers. 
Table 5-2. Transaction costs (purchaser) 
Market Hierarchy 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
Investment 
0 (CA) or 
Ï ( C S ) B ^ d y a > 0 (CS) 
0 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
Effort ( i M ) B ^ d / > 0 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
Motivation > 0 0 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
Risk 0? 0? 
Fixed rj-tpML jVML rptpHL jvHL ^ j<pML jvML 
Total t c M TCH<TCM 
Together therefore individuai components lead to the first main empirical hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis Hl: 
Total purchaser transaction costs in hiérarchies are less than in markets: TC" < TCM 
To re-cap, provider transaction costs also accrue in markets: J ^B™Kdye > 0 in 
agreeing the product contract in relation to effort. Also, £ ^ B ' ^ d y " > 0 under CS 
contracts from agreeing an investment contract. Because for both markets and 
hiérarchies we have set (the assumed equal) planning costs to zéro, there are no 
transaction costs for providers in hiérarchies. Hence if Hl holds for purchaser 
transaction costs it will also hold for total transaction costs, which we label hypothesis 
Hla. 
5.8 Net production costs 
The above comparative prédiction of the level of effort and investment as between 
market and hierarchy implies comparative production costs as follows. Should the 
transaction go ahead final provider payment will be: 
(5-78) P = £ / '%)- | a i | / + C + V 
Period 2 utility less excess price disutility is the net monetary share to the provider. 
Payment is the sum of production cost, shared investment cost and provider net utility. 
In markets with CA contracts, payment to cover investment is made in the first period 
and so does not figure above i.e. S = 0 . With cost sharing and CC contracts investment 
does figure in payment considérations with payment covering the provider's 
contribution to the costs i.e. 0 = n . Purchasers (super-ordinates) direct the level of 
investment in hiérarchies, although in terms of accounting data these costs may show up 
in provider's unit costs, which are équivalent to payments. In any case, the associated 
level of market utility will be the basis for the opportunity utility calculation for 
hierarchical providers. As given by the constraint (5-32), uw = U" s U", and so (5-78) 
applies to market and hierarchical providers. 
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5.8.1.1 Effort 
Provider effort is at the contacted level i.e. y e = y y C as indicated by (5-63). Also, 
U" = (l + XV')Z" and so using (5-60), U" = n(rMKS + y-e(ye)+Z0-BMK-BML) and 
therefore, — = J S . - e . - (b«'mk + ß f M L = J s . - e . - B A Hence 
dye { v y " " 'dye ) 1 > -v y ' 
differentiating (5-78) gives, 
(5-79) Pf = U'¡. + C , = ii(Vye - C.. - ^ - B, )+ C , =iiVy.~ + B, )+ C . (l - fx) 
The sign of this differential depends on the relative size of the impact of effort on costs 
and on the purchaser's valuation of the product (via the effect on quality). When 
\iVv, < -C , (l - |J.) then prices fall as effort increases: P r < 0 . In fact, since in relation 
to provider motivation, p. < xh, the condition reduces to F , < -Cyl. ,42 Even if this is not 
satisfied, the combination of marginal effort and bargaining costs may ensure that 
marginal price changes are downwards (although we have assumed that F , > B , ). 
It follows, ceteris paribus, that where effort levels markets are higher than those in 
hierarchies, total payment in markets will be lower. 
5.8.1.2 Investment 
For investment, given that U" = \xrMKS + - rMKe(ye)+ Z° - BMK - BML), the 
differential is (discounting provider misrepresentation): 
(5-80) Pf = U''„ + Cf + S = ¡.iSf + Cf + 9 - 1 x B f =\iVya + ( l - \ i ) C y l l + S ( l -
We cannot sign this function a priori since it is likely that increased levels of 
investment will reduce costs. If investment is cost neutral in that it changes the produci 
but not its costs, then P „ > 0 : under cost-sharing or CC contracts below optimal level 
42 It is possible for the sign to change if the marginal value of the produci to the purchaser is large -
because this (directed) effort yields substantial increases in quality. 
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of investment, + S - [IB0 = j j , ^ +1 - \IBY„ )> 0 and under CA contracts, 3 = 0 
and S > 0 . In practice, investment is required to allow the production of product type 
q. Where products improve in quality so generally their production costs increase. 
5.8.1.3 Motivation failures 
Turning to motivation failure, productivity shirking has the same effect as the 'poor 
incentives' coordination failure above, that is, reduces comparative effort levels and 
therefore implies higher comparative payments, other things being equal. 
Regarding misrepresentation of care/cost type, P, the effect on payment is given by the 
differentiation of (5-78) with respect to 0P , which at the (first best) no misrepresentation 
level is (dropping the P superscript), 
(5-81) / > = l t f - n i | / 6 + C e > 0 
At the no misrepresentation level, U" is given by (5-73) and is greater than zero. 
Although it will increase provider utility, cream-skimming will not result in a change of 
prices (because price is set by the purchaser - the gain comes from providers selecting 
lower cost users - in (5-81) U" > 0 is offset by Ce = -U" < 0 ) . If in the agreed 
contract, price is contingent on reported p to a sufficient degree, cost exaggeration will 
occur instead. Then the increase in provider utility as given by (5-73) will come from an 
increase in P. Essentially, with reference to (5-62), if the contract is such that Pq > -Cq 
(at rMK = 1 ) then cost-exaggeration will result. Otherwise, providers will cream-skim. 
There is a possibility of some change in optimal effort, that could have a reducing effect 
on costs, but this is likely to be dominated by the demand effect. Overall, providers who 
are opportunistic in this way gain from a price increase as outlined above, an increase 
that is based on an exaggerated report of P - see also chapters 7 and 8. 
5.8.1.4 Market power 
Ceteris paribus, ( / ' w i l l be a function of p., the market power parameter. Above we 
argued that u ' =U" = U" . However, it may be the case when market competition is 
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parti cu lari y harsh that public hierarchical équivalent 'market power' is slightly higher 
than for markets i.e. uw > U" = U" . The implication is that for the same effort and 
investment, and in same state-of-the-world, market production cost may be slightly 
lower than in hiérarchies. 
An increase in competition/contestability - given monopsony purchasing - will reduce 
(a. A fall in p will not affect effort in markets or hiérarchies, although it may reduce 
dya 
investment under CA contracts i.e. > 0. However, with the above cost function 
assumptions, P (¡a.) > 0 and provider's utility being positively related to its net surplus 
share, i.e. U"(y°)> 0 , so: 
5.9 Overall net production costs 
Production costs are a function of the levels of investment, effort, misrepresentation and 
market power in the above model. The baseline position is that if ali relevant variables 
were the same for market and hierarchy, respective utilities would be equal. The 
following table summarises the above section: 
Markets cf. Hiérarchies Sign Market 
PCs 
e £ 
es C 
Effort 
y e C { M ) > y e C * { H ) > y e C * ( h ) given 
© = (ù for both M, H 
P . < 0 
y Lower 
•o 
u 
0 1 
© 
U Investment y ° { M ) o y ° * { H ) 
P . 
y 
? 
e 
> 
Misrepre-
sentation ß 
Qpm s ^ _ j > _ ep// = 0 PeM> 0 Higher 
o 
£ Shirking » 
à" =(ù implying 
ye{M) = y e C { M ) > y e C * { H ) > / * ( H ) 
P,c =Pe <0 
y y Lower 
Market 
power p 
Pv> 0 Lower 
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The results for production costs are ambiguous a priori. It would not be unreasonable, 
however, to expect the effort considérations to be dominant, especially as the motivation 
effects could well cancel out. Moreover, if anything, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
investment in markets is slightly better, again resulting in lower costs. Overall, we posit 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H2: 
Total production costs in hiérarchies are greater thon in markets: PC?1 > PC f 
5.10 Discussion 
5.10.1 Empirical hypothesis 
Summarising the above discussion, the investment, effort and motivation failure 
arguments made above suggest that (variable) transactions costs will be lower and 
production costs higher in public sector hiérarchies compared to markets. The fixed 
transaction costs arguments reinforce this hypothesis since fixed transaction costs 
(mainly measurement costs) in hiérarchies are, in terms of the above theory, lower than 
in markets. 
In addition to investment, effort and motivation effects, the above also noted that 
hiérarchies and markets differ in how they deal with risk. The arguments related to risk 
tend to countervail our main hypothesis somewhat because we would expect market 
providers to charge risk premiums that push up production costs to purchasers. Only 
where efficient risk sharing contracts are used would we expect that production cost risk 
premiums are reduced to levels équivalent to those in hiérarchies.43 Risk effects will be 
significant in social care (see chapter 7) but the relative risk effects as between markets 
and hiérarchies are very unlikely to overturn the sum of the other variable transaction 
and the fixed transaction cost différences. 
With the caveats about risk, what drives the transactions costs différences is the degree 
to which control rights are ceded. High ceding in hiérarchies will reduce transaction 
43 The problem is that in practice, it does not appear that these types of contracts are being used much. 
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costs but removes incentives that mitigate slacking or shirking - depending on the 
reimbursement of hierarchical subordinates. Generally, hierarchical provider 
productivity is only affected by the effort being induced through purchaser's 
instructions. 
Reputation and other safeguards are the glue that holds together hiérarchies and the 
ceding of control rights. If réputation was absent, hierarchical providers would expect to 
be exploited and receive low payment, and, in response would either quit or shirk 
heavily. Without a (at least reasonable) réputation, hiring back providers to replace 
those that quit would be at higher than normal market rates. The combination of 
shirking and/or high wage costs would make for very inefficient production. Such 
inefficiency might ultimately make the hierarchy untenable to government, and so a 
switch to market modes of opération would likely follow. In other words, where 
réputation effects can work, although net production costs may still be higher in 
hiérarchies than in markets, the savings in transaction costs could be very large. A 
considérable saving can be made in hiérarchies in avoiding the high costs of negotiating 
and writing produci contracts and in the duplication of fixed (measurement) transaction 
costs. 
Reputation effects can also work in markets to curb problems like cost and quality 
misrepresentation. The conséquence is likely to be a réduction in production costs 
compared to situations where this type of misrepresentation does occur (unless 
significant monitoring has been undertaken in which case the conséquence would be 
reduced transaction costs - this is not however consistent with the observations about 
monitoring). Reputation in markets would therefore reinforce the above hypothesis. 
Complexity and compétition are also relevant, as outlined above, in affecting the 
transaction to production cost équation. The two main hypotheses are explored 
empirically in the next chapter. 
Annex 5-1 
Restricting ourselves to state-of-the world k - as stakeholders are risk neutral - suppose 
that the purchaser's offer price ispR and the provider's offer price is p . Bargaining is 
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efficient so that ail expected surplus from the current transaction (between these two 
parties) is allocated, 
(5-83) rm \R{x)ix-p*x + {pc-c)c = rMKS 
which follows multiplying (5-4) by rMK and where output is x up to D. The optimisation 
problem is therefore: 
(5.84) m a x Z " U " 
p 
s.t. 
rMKS - rMK J/?(x)cfcc + pRx - {pc - c)x = 0 
o 
This constrained optimisation problem gives two fïrst order conditions: 
(5.85) U"Z"S H-Ajc-0 
and 
(5.86) U'}cZ"-Xx = 0 
so that: 
— Z" —Z,! 
(5.87) Z" =U"—= 
p p 
where, differentiating, Z"pR - -x < 0 and U"c = x(l + > 0 . Changes in paymentpR = 
p do not affect output levels since output is set to a 
level D such that R(D) - CX. The 
constraint can be re-written as Z" -Z° + BML+U"~rMK\\i + BMK + e(ye)rMK = rMKS and Z" = U" from (5.87), so: 
(5-88) U" = { ^ ^ j r m S + rUK^-rm4yt)+Z0-BMK-B141) 
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or (5-14) as above, writing j^-——J = . In the profit maximising case, for instance, 
absent transaction costs and effort costs, Z"„ jU", = - 1 , or equivalently T ' = 0, and so 
*U" = \rMKS . Otherwise, when T ' < 0 , V4. Substituting for U"using (5-88) into 
Z" = U" — — from (5.87), gives: 
1 + 4" 
Z" = ( l - + (1 - " rMKe{ye)+ Z° - BMK - BML) 
For the CC contracts case, expected surplus now includes utility from period I: 
(/? -p*)x + ( p c -c)x-y" = S' = rMKS - y". The Nash bargaining outcome is as above, 
given from the maximisation Z'if subject to this expected surplus constraint, which can 
be expressed as Z " - Z° + BML + U' - + BMK + rMKe(/)= S!. 
Annex 5-2 
Full contingent contracts are negotiated at time 1 when (p is known. With these 
contracts, because the nature of the product q, D and the associated payment terms for 
ail possible states of the world are specified, then whatever state does actually arise (i.e. 
what u), each party will have an agreed course of action/payment, tailored in advance 
for that state. Such a contract can be enforced at time 2. The exact nature of this 
enforcement depends on prevailing contract law, but in any case the contract is the basis 
for damages to be levied for non-compliance. The contract would specify 
{x7* (q>, u ) , q'* (y" * (<p), u)}, Vu and payment p' *, and also a set of damages clauses: 
M KM > 0 if {x, q} * {x7*, q' *} and > 0 if p(cp, u) * p' * (cp, u) . Here the superscript 
I denotes that variables are agreed at time 1. At time 2, after the provider has made 
investment y", the purchaser will wish to renegotiate the contract (as in the above case 
where no time 1 contract is agreed in order to divide the transaction surplus net of the 
investment cost). Would the provider agree? If réparations for breech were expected to 
be sufficiently large, then the provider would not agree. If réparations were expected to 
be quite small, then réservation utility plus réparations may be less than the surplus 
from a renegotiated contract. This issue will generally tum on the expected attitude of 
the courts (see Hart, 1995). Since full contingent (CC) contracts are negotiated at time 1 
they can account for the investment cost. Thus, we add this cost to (5-12) to get provider 
(partial) utility of: 
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(5-89) U' =(pk-ck)xk-y°+rM«y{9k)-rMKe{f)-BMK 
Purchaser (partial) utility is unchanged: z' = Z 7 Furthermore, expected surplus is now: 
(R - pR )x + {pc - c)x - y" = S1 = rMKS - ya i.e. now including period / utility. The Nash 
bargaining outcome is directly analogous with the above, except that all period utility is 
summed - see Annex 5-1 : 
(5-90) U' +ìixv = [L{rMKS-/)+ìx{rMKy-rMKe();e)+Z0-Bm-BML) 
Purchaser utility is: 
(5-91) Z ' = (1- p X ^ S - / )+ (1 - - rMKe(f)+ Z° - BMK - BML ) 
Annex 5-3 
Under complete contracts stakeholders agree at time 1 prices,/?, and final outputs {D,q} 
for each state of the world u, given known (p. Since u is unknown at time 1, investment 
is at the level required to fulfil the expected contracted product specification and price. 
Specifically, the investment level under CC contracts is the value that maximises both 
expected utilities, (5-90) and (5-91), that is, 
e[z'|u]= ^[(1 - /)+&" nX'^V - rMKe(/)+ Z° - B m - BML)|o] . 
Differentiating either of these functions with respect to the investment level induced by 
the product contract gives: 
(5-92) rMK (yaCC )-1 - B™ - BMtc = r>m (y°cc )-1 - Y ( ß f K + B"ML = 0 
dyaC V 1 y y ôyacV ' t f V " " ôy 
The product type specified in the contract for each o is that implied by this level of 
investment, i.e. q = q{y"cc and output D, at a price that shares the surplus 
generated by yaCC. Should the provider produce yaC * y"cc then 
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<7C(yoC,u,<p)* q€{yaCC,u,cp), which is a contract breech and subject to (prohibitively 
high) damages. Similarly, if the purchaser failed to pay the agreed /?(>>"" ,u,cp), they 
would have to pay damages. Spécification of product terms {q, D,p\ for each 
contingency is required to ensure an appropriate spécification whatever the actual 
circumstances that prevail at the time of any challenges to the contract. The existence of 
bargaining costs prohibits the writing of fully specified product contracts and therefore 
the actual contract cannot induce providers to supply the first-best investment.44 All 
parties are aware of this, and so the payments made reflect the anticipated, not the first 
best level of investment. It might be assumed that providers would unilaterally supply 
the additional investment beyond y a C C . However, for this additional investment the 
provider would bear the full costs but expect to reap only a share of the benefits i.e. as 
in the CA contracts case, and soy" <ya*' where transaction costs exist. 
Bargaining costs are a serious constraint. It is difficult to get an idea of magnitude of 
abstract terms such as BMK, but clearly, the need to calcúlate optimal service 
configurations and pricing for all conceivable values of u (and potentially ß and co and 
given one of many possible states implied by cp) is a demanding task. Many 
commentators argue the bounded rational nature of stakeholders and the conséquent 
near infinite costs of this task, to effectively rule out CC contracts (see chapter 2). 
Nonetheless, describing this type of contract is useful because it helps make clear why 
CA contracts fail to deliver first best outcomes (even absent motivation problems). 
Annex 5-4 
In order to investigate the affects of scale, we will consider organisations with net 
income drawn from some distribution with constant variance, a2n. For each transaction i 
providers receive a variable net income with a mean of ñ . Managers (perhaps reflecting 
the preferences of stakeholders) are risk averse with utility u = w(n) , such that, 
M(0) = 0, u > 0, u < 0, um = 0. Performing a Taylor series expansion on u about u = 0: 
44 Only complete contracts that have full spécifications for each contingency will be assured of inducing 
the first best level of investment (given expectations at the time of actual investment). Where only a 
partial spécification exists due to transaction costs, the investment will be too generic, as it were, under-
supplied, with the provider expecting, ex post, for a lack of précision to work against him. 
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(5-93) w(n) = m(ü)+ u'(TtX- (* - " ) ) + î " " M - fa - = " f a ) - w'OOfa - j i )+ { u ' ( n X { n - n)f 
where n = n + (71 - n) = % - (rc - 7i). Taking expectations we have: 
Eu{n) = «( té) - « f a X ^ M " u"{n\E[n]-E[nf 
(5"94) = u{n)~u'{ît\E[n\-£[71])+ \«"(té^tt]2 + E[nf - H ) 
As N = -X!"= i7 r i a n c* %1 =(~~X"=1K> ) . s o w e h a v e E[K]=E -X^i71 and 
E[nf = E[tï2]= E 
1 •c-in 
n 
Also, É[k\=E , which means, 
(5-95) 
Eu(n) = u(E{n))+\u''{n 
or 
(5-96) Eu(n) = u(E{n))+±u"{Ti I L - , -E 
or 
(5-97) 
and so, 
(5-98) 
which indicates the negative utility associated with risk. It is clear however that this 
disutility lessens in size as the number of transactions n increases, so that as n 00, so 
Euij\)= » 1/(7!). The variance of net return, which gives rise to negative utility is 
diminishing as the number of samples (transactions) tends to its probability limit: mean 
costs for larger organisations tend to the income level. 
188 
Chapter 6. Empirical analysis of governance archetypes 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to address the two main hypothesis developed in chapter 5, namely 
that purchaser (and total) transaction costs in hiérarchies are less than in markets: TCF1 < 
TCF and that total production costs in hiérarchies are greater than in markets: PC" > 
p d " . The empirical focus is on residential care for older people. The empirical 
investigation exploits the variation across England in the proportion of places that are 
organised under broadly (quasi-) market like and (public) hierarchy like arrangements -
see chapters 3 and 4. This chapter proceeds in section 6.2 by describing the cost 
modelling approach, specifically the spécification of the cost fonctions to be estimated. 
Section 6.3 describes the main data used in the analysis. It reports the dérivation of the 
cost variables. The estimation techniques used are outlined in section 6.4, and the results 
of the analysis are given in section 6.5. Conclusions follow in section 6.6. 
6.1.1 Governance arrangements 
The main empirical task in this chapter is the attribution of costs - transaction and 
production - to governance alternatives i.e. to explore how transaction costs differ 
between governance arrangements. In chapter 3 a theoretical définition of governance 
arrangements was developed. Our practical measure used here relies on the distribution 
of ownership as its basis, whilst the theoretical définition includes issues relating to the 
distribution of control. However, the analysis in chapter 4 (section 4.6.1.1) showed first 
that there was a strong corrélation between ownership and control. Specifically, 
synthetic régression using data on control and incentives, as well as ownership, at local 
authority level - but with a much smaller sample size - supported the use of ownership 
distribution as a summary statistic. Moreover, even 'internai markets' in social care are 
likely to have significant 'hierarchical' features since provider (home) managers are 
directly employed by the local authority and are accountable ultimately to the corporate 
centre. 
Taking an output focus, the empirical indicator for 'governance archetype' is the 
relative number of care home placements made according to ownership distribution. 
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Specifically, a placement is made under hierarchical arrangements if ownership of the 
means of purchasing and provision are integrateci i.e. both public sector. A placement is 
made under market arrangements if ownership is dispersed. Because we are concemed 
only with publicly funded, and so publicly purchased services, the latter is équivalent to 
the number of placements made to independently owned providers. 
6.1.2 Costs 
An inclusive définition of 'total costs' in the study is of total locai authority social 
services expenditure less expenditure explicitly identified as allocated to non-older 
client groups. Total costs comprise both the costs of production of services and the 
transaction costs of facilitating production and allocation of services (see chapter 3). 
Identifying production costs by governance type and client group is straightforward 
since our governance définition is output based. However, the transaction cost element 
is not output based. Total costs data, and by subtraction, transaction cost data, are not 
categorised by output type. In this study Statistical modelling is used to allocate these 
transaction costs. Transaction costs take a broad définition in this analysis being 
essentially total costs less the costs of production of services. 
6.2 Cost modelling 
The aim of the analysis is to test a number of hypotheses that concern the relationship 
between social care costs - total, production and transaction - and governance 
arrangements. A Statistical model is used to estimate the association between variation 
in these costs across local authorities (at two points in time) and the proportion of total 
residential care output provided by locai authorities (hiérarchies), rather than purchased 
from the independent sector - i.e. our governance archetype indicator. The locai 
authority Social Services Department (SSD) is the unit of analysis. 
6.2.1 Cost-theoretic underpinnings 
A cost model underpins the analysis. The production cost fiinction for each service takes 
the standard form: 
(6- i ) C , 4 = C ; ( * , 4 , w „ T , ) 
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where q is service output, with the superscript k = h,m indicating hierarchical and 
market output respectively. Residential costs are described by the vector C = {C. , C,m}. 
The subscript i = 1,.., N, denotes the local authority SSD. The vector w,- is the various 
inputs costs, x; is a vector of cost shift factors. The vector x, includes, in particular, 
client dependency characteristics that affect the costs of providing output of required 
standard. Transaction costs are: 
(6-2) 7) =Ti(q],..,^,..,qUwi,Ti) 
The governance choice by the local authority is assumed to be according to the 
following programme: 
(6-3) maxi / , =£/,(?, ,9 ) 
Subject to production and transaction costs summing to total expenditure E: 
(6-4) E, =Y<ìkCk+T{q) 
k 
where q is the vector of Outputs and 9 are preferences. This problem has the usuai first 
order condition: 
Uql uqk uq. 
(6"5) (c; + q)Clgl )+ 7, = - = (c* + q{ckqi ) + Tqk = ' = (c/ + q'C, ) + T, 
which can be solved for optimal Outputs q. = q"(q^, C,., w, x, 9), with Ci the vector of 
production costs, and q~k is the vector of Outputs other than output k. Substituting using 
(6-1) gives q. = q-2{qjk, w, x, 9). We are interested in the three Outputs: LA residential 
care, in-house residential care and domiciliary care, which will be denoted 
/ c k : k = h, m, nr with the remaining s- 3 Outputs denoted by j a k : j £ l, and 
the vector of j Outputs referred to as q~J. The 5 - 3 output équations can be solved 
simultaneously for the s - 3 Outputs j (assuming a solution exists e.g. a linear équation 
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system) to give the vector of other outputs as (partial) reduced-form équations: 
(6-6) q ; J = q ; J ( q } , g ? , g ? , * , x, e) 
These outputs can be substituted fïrstly into the transaction cost fonction (6-2): 
(6-7) Y j =TiR{qlq:,qr,qrJ{q':,qr,qr,w,',,Q\wi,x) 
or 
(6-8) Yl =TiR(q»,q",qr,wi,Ti,Q) 
to give the residuai transaction cost fonction, Y j . Similarly, residuai total cost, and 
residuai production cost fonctions are: 
(6-9) Y,1 =Y>{q,;,q:,q';\wi,Ti,$\ l = E,C 
i.e. where F c is the (residuai) production cost fonction and Y-E is the (residuai) total 
cost fonction. Depending on exact fonctional form, these residuai cost fonctions can be 
re-specified as: 
(6-10) Y,1 = Y'(q,., q f , q"r, w,., x,., 9), l = E, C, T 
where Q, = q*¡{q* + q"' )= q'- /qf is the governance indicator variable. 
A Taylor sériés expansion (to second order) in logs by différences {q^,q™, } can be 
used to approximate this transaction cost fonction. 
Y,t « i r ( 0 , 0 , 0 , w„ T,., e . ) + ^ q- + q™ + ^ wf 
(6-11) 
ô2Y1 ô2Y7 
Ôq»dq* ' dq"Ôq; 
d Y 1 \ ¿ D " (~h~\ C'Y.' \ 
dwdw: 
d2?1 
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, O1. O ï „ ~ ) 
assuming that ^ = ^ . where k = \q. , q , w ] and the superscript refers to 
OK OKJ OKJOK 
they'th element. Here ic = logK. 
This approximation function has a number of attractive properties, but most importantly 
imposes no a priori restrictions on cross-elasticities between outputs, and inputs and 
outputs. 
6.2.2 Empirical spécification 
Three sets of estimations are undertaken. The primary analysis is of the covariates of 
transaction costs and is undertaken to address the hypothesis that hiérarchies have lower 
transaction costs. Thereafter a model of total costs is fitted and is used to assess the 
overall impact of governance choices. Finally, an analysis of production costs is 
undertaken mainly to assess the précision of the governance variable in its impact on 
production costs. 
Two models are fitted for the transaction costs analysis. The first is the stochastic 
counterpart of (6-10), with power-transformed variables: 
(6-12) l o g l f = p f f i , + P 3 r r +p4r logw, + ( P 5 , x , ) 
The Box-Cox metric: x =(xx -1 )/X is used to tackle the problem of zéro values on raw-
scales that prevents the use of logarithmic transformations. Nonetheless, the natural log 
is the limiting case of the Box-Cox metric: l imx = l n x . This ratio model has total 
residential care output as a control factor. The coefficient therefore measures 
substitution effects with given total output. 
The second approach to estimating transaction costs was to use the generalised translog 
multiproduct cost function (GTMCF) (Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway, 1980): 
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(6-13) l 0 g Y i T = a + l o g M ; ' + + P - & " ' ) 2 + PwOog w,.)2 
where a = a 0 + + (P t , t;.^ 
This is a flexible functional form that is linear in parameters, the empirical counterpart 
of (6-8), and so has no restrictions on cross-elasticities. However, the Box-Cox 
transformation is used instead of logs for variables that have zéro values on the raw 
scale. 
The total cost and production cost models are the complément to (6-13): 
(6-14) log Y.' = PÎQ. + P'257 + p3?i"r + P4 1°S wi + (p5x, )» l = E,C 
Total costs are by définition at the local authority level as they include transaction cost 
elements.45 
6.2.3 Empirical hypothesis 
Table 6-1 lists the signs of the relevant coefficients in the respective models that are 
consistent with the two main hypotheses developed in chapter 5. We would expect 
authorities with relatively high proportions of hierarchical provision (that is publicly 
owned provision) to be associated with relatively low transaction costs, given total 
output and other control factors. The reverse would be the case for production costs. As 
to total (transaction and production) costs, it is not a priori clear what the sign would be 
because it is the sum of two countervailing effects. 
The analysis is focused on the local authority i.e. purchaser transaction costs. This is 
motivated mainly because it is local authorities that make décisions about governance 
45 Production costs are service-specific and these costs can be attributed a priori to individuai production 
units, that is, care home types. Indeed, analysis conducted elsewhere at the home level show that local 
authority (hierarchy) homes have higher production costs than homes in the independent (market) sector, 
other things equal (Netten et al., 1998). Nonetheless, an LA level analysis was also performed to assess 
the précision of the governance variable in its impact on costs at this level, and to provide some basis for 
interprétation and/or calibration of the LA level results in correspondence with the home level results. 
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structures. In any case, as argued in section 5.7 of chapter 5, if the data support 
hypothesis HI then we have a great deal of confidence that they would also support Hla 
(that total transaction costs are higher in markets), although we should be explicit that 
we are not directly testing Hla. Any reference to transaction cost below is to purchaser 
transaction cost, unless specifically attributed to providers. 
Table 6-1. Expected signs 
Cost Model Variable Coefficient Sign Hypothesis 
(Chapter 5) 
Transaction 
(log) 
Ratio Hierarchical/LA 
output proportion 
(Box Cox) 
ßr -ve Hl (see 
section 5.7) 
Transaction 
(log) 
Translog Net LA output 
(Box Cox) 
+ve 
Production Ratio Hierarchical/LA 
output proportion 
(Box Cox) 
ßf +ve H2 (see 
section 5.9) 
Total Ratio Hierarchical/LA 
output proportion 
(Box Cox) 
ßf 
? 
6.3 Residential care in English local authorities 
The data are drawn from routinely collected Government data sources - see chapter 1. 
For further détails see Table 6-24 in Annex 6-1. 
6.3.1 The Costs of residential care 
Expenditure data are used to construct three cost dépendent variables. Catégories 
available in local authority expenditure collections (the revenue outturn statistics, R 0 3 -
see Table 6-24) are listed in Table 6-2. This catégorisation can be aggregated to 7 
expenditure variables, which in turn, can be reduced to our three cost variables:46 
Total cost = olderpeopleproduction costs (PI to VI) + olderpeople transaction costs 
(TI to T9) 
46 The expenditure data include revenue expenditure and capital charges (which includes debt redemption, 
interest, and capital expenditure charged to revenue account). As ever, the particular accounting 
convention that underpins these figures may not generate an accurate economic opportunity cost figure. A 
bespoke bottom-up economic costing is clearly not possible for all expenditure items relating to care of 
older people for all Social Services departments in England. For our comparative purposes anyway, there 
is no reason to expect accounting conventions to differ by provision type. 
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Table 6-2. Expenditure - older people client groups 
Expenditure category - older people Transaction Production 
Assessment & Commissionin¡¡ costs 
Senior management ( eg : Assistant Director costs ) TI 
Care management / social work T2 
Management costs (SSMSS)1 T3 
Êesidential costs -> 
Residential care placements : own LA provision PI 
Residential care placements : commissioned placements P2 
Nursing placements P3 
Other residential services for older people P4 
Management costs (SSMSS): residential T4 
Non-residential costs 
Home care / home help P5 
Day centres P6 
Other non-residential costs P7 
Management costs (SSMSS): non-residential T5 
Central strategic (apportioned to older people client group) 
Strategic management, planning, etc. T6 
Registration and inspection T7 
Complaints procédures T8 
Management costs (SSMSS) T9 
Notes SSMSS: Social Services Management and Support Services 
Stratégie management costs (T6 + T7 + T8+ T8) are not allocated by client group in the 
expenditure data.47 They include more general governance activity such as registration 
and inspection. Total costs include the production costs of services for older people -
residential care, nursing home care, domiciliary care and other forms of residential care. 
In addition, the costs of care management, planning and assessment are also 
components. 
Descriptive statistics concerning these cost measures for the pooled sample are reported 
in Table 6-3. Table 6-4 reports the data for the 1998/9 sample, whilst Table 6-5 has the 
results for the 1997/8 sample. As is usual for cost data each sample exhibits a rightward 
skew, which has implications for the estimations as discussed below. 
47 Total costs relate to the older people's client group, although in that the data on strategic management 
(which are transaction costs) are not related to output and client group, a small proportion of the 
transaction costs that in reality apply to non-older services are included in our measure of 'older people' 
transaction and total costs. This restriction should not be a problem unless our goVernance indicator 
defined by output relating to older people services is strongly negatively correlated to an equivalent 
measure for non-older people client groups such as mental health and learning disabilities, which is not 
suggested by the evidence. Absence such correlation the counting of some additional non-older people 
transaction cost merely introduces more. 
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One relevant issue is that it is possible that some transaction costs are bound up with 
the measure of independent sector production cost, taking the form, for example, of 
providers having to do their own assessments of clients. This would act to exacerbate 
the results below that markets have high transaction costs and low production costs. 
Table 6-3. Costs (£000s) - pooled sample 
Cost Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Median 
Total 34608.84 20796.41 2329.00 125309.00 1.59 5.93 30003.50 
Production 11840.26 7721.54 518.55 43482.00 1.65 6.13 9967.00 
Transaction 5363.24 3335.58 448.77 18279.78 1.82 6.78 4498.76 
N = 230 
Table 6-4. Costs (£000s) - 1998/9 sample 
Cost Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Median 
Total 35783.52 21531.61 2359.00 125309.00 1.56 5.86 30788.00 
Production 12326.63 8038.76 518.55 43482.0(P 1.66 6.29 10324.00 
Transaction 5749.63 3539.47 479.18 18279.78 1.71 6.17 4875.16 
N = 113 
Table 6-5. Costs (£000s) - 1997/8 sample 
Cost Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Median 
Total 33474.32 20088.06 2329.00 116902.00 1.61 5.93 29708.00 
Production 11370.52 7406.49 531.75 40436.00 1.61 5.75 9221.00 
Transaction 4990.05 3095.60 448.77 16823.78 1.93 7.43 4349.34 
N = 117 
6.3.2 The characteristics of residential care 
Residential care is characterised for our purposes in terms of activity or output levels, 
the costs of inputs such as labour, and also a number of process indicators. Table 6-6 
summarises the empirical indicators and lists the transformations used to address 
skewed data. 
6.3.2.1 Activity 
The analysis aims to allocate costs to different governance arrangements - market and 
hierarchy. In practice almost ali authorities use some combination of these two modes, 
and to measure their relative proportionate use in each authority we use the proportion 
of total output that is provided under each arrangement. The latter measure is our 
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'governance indicator', Q, and it is constructed using output, q* and q'" - see section 
6.2.1 (the merits of this définition are discussed in the conclusion). 
Table 6-6. Var iables - définition 
Category Variable Definition Transfor 
mations 
Output LA Output LA provider residential care output in resident-
weeks 
Box-Cox 
Ind Output Independent provider residential care output in 
resident-weeks 
Box-Cox 
Output ratio Ratio of LA provider output to total residential 
care output 
Box-Cox 
Output ratio (BC) x 
wage (log) 
Ratio of LA provider output to total residential 
care output (Box-Cox) x wage (log) 
Box-Cox, 
log 
Total output Total residential care output: resident weeks Log 
Domiciliary output Older people helped to live at home per 1,000 
population aged 65 and over 
Log 
Domiciliary output Older people helped to live at home Linear 
Input costs Wage Social care wages Linear 
Log 
Population Pop 65+ Population aged 65 plus Log 
Pop 65-75 Population aged 65 to 75 Log 
Pop ratio Ratio of population aged 75 and over to 
population aged between 65 and 75 
Log 
Linear 
Dependency SMR Standardised mortality ratio (uk=100) Linear 
Hosp% Number of hospital admissions of people aged 75 
and over with a diagnosis of hypothermia per 
older population 
Linear 
Gender Proportion of females to males in LA Linear 
Process 
factors 
Statement Percentage of people receiving a needs/service 
Statement 
Log 
Linear 
Single room% Percentage offered a single room Linear 
Dummy 
Time First period Observation for 1997/8 (first time period) Dummy 
LA 
dummies 
Met Metropolitan LA Dummy 
Shire Shire LA Dummy 
InnLon Inner London LA Dummy 
OutLon Outer London LA Dummy 
Activity information is reported in Table 6-7 for the whole sample, Table 6-8 for the 
1998/9 cohort and in Table 6-9 for the 1997/8 cohort. The average ratio of local 
authority resident-weeks to independent sector resident-weeks in 1998/9 was a third, 
down slightly from its value in 1997/8. Throughout the analysis period 2 authorities had 
no in-house provision of residential care for older people and relied entirely on market 
means of securing service for their clients. The greatest proportion of in-house use was 
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jus t ove r three quar te r s o f ail r es iden t -weeks . U s i n g total r e s i d e n t - w e e k s es t imâtes , t h e 
ave rage p roduc t ion cost pe r w e e k is £ 2 8 0 . 
T a b l e 6-7 . Act iv i ty - p o o l e d s a m p l e ( N = 2 3 0 ) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Residential care 
Supported residents - LA homes LA Supp 354.17 291.26 0.00 1637.00 
Supp. residents - Indep. homes Ind Supp 813.00 529.42 39.00 2667.00 
Resident weeks - LA homes LA Output 15847.70 14083.66 0.00 77804.45 
Resident weeks - Indep. homes [nd Output 29117.22 20794.85 1296.38 110029.80 
Resident weeks - ratio (LA/all) Output ratio 0.34 0.16 0.00 0.76 
Domiciliary care 
Older people helped to live at Dom. Output 3822.96 2899.49 162.83 19597.62 
home (no. in LA) 
T a b l e 6-8 . Act iv i ty - 1 9 9 8 / 9 sample ( N = 113 ) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Residential care 
Supported residents - LA homes LA Supp 346.32 281.03 0.00 1197.00 
Supp. residents - Indep. homes Ind Supp 848.41 563.54 39.00 2667.00 
Resident weeks - LA homes LA Output 15457.04 13482.66 0.00 58571.57 
Resident weeks - Indep. homes Ind Output 30389.03 22205.45 1296.38 110029.80 
Resident weeks - ratio (LA/all) Output ratio 0.33 0.15 0.00 0.64 
Domiciliary care 
Older people helped to live at Dom. Output 3828.54 2934.27 164.33 19536.91 
home (no. in LA) 
T a b l e 6-9 . Act iv i ty - 1 9 9 7 / 8 s a m p l e ( N = 117) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Residential care 
Supported residents - LA homes LA Supp 361.75 301.82 0.00 1637.00 
Supp. residents - Indep. homes Ind Supp 778.81 494.27 40.00 2432.00 
Resident weeks - LA homes LA Output 16225.01 14688.88 0.00 77804.45 
Resident weeks - Indep. homes Ind Output 27888.90 19351.79 1329.38 94037.44 
Resident weeks - ratio (LA/all) Output ratio 0.36 0.17 0.00 0.76 
Domiciliary care 
Older people helped to live at Dom. output 3817.568 2878.104 162.825 19597.62 
home (no. in LA) 
Domic i l i a ry care ac t iv i ty is a l so l isted in the tab les , measu red he re as t h e n u m b e r of 
o lde r people in the local au thor i ty in rece ip t o f domici l ia ry ca re se rv ices . Th i s n u m b e r is 
équiva len t to about 8 p e r cen t o f the p o p u l a t i o n over 65 and 18 pe r cen t o f the 
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population over 75. The highest proportion of over 75's receiving this care was 41 per 
cent. 
Activity is asymmetrically distributed with a rightward skew (skew = 1.65 and Kurtosis 
= 5.57 for LA resident-weeks and skew = 1.65 and Kurtosis = 5.72 for independent 
sector resident-weeks). A (natural) logarithmic power transformation reduces this 
asymmetry and was employed in the model for the total weeks variable. The governance 
variable Q, was also transformed. The existence of zero values for the ratio Q, rules out 
a log transform and instead a Box-Cox transformation was used - see section 6.2.2. 
6.3.2.2 Control factors 
A wide range of other factors compound the relationship between the cost and 
governance - the w, and t , terms in (6-1) and following equations. The Wj are inputs 
costs such as labour and capital costs. The vector x, are shift factors including, client 
dependency, population, authority types, and process/quality indicators. Table 6-10 
below describes the empirical proxies used in the analysis.. 
6.3.3 Sample sizes and Missing values 
At the start of 1998, England had 132 local authorities. During the course of the year 10 
of these local authorities (Shire counties) were re-organised into 28 new local 
authorities, making 150 local authorities from 1999 (and currently). From these 10 Shire 
LAs, 19 new unitary authorities were created, as was one new Shire LA. Two of the 
original Shire LAs ceased to exist, with eight remaining in name, but with new 
boundaries. 
In order to have a consistent panel dataset the 20 new authorities and the eight Shires 
with new boundaries were deleted. Accordingly the data set used 122 authorities over 
the two-year period, a total valid sample of 244. Eight cases (Brent 98/9, Bromley 98/9, 
Stockport 98/9, Wandsworth 98/9, and Somerset and Tameside in both periods) were 
dropped where a positive expenditure was recorded in maintaining people in homes but 
the activity statistics recorded zero places. A further 2 cases (the Isles of Scilly in both 
periods) were dropped because information on domiciliary care was missing. Four cases 
(two local authorities in both periods: Southwark and North Lincolnshire) were dropped 
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d u e to miss ing data on the number of L A suppor ted residents. H e n c e the régress ion 
s a m p l e w a s 230 cases and 117 local authori t ies (95 % of the va l id sample ) . 
T a b l e 6-10 . Descr ipt ive statistics - poo led s a m p l e (N=230) 
Variable 
name 
Factor Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Input cost 
Wage 
Dwell price 
Input cost 
Average dwelling prices, ail 
dwellings (1998) 
5.157E+01 
8.676E+04 
1.422E+01 
2.842E+04 
3.483E+01 
5.705E+04 
8.810E+01 
1.278E+05 
Population 
Popall 
Pop 65-75 
Pop 65+ 
Pop ratio 
Pop density 
Population - ail 
Population aged 65 to 75 
Population aged 65 and over 
Ratio of population aged 75 and 
over to population aged between 65 
and 75 
Population per Km squared 
3.247E+02 
2.727E+04 
5.081E+04 
8.619E-01 
2.628E+03 
2.181E+02 
1.981E+04 
3.717E+04 
1.083E-01 
2.735E+03 
5.000E+00 
5.260E+02 
9.750E+02 
5.755E-01 
6.100E+01 
1.231E+03 
1.050E+05 
1.928E+05 
1.199E+00 
I.367E+04 
Dependency 
SMR 
Gender 
Standardised mortality rate 
(UK=100) 
Proportion of females to maies in 
LA 
Number of hospital admissions of 
people aged 75 and over with a 
diagnosis of hypothermia 
9.974E+01 
1.031E+00 
1.020E+01 
4.300E-02 
6.500E+01 
6.667E-01 
1.240E+02 
1.122E+00 
Hosp% 1.058E-02 3.570E-03 2.261E-04 2.003E-02 
Process 
lndicators 
Statement 
Single rm% 
Percentage of people receiving a 
needs/service statement 
Percentage offered a single room 
7.219E+01 
9.360E+01 
2.227E+01 
1.043E+01 
5.000E+00 
4.700E+01 
1.000E+02 
1.000E+02 
LA types 
Met 
Shire 
InnLon 
OutLon 
Unitary 
Metropolitan LA 
Shire LA 
Inner London LA 
Outer London LA 
Unitary LA 
3.000E-01 
2.087E-01 
1.000E-01 
1.652E-01 
2.261E-01 
4.593E-01 
4.073E-01 
3.007E-01 
3.722E-01 
4.192E-01 
O.OOOE+OO 
0.000E+00 
0.000E+00 
0.000E+00 
O.OOOE+OO 
1.000E+00 
1.000E+00 
1.000E+00 
1.000E+00 
1.000E+00 
6.4 Estimation techniques 
In b r ie f , two est imators w e r e used. The first is the popu la t ion -ave raged general 
e s t imat ing équat ions ( G E E ) model , which is ana logous to the gene ra l i sed l inear mode l 
( G L M ) and was u s e d to address both skewed data issues and the pane l dataset . The 
s e c o n d is the (one-way) G L S random-ef fec t s mode l , a more conven t iona l est imator , 
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which allowed more standardised diagnostic testing. The remainder of this section 
provides a more detailed discussion of the chosen techniques. 
6.4.1 Transformation issues and GLM 
As noted above the raw scale cost data have the usual rightward skew. Generalised 
linear models (GLM) estimation was used to address this problem. GLM involves the a 
priori spécification of a link function that relates a linear combination of coefficients 
and independent variables with the dépendent variable. A log-link function was used in 
the present analysis: 
(6-15) l o g ( £ ( y , ) ) = l o g ( K ) = T i , = x ; p 
and therefore, E(yj) = exp(x'P). The GLM formulation has the expected value, |i, of the 
data transformed according to the link function. The data Fare assumed to be drawn 
from a particular distribution with an expected value and variance var(i^ ) , conditional 
on x. The coefficients P are then chosen to maximise the likelihood, given the fixed x,'s, 
that ja, is the expected value of specified distribution from which F, was drawn. Hence 
the expected value is a systematic (non-stochastic) function of the optimal P estimâtes. 
Wedderburn suggests the estimation of parameters by maximising quasi-likelihood 
functions because it avoids spécifié a priori parameterisation of the distribution 
(Wedderburn, 1974). These functions are otherwise known as generalised estimating 
équations (GEE) and take the form: 
(6-16) tWjr'fc-^O 
This parameter vector p, the solution to (6-16), is found by itération using Fisher's 
scoring method (McCullagh and Neider, 1989). The advantage of using GEE 
estimation is that re-transformation of (6-15) to the raw scale gives an expected value of 
the cost variable as a non-stochastic function of only the independent variables: 
E(y. ) = exp(x'p). Compare this to an équivalent OLS régression of a log-transformed 
dépendent variable: log(y. ) = x'P + s,, which on re-transformation is 
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(6-17) £ ( ^ ) = exp(x;p)£(exp(e,)) 
Calculating the expected value of the exponentiated error term (which is not equal to 
zero) is difficult, particularly in the presence of heteroscedasticity48 (Manning, 1998; 
Manning and Mullahy, 2001). 
6.4.1.1 Choosing distribution functions for cost estimâtes 
The drawback of GEE estimation is the need to specify a distribution for the cost 
variable. In general the variance can be written as v a r ( ^ ) = a((|))K(|a,). The use of 
extended quasi-likelihood estimation of GLM obviâtes the need to specify exactly the 
distribution of Y, that is, the value of the dispersion or 'scale' parameter, <|> (indeed, the 
a(<|>) term drops out of the estimation function). However, an appropriate variance 
function, V(p), must be specified. The class of (exponential) distributions from which 
this choice is made in GLM estimation can be summarised as: (see Forder, 2005) 
(6-18) var (7)=a( ( t ) )F(^) = K X =K0(g- ,(î i i))K 
where k is an integer on the support k e [0,3]. Manning (1999) and Blough (1999) 
suggest that estimâtes of k can be derived from an OLS estimation of (6-18), when 
taking the following form, and given a log-link function: 
(6-19) log(ft - A, )2 ) = log(K0 ) + k log(exp(x'p)) + ef = a + kti, + e, 
where |i is the predicted expected value. This is a form of Park Test for 
heteroscedasticity. Since we are interested in c5[log(var(y))]/c)r|( = k , re-transformation 
issues are not relevant in this Park estimation. The variance (6-18) was also estimated 
48 The smearing estimator has been suggested as a robust, non-parametric alternative (Duan, 1983). It is 
based on the estimated residuals s = log(y ) - x ' P and takes the form: ,v = exp(ê,.)- The estimated 
value of the dépendent variable then becomes: E{Yi) = exp(j'P)s • Again however, this estimator is 
problematic when the error exhibits non-constant variance, that is, when e = e(.x). (In practice, log 
transformation may remove non-constant error variance problems that often arise with cross-sectional 
analysis performed on the raw scale). 
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by non-linear least squares, although this carries more assumptions than the OLS model. 
The NLS model produced generally equivalent results although the estimates of K were 
slightly smaller. 
The estimated variance will depend on the predicted valué ¡1,, which in turn depends on 
the chosen variance function. Nonetheless, whilst the inappropriate choice of variance 
function will lead to some imprecisión of the estimates of (i,, in the main the shape of 
the var(y)will be maintained (for relevant conditions, see Manning and Mullahy, 
1999). On the whole the three models produced consistent Park Test valúes of K « 2 
for each of following estimators: (i) OLS on log dependent variable with assumed 
homoscedastic log-normal errors, (ii) GLM with Gaussian variance function (iii) GLM 
with Poisson variance function, (iv) GLM with gamma variance function, and (v) GLM 
with inverse Gaussian variance function. These tests supported our adopted assumption 
of quadratic variance, that is, the gamma distribution. 
6.4.2 Panel data - random effects 
In this study two consecutive years of cross-sections of local authorities were used: 
(6-20) Yu = a + 4 P + e,7, i = 1,..., N; t = 1,..., T 
A panel data set has the advantage of controlling for some omitted variable effects, 
although clearly with only two years of data this is limited in the current analysis. A 
two-way model can also tackle some of the problems of omitted time effects that are, in 
addition, relatively invariant across observational units: 
(6-21) Yu = a + + u, + v, + s,., 
Such omissions can result in heterogeneity bias (Hsiao, 1986). 
6.4.3 Skewed data and panel effects 
In light of the re-transformation problem discussed above the primary estimation 
method used is GEE. The use of a panel data is addressed using a population-averaged 
GEE model, which is an extensión of (6-16): 
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where F , (a )= a}Ri{u)a} and A, = diag^,...^ } (see Forder, 2005) . Here R is the 
working corrélation matrix and assumptions are required concerning its structure (for 
détails see StataCorp, 1999). The primary modelling choice for this analysis was the 
"unstructured" distribution, although in practice, with a limited number of time periods, 
the one-way and this two-way model are little différent. 
To provide some comparison, a more conventional estimator was also used, the (one-
way) GLS random-effects model (Greene, 1993): 
(6-23) Y„ =a + x'iß + ui+til 
A number of diagnostics are available for this estimation. In random effects estimations 
the group effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the other regressors. Should this 
assumption not hold, the estimator would be inconsistent (i.e. mis-specified due to 
omitted variables). This assumption is not however needed for fixed effect estimators, 
and this characteristic is used as a basis for a test of the former (Hausman, 1978). 
Hausman's test is that for the random effects estimator to be consistent it should not 
differ systematically from the fixed effects estimator, and this forms the nuli hypothesis 
for a chi-squared test. For none of the models described below could this nuli 
hypothesis be rejected. To test that the variance of additional error u, is significantly 
différent from zero, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test was used. Again 
this condition was satisfied for all the models reported below. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Transaction costs 
As noted above two models of transaction costs were estimated: the ratio model (6-12) 
and the translog model (6-13). GEE was the primary method used to estimate both these 
models. As noted, GLS with a log-transformed dépendent variable was also estimated. 
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6.5.1.1 Transaction cost ratio model 
Table 6-11 lists t he variables in the rat io mode l and both the G E E and G L S estimâtes. 
The cost fonctions uti l ise variables f r o m f ive catégories: output , input costs , populat ion, 
dependency and p rocess factors - see Tab le 6 - 6 fo r a défini t ion and sect ions 6.2.1 and 
6.2.2. Bo th mode l s were highly signif icant overal l . 
Table 6-11. Transact ion costs models - L inear , panel and General i sed Est imating 
Equat ions 
GLS, random effects GEE, random effects 
Variable Coefficient Std error Coefficient Std error 
Output ratio (BC) 1.204E+00 3.594E-01* 1.267E+00 3.471E-01 * 
Output ratio (BC) * wage (log) -3.252E-01 9.321E-02* -3.420E-01 9.002E-02 * 
Total output (log) 1.414E-01 8.301E-02* 1.591E-01 8.117E-02* 
Domiciliary output (log) 2.617E-01 1.264E-01 * 3.032E-01 1.216E-01 * 
Domiciliary output -1.440E-08 1.800E-08 -1.900E-08 1.740E-08 
Wage (log) 4.357E-01 1.445E-01 * 3.973E-01 1.392E-01 * 
Pop 65-75 (log) 7.648E-01 1.095E-01 * 7.724E-01 1.061E-01 * 
Pop ratio (log) -1.595E-01 2.259E-01 -1.032E-01 2.177E-01 
SMR 6.618E-03 3.471E-03* 6.188E-03 3.348E-03* 
Single room% (squared) 2.270E-04 1.446E-04 1.852E-04 1.412E-04 
Single room% -3.526E-02 2.425E-02 -2.839E-02 2.370E-02 
Hosp% 9.498E+00 6.567E+00 1.258E+01 6.318E+00* 
Constant -3.078E+00 1.494E+00* -3.577E+00 1.448E+00* 
Model Linear (GLS), random effects GEE population-averaged 
Link/dependent variable Log (transaction cost) log 
Family gamma 
Correlation unstructured 
Number of obs 230 230 
Number of groups 117 117 
Obs per group: min 1 1 
avg 2.0 2.0 
max 2 2 
Wald chi2(9) 554.68 610.85 
Prob > chi2 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Scale parameter .0717761 
R-sq: within 0.0026 
between 0.8400 
overall 0.7992 
rho 0.4819 
Hausman spécification test 9.40 (NS) 
Breusch and Pagan test 17.00* 
Note * denotes significant at 10 per cent or better 
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The GEE model was estimated using a gamma error spécification; the Park test results 
(see section 6.4.1.1) are listed in Table 6-12. The table lists the estimate of the 
spécification integer K for the différent assumed error fonctions. Except for the 
Gaussian form, the nearest integer is K = 2, which is the gamma spécification. The GLS 
model satisfied the Hausman and the Breusch and Pagan LM tests to support the choice 
of random effects. The model also produced a high measure of fit. 
Table 6-12. Park tests - assumed variance functions 
Error spécifications GEE ratio model 
Transaction costs Production costs Total costs 
Log OLS - hom, normal 1.946E+00 1.865E+00 2.024E+00 
Gaussian 1.426E+00 2.006E+00 9.967E-01 
Poisson 1.694E+00 1.877E+00 1.164E+00 
Gamma 1.862E+00 1.914E+00 2.005E+00 
Inverse Gaussian 1.807E+00 2.419E+00 2.229E+00 
A Box-Cox transformation of the ratio Q„ the variable Output ratio (BC), was used to 
address the main hypothesis. Some expérimentation suggested that the inclusion of an 
interaction between the output ratio and the (log of the) input price variable, wage (log) 
produced the best fit. Overall, because the différent estimators produced very similar 
results, further analysis below is of the GEE estimation results. 
Table 6-13 summarises in the main results of the estimations. The relevant coefficient is 
the change in (log) transaction costs associated with a marginal increase in the listed 
factor. Also, the for GEE model, elasticities are reported. Elasticity in this case is given 
by 
c = (Ar7rr)xioo^3* ÔY1 
( A t f 7 ? A ) x l 0 0 ~ YT dq„ 
as A YT =dYT/dqh\ Aqh and where the marginal change in transaction costs for a 
'<7 
(relative) increase in hierarchical output (i.e. given total output) is 
ÔYT/Ôqh| , = ß R ( t f / V / ) X ~ l ( l / t f r y r , which is équivalent to ÔYT/dqh-dYT/dqm . 
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Table 6-13. Transaction costs modeis - Derived marginal effects 
Variable 
GLS, random effects 
Coefficient Std error 
GEE, random effects 
Coefficient Std error Elasticity 
Output ratio (constant output) 
Output (constant Output ratio) 
Wage 
Domiciliary output 
-3.761E-06 1.129E-06 * 
3.144E-06 1.846E-06 * 
8.483E-01 1.189E-01 * 
5.405E-05 2.310E-05 * 
-3.962E-06 1.081 E-06 * -0.063 
3.537E-06 1.805E-06 * 0.159 
8.313E-01 1.145E-01 * 0.831 
6.031E-05 2.180E-05 * 0.231 
Note * denotes significant at 10 per cent or better 
Holding total output constant, a change in the proportion of hierarchically arranged 
Provision (output ratio) was negatively related to transaction costs. Thus we infer that 
LAs with a high proportion of hierarchically arranged provision have relatively low 
transaction costs, and vice versa. The use of an interaction term in the model suggests 
that this effect is exacerbated in areas of high input costs. In other words, in such areas 
e.g. London, a small increase in the proportion of hierarchically arranged provision is 
associated with a greater reduction in transaction costs than for areas of low input costs. 
By contrast, holding output ratio constant, an increase in total output is associated with 
an increase in transaction costs. Although statistically significant the size of the effect is 
small; greater output means higher transaction costs, but it also suggests that a large part 
of total transaction costs is a fixed transaction cost element (this inference is explored 
below). A nursing home output variable was originally specified but was dropped due to 
a high degree of collinearity with residential care output. The correlation between (total) 
resident-weeks in residential care and resident-weeks in nursing homes was 0.84 
(Spearman's test of independence rejected a t p < 0.001) (see also below). 
Domiciliary care output is also positively related to transaction costs. Since the 
transaction cost measure includes services for all older people this finding is expected. 
The estimated elasticity is also comparable with that associated with (total) residential 
care activity. Other non-residential services were not included due to their high 
correlation with domiciliary care output; correlation between spending in 1998/9 on 
domiciliary and other non-residential services was 0.78 (Spearman's test of 
49 independence rejected a t p < 0.001). 
49 Expenditure on other non-residential services could have been included, possibly reducing co-linearity 
problems, but would have introduced an input cost element as well as activity. 
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Input prices, with wage as a proxy, are positively related to transaction costs and have 
an estimated elasticity near to one. This implies that transaction costs are sensitive to 
input prices as might be expected. If the input price (wage) accounts for much of the 
average of total transaction costs then its elasticity would be close to one. 
A number of control factors were also significant. The size of the population aged 65 to 
75 in the locai authority had a positive association with transaction cost, with an 
elasticity of 0.77. This variable might capture some older people client group service 
output not picked up directly by the residential care and domiciliary care activity 
measures. It also may be an LA scale factor. Dependency measures, such as the LA ' s 
standardised mortality ratio (SMR ) and the number of hospital admissions of people 
aged 75 and over with a diagnosis of hypothermia per older people population (Hosp%) 
were also significant. Higher average dependency - reflected by higher values of these 
two measures - would be expected to increase transaction costs. Highly frail service 
users would need a more considered and extensive spécification of care packages and 
greater follow-up that would increase costs. This general hypothesis is borne-out by the 
data: SMR and Hosp% have elasticities of, respectively of 0.62 and 0.01. 
6.5.1.2 Transaction cost translog model 
The translog model - as a flexible functional form not limited to a ratio - is a good basis 
for calculating marginai transaction costs directly (Table 6-14). It is estimated with the 
same set of population, dependency and process factors, but with a flexible 
spécifications of Outputs and input costs that allow second order effects and output 
interactions with input costs. A gamma error spécification was used to be consistent 
with the ratio model, and the associated Park test value supported this choice. Table 
6-15 reports the translog model using GLS with a log dépendent variable, which was 
estimated for comparison. 
A marginal change in resident-weeks of hierarchical (LA) output (not holding total 
output constant) is related to total transaction cost as follows in the translog model: 
(6-25) dYT/dg" =(ß„ + 2 ß ^ 4 + + ß A > g w , - » V ^ y 
209 
Simi la r ly , fo r m a r k e t ( independent ) ou tpu t , the marg ina l e f fec t on total t ransact ion cos t 
is: 
( 6 - 2 6 ) dYT/dqm = (p,„ + 2^nJr + Vhmq, 
T a b l e 6 -14 . T r a n s a c t i o n costs mode l s - T r a n s l o g m o d e l ( G e n e r a l l s e d E s t i m a t i n g 
E q u a t i o n s ) 
Linear, random effects 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
LA output (Box-Cox) ß* 1.468E-02 2.032E-02 
Ind output (Box-Cox) ß,„ 3.909E-02 2.004E-02* 
Wage (log) Log w 2.692E+00 4.242E+00 
LA output (Box-Cox) squared ß*A -9.680E-06 4.180E-05 
Ind output (Box-Cox) squared ß™ -6.580E-05 6.100E-05 
Wage (log) squared (Log wf -1.234E-01 5.126E-01 
LA output (Box-Cox) * wage (log) ß*„ -6.431E-03 5.221E-03 
Ind output (Box-Cox) * wage (log) ßnm- -7.775E-03 5.186E-03 
LA output (Box-Cox) * Ind output (Box-Cox) ß/m 1.507E-04 7.530E-05* 
Domiciliary output (log) 3.182E-01 1.528E-01 * 
Domiciliary output -2.690E-08 1.870E-08 
Pop 65-75 (log) 6.510E-01 9.768E-02* 
Pop ratio (log) -1.628E-01 2.245E-01 
SMR 4.029E-03 4.I56E-03 
Single room% 3.216E-03 1.751E-03 * 
Hosp% 9.951E+00 7.066E+00 
Constant -9.158E+00 8.700E+00 
Model GEE population-averaged 
Link/dependent variable log 
Family gamma 
Correlation unstructured 
Number of obs 230 
Number of groups 117 
Obs per group: min 1 
avg 2.0 
max 2 
Wald chi2(9) 794.98 
Prob > chi2 <0.0000 
Scale parameter .0757969 
Park test parameter 1.955901 
Note * denotes significant at 10 per cent or better 
U s i n g the es t imat ion resul ts these two m a r g i n a l e f f ec t s are r e spec t ive ly £ 6 and £41 
b a s e d on mean values , g iv ing a (margina l ) t ransac t ion costs r a t i o of 0 . 1 5 a n d a 
d i f f é r ence of £35 (see T a b l e 6-16) . The rat io m o d e l can also b e u s e d t o es t imate 
marg ina l effects . T h e G E E ratio model genera ted a rat io of m a r g i n a l cos t s o f 0.18. T h e 
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overall results imply that, at the margin an increase in provision secured in the market is
associated with higher extra transaction costs than using hierarchical means. For
comparison - but noting the re-transformation problem - the marginal effects from the
GLS model were very similar: £9 and £37 respectively.
Table 6-15. Transaction costs models - Translog model (GLS random effects)
Linear, random effects
Variable Coefficient Std error
LA output (Box-Cox) I3It 1.l08E-02 2.493E-02
nd output (Box-Cox) 13m 4.255E-02 2.537E-02 *
\Wage (log) Logw 1.413E+00 4.222E+00
!LAoutput (Box-Cox) squared I3hh 1.81OE-06 4.91OE-05
nd output (Box-Cox) squared a, -4.280E-05 6.380E-05
IWage (log) squared (Log W)2 4.844E-02 5.254E-Ol
LA output (Box-Cox) * wage (log) I3ltw -5.317E-03 6.281E-03
Ind output (Box-Cox) * wage (log) Pm», -9.433E-03 6.373E-03
~Aoutpl:1t(I;:3(»)(~c::())()~Jn4()l:1tpl:1t(I;:3()X-C::()X) ~ft..!!L--__ 1.273E-04 9.000E-05 *
---
Domiciliary output (log) 2.937E-Ol 1.487E-Ol *
Domiciliary output -2.750E-08 2.380E-08
Pop 65-75 (log) 6.661E-Ol 1.124E-Ol *
Pop ratio (log) -1.624E-Ol 2.485E-Ol
SMR 4.518E-03 3.400E-03
Single room% 3.645E-03 2.196E-03 *
Hosp% 7.22 IE+OO 6.810E+00
Constant -6.819E+00 8.698E+00
Model GEE population-averaged
Dependent variable Log
Number of obs 230
Number of groups 117
Obs per group: min I
avg 2.0
max 2
IWald chi2(9) 517.09
Prob > chi2 <0.0000
R-sq: within
0.008
between 0.837
overall 0.792
ho
0.505
Hausman specification test
17.84
Breusch and Pagan test
19.66
Standard errors for complicated relationships such as (6-25) and (6-26) can be estimated
using a bootstrapping methodology. This technique draws repeated samples from the
data. In this case, it runs the model on that drawn sample calculating the coefficients as
normal. It also derives the mean values of the q and logw factors for the sample and
211
stores these and the coefficients for each répétition. The marginal effects are derived for 
each répétition and summarised using central tendency and variance (standard error) 
statistics for the, in this case, 1000 répétition sampling distribution. Because this 
sampling procédure is unbiased the derived slopes equal the above marginal values. The 
estimated standard errors are used to calculate confidence intervais. 
Table 6-16. Marginal transaction costs 
Output Unit Marginal cost 
LA residential Resident-weeks per year 6 
Independent residential Resident-weeks per year 41 
Domiciliary Clients served per year 303 
This bootstrapping method was initially tried for the GEE model, but suffered the 
problem of the likelihood functions failing to converge. Results were obtained, 
however, for the computationally (much) simpler GLS model. For the hierarchical 
marginal effect, standard errors of 16.5 were found (compared to a marginal effect of 
8.8), indicating that these marginal effects are not significantly différent from zero. For 
the market marginal effect, estimated standard errors were similar in size at 14.5, 
relative to a marginal effect of 37.4, indicating strong significantly positive marginal 
transactions cost. These results are consistent with the significance of the governance 
ratio variable in the ratio models above. They are very likely to be représentative of the 
significance of the GEE model, and in view of this, and the issues around re-
transformation, we proceed using the GEE results. 
The GEE model was also estimated with the market output variable qm specified as the 
sum of independent sector residential and nursing home resident-weeks. The résultant 
marginal costs différences were very similar. 
This model also provides an estimate of the marginal transaction costs of domiciliary 
care: 
(6-27) dYr/dqd + 
which produces a point estimate of marginal costs of £303 per client served. 
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6.5.1.3 Average versus marginal transaction costs 
For policy purposes the average transaction cost per unit output is a particularly useful 
measure. Transactions costs are composed of a fixed and variable element. Generally 
speaking the models above give marginal effects. However, by making some 
assumptions we can go further and explore the fixed costs as well. To proceed therefore, 
and given the above results, we make the assumption of constant marginal costs (see 
Annex 6-2 for an analysis of this assumption). Total variable cost for the major service 
groups used by older people - i.e. LA (hierarchical) residential care, independent 
(market) residential care, nursing home care, domiciliary care and other non-residential 
- is: 
(6-28) VT =(ôYr/dq")qh +(ôYTldqm)qm +(ôYT/ôq")q" +(dYTldqd)qd +(ôYT/ôqg)qg 
VT dVT d2VT 
i.e. — = if r - = 0 . We do not have a direct estimate of the marginai costs for 
q dq dq 
nursing home output, but we might assume it to have similar marginai transaction costs 
to market residential care output being provided entirely under market arrangements. 
Nor do we have an estimate for other non-residential care, dYT/dqs . For day care we 
assume that the marginai cost per client served is the same as for domiciliary care 
output: dYT/dqsì = ôYT/dqd . For other non-residential services (e.g. meals) we 
arbitrarily assume marginai costs of half that figure 8YT/dq82 = \dYT/dqd . In either of 
these latter cases the size of expenditure is very small relatively speaking, so these 
assumptions have a limited hearing anyway. Fixed transaction cost for the average locai 
authority is then: FT = YT - VT. To avoid double counting, these fixed costs need to be 
allocated to service type: residential, nursing homes and non-residential. Without other 
information this allocation - i.e. Fn in FT = FT1 + FT2 + . . . , - is assumed to be in the 
same proportions that each service type contributes to total variable costs, VT, e.g. for 
residential we have a proportion: = VTr/VT = \(dYT/8qh)qh + (dYT/dqm)jm]/VT . 
Similarly, we derive and T 0 respectively for nursing and non-residential. These 
estimâtes provide a breakdown of transaction costs YTk - FTyYk + VTk for k = r,n, D. 
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Total transaction cost for ail services is YT= 5363,000 (for the sample average authority 
- see Table 6-3). Each service category variable costs are calculated from (6-28) using 
the marginal cost figures in Table 6-16 and their respective outputs. Fixed costs are 
calculated in total and then allocated according to the vFs. The results are in Table 6-17. 
Table 6-17. Fixed, variable and total transaction costs (£ 000s) 
Output Unit Variable cost Fixed cost Total cost 
Residential 
Resident-
weeks per 
year 
(dYTlôqh)qh + 
(dYT / ôqm^qm 
1303 FTx¥r 658 yTr 1961 
Nursing 
Resident-
weeks per 
year 
(dY'/dq-Y 
= (ôYT/ôqm)qn 
939 474 yTn 1413 
Non-
residential 
Clients 
served 
per year 
{dYTldqd)qd + 
{dYTldqs')qg,+ 
(.dYT/dqg2)qs2 
1322 667 yTD 1990 
All VT 3564 FT 1799 YT 5363 
The estimâtes of fixed costs allow us to also calculate total and variable transaction 
costs for residential care where, first, ail residential care provision is by hierarchical 
(LA) means and, second, where ail residential care provision is by market (independent) 
means. Fixed transactions costs for residential care remain unchanged (£658K) in these 
scénarios (Table 6-18). 
Table 6-18. Total and average transaction costs of residential care - ail provision 
by one governance arrangement 
Output Total cost 
(£ 000s) 
Average cost 
Hierarchical 
(LA 
residential) 
(dYT/dqh\qh+qm)+FTxi"' 940 
(dYT/dq"\qh+qm)+FTVr 
q +q 21 
Market 
(Independent 
residential) 
(<dYT/ôqm\qh+qm)+FT 2516 
(ôYT/dqmlqh +q"')+FTVr 
qh+qm 56 
Différence 1576 35 
These calculations give some indication of average transaction costs for hierarchical and 
market means of governance. Average costs in the table are sensitive to estimâtes of 
214 
fixed costs. However, the différence between hierarchical and market average costs 
remains: (dYr /dq'" )- (pYY/ôqh), whieh is our estimate at the sample mean. The 
sensitivity of the results to changes in key factors is demonstrated in Table 6-19. 
Table 6-19. Average transactions costs - sensitivity analysis 
Percentaje change in Usted factor 
Residential care fixed 
cost proportion, Tr 1 1 1 1 0.9 0.66 1.1 1.33 
LA marginal cost 0.9 0.66 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IR marginal cost 1 1 0.9 0.66 1 1 1 1 
Predicted average costs 
LA 20 19 22 24 19 16 22 26 
IR 56 56 53 45 55 51 57 61 
Différence 36 37 31 21 35 35 35 35 
6.5.2 Production costs 
Table 6-20 reports the production costs ratio model, which assesses the impact of the 
output ratio variable on total production costs at the local authority level. Again, a GLS 
and GEE estimator were used, and the models satisfied the relevant diagnostic tests. 
Table 6-21 lists some marginal effects associated with LA-level production costs. 
Output ratio is significant and positive, implying higher production costs under 
hierarchical arrangements. Marginal production costs can be derived from the results as: 
(6-29) dYc/dqh = 
and 
(6-30) 8Yc/dqm = 
h 
fl T 
q 
/ L A 
-<7 
1 
which work out to be respectively for hierarchy and market: £88.60 and £55.00 (per 
resident per week). 
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Table 6-20. Production costs models - Linear, panel and Generalised Estimating 
Equations 
GLS Random effects model GEE model 
Variable Coefficient Std error Coefficient Std error 
Output ratio (BC) 4.881E-02 1.904E-02 * 3.852E-02 1.775E-02 * 
Total output (log) 2.538E-01 6.804E-02 * 2.378E-01 5.976E-02 * 
Wage (log) -2.342E+00 1.241E+00 * -2.559E+00 1.167E+00 * 
Wage 5.140E-02 2.499E-02 * 5.497E-02 2.351E-02 
Gender -2.487E+00 6.579E-01 * -2.503E+00 6.174E-01 * 
Pop 65+ 6.644E-01 9.211E-02 * 7.063E-01 8.347E-02 * 
Pop ratio 7.394E-01 2.531E-01 * 7.249E-01 2.366E-01 * 
SMR 9.101E-03 2.790E-03 * 8.462E-03 2.619E-03 * 
Statement (log) -2.151E-01 9.688E-02 * -1.902E-01 8.431E-02 * 
Statement 5.660E-03 2.165E-03 * 5.066E-03 1.915E-03 * 
Single room (%) -1.875E-04 1.788E-03 -4.355E-04 1.594E-03 
First period -6.373E-02 1.913E-02 * -5.749E-02 1.614E-02 * 
Met 2.882E-02 7.091E-02 1.391E-02 6.672E-02 
Shire 3.963E-02 9.869E-02 3.501E-03 9.275E-02 
InnLon 4.531E-02 1.969E-01 4.387E-02 1.854E-01 
OutLon -1.284E-01 1.225E-01 -1.318E-01 1.153E-01 
Constant 7.598E+00 3.762E+00 * 8.059E+00 3.537E+00 * 
Model Linear (GLS), random effects GEE population-averaged 
Link/dependent variable Log (production cost) log 
Family gamma 
Corrélation exchangeable 
Number of obs 230 230 
Number of groups 117 117 
Obs per group: min 1 1 
avg 2.0 2.0 
max 2 2 
Wald chi2(9) 924.76 1047.14 
Prob > chi2 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Scale parameter .0496747 
R-sq: within 0.1295 
between 0.8975 
overall 0.8835 
rho .67837275 
Hausman spécification test 7.07 
Breusch and Pagan test 39.43 
Note * denotes significant at 10 per cent orbetter 
Assuming constant marginal costs, fixed costs can be calculated as: 
(6-31 ) Fc=Yc-{dYc/dqh)-qh-(dYc/dqm)• qm 
With this assumption, we can calcitiate (a point estimate of) average production costs 
given, first, that ail provision is hierarchical as: 
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(6-32) hYc =(Fc/qT)+(dYc/dqh) = 280.5 
and, second, that ail provision is under market arrangements: 
(6-33) mYc = (Fc/qT )+ (dYc/dqm ) = 254.0 
The différence between these point estimâtes is £26.5. 
Table 6-21. Production costs models - Derived marginal effects 
Variable 
GLS, random effects 
Coefficient Std error 
GEE, random effects 
Coefficient Std error Elasticity 
Output ratio 
(constant output) 
Output (constant 
output ratio) 
Wage 
Statement 
2.775E-06 1.082E-06 * 
5.645E-06 1.513E-06 * 
5.980E-03 4.015E-03 
2.681E-03 1.021E-03 * 
2.190E-06 1.009E-06 * 0.035 
5.289E-06 1.329E-06 * 0.184 
5.349E-03 3.778E-03 0.276 
2.431E-03 9.383E-04 * 0.175 
Note * denotes significant at 10 per cent or better 
6.5.3 Total cost 
Table 6-22 lists the variables in the ratio model and both the GEE and GLS estimâtes. 
Both models were highly significant overall. The GEE model was estimated using a 
gamma error spécification; the Park test results are listed in Table 6-12. The table lists 
the estimate of the spécification integer K for the différent assumed error functions. 
Except for the Gaussian and Poisson form, the nearest integer is K = 2, which is the 
gamma spécification. The GLS model satisfied the Hausman and the Breusch and Pagan 
LM test to support the choice of random effects. The model also produced a high 
measure of fit. 
In addition to the catégories of variables in transaction cost (ratio) model, the total costs 
model includes LA type dummies. These dummies were found to have some significant 
effect capturing some LA-level fixed effect, above and beyond the LA level control 
factors (e.g. population and wage). Nonetheless, as noted the GLS model satisfied the 
random effects tests. To account for inter-temporal fixed effects, a period dummy 
variable was also included. 
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Table 6-22. Total costs models - Linear, panel and Generalised Estimating 
Equations 
GLS Random effects model GEE model 
Variable Coefficient Std error Coefficient Std error 
Output ratio (BC) 3.683E-01 2.064E-01 * 3.279E-01 1.924E-01 * 
Output ratio (BC) * wage (log) -9.592E-02 5.406E-02 * -8.541E-02 5.032E-02 * 
Total output (log) 9.844E-02 3.535E-02 * 9.434E-02 3.100E-02 • 
Domiciliary output (log) 1.941E-01 6.997E-02 * 1.963E-01 6.796E-02 * 
Domiciliary output -1.480E-08 9.510E-09 -1.490E-08 9.240E-09 
Wage (log) -1.262E+00 7.163E-01 * -1.355E+00 6.931E-01 * 
Wage 2.871E-02 1.432E-02 * 3.052E-02 1.388E-02 * 
Pop 65+ 9.358E-01 6.142E-02 * 9.397E-01 5.788E-02 * 
Pop ratio 3.076E-01 1.465E-01 * 3.319E-01 1.406E-01 * 
Gender -2.175E+00 4.240E-01 * -2.237E+00 4.079E-01 * 
SMR 7.261E-03 1.857E-03 * 7.167E-03 1.787E-03 * 
Statement (log) -9.218E-02 4.961E-02 * -8.863E-02 4.317E-02 * 
Statement 2.436E-03 1.129E-03 * 2.383E-03 1.001E-03 * 
Single room (%) -1.583E-02 2.279E-02 -1.488E-02 2.095E-02 
First period -5.936E-02 9.344E-03 * -5.868E-02 7.875E-03 * 
Met 1.251E-01 4.096E-02 * 1.266E-01 3.974E-02 * 
Shire -3.524E-02 5.636E-02 -3.367E-02 5.454E-02 
InnLon 3.127E-01 1.178E-01 * 3.141E-01 1.141E-01 * 
OutLon 1.815E-02 7.116E-02 1.629E-02 6.912E-02 
Constant 3.420E+00 2.225E+00 3.728E+00 2.157E+00 * 
Model Linear (GLS), random effects GEE population-averaged 
Link/dependent variable Log (production cost) log 
Family gamma 
Corrélation exchangeable 
Number of obs 230 230 
Number of groups 117 117 
Obs per group: min 1 1 
avg 2.0 2.0 
max 2 2 
Wald chi2(9) 2633.99 2798.08 
Prob > chi2 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Scale parameter .0163688 
R-sq: within 0.3308 
between 0.9623 
overall 0.958 
rho 0.755 
Hausman spécification test 9.34 
Breusch and Pagan test 51.96 
Note * denotes significant at 10 per cent or better 
Table 6-23 lists various marginal effects on total costs. Output ratio is negative but not 
statistically différent from zero; in other words, around the sample means, a change in 
governance arrangement (as conceived as a change in the ratio of provision organised 
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under hierarchical to ail provision) has no significant effect on total costs. The model 
was estimated without area and time dummies, and while the résultant statistical 
performance was less good, the output ratio variable remained insignifïcant. In addition, 
the output ratio variable was also tried without interaction effects (with inputs costs) and 
was also insignifïcant in that spécification. 
The size of output ratio elasticity is about 8 per cent of the output ratio elasticity with 
regard to transaction costs (see Table 6-25). This finding is therefore consistent with the 
above results, that transaction costs are higher and production costs lower for markets 
compared with hiérarchies. 
Table 6-23. Total costs models - Derived marginal effects 
Variable 
GLS, random effects 
Coefficient Std e r ro r 
GEE, random effects 
Coefficient Std e r ro r Elasticity 
Output r a t i o 
(Constant output) 
Output ( C o n s t a n t 
output ratio) 
Wage 
Domiciliary output 
Statement 
-3.685E-07 6.827E-07 
2.189E-06 7.862E-07 * 
4.226E-03 2.348E-03 * 
1.300E-05 3.830E-06 * 
1.159E-03 5.758E-04 * 
-3.340E-07 6.167E-07 -0.005 
2.098E-06 6.895E-07 * 0.094 
4.248E-03 2.381E-03 * 0.219 
3.644E-05 1.245E-05 * 0.139 
1.155E-03 4.709E-04 * 0.083 
Note * denotes significant at 10 per cent or better 
6.6 Conclusion 
The last chapter developed theoretical hypothesis concerning, primarily, the relative size 
of transaction and production costs of market and hierarchical provision. This chapter 
seeks to determine whether these hypotheses are supported by the data. The empirical 
analysis began with the définition and calculation of total transaction cost. The available 
financial data report both total expenditure to the local authority and the amount 
consumed specifically in provision/production of ail services for older people (where 
'production costs' include the prices paid to independent sector providers in markets). 
We take a broad définition of transaction cost such that total costs are a sum of 
transaction and production costs. Total purchaser transaction costs are then found by 
subtraction. The aim, however, is to explore the size of transaction costs by governance 
arrangement. As outlined in chapter 4, an 'ownership' définition of governance 
arrangements is sufficient for our purposes. In other words, services provided by 'in-
house' providers can be regarded as being deployed under hierarchical arrangements. 
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Those supplied by independent sector providers must be under market arrangements as 
implied by the conceptual définition of governance in chapter 3. The only case where 
this relationship might not hold is if authorities adopt full internal markets. The 
commissioning survey explored this issue (see chapter 4) and found that whilst there are 
some différences as to how in-house provision is organised in the sample, councils with 
significant in-house provision utilised hierarchical arrangements. Generally, where the 
authority was a substantial user of market arrangements (i.e. a large proportion of 
service outsourced), their in-house service showed indications of being more internal-
market-like. If anything, this supports the spécification of the governance indicator as 
used. 
In practice, local authorities use a mix of in-house and independent sector providers, 
and therefore a mix of governance arrangements. The local rationale for this mix varies, 
as does the mix itself - quite substantially across the country - in terms of the numbers 
and proportion of all supported placements that go to either in-house or independent 
sector providers. Exploiting this variation, we can model the relationship between 
supported placement mix and total purchaser transaction costs to determine (marginal) 
transaction cost per place by type of placement, and therefore, by governance 
arrangement. According to the theoretical hypotheses, it should follow that where 
authorities have a high proportion of independent sector providers, their average and 
marginal transaction costs will be higher than authorities with a low proportion. 
The results were highly consistent between the models and they provided support for 
the theoretical hypothesis. As regards the ratio models, the ratio variable was significant 
with the expected sign. The translog models produced marginal transaction costs (point) 
estimâtes of £6 per place per week for hierarchical placements; estimated confidence 
intervais do contain zero. For markets, the point estimate was £41 per place for market 
places and this was significantly différent from zero. The results also suggest that fixed 
transaction costs were sizeable. Further analysis estimated average transaction costs at 
£21 and £56 per place per week respectively. 
For production costs, a significant différence was found in the other direction; marginal 
costs of £89 for hierarchy and £55 for markets. Overall, the total (production + 
transaction) costs model could not find a significant différence between market and 
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hierarchy, which is consistent with the findings for transaction and production costs 
individually. 
Analysis elsewhere at home level has found greater différences in production costs 
between in-house and market providers (e.g. Netten et al., 1998). Nonetheless, the 
implications of the current analysis are clear. Much of the pro-market rhetoric that 
underpinned social care policy in the late 1980s and 1990s, as discussed in chapter 4, 
focused on production unit cost différences between markets and hiérarchies. And these 
comparisons do show the benefits of markets. A more comprehensive comparison 
should also consider the différences in transaction costs, which the above analysis 
suggests, work in the other direction. 
Since local authorities décidé governance arrangements, we have focused on the costs to 
purchasers. Nonetheless, we can also take a societal perspective, adding provider 
transaction costs into the équation. According to the theory of the last chapter, we would 
expect this addition to reinforce the above conclusions. After subtracting planning costs 
incurred in both market and hiérarchies, the theory suggests that only providers in 
markets will bear transaction costs. Moreover, because at least some of these provider 
transaction costs will have been passed on to purchasers as costs of production, it means 
that adjusted market production costs will be even, underlining hypothesis H2. Of 
course, this re-allocation of costs will not change the total costs (production and 
transaction) incurred in markets compared to hiérarchies. 
Indeed, the comparison of total costs suggests that whilst markets may still have an 
advantage in total cost terms, the gap is far smaller than that implied by looking at 
production costs alone. Small enough, perhaps, to justify the continued use of 
hierarchical arrangements to some degree, if other non-cost considérations are also 
brought to bear. 
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Annex 6-1 
Table 6-24. Data Sources 
Variable Source 
O
ut
pu
t 
• Local authority supported residents, 
31 March 1998 and 1999 
• Independent sector supported 
residents, 31 March 1998 and 1999 
• Total supported residents, 31 March 
1998 and 1999 
Community Care Statistics, Bulletin 
2000/2, Table S3 
Community Care Statistics, Bulletin 
1999, Table S3 
(see http://www.doh.gov.uk/ 
public/stats3.htm 
O
ut
pu
t • Local authority resident weeks, 
1997/8 and 1998/9 
• Independent sector resident weeks, 
1997/8 and 1998/9 
• Total resident weeks, 1997/8 and 
1998/9 
Department of Health, Social Services 
Performance, Performance Assessment 
Framework/Key Indicator statistics, 
KS1, 1998/9 (11 May 2000) and 1997/8. 
(see http://www.doh.gov.uk/ 
paf/index.htm 
O
ut
pu
t 
Domiciliary Output 
Numbers of people helped to leave at 
home 1998/9 and 1997/8 
PAF key indicators (see above) 
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
Local Authority Personal Social Services 
Gross Expenditure, 1998-99: 
• Central Strategie (SSR) expenditure 
• Older people/EMI expenditure: 
> Assessment & Commissioning 
> Residential costs - LA homes 
> Residential costs - Indep. homes 
> Non-residential 
Social Services Performance in 1998-99, 
Bulletin 2000/10 (11 May 2000): R03 
statistics, Department of Health and 
DETR. 
Local authority breakdowns for 1998/9 
and 1997/8 
(see http://www.doh.gov.uk/ 
public/pss_stat.htm) 
In
pu
t 
co
st
s 
Capital 
• Property prices, 1998 
Regional Trends 34, 1999, Office of 
National Statistics (adapted from 
StatBase, dataset RT34610, source H M 
Land Registry). 
In
pu
t 
co
st
s 
Labour 
• WTE social services staff by local 
authority, 1999 
• WTE management staff 
Local authorities Staffing statistics, 
Statistical bulleting, SSDS001. 
(see http://www.doh.gov.uk/ 
public/psstaff.htm) 
D
ep
en
de
nc
y 
Population statistics by local authority, 
1997 
• Population 65+, 
• 65-75 
• total population 
• SMR 
• Population by gender 
Regional Trends 34, 1999, Office of 
National Statistics (adapted from 
StatBase, dataset RT341401, Source 
ONS). 
D
ep
en
de
nc
y 
Hospital admissions, 1997/8 PAF key indicators (see above) 
P
ro
ce
ss
 
fa
ct
or
s Statement of needs provisión, 1997/8 & 
1998/99 
PAF key indicators (see above) 
P
ro
ce
ss
 
fa
ct
or
s 
Single room PAF key indicators (see above) 
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Annex 6-2 
Differentiating marginal costs gives: 
d2YT/dqhdq" =dl(dYT/dlogYTld\ogYT/dq")]/dqh 
(6-34) =(dYT/d\ogYT)d2 l o g Y T / d q h d q h +(ôYT/Ô\ogYT\d\ogYT/DqhJ 
= [d2 l ogY t l dq h dq h + (ölog YT¡Ôq" J\T 
(6-35) d2YT/ôqhdqh = z ß M i + s ' ^ r + i s M 
Similarly for independent sector marginal costs: 
(6-36) d2YT/dqmdqm = 
Second order interactive effects on marginal costs are: 
(6-37) d2YT/dqhdz = [(d$h /dzlqhY l + ( ^ V ( ô l o g ( y r ) / & ) j r r 
and équivalent for market provision. Using the estimated parameters gives second order 
cost effects as reported in Table 6-25. Both the own-second order effects were negative, 
although both are very small in size, largely supporting out assumption of constant 
marginal transaction costs. Hierarchical and market marginal costs are negatively 
related to input costs w. 
Table 6-25. Changes in marginal transaction costs 
Second order effect Value 
d2YT jdqhdqh -5.04E-04 
ô2YT/ôqmôqm -3.05E-03 
d2YT/dqhdw -9.46E-01 
d2YT/dqmdw -2.89E-01 
d2YT/dqhdqm 4.88E-02 
d2YT¡dqmôqh 3.29E-02 
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Chapter 7. Contracts and profits 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the effects of reimbursement structure on providers operating 
under market governance. It considers how the choice of contracts between 
commissioners and providers operating in market-like governance arrangements can 
have implications for provider behaviour and so for outcomes. 
As described in chapter 3, choices regarding contracting are multi-dimensional, 
covering incentive 'power', timing, contingency and so forth (see section 3.3.3.1). The 
empirical relevance of these choices in social care varies however (see chapter 4). 
Moreover, these choices tend to be correlated with other non-contracting dimensions of 
governance, especially with ownership. For example, although both high and low 
powered contracts are used, high-powered incentives are almost exclusively used in 
markets (i.e. dispersed ownership) and low powered contracts in hiérarchies (unified 
ownership). Contract contingency varies between, but also within governance 
archetypes. In order to isolate ownership from contract contingency effects we 
concentrate on this choice within market governance arrangements. 
A change in the degree of contingency of the contracting system will impact on provider 
behaviour as considered here in three ways, via stakeholders' potential exploitation of 
information advantages, their response to risk and their response to cost shocks. The 
investigation of information problems relating to contracting choices is addressed in the 
health économies literature. This work has tended to focus on cream-skimming and 
'upeoding' behaviours in hospital markets, especially Medicare reimbursement of 
hospitals under prospective payments systems, but there are also important examples 
relating to England (e.g. Propper, 1995). There is evidence of opportunisme use of 
information (see Culyer and Newhouse, 2000). Analyses in social care - as discussed in 
chapter 2 - find evidence of similar information opportunism. In particular, Forder 
(1997) finds evidence of upeoding type behaviour in residential care markets. 
In Chapter 5, section 5.8.1.3, the core proposition was elaborated; that given sufficient 
price contingency on user cost parameters (e.g. ß in the model), we would expect 
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providers to exaggerate costs and so push up prices, other things equal. If contracts are 
not contingent in this way, cream-skimming will occur instead and prices will remain 
unchanged. Furthermore, if cost exaggeration does happen, utility and so profit under 
contingent contracts will be higher than under non-contingent contracts. 
To sum up, the hypothesis regarding this information effect is that prices and 
profitability will not be less under contingent contracts compared with non-contingent 
contracts. The current chapter refmes this resuit, and adds the potential effects of risk 
and unaccounted-for cost increases (cost shocks). We would expect risk averse 
providers to require a risk premium to cover the addition risk exposure that occurs under 
non-contingent contracts (i.e. that do not account for cost related contingencies). This 
risk effect on price and profitability potentially offsets the information effect. However, 
below we argue that there is very little evidence of risk premiums being paid in social 
care. Cost drivers have generally been pushing costs up in residential care in recent 
years (see chapters 3 and 4), but there has been little account made in terms of 
compensatory prices rises (Forder and Netten, 2000a). Therefore, cost shocks effects are 
aligned with the information effects. Overall, in this chapter we develop a main 
hypothesis that prices and profitability will be higher for residential care providers 
under contingent contracts compared with non-contingent contracts, other things equal. 
This chapter provides an in-depth look at the types of contract used to conduci social 
care transactions. After this introduction the chapter has five substantive sections. The 
next section (7.2) develops a formai spécification of contracts. It defines the concept of 
contract contingency. The section also lays out general objective functions for providers 
that allow for broader provider motivation (see also chapter 3). Section three (7.3) 
considers how providers can exploit information advantages under différent types of 
contract. Section four (7.4) looks at the risk properties of these contracts. Section five 
(7.5) analyses how cost shocks affect providers under différent contracts. These three 
effects are key elements in understanding how providers behave in terms of pricing, 
costs and profitability. Together they are the basis for hypothesis about provider 
behaviour that is tested in chapter 8. Section six (7.6) spécifiés hypothesis for empirical 
testing. Policy implications are considered in chapter 9. 
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7.2 Contract choice 
To show the implications of contract contingency choices we use the basic model 
outlined in chapter 1. Provider utility is given by (1.4). In previous chapters the focus 
has been on the distinction between the investment stage, period 1, and the effort stage, 
period 2 (see figure 1.1). Investment décisions are not relevant to information issues 
discussed in the present chapter and therefore we consider only period 2 activities. 
The focus on market governance makes it relevant to explicitly allow more than one 
provider. This focus also prompts a structure where period 2 has multiple production 
stages. In particular, in period 2 we assume repeated transactions denoted t = 1, ..., T, 
an assumption that allows us to consider a more comprehensive range of information-
related behaviour such as réputation effects. The actual number of sub-periods Tmay be 
uncertain to stakeholders. With reference to chapter 1, uncertainty about the state-of-
the-world k is characterised by a number of parameters (see section 1.4 of chapter 1), 
however in this chapter the focus is on p. The parameter (p has a primary hearing on 
investment, which is taken as given in this chapter. Potentially o is relevant, but because 
we assume that purchasers always undertake assessments and providers always measure 
P, then both parties have the same full information embodied in u. Purchasers as social 
services departments have a statutory duty in law to undertake user assessments. And 
because P is largely about a user's experi enee of care, the cost of its measurement for 
providers is low enough that it is always worth the measurement cost. Finally, the co 
parameter has asymmetric measurement costs and is determined in period 2. However, 
its misrepresentation in markets is of little conséquence because it affects provider costs 
- which are also unknown to purchasers. In any case purchasers base their décisions on 
prices not costs and so misreporting of co does not change purchaser behaviour - see 
section 5.3.2.2 of chapter 5 for détails. 
As a conséquence Figure 1.1 can be adapted for our purposes here. Figure 7-1 highlights 
the events in phase 2, the effort phase, and the relevance of the signal of p. 
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Figure 7-1. Information structure - market governance 
Time 1 Time 2 
Phase 2.1 Phase 2.2 Phase 2.3... 
r 
Phase 1 
Investment Configure inputs Production Configure inputs Production 
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Signals ßf ofß , 
Nature 
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P2(«2) 
(and (02) 
Signals ßf ofß. 
7.2.1 Objective functions 
Utility is given by (1.4) in chapter 1. For each state k, provider / 's utility is (suppressing 
the i and k subscripts): 
(7-1 ) U = y[v(7ï - y)+ M>(p)] = y[v(ti - y) + r\|/(p)] 
with, profit: 
« - K e ) D ( p ) ( , ( p ) - c ö » ) + f t ì ß ( p , X„(p, ) - c(p , )) 1 + b 
(7-2) 
- ( e ) n K e , ) 
+. . + 
(1 + b ) 
- Z ) ( ß r ) ( p ( ß r ) - c ( ß r ) ) + . . . 
We assume that for the future (time t > 1) providers operate with an initial expectation of 
ß at its mean level: ß ; there is extensive uncertainty about referrals and other pertinent 
factors and providers are boundedly rational (see chapter 2). 
Thus (7-2) can be written: 
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n = r ( e ) Z > ( p X p ( p ) - c ( p ) ) + r ( Q ) ± - ^ — D { p - c ) 
/=i (1 + b) 
(7-3) = r ( 9 ) 
= r (9 ) 
^ ( P ) W p ) - c ( P ) ) , D(p~c) 
1 - r + b 
' ^ ( p ) W p ) - c ( p ) ) + s ] 
where the embellishment e denotes expected (average) values of the corresponding 
variable e. In order to have the infinite sum converge as indicated we assume that 
1 - r + b < 1. Hence the interest rate b must be small. Uncertainty, especially far into 
the future, and the independence of transactions via new referrals means that providers 
do not expect current realised actions to directly bear on future profits. They may form 
expectations that the discounted stream of future profits may embody information rents, 
but that the size of current information rents is not a good indicator; some prior 
expectation is used instead. Continuity into the future is directly relevant, however, in 
that the loss of a contract now also implies a loss of future profit streams. This 
modelling approach therefore mirrors the réputation models outlined in chapter 2. 
Furthermore, in (7-1) the present value of service price, p, is written: 
where p is the expected future price. Providers suffer disutility from having actual 
prices at 'excessive' levels. However, if the contract does not proceed this disutility is 
generally not incurred - provider réservation utility is zero.50 Hence we have: 
vj>(p) = rvj/(p). The utility function for each provider is: 
(7-5) U = yvf r(9)D(p |p(p)- c{p)] + r(0>i -y] + yr(9> l/(p) 
50 Although loss of contract potentially implies a loss of access for users, providers in that situation would 
expect some alternative arrangement or provider to instead provide the service and hence restore access 
for users. 
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7.2.2 Contract contingency 
We need a robust définition of contingency. The intensity and range of components of a 
care package - and so the package's cost - is positively related to a person's care 
needs.51 The service-cost-characteristic, ß, is a good summary statistic of cost. Let 
ß e [ß,ß] be the actual cost-parameter of clients served by the provider. As outlined in 
previous chapters, ß e [ß, ß] is the reported cost-parameter, where 
ß e [ ß , ß ] c [ß ,ß jand 9 = ß - ß . Furthermore, ß ' e [ß,ß] is the cost-parameter of 
the client initially referred to the provider - which the provider can, with varying ease, 
reject - and ß is the purchaser's estimate of the actual cost-parameter ß. Finally, ß is 
the sample average value of ß7. This notation is summarised in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1. Cost parameters - notation 
Term Defintion 
ß Actual cost-parameter 
ß Reported cost-parameter 
ß ' Cost-parameter of initially referred client 
ß Sample average value of ß ' 
ß Purchaser's estimate of the actual cost-parameter ß 
7.2.2.1 Contingent contracts 
For each provider in each state, demand under a contingent contract i s D c = Dc (ß), 
being twice differentiable with D^ > 0 and D ^ = 0. Also: 
Assumption 7-1. Z)(ß)>Z)^ (ß ) (ß -ß ) . 
This assumption means that the purchaser's willingness to pay is high even for the least 
dépendent clients relative to changes in demand. We are specifically interested here in 
51 It is worth noting that whilst it is generally true that people with higher levels of dependency will need 
more support to manage activities of daily living etc. than people with lower dependency, the relationship 
between cost and dependency in practice whilst valid is less straightforward that we approximate here. 
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price contingency with respect to ß and not just with u, although the two parameters are 
highly correlated. Prices that are contingent on costs related to ß allow some scope for 
providers' reports of ß to differ from its actual value. Contingency strictly limited to u 
would still allow some scope, but for our purposes here, ß is synonymous with cost 
changes due to case-mix (as opposed to say, the price of labour). 
The size of the relationship between demand and reported client characteristics defines 
contingent contracts. The exact formulation used in practice by the purchaser could vary 
enormously and is arbitrary. Nonetheless, some purchasers will have prices changing by 
a larger amount in response to a unit change in the cost-parameter than others. To make 
this 'degree' of contingency - defined as the size of price changed in response to a 
change in the reported cost-parameter - more meaningful we can measure it relative to a 
change in costs. In particular, it is useful to define the degree of contingency, p^, 
relative to how the same change in the actual cost-parameter would affect marginal cost 
c p . This corresponds to the underlying aim of using contingent contracts, which is to 
compensate providers for higher costs associated with higher cost clients. There is no 
implication that purchasers use a reimbursement formula that is explicit in c p , even if 
they could measure marginal costs. This comparison is just to provide a baseline from 
which to gauge the degree of contingency. 
Price change in response to a change in reported dependency results from an increase in 
demand/willingness and ability to pay by the purchaser at each output. In turn, such a 
demand change may elicit a change in output by an optimising provider that depends on 
the slope of the demand fonction - see Figure 7-2. 
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Figure 7-2. Price contingency 
Price 
Do Output 
Differentiating the profit function (7-3) with respect to price for any given state k, we 
have the first order condition: 
(7-6) Q = p-c + ~ = 0 
and so, 
Q. 
(7-7) D ^ - J 
dp 
3ß D 
dp 
nu 
5ß D 
1 1 
— + — 
D„ D„ 
We assume that the term Dp is not a function of ß in a Symmetrie equilibrium (and that 
Dpp = 0). Suppose that the reimbursement arrangement is such that: 
Commissioners may have pre-determined what price increases/decreases they are 
prepared to make for users of higher/lower dependency. Thus, if the provider 's report of 
dependency is accepted (given the information that commissioners also have about the 
service user) then p^ indicates the price premium they are prepared to pay. We can 
usefiilly define contingency 'catégories' in terms of ranges of these parameters. For 
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example, a fully contingent contract is one where = cp or equivalently, h = 1 in the 
relationship (7-8). A partially contingent contract is where p^ < cp or equivalently, h > 
1. For a non-contingent contract p^ = 0 , or equivalently, h = oo. For shorthand we will 
say that fully contingent contracts i.e. h = 1 are called Cl contracts. For contracts where 
1 < h < oo, i.e. partial contingency, these are referred to as C2 contracts. 
In practice, under différent contract types (h), reported dependency changes need not be 
an 
équivalent to referred dependency changes. Indeed, pp/ = = p^m(h) where 
= m(h) is a fonction of contract type h. Similarly: cp, = cp = c^w{h). Taken 
together, the relationship between actual and reported dependency is: 
The significance of this resuit is that if M ^ 1 for derivatives from sample average 
referred dependency then for a contract of contingency h in (7-8), we have 
contingent contract where h = 1, we could find that * c p , , whilst p^ = c ( i . 
7.2.2.2 Non-contingent contracts 
For non-contingent contracts, DN = DN (p j, where P is some average value of P such 
that p e (p, p ) £ {p e R] : p < P < p}. Also D? = 0 and D^ = 0 . Therefore, 
for non-contingent contracts, p^ = 0 , or in général, Mh = 0. 
7.3 Information 
The asymmetry of information inhérent in social care markets potentially allows 
providers to push up their price-cost margins. Two types of information problem are 
relevant as outlined in chapter 2 and chapter 5 (section 5.3.2.1): cost exaggeration, a 
form of moral hazard, and cream-skimming, a form of adverse selection (Rasmusen, 
/?p, = p^m(h)= — Cpm(h)ï — cpw(l)= — c p / . For example, in this case, for a fully 
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1992). The extent of these problems is sensitive to the ex post contingency of the 
contract. 
Cost exaggeration involves providers having an opportunity to overstate the intensity 
and range of eomponents of the individual's care package - and so the package's cost -
i.e. ß > ß = ß . Providers engaging in cream-skimming selectively choose résidents 
who have relatively low expected service costs (i.e. below the purchaser's estimate) but 
claim that these clients have a service-cost-characteristic in the région of the purchaser's 
estimate i.e. ß = ß > ß . Although the provider's report does not differ from the 
purchaser's estimate, it is still greater than the actual service-cost-characteristic because 
high service-cost clients are rejected. If purchasers are paying for care on the basis of 
service-cost-characteristic ß then cream-skimming will mean that providers are only 
providing care at level of ß, which is less than ß . 
The incidence of these two information problems is highly sensitive to the (fmancial) 
incentives embodied in the transaction between purchaser and provider (Forder, 1997a). 
Reimbursement arrangements that reflect the purchaser's willingness to pay more for 
the care of more dépendent people - i.e. contingent contracts - will accommodate the 
moral hazard behaviour described, but provide no incentive for cream-skimming. 
However, if demand is not expressed over individuai clients - i.e. non-contingent 
contracts - then the exaggeration of clients care needs is not going to affect demand and 
so provider reimbursement. Such arrangements may promote cream-skimming however, 
because by doing so providers can lower costs relative to a fixed income. 
7.3.1 Probability of detection 
It is the asymmetry of information that lies at the heart of this issue. We assume that the 
cost to providers of collecting information ß is zero and that purchasers have a 
sufïiciently large cost as to make full measurement of ß inefficient. Purchasers do 
however get a signal of ß to assess a probability that providers' reports of ß are 
inaccurate e.g. from the user assessment, which yields parameter u. 
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The probability r that the purchaser will be satisfied with the provider's report is defined 
as r = r(ß - ß ) . However, we assume that the purchaser's predicted value ß equals 
the actual value ß. So we can write r = r ( ß - ß ) = r(0) where r I with 
/ s {r : 0 < r < l}. 
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Assumption 7-2. We assume thatr- = rd — = rd < 0 . Similarly, < 0 , r... = 0 , p pp ppp 
00 
r^ (0 ) = 0 and r ( 0 ) = 1 i.e. when ß = ß . Also rß = re — = - r e > 0 and 
'pp > 0 , rm = 0 , r ß (0 ) = 0. 
The chance of detecting small déviations of reported from the actual service-cost-
characteristic (1 - r) initially increases slowly from zero, but latter more rapidly. An 
inverse quadratic relationship fulfils the criteria of assumption 7-2. 
7.3.2 Cost exaggeration 
The model can be used first to demonstrate the basic moral hazard problem (of 
ß > ß = ß ) discussed above. 
Lemma 1. Misrepresentation of the client's service-cost-characteristic. This lemma has 
two parts. 
(a) It is optimal for profit maximising providers to misrepresent by overstating the 
client 's service-cost-characteristic i.e. ß > ß = ß under a contingent contract and where 
there is no client selection. 
(b) This incentive does not exist under a non-contingent (fixedprice) contract such that 
ß < ß = ß -
Proof 
(a) Since we are considering profit maximisers, differentiating the profit function (7-3) 
gives: 
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(7-9) nrrDp,+rD,{p-c)+Dre{p-c)+r6n 
From the profit function (7-3), differentiating by the time 1 priee,p, gives the first order 
PLDp 
condition: z = r 
can now write (7-7) as: 
D ^ 
p-c + — 
Dn p 
= p-c + ~ = 0 and so, D- = — ^ — (see (7-7)). We 
(7-10) n-=D 
D D p p 
+ rPk + r67i
l 
At ß = ß we can write this differential as: 
(7-11) 7ti = D 3 
D, + P« +p>)=i> 
+p*\ + 
p / 
using assumption 7-2. Because output is adjusted following a shift in the demand curve 
(to maximise profits), the actual change in price, is less than p ^ i.e. 
p. = p. I + — = n. I + —Ê- (see Figure 7-2). With the assumed linear demand 
14 ÔD öß Dp 
curves, the price adjustment due to a change in optimal output is equal to half of the 
original demand shift i.e. \ j d ^ . 
It follows that at ß = ß we do not have a turning point and so ß = ß cannot be a 
solution. Let us write the solution - the optimal reported value of ß under contingent 
contracts - as p c . For values p c > ß we have r < 1 and r0 < 0 , which, in view of 
D, > 0 is not a contradiction with (7-10).52 
52 We have assumed for exposition that Dpp = 0. However, if we were to allow for Dpp > 0 then 
proposition 1 still holds unless price elasticity of demand is very close zéro. 
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(b) Under a non-contingent contract, D- = 0 and so we have: 
for ail values of 9 > 0. There is no incentive to exaggerate the value of the client 
service-cost-characteristic. • 
Under contingent contracts therefore the reported client-costs parameter will be higher 
than under non-contingent contracts. In the appendix, Lemma A l checks the conditions 
under which ß*c is a global maximum. These conditions are consistent with the 
assumed form of the detection fonction (assumption 7-2). 
Lemma 1 establishes that r < 1. Intuitively, misrepresentation is likely to be modest 
when providers value future business and wish to secure their réputation (Kreps and 
Wilson, 1982). Providers are not Willing to risk much current period exploitation 
because it endangers potentially sizeable future profits as denoted by ä in (7-9). 
What are the implications for the size of misrepresentation when providers are 
satisficers rather than profit maximisers? The expectation is that satisficing providers 
will misrepresent to a lesser degree than their profit maximising counterparts because 
they suffer disutility from excessive pricing. The term \\i in the utility fonction is 
negatively related to (the present value of) price. Generally then profit maximising 
prices will produce some disutility and at the margin we would expect satisficers to 
reduce ß below profit maximising levels, p . However, because they do not suffer 
disutility of this type if they provide nothing, this problem does offer the possibility of a 
rather counter-intuitive resuit. If total disutility of price increases was very high, and 
réputation effects were minimal then, in theory at least, a provider might wish to 
increase misrepresentation in order to reduce expected prices. Nonetheless, in this case, 
marginal profit would also fall along with disutility, and since the former is assumed to 
have a greater value, in practice we should not get the counter-intuitive resuit. 
D„ 
+ rnfc < 0 
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Differentiating the utility fonction (7-5) for given state k yields: 
(7-12) Uk = v \ + = v \ + = v'n + rDV'p. + r^D- + D4V-ß ß Öß ß öß ß ß ß ß 
where, as in chapter 5, \|/(p4 ) = Dx¥(pk ) ,53 At pc, this fonction reduces to: 
rU¥'P- ß + r ^ D p + D^Vr- where the first and second terms are negative, but the last is 
positive ( T < 0, = p-ß > 0 , = rg < 0 ). If the objective fonction was slightly 
différent in that providers feit disutility associated with excessive prices even if they lost 
the contract54, (7-12) reduces to: 
U- = v'n- + = viu + = v'tc + DW'p, + TD- < 0 . This result is clear-cut. It P ß gß ß S ß ß ^ß ß 
means that at ß * c , where n-p = 0, we have i/- < 0 and so réductions in reported ß will 
increase utility. 
Returning to the case where the differential is as (7-12), then at ß'c , although this 
fonction suggests the possibility of the sign of the differential to be positive, forther 
investigation undermines this possibility. To show this, assume that marginal 
production costs are normalised to zero. This allows us to focus on the disutility of 
excess prices rather then the disutility of having to bear production costs. Moreover, we 
should note that we have assumed excessive price disutility to be modest in size. 
We draw on the differential (7-9), which with zero marginai costs is, 
n a = r D p - +rD^(p-c)+Dre{p-c)+ren = rDp^ + rD^p + DrQp + ren. At ß'c, t i - = 0 
and so this fonction can be re-arranged to be: 
,7-13) D r ^ - ^ l - r D , - ^ 
P P P 
1 i.e. that disutility of excessive prices is felt per unit output. 
1 because losing the contract will reduce access for users, at least during transition to a new provider 
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Substituting into (7-12) gives: 
(7-14) Uç = v \ + r û T ' p . + T*¥Dt + ^ ( DrP* rP. ** 
P P P 
(7-15) ( / - r ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ J U . ^ - Y ) - ^ ] 
* p p p p 
Now by assumption there is no disutility when prices are low i.e. »/' = 0 and SP = 0 for 
p ^ p . Therefore we can suppose, in general, that VP = 
p > p and so i ^ f ' p - = Vp < 0 . Hence, at ¡3*c, 
(7-16) 
P P 
Moreover, when réputation effects are comparatively strong i.e. when n is larger (e.g. 
due to a smaller rate of discount), then £/é(p*c) will be more negative. 
d\r 1 
We can therefore safely assume that < 0 and so advance the following 
straightforward lemma, 
Lemma 2. Other things being equal, when expected disutility ofprice faïls with respect 
to an increase in p i.e. < o, then information rent/profit level différences for 
3(3 
profit maximising providers using contingent contracts will be higher thanfor 
satisficing providers using contingent contracts: 
Proof 
Differentiating the utility fonction gives: 
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(7-17) é + % ! < 0 
pv ; p 5p 
A solution, p*,.<0 < p*c, may exist or a corner solution may exist where £/- < 0 for 
P = P . In either case however, 0 and so there is a lessened misuse of 
information than in the profit maximising case. • 
We have considered the optimal reported cost-parameter with respect to the sample 
mean value of the cost-parameter of the referred client. How then will the optimal 
reported parameter change for changes in the cost-parameter of the referred client? In 
other words, what is dp /ôp 7 , which we dénoté ml Intuitively, we would expect this 
value to be close to 1 because we are only changing the baseline firom which cost 
exaggeration occurs. 
Lemma 3. (a) For fully contingency (Cl) contracts, for any \\i,m = 1. (b) Forpartially 
contingent (C2) contracts m e \m,m\ where m < 1 and m > 1. 
Proof 
See appendix 7.7.3. • 
This lemma shows that for partially contingent contracts the size of m depends closely 
on the effective value of Dp as associated with changes in referred dependency. 
7.3.3 Cream-skimming 
Cream-skimming involves providers selecting clients with low cost characteristics. 
Assume initially that there is free selection - providers can effectively choose a value 
for p. Providers are initially referred clients with characteristic p ' e [p , p]- Is there 
any incentive to re-select clients with a lower value of P e ( p 7 , p]? 
Purchasers are concerned that providers are not vertically selective - providers can 
select among clients of the same dependency, but to select lower dependency/lower cost 
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Clients when the purchaser is under the impression that no selection occurred is 
opportunisme. Consequently, if providers are vertically selectively they must 
misrepresent the dependency-cost characteristics of the selected client as being of the 
original level. Hence, r = r(ß7 - ß ) = r(ß7 - ß ) = r(ö) because ß = ß . As in the above 
case, 6 is the degree of misrepresentation of ß. 
In general, differentiating the profit fonction with respect to ß gives: 
(7-18) 7tß = 
öß 
dn dß 
+ Ößdß 
Using the first order condition, (7-6), of the profit fonction, demand changes by: 
Q ß 
<7-.9> 
1 
D„ 
This fonction indicates how optimal demand changes in response to a change in 
marginal costs. Furthermore, 
( 7 - 2 0 ) 
öß 
= 7IpL =rD m. C +rDp(p-c)-Dre{p-c)-rBit 
Using the ß analogy to (7-70) (see page 263) this becomes: 
/ 
(7-21) n±=-rD 
where 
A 
c ' I + rD^-c)-Dre (p-c)- r6n 
V P. 
(7-22) [rDpi +rD^(p-c)+ Drd(p-c)+ 
using (7-9). Hence: 
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7iß = -rD 
( 7 - 2 3 ) 
' c - V + rDÀp - c)-Dr6(p - c)-rB% 
+ [rDp- + rD-{p - c)+ DrB(p -c)+ re7t]|^ 
Lemma 4. Under non-contingent contracts, selection occurs such thaï ß < ß 7 . 
Proof 
For a non-contingent contract, p = /?(ß) so = 0 and D- = 0. Differentiating the 
profit function (7-3) with respect to ß gives in this case: 
(7-24) 7TP = -rcßD - re [(p(ß) - c ( ß ) ) ö + Ä] 
Under non-contingent contracts there is no cost exaggeration and so ß = ß 1 . What 
incentives for cream-skimming exist at ß = ß ' = ß ? The differential (7-24) then 
reducesto 7tß(ß7 ) = - D c p < 0 which cannot be a turning point, so ß = ß7 = ß is 
not a solution. The optimal value, if it exists, is thus ß*iV < ß = ß ' . • 
In the appendix it is shown that ß*N is a global maximum - given our assumptions 
about detection (Lemma A2). 
Lemma 5. Under a fully contingent contract, at the optimal cost exaggeration solution, 
ß *, incentives to cream-skim for a profit maximiser are absent. 
Proof 
At the optimal cost exaggeration solution: 
(7-25) je.(fi«j= rDps +rDji(p-c)+Dre{p-c)+r6n = 0 
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Here (5* is the optimal level of exaggeration when referral dependency is p7 = p . 
Cream-skimming involves the seleetion of clients to reduce actual dependency P to a 
level below p7 = P . If providers have already exaggerated dependency to suggest to 
purchasers that referred dependency in this transaction was p * , then any subséquent 
cream-skimming does not involve a change in reported dependency levels i.e. P = P * 
and so ôp/ôp = 0 . Furthermore, the purchaser expects demand to remain at the level 
p = P * and so Z)p = 0 . The marginal benefits of cream-skimming are given by (7-23), 
which in the case where ôp/ôp = 0 and £>p = 0 becomes: 
(7-26) 7up=-rcpD-[Z>B(p-c)+re7i] 
Re-arranging (7-25) such that rDp- + rD^(p -c) = ~[Dr%{p-c)+ r07i] and substituting it 
into (7-26), using (7-6) gives: 
(7-27) Tip = -rc^D + rDp^ - rD^ 
p 
Using (7-71) and (7-7) this becomes: 
(7-28) 7 r p ( p * ) = - r D C p + r D ^ - | o + r Z ) i ^ | D = r i ) y D - c p ) = 0 fovh=\. 
Hence profit maximising providers with fully contingent contracts do not gain from 
cream-skimming at the cost exaggeration optimal. 
• 
Provider motivations as we have cast them are not an issue with regard cream-skimming 
because there is no direct price implication; prices do not change if providers cream-
skim clients. This conjecture is the basis of lemma 6. 
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Lemma 6. Other things being equal information rent for maximsing providers under 
non-contingent contracts will be equal to that for satisficingproviders using non-
contingent contracts: <,<0 = n f e . J - 7r(p*;<0)= = n f c ) or 
<-<0 = 4 v < o ) ~ 4 ï ' < o ) = < = o = 
Proof 
The utility fonction under non-contingent contracts is: 
(7-29) U = v(7t - y) + H/(p(p)) = v(rD[/;(p)- c(p)]+ ni - y)+ rM/(p) 
where p(p), the (present value) of price, is a constant set by the local authority 
purchaser. At this value, vy = 0 so (7-29) reduces to: U = v(r£>[/?(p)- c(p)]+ rk-y) i.e. 
the same as the maximising case. Effectively providers lose control over pricing and 
therefore disutility stemming from charging 'excessive' prices is irrelevant. • 
This resuit is slightly removed from the spirit of satisfïcers as somehow having an 
altruistic component to their utility fonctions. What drives the above resuit is that 
= ^ ' ( p - p) and that T = 0 for p < p. We have assumed thus far that p is fair price 
for the population average dependency. Individual providers may feel that actually 
p refers to the home average dependency, and therefore when they cream-skim p falls. 
It follows that the non-contingent market price is then above p when cream-skimming 
occurs. In this case we have, with analogy to Lemma 2, 
», , dini/l , Sut dp . ,dp 
(7-30) U«=v 7t„+ 1 J = v7t„ + r — — + \yr„ = V7i,, - rv|J — + V|/rR p dp p dp d p p p ap p 
where ~ > 0 by construction. Again referring to Lemma 2, it follows that for a small 
réduction in y from \\i = 0, —— 
Si / 
would occur in this case. 
= —r — < 0 i.e. a lessened cream-skimming 
\|<=0 ^ 
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How does cream-skimming behaviour change with changes in the referred client cost-
^P o parameter: —S-? 
dp' 
Lemma 7. 4 < w = < 1 . 2 dp7 
Proof 
See appendix 0. 
Unlike cost parameter exaggeration under contingent contracts, Lemma 7 holds for both 
maximising and satisficing providers. This resuit stems from Lemma 6, which indicates 
that both types of providers have the same cream-skimming incentives. 
Together Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 show that for basic reimbursement systems (of the 
sort described above), under both types of contract, asymmetric information gives rise 
to information rents, in the form cream-skimming or cost-misrepresentation. What then 
are the conditions when contingent contracts will generate greater rents than non-
contingent contracts? 
Let 7t c (0^ o ) be the (optimal) rent from a pure strategy of cost-exaggeration, and 
n N (o^Io) be the (optimal) rent from a pure strategy of cream-skimming. Then we have 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. For fully contingent contracts (h = l),for profit maximisers with initial 
referrals P' = P , Ttc(o^l0)> For some h > 1, h existssuch that 
Proof 
See appendix 7.7.2. 
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What essentially drives this resuit is that although marginal gains per unit of output are 
the same under the two stratégies i.e. (0)]^ = 74 (9)^ = D 
contingent contracts, demand can change to its optimal level, whilst with non-
contingent contracts it cannot. In the latter case the prevailing level of demand will not 
be the optimising level and consequently profit gain will be lower. 
Providers have three available strategies: to exaggerate costs, to cream-skim or to opt 
for a mix of the first two strategies. Lemma 1 shows that providers with non-contingent 
contracts have no incentives to exaggerate costs and therefore they will only cream-
skim. Proposition 1 and Lemma 5 show that providers with contingent contracts will 
choose between either of the pure strategies depending on the degree of contract 
contingency, h. In particular, when h > h the pure cream-skimming strategy will yield 
the highest rent. In that respect a provider with a contingent contract with a low degree 
of contingent will act in the same way as a provider facing a non-contingent contract. In 
fact h > h ensures that tcc(0£*o)< ^ ( o ^ J . But since at h = h we have 
71q (o)<nN(o), we can instead define 1 < hN < h as the level of contingency that gives 
The proposition implies that providers either cream-skim or exaggerate cost reports 
depending on the degree of contingency. And it is possible that cream-skimming can 
occur under low contingency contracts (i.e. where h>h). Intuitively, because the 
chance of detection is defined on the différence between the reported and actual cost-
parameter, 0, the chance being the same for an equal différence resulting from either 
cream-skimming or cost exaggeration, the dominance of the marginai benefits at 0 = 0 
of one type of asymmetric information behaviour or the other will apply through the 
range of values of 0. In other words, either cream-skimming but not cost exaggeration 
or vice versa is the provider's optimal strategy. And this choice hinges on the degree of 
contingency, h. If the degree of contingency of a contingent contract is high then 
providers will earn greater information rent by exaggerating cost reports compared to 
rents accrued from cream-skimming. Below the criticai value it would be optimal to 
cream-skim regardless of contract type. 
D 
D 
+ r0 tc , under 
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Proposition 1 refers to profit maximising providers. How does a change in provider 
motivations affect these relationships? To généralisé we can write the différence in 
information rent as ôj, = 7ic(0^*)- 7^(0**) Vy < 0 . The next proposition shows that the 
différence is reduced when providers suffer some excess price disutility i.e. v|/ < 0 . 
Proposition 2. 8j,=0 > ôj,.<0/or > 0 and Ô'v=0 = ô^/or Ô'v=0 = 0 
Proof 
First, 
s ; =K c ( p ) - ^ ( p ) 
(7 31) 
= A ; c - < , Vvf/ < 0 
Hence, 
KlC _AW _ A/C K!N v<y=0 M*=0 \|i'<0 *|i'<0 
A / c - A ' c 
which follows from Lemma 6, i.e. A;*.<0 = A'^=0 . Second, 
(7-33) Ô;= 0-Ô;.< 0 = A / ^ 0 - A , ; . < 0 > 0 
from Lemma 2 when ô^=0 > 0 i.e. h = 1. 
In addition, for = 0, this implies providers under ail contract types cream-skim, 
and again from Lemma 6, Sj,=0 -8j,,<0 = -A'J.0 + A^.<0 = 0.0 
In other words the différence in information rents between profit maximisers and 
satisficers cornes down to the différence in rents from cost exaggeration since there is 
no différence from cream-skimming. The implication is that when providers are 
(7-32) 
rf _<•/ _ 
°\|>=0 \y'<0 ~ 
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satisficers they opt for the cream-skimming strategy at higher degrees of contract 
contingency than profit maximisers. 
Cream-skimming as modelled above allows providers to freely select possible residents. 
In effect, providers are able to select residents from a sufficiently large pool of potential 
users, choosing low dependency, low cost residents (but claiming to provide service to 
the average mix). However, given the high level of compétition and apparent over-
supply of residential care, we might expect the referral of potential residents to be much 
more limited (see also Pauly, 1984). As a resuit, rejecting a potential resident may leave 
the home with a vacant place (attracting no revenue, but stili incurring some costs) until 
a suitably low dependency person is referred. Homes may set themselves up to attract 
low dependency people, but need to do so without this strategy becoming overly 
apparent to purchasers. In any case they will be subject to compétition from other 
homes trying the same strategy. Whatever the exact mechanism, homes will not have 
available an inexhaustible supply of low dependency potential residents. Without 
simultaneous replacement, the costs of cream-skimming behaviour rise significantly 
(Forder, 1997a). 
The relaxation of this free replacement assumption can be modelled as a factor g that 
reduces expected demand. Thus we expand the profit fonction (7-3) to be: 
(7-34) 7t = We)- g(e)Hß)Wß)- c(ß)+ Ä) 
where g ö (0)> 0 , g ( o ) = 0 and so r ( o ) - g(o) = 1. Any increase above zero of 0 due 
to cream-skimming not only yields a positive chance of punitive action (loss of ail 
demand) but also a réduction in demand. In practice, purchasers may offer some 
replacement of potential residents so that selection does not imply a one-for-one 
réduction in output, but we assume the probability of replacement is less than 1. So 
what are the implications? 
Lemma 8. (9,0) < 7iß (e, g) < 0 
Proof 
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The counterpart to (7-24), the first order condition for pure cream-skimming is: 
Hence, np (0, g ) > rcp (0,0) because ge (0) > 0 and g > 0. • 
This resuit implies that cream-skimming is less rewarding and so reinforces Proposition 
1. 
Proposition 3. If replacement is costly such that ga > 0 then ath = hN cost 
exaggeration yields greaterprofits than cream-skimming i.e. ô7=0 > 0. 
Proof of proposition 3. 
This proposition follows from propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 8. • 
The lack of free replacement means that even with low contingency contracts cost 
exaggeration can be the optimal choice. 
7.4 Risk and Uncertainty 
Relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality, when providers are risk averse, we would 
expect a risk effect to will impact on profit rates, with the size of which is dépendent on 
the type of contract a provider uses. As we have noted above, provider costs vary 
according to the characteristics of those placed. Demand is also assumed to vary from 
state to state and together the cost and demand effects will have implications for profit 
in any given state. When the provider is uncertain of cost and demand, and so 
profitability, then the choice of contract has implications for prices, the effect being 
influenced by the degree of provider risk aversion (Shavell, 1979). To fix this idea we 
assume that v " < 0 and v " = 0 and also that v^=0 = v^>0. 
Profits are state-contingent and so provider utility is: (the provider identifier i is 
suppressed for clarity) 
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(7-36) 
U = y,[v(ix, - 7 ) + r,Vj/(Pl)]+ y2[v(rc2 - y ) + r2y(p2)]+ 
where y, + y2 + . . . + yç = 1 and 7t(pj- y = g is the provider's expected (period 2) 
profit, which is unchanged for any state k. We can write expected profit as: 
(7-37) y,ti , + y 2 î i 2 +. . . + 7,71, = 0 + y 
and expected price: 
(7-38) y,p, + y 2 p 2 + ... + y , p , = p 
Let expected profit in each state vary: 11 k ->> = <* + <|>t which means that 
y,<|>, + y2(|)2 + ... + 7 ^ = 0 . Also let pt = p + n((|>t ) , again with 
State 1 - with profits 71, - >> = cr + <|>, - isthe lowest profit state. State 5 - with profits 
ns - y ~ <7 + c|> s. - is the highest profit state. Therefore we have: 
Expected utility is therefore: 
(7-39) U = yxv(o+$,)+7,+ + + f )+Y/*M>(p + F ( f )) 
Since v" = 0 and i|/" = 0 utility will be given by the second-order Taylor series 
expansion: 
YiH(4>i) + - + Y . n O U = 0. 
4>1 <<1>2 <-<<l>,-l <4>, • 
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(7 41) U = ( V ( < T ) + ^(pÎXyi + y2 -«-"-+y, ]+ v(c*Xyi<I>i + y2<l»2 —+y,*, ] 
(7-42) U = v(a)+iv"[y,(t)f + ... + y i ^ ]+rv t / (p ) 
Each state-of-the-world k is characterised by the client-cost-parameter of the referred 
client, that is, p'. What are the profit conséquences of the déviation of this parameter 
from the sample average value P ? Profit is n = 7i(p(p' ),p(p7 )). Expanding this fonction 
around Pgives: ^ 
(7-43) = 
dn dp dn dp 
â p 5 p / + ô p ap7 
¿P ' 
where dp 7 = p7 - p . The two differentials dp/dp 7 and dp /dp 7 describe 
respectively how reported and actual dependency change with the cost parameter of the 
referred client (see lemmas 3 and 7). These differentials reflect implications for cost 
exaggeration behaviour and cream-skimming respectively, and are fonctions of the 
degree of contract contingency. Because this behaviour occurs after the state k is 
known, it is completely described by first order conditions. 
The size of <)>* will depend on the degree of contract contingency measured, which 
affects the relationship between p , and c(J : 
Lemma 9. <)>f = L + n , }ip7 = 0 
For folly contingent contracts i.e. h = 1, the above propositions tell us that providers do 
not cream-skim and therefore: P s p ' and hence — = 7t , I . Lemma 3 indicates that 
dpôp 7 ^ 
m = 1 and that rc- + n , = 0 . Hence from (7-43) we have Lemma 9. • 
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For non-contingent contracts, P s p ' and so = nRl I . Differentiating the profit 
dp 9p p 
function (7-3) with respect to p7 holding P constant is équivalent to the effect of a pure 
increase in the degree of misrepresentation of 0 = P - p s p ' - p by p7 i.e. 
dn ô|3 I / / v . 
^ = îtp/|p = r6{D{p- c )+ fc )<0 .1n th i s case, withcream-skimming, the size of 
(7-43) depends on the value of w: 
(7-44) tf = dn dp 
ô p ^ p 7 
+ 7InH> dp ' 
(7-45) * î ' = [ r 9 ( 2 ) 0 > - c ) + î i ) + i i ( , w j ^ / 
or using (7-24), 
(7-46) tf = [ - D N c ^ r w + (l- w)re{D(p-c)+ tt)] dp; 
Hence, we have: 
Lemma 10. <|>f < 0 for > 0 
Ali the terms in square brackets in (7-44) are negative (see Lemma 7). • 
Lemma 11. Regarding partially contingent contracts, a positive change in referred 
dependency, d$l > 0, will yield a réduction in profits: 0 > <J>" > §Nk . 
The impact on profits will be smaller than for providers with non-contingent contracts 
because revenue changes - at least partially - in line with positive cost shocks. So we 
have: ^JL-. (p J = ^ L - (r) but (fi) > 0 and, under C2 contracts, demand is 
dp ' V D dp ' VK/ ' dp' r > 
allowed to vary to its profit maximising level. • 
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Writing y v"[y,<j>f + y + ... + y , ] = \ v"<D we can establish the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 4. \ v"<bN < \ v"®c < 0 if h = 1 . 
Proof. 
The first part requires that O c < O w . It is sufficient therefore to show that 
Y* (•* 1 < Y* ï ' V k = 1- , - s , which can be reduced to - |<J>" | < 0, Vit = l , . . ,s . This 
latter condition is satisfied as a resuit of Lemma 9 and Lemma 10. • 
Utility in each case is (from (7-42)): 
(7-47) UJ = v(n'j )+ } v*Q>j + n | / (p J} j = C,N 
The risk-effect on utility is the term \ v " O j ( 7 1 / n J s ). The différence between 
contingent and non-contingent risk effects is: A = jv"(a)O c - ^ " ( c t ) ^ > 0 . Suppose 
that this différence is the only différence in the utility of représentative providers under 
différent contracts, that is, ail providers would have the same expected profit in the 
absence of risk. Providers need to be compensated for comparatively higher disutility of 
expected profit fluctuations such that U c - U N = 0 and this can be achieved by paying a 
risk premium to add to expected profit. The way in which the compensation factor is 
awarded to providers is important. We assume that the risk premium takes the form of a 
ô R 1 
higher price on each unit sold, i.e. 8R = D[pR - p) so that — + p = pR and = — . 
Conceivably, the compensation could be awarded as more sales, assuming that each sale 
accrues a positive profit, thus giving p&K = 0 . However, this option is unlikely in 
practice as it présupposés some excess service need exists as well as spare capacity or 
zero costs in expanding output. 
Proposition 5. For profit maximisers, with Cl and C2 contingent contracts, S* < 0. 
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Proof. 
Using (7-47) the expected utility différence is reduced to zero: 
(7-48) UC-UN =v(pR)-v{p)+ry(pR)-ry{p)+A = 0 
or 
(7-49) A* = v(pR )- v{p)+ ) - = - A 
dAR 
Differentiating we have: = v' + r\\i' > 0 (by assumption 1-1 and since r < 1) where 
the premium pR does not affect the expected profit variation under each contract type 
i.e. A „ = 0 . Hence, — - = — = (v' + rvi/')— > 0 , which means that the premium 
' dÒR SpR dò* k ' D 
must be negative, òR < 0 , to satisfy (7-49). • 
7.4.1 Risk and provider motivation 
How will risk effects of différent contracts compare as between profit maximisers and 
satisficers? There are two aspects to this problem, which can be seen with référencé to 
(7-48). First, how does profit change following a cost shock, and therefore what the size 
of A will be in the function. Second, what the implications are for how the premium is 
paid to providers with least protecting contracts. We can compare full contingent (Cl ) 
contracts with non-contingent (NC) contracts. As to the first aspect, under CI contracts 
ali providers are fully protected and Lemma 9 indicates that cost shocks do not change 
profits. Hence, we have: A = v"(a)0A ' > 0 . Lemma 6 indicates that under contingent 
contracts there are no behavioural différences between provider types, and therefore 
d2AR 
A., = 0 . As to the second aspect, it is clear from (7-49) that —¡=—- > 0. However, this v dp dy 
resuit is predicated on the way the risk premium is paid. Satisficing providers are 
somewhat résistant to price increases (above p ) and so would be less happy with a unit 
price based premium than their profit maximising counterparts, unless they considered 
the risk premium to be part of the fair price under the non-contingent contract i.e. 
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d A * , ' > & T • , r Ô P 1 Ô A* r „ T 
—_ = v + r\\i -n\i — ^ . In particular, for — = 1, — - = v > 0 . In this case, there îs 
dpR dpR dp* 
no différence in ôÂ between provider types. 
Having considered the case where p is provider specific, it seems also reasonable to 
assume that p also changes on a per provider basis with regard to cream-skimming -
see Lemma 6 and (7-30). With this assumption, Av, * 0. As in proposition 4 the risk 
implications can be ascertained from |((>c|-|((>A'|, the différence in the absolute size of the 
profit change following a cost shock. Since, moreover, <j>c = 0 for ali states under Cl 
contracts, our attention can be focused on j ^ j . Using (7-24) in (7-30) gives the optimal 
condition: 
_ , feL _ D-rB [(/?(ß)- c(ß))z) + 7t]+ % = 0 (7-50) t/ß = v7tp + ~ = ~ r c \ 
This function can be substituted into (7-46) to give an approximation for expected 
change in profit following a cost shock dß1: 
(7-51) - DNc&rw + (l - w\ - Dc^r + 0 
(7-52) tf = 
At the optimal for satisficers, cream-skimming is at a lower level in this alternative case 
and therefore, the term -Dc/r will be lower for satisficers than maximisers. However, 
the second term in (7-52) is higher for satisficers than maximisers. There is a balancing 
effect when compared to the situation with profit maximisers. Satisficers operate at 
higher output with a better chance of having to actually proceed with the contract after 
time 2 and therefore incur costs. But the disutility of cream-skimming in this case 
reduces the amount of profit made and therefore how much it will change following a 
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change in referrai dependency. When w tends to 1, however, the former effect is greater 
and satisificers would find themselves experiencing greater profit variability. 
The above results are collected in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. (a) If satisficing providers suffer disutility when prices exceed the 
population mean, then comparing Cl contracts with NC contracts, the risk premium is 
the same for both satisficers and maximisers. (b) If satisficing providers suffer disutility 
when prices exceed the mean price given actual dependency, then when w —> 1, 
8 ^ ( p ) < S - ; ( p ) < 0 . Overall, given a mix of Cl and C2 contracts, we can say that: 
S U p K U P M -
7.5 Cost shocks 
The above propositions regarding risk effects refer to expected mark-up rates evaluated 
before production (made at time 2), modified by a pre-determined risk premium. Thus, 
absent other factors, the term8* is the expected or average différence between the profit 
rates of providers operating with contingent rather than non-contingent contracts. But 
when we make an observation of the actual state of nature k after time 2, it is probably 
différent from that average state. Actual profits will vary depending on the contingency 
of the contract. 
Actual net mark-up rates are state-of-the-world dépendent: %[ - y = aJ + <\>Jk,i=C, 
N. We know that g c - aN = 8 j so: 
(7-53) nck (p = P) " < (è = P) = tf " tf + S ì (P) 
In the absence of cost shocks then = nk + 8^ . However, suppose that a large 
upwards cost shock occur in state k such that dfi' = p ; - (3 > 0 . Then we have: 
Lemma 12. For contingent contracts, (J)^1 -cj)^ >0. 
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Proof. 
Cl contracts fully compensate a change in costs and so <t>£' = 0 . NC contracts do not. 
Therefore <|>£ < 0 . C2 contracts partially compensate so will be have an intermediate 
effect between NC and CI contracts. • 
We can write the upwards cost shock effect as ô s (p)= - . For any contingent 
contract, ô s(p)> 0 by Lemma 12. Therefore, if positive costs shocks are sufficiently 
large then the actual profits of contingent contract holders could be, ceteris paribus, 
higher than non-contingent contract profits, despite the latter receiving a risk premium. 
In any case actual increases in payment following an upward cost shock would offset 
the ex ante risk premium. 
The effects for satisficers depends on our treatment of access pricing. Satisficers do not 
like to increase prices above a baseline and so limit access. If the baseline is sample 
average dependency-at the beginning of the year then following an average increase 
during the year, even at 0 = 0, price will be above access price. However, if the baseline 
is the average throughout the year then access price will rise proportionately and costs 
shock effects will be little different as between maximisers and satisficers. 
7.6 Conclusions 
7.6.1 Net effects 
The set of theory above can be interpreted to give us a number of empirical 
propositions. Our main aim is to assess empirically the impact of contract choices, 
defined as the degree of contingency, on provider price and price-cost margins. In the 
theory we distinguished between contingent and non-contingent contracts. Choices have 
profit implications in respect to the expected size of: information rents, risk premiums 
and additional profits due to cost shocks. How then do these individual effects of 
contract choice combine to give an overall expected profit implication for contract 
choice? Table 7-2 summarises the individual effects, distinguishing degree of 
contingency (h). It shows the effects on profit of using, respectively, a CI or C2 contract 
compared to using a non-contingent contract. Thus for example, regarding information 
rents, profit maximisers with CI contracts are predicted to have larger rents that profit 
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maximisers with non-contingent contracts, ceteris paribus. The latter do accrue 
information rents but - due to being unable to select optimal output - cannot accrue as 
much at the margin for a given degree of misrepresentation of ß. 
Table 7-2. Individual effects 
Cl contracts: h = 1 C2 contracts; h > h 
Max Satis Max ' Satis 
Information 8 U ( P ) > 0 
Proposition 1 Proposition 2 
ö U ( ß ) = ° 
Proposition 1 Proposition 2 
Information 
- no free 
replacement 
S ; . . ( P ) > O 
Proposition 4 Proposition 2 
» ; - o ( P ) > o 
Proposition 4 
K'Aß)<K-M 
Proposition 2 
Risk 
premium ö j ^ ( ß ) < o 
Proposition 5 Proposition 6 
C > ( ß ) < o 
Proposition 5 roposition 6 
Cost shock 8 J W > 0 
Lemma 12 
s ; ( W > o 
Lemma 12 
The aim is develop some hypotheses as to the relationships between profit rate and 
contract choice overall and how these relationships differ in various circumstances. 
Because the individual effects change in différent circumstances we can use the theory 
to predici which circumstances are likely to have aligned individual effects, and which 
will generate contradictions. 
The above table does not demonstrate any completely aligned effects. However, the 
respective propositions do provide some, albeit limited, indication of strength of effe et. 
Table 7.3 maps this additional information about individual effects. Moreover, the table 
crudely combines this information about individual effects to propose a net effect. 
Strictly speaking there is only a limited basis for making these comparisons since they 
rest on - in some cases - independent parameters e.g. the degree of risk aversion. This 
is essentially an empirical question. What is clear is that the availability of financial 
compensation for risk requires action on the part of commissioners - including 
récognition that this is an issue. The evidence on commissioning f rom the 
commissioning survey reported in chapter 4, suggests in practice this action is limited, 
récognition of risk issues. We conclude that only modest risk premiums are paid, if at 
ali, implying a limited risk related profit différence between those with contingent and 
non-contingent contracts (but as a resuit a shortfall in utility as between providers with 
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these différent types of contract). There is more anecdotal support for the selective 
reporting of information, however. For example, a signifieant minority of people do find 
their condition improves, but this is generally not reported to purchasers. 
7.6.2 Contracts with lower values of h ( h < 1 ) 
Cl and C2 contracts are provided for illustration. With limited information about 
dependency and about provider marginal cost-dependency relationships, commissioners 
could easily set up contingent contracts with h values that are less than h = 1 i.e. where 
p^ > c p . Generally speaking the smaller the value of h, the higher are information rents. 
Moreover, if h < 1 then contracts are overcompensating providers for changes in ß so 
much so that profits do fluctuate with the state of the world, and compared to a h = 1 
contract, risk averse providers would need a risk premium. For contract with h values 
that are modestly below 1, this risk premium is still likely to be a lot smaller than for 
non-contingent contracts. But clearly as h tends to zero, so information rents grow and 
risk premium effects would also go positive. For some value of h, h < 0 as h 0 so 
öM7)=o(ß)> 0 , 5j= 0(ß)> 0 and öj(ß)> 0 . In this case providers with contracts of 
contingency h < 0 are predicted to unambiguously have higher profits that providers 
with non-contingent contracts. 
Table 7-3. Ex post contingent contracts compared with non-contingent contracts -
effects on mark-up rate différences 
Cl contracts: h = 1 C2 contracts: h > h Contracts h <h 
Max Satis Max Satis 
Information ++ + + 0/+ ++ 
Risk premium - - - - - - / — 0 
Cost shock ++ ++ + + ++ 
Net effect? ++ â " + 0 l t-f 
Overall, therefore the 'net effect' in the table summarises our hypotheses - used as the 
basis for our empirical analysis - of the association between observed profit or mark-up 
levels and use of contingent compared with non-contingent contracts. In particular, 
profit maximisers with Cl contracts are predicted to have the greatest comparative 
mark-up, and satisficers with C2 contracts the lowest. 
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7.7 Appendix 
7.7.1 Appendix lemmas 
Lemma Al. A sufficient condition for p to be a global maximum is for rm < -1. 
Proof. 
A sufficient condition is that 7t-- < 0 . 
(7-54) K-- = (2reDp + Drm \ p - c) + 2 p - (rD^ + Z>9 ) + r e e i 
(using assumption 7-2) 
(7-55) = Drm(p -c)+ 2p^rD^ + [lrQD^{p - c) + Ip^Dr, + ree7ij 
The term in square brackets in (7-55) is negative, so our condition 7t-- < 0 reduces to 
showing: 
(7-56) Drm(p-c)+2p-rDii < 0 
or 
(7.57) > n 2 
r p 
If r99 < - 1 and r < 1 then (7-57) reduces to Z) > D- which holds for the class of 
demand fonctions under considération. As 9 increases from 0 so the right-hand-side of 
(7-57) increases, whilst the left-hand-side stay constant - thus higher values of ree will 
be sufficient to ensure that ti-- < 0 . 
A quadratic of the form: r = 1 - 02 would fit the conditions of assumption 7-2 and 
produce a second order derivative of - 2 . • 
Lemma A2. is a global maximum. 
Proof 
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A sufficient condition is that 7ipp < O .S inceas ree = - r e p < 0 , w e h a v e : 
(7-58) Ttpp = ree7t + 2 r e c p D + (p - c ) i > e e < 0 
7.7.2 Proof of proposition 1 
Consider the first order effect with respect to 0 under each contract. For pure cream-
skimming change in rent (N) from (7-24) is: 
(7-59) <(0)=-7Tp=^ 
zr 
From (7-10) for cost exaggeration (C) we have: 
(7-60) n c e { Q ) = n - = D c 
We proceed in three parts. 
(a) Consider first the marginal profit at 0 = 0 . We have from Lemma 4 
«e ( ° ) = = ^ ( P K and, from Lemma 1, t ï £ (o )=£> c / ^ | =£>(p) /?^ . Hence 
with a fully contingent contract, 7ig (o) = n^ (o). (Note, that using a second order 
expansion for 0 = 0 , dnc > dnN for dd > 0 as 
(O) = 2£>p/>p + ree [D(p - c)+ n] = 2D-p- + (o) > (o) hearing in mind that Dp = 
0). 
r
 PR D„ 
(b) Now consider marginal profit at Q*N (which is the same for maximisers and 
satisficers - see Lemma 6). Clearly, tc" (0 ,JV ) = 0 . Suppose that 0 e = 0** andalso 
that Dc = Dn = D. Then it is clear f rom (7-59) and (7-60) that < (e*'v)= n(0 (o'N ) and 
that pc -c = pN-c, so that nN =nc. 
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However, at 0*N with contingent contraets Dc is not limited to a value DN. Hence Q*N 
need not be a turning point for contingent contracts. The first order condition in its füll 
form, i.e.(7-9), at 0*" and i f is: 
where n = D(p — c) is actual profit (rather than expected profit). Note also that we have 
assumed that in the future the contracting regime may change, so that the size of 7t is 
independent of contract type. For non-contingent contracts, n e = -ceDN = D v h , 
in analogy with contingent contracts. However, DN * argmax(n) since with D free, 
from (7-7) the optimal demand response for a change in 0 is D- = - \ p ^ D p > 0. It 
foliows that n"(ew+A8)-nw(ew)<nc(eA' +A0)-n(0") , i.e. that n^(ew)> new(ew), 
dD V y " ßlö 
Now at 0*w, 
This inequality arises because the right hand side does not include any price réduction 
due to an increase in D. Now at the turning point for the non-contingent contract 
.c {DN)=r[DNp.+D^{pN~c)} +DNre(pN-c)+ren = rUe +DNr6(pN - c ) l+rfl7t 
problem, < ( / ) " ) = < +DNr6(pN - c ) + r e Ä = 0, so, 
Hence for fully contingent contracts (h = 1), (7-61), 
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since - ^ - ( ^ ( e ^ ^ ^ . I t f o l l o w s t h a t a t 9*" , j £ ( e " ) > 0 = <(e , J V ) . 
(c) When h = 1, from parts (a) and (b) ( 0 ) > < (0) and nc& (&'N ) > < (e'N ) . It 
is then sufïîcient to posit that < ( 9 ' v ) > < (0 V ) for ali 9'v e [o, ] given our 
assumed continuous, differentiable functions. 
For some h > 1, called h there will be equality between the marginal profit rates: 
TIq(Q'n)= N'fi"). This can be seen with respect to (7-61) where 
= 0 . At h wehave < ( o ) < < (û). 
(d) Integrating the first order condition on the support 9 ,v e [o, 9'v* ] gives: 
(7-63) ^ ( 9 ^ ) = f < ( 0 ) d B + 4 ) 
and 
(7-64) t i c(9w*)= f < ( 9 ) d B + Ç 4 ( 9 > / 9 + 7i(p) 
and noting that TTC(O)= 7T"(o) = 7I(P)S 7I(P'). When h = 1 the second term in (7-64) is 
positive in view of Tig {&*N ) > 0 from part (c). Also, on the support 9 , v e [o, 9N* ] 
we have that nce ( e * ) > < (9* ) and so j[ " < (9)c$ > { < ( 9 ) d 9 . It then 
follows that 7ïc ( e j : 0 ) > t ï " ( e j : 0 ) = n N ( 9 j ; 0 ) as required. 
To use analogous argument, when h > h > 1, nc ( g £ 0 )< nN ) = nN (9**0 ) as 
required. • 
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7.7.3 Proof of lemma 3 
Using the envelope theorem we can write: m(h) = ôp /ôp ' = - U^, /£ / . . . Since 
Ppp = 0, y " = 0 , the denominator 
(7-65) {/-. = v'(7l)7t.. + 7T-v"(7l)7r. + M/'(p)p-. + p ^ " ( p ) p p 
reduces to 
(7-66) £/.. = v'(n)n-. + n.v"(n)n-. 
Similarly the numerator is: 
(7-67) U w = V'(7l)71-pi + 7i.v'(7t)7rpy . 
Using the first order condition, (7-6), on the profit function, 
(7-68) = = 
D » p p 
In addition, we have from differentiating (7-9): 
(7-69) 
~ ^pp' = re + (p~ c)Dpre + D(P - + X„i rD- + pJ r0 - Dp, rp. - Dp, r0 (p-c) + re en 
where 
(7-70) X p , = = - c p + = - i c p 
D ^[-D/D] 
Put another way, for profit maximisers, p-c = and — = - y c p . Also, note that 
^ = Pn = P J + 
ap / p D 
(7-71) ^  />rL DP = L • 
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(7-72) ti-- = Dp.rö + (p- c )d . r e + 0{p - c)rm + reeÄ + 2 r D ^ + D^p- c)r% + Dp^ 
(7-73) Ti-. = -ti-ß , - Z)xp, re - + 2 r D - + D - { p - c)re + Dp^r, + Dp, /p- + Dß, r e { p -
(7-74) TT - - = -7T-ß/ + Dr, (pe - )+ rp-ID- + Dß, J+ rD- ^ - Xp, J+ (p - c)rB (i). + Z>p, ) 
(7-75) TTpp t U p L K ^ p 2 UPL 
(7-76) 7 t p r - 7 i . ß , - c p 
For fully contingent contracts where h = 1, then p-\ - c „ = 0 , and so 7i-- = -n- , . PI ¡y P PP PP 
However, for partially contingent contracts when h > 1, pÀ - c „ < 0 , the value of cp is 
pId p 
unclear. At r = 1, cp > 0 and at r = 0, (p < 0. When h<\, p-\ -cß > 0 , so that at r = 1, 
(p < 0 and at r = 0, (p > 0. 
Now, 
[/-- =-v'(7l>t.p i -v ' ( t t )p + V ^ K 
= ~uw - v ' ( * > p + V ' ^ ß + V ) 
which means: 
(7.7,0 = 
c/ÄÄ i/Sfi 
Furthermore, 
(7-79) 7ip; = r D d ^ ^ + r D ^ p - c ) - D r B { p - c ) - r B n 
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(7-80) =-rD\ cß, —g- | + r D R , ( / 7 - c ) - D r 0 ( p - c ) - r o 7 i : 
Hence using (7-68), 
(7-81) 7ip, =-\rDc^rD^{p-c)-DrQ{p-c)-r,% 
and so for fully contingent contracts, for any \\i, 7tp + 7tp, = 0 as p p = \ 1 > 0 . 
Hence, for fully contingent contracts for any \ \ i ,m= 1. 
„ , v ' ( 7 l ) ( P For partially contingent contracts in the profit maximising case m = 1 + , 
^ßß 
because 7i - = 0 . Since £/pp < 0 the usuai second order condition of a first order 
V'Itc kp 
maximum, we have m = I h — < 1 at r = 1 and m > 1 at r = 0. At the optimal r*, the 
um 
value of m is ambiguous, although its possible values do include m = 1. • 
7.7.4 Proof of lemma 7 
Noting that we can write 0 = P - ß s ß - ß , differentiating (7-24) gives: 
(7-82) 7ipp = £>recp + D(p - c)ree + r06Ä + Drecp < 0 
and 
(7-83) 7ipp, = -Dr e c p - D{p - c)rm -rmn- DrQp^, - rcp - Dp( (p - c)r0 
However, since prices are fixed at the sample average dependency then p , = 0 . 
Moreover, optimal demand is a function of price and actual marginai cost i.e. 
D* = d(p(p)c(P)) , and the former is fixed. Actual marginai costs are a function of the 
actual level, not the referred level, of dependency (where these might differ). Therefore, 
D = o and (7-83) then becomes: 
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(7-84) 7t = -DreCp - ü{p - c)rm - ree7t 
We then have: 
(7-85) TT = -n ß p +Z> e Cp 
Twice differentiating Utility gives: 
(7-86) U , =7ißv"(7i>rp, +v'(7t>rßß, = v'(7t>ipp, 
as at the optimal 7tß = 0 for any by Lemma 6. Similarly, 
(7-87) C/pp = v'(7i)jrpp 
Therefore, with analogy to the proof for lemma 3, part 1 of this proof is: 
(7-88) w = = 1 - = 1— 
t/pp v'(7i)nßß 7tßp 
Furthermore, < 1 or r 0 c ß D - 7tßp > 0 because r e c p D - 7tpp = 7t , > 0 . 
n ßß 
Part 2 is as follows. To begin with write: = 2 + r™D(p (where D 
r 0 c p D recßD 
r (p c Î 2 ~ r + b ] 
1 - r + b r0cpD r0cp 
at the optimal value of ß, 7tß = 0 , implying cB = - — (p - c ) ( 2 ~ r + b \ from 
/• \l - r + b ) 
(7-24). Therefore, = 2 - M . o r w = r*\~ r*> r . When r = 0, then w= '/2. When r 
>-ecßD r{)- 2re- - rmr 
= 1, then r0 = 0 and so w = 1. Hence V i < w < \ as required. • 
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Chapter 8. Empirical analysis of contract effects 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the empirical investigation of the main propositions of the 
previous chapter i.e. the proposition summarised in table 7.3. The aim is to determine 
the relationship between contract types used by providers - that is the degree of contract 
contingency - and both prices and price-cost margins (profit rates), Controlling for other 
relevant factors. The literature describes the options and challenges of empirical 
investigations of profitability (a particularly useful overview is Bresnahan, 1988). This 
chapter describes how the chosen approach - a residual demand elasticities method - is 
applied. It draws on Forder (2000). The chapter then discusses the dérivation of the 
various profit 'mark-up ' indicators. The results follow, and then conclusions are 
presented about how well the data square with the theory. 
8.2 Empirical Foundations 
A general imperfect compétition model with product differentiation (Bresnahan, 1988; 
Baker and Bresnahan, 1985) of the following type is used. Consider a market with n 
heterogeneous providers of residential care. To be clear about market power at the 
provider level we start with the case where each provider supplies one service. Later we 
develop the model to allow providers to seil more than one product. 
Demand at period 2 for service 1 is given by (1.1), which in inverse form is: 
(8-1) px = A , ( x , , : r 2 , . j / ; a , ) 
where, p¡ is the service 1 demand price, x¡ to x„ are the (expected) demands faced by the 
n service/providers in the market, y¡ is a vector of exogenous variables that shift demand 
- and would include types of contract y used - and y are non-firm specific (e.g. buyer) 
shift factors. Finally, a , is the parameter vector. The usual assumption that < 0 and 
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— - > 0 fory = 2 ... n is made. Buyers are distributed throughout the market according 
dp j 
to their tastes for each care produci. 
The partial derivative, dhjôx, , indicates how provider l ' s demand changes when the 
prices of ail other providers are kept constant - the Nash-in-quantity case or Cournot 
case (see Martin, 2002). However, to allow a more general spécification of provider 
conjectures we can be explicit about the dependence of the other providers' demands on 
provider l ' s demand: 
(8-2) pt = ^ ( ^ ^ ^ ( x , ) , . . . , x„(x, ),);,, y; a , ) 
Allowing x2,...,xn to vary, the total derivative of provider l ' s price with regard its 
demand (excluding changes in the exogenous variables) is: 
(8-3) ^ = ôPi + f ^ L ô ^ = dEi + ydPLX_i 
dx] dx{ r 2 ôxj uxi cbt, ôXj 1 
where Xji is the conjectural variation. In the Bertrand (price compétition) case each 
provider expects its rival's price to remain constant for changes in its own price. Then, 
/ \ dp j /dx, 
with Pj (x, ) = const, we have: L , = — . Provider l ' s residual price differential 
dpj./dxj 
- the relationship between its price and demand net of responses of other providers - is 
dépendent on that provider's conjectures about the other providers. This conjecture is 
therefore part of the provider's optimal price fonction. Indeed, it is the residual price 
differential that we wish to determine because such an estimate would encompass the 
effects of competitive interaction as it prevails in the sample market. It tells us about 
provider market power, which we turn to next. 
To proceed in the dérivation of the provider's optimal price fonction we need to be 
explicit about provider objectives and cost fonctions. We allow for marginal costs to 
change, albeit by relatively small amounts because both the capital (mainly property) 
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and labour inputs are quite divisible for the industry. We write the marginal cost 
function as: 
(8-4) c, = c(x,,z,.,z;e,.) 
or more specifïcally 
(8-5) c, = c ( z , , z ;9 , ) + cxx, 
where z is a vector of cost shift elements including factor prices such as the price of 
labour and the price of capital. It also includes the choice of contract, which can affect 
the cost function if it induces cream-skimming and so changes the balance of client 
types served by the provider. Also, z, are provider specific factors such as home 
characteristics. The elements of the vector 9, are the unknown parameters of the cost 
function. Total costs are given by the intégral of (8-5): 
(8-6) C, = J cidx! = | [ c ( z , , z ;9 , ) + cx.x, }dx: = [ex, + }cxxf J = ex, + \cxxf + F, 
Average costs are thus: 
C F F 
(8-7) ~L = c + \cxxi +-L=c-\cxxi + — 
XJ X, X, 
and average variable costs are: 
Cv 
(8-8) —1— = c + \cxxj = c -1 cyxi 
xi ~ ' 
We do not have information on the specific incentives/motivations of individual 
organisations, that is, whether particular providers are profit maximisers or satisficers, 
and if the latter, what value of i |/ applies. We will assume that provider types are 
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defined by two limit cases. The first and most straightforward is the profit maximiser, 
i.e. = 0 . 
Profit maximisers have the usual period 2 profit fonction (at time t with time subscripts 
suppressed) (see(1.5)): 
(8-9) 7if; = / ? , . ( * , > / - 0 
The first order condition is: 
0 7 1 . 
(8-10) —^ = p, - c, + 
ox. dxi dxj 
xi(p, x_t, yi, y, <Ji ) = 0 
or with more manageable notation, 
(8-11) pi = c, - pxxi 
wherep is the vector of ail providers prices. The other limit case is the satisficer with 
the constraint that providers break-even, that is prices at least equal average variable 
cost. We can assume that provider types are uniformly distributed between these limit 
cases, such that on average price setting is a weighted sum of these extremes. With a 
weighting factor a(i | / ' ) , the average price - cost relation is: 
(8-12) pt = a(c, - pxx)+ (l - oc)— 
(8-13) 
pi = a(c + cxxi - pxxt) + (l - aXc + \ cxxi) 
a c x + 2 c x ~ a P x )xi + c 
The weighting or motivations parameter, 0 < a < 1, measures the average propensity of 
providers to use market power to make profit. It is assumed to be exogenously 
determined, and not directly observable. 
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Overall then (8-13) indicates that a provider's (expected) price setting will depend on 
the extent of produci differentiation and compétition as they act on provider own price 
elasticity, on providers' conjectures regarding price responses of competitors (i.e. the 
conjectural variations parameter, Xß), and also on the value of motivations parameter 
(a). The latter implies that this measure is of actual rather than potential price-cost 
margins (see Forder, 2000). 
8.2.1 Estimating price-cost margins 
Three estimâtes are required to calculate price-cost margins as specified by (8-13): the 
'perceived' price differential px = dpjdxi ; the change in marginal costs; and the 
motivations parameter. Undertaking a direct estimation of dpj/dxj i.e. (8-3) présents 
considérable practical difficulties because the number of own- and cross-elasticities is 
very large. Baker and Bresnahan (1985) offer a more manageable approach that 
involves removing the dependence of the other n - 1 provider's prices on the demand 
fonction of a représentative provider. 
Consider the pricing décisions of a given provider, say provider 1. The other firms in 
the market are denoted j = 2,..,n and have demand fonctions: 
(8-14) p_. = Ä _ . ( i „ j c . f , y _ i , y ; a _ j ) 
where the subscript -i refers to the vector of providers j. The associated first order 
conditions are given by (8-13), or in this case: 
(8-15) p_i = c_i -
Using the (n - l) inverse demand équations and the (n - l) supply équations in the 
respective vector relations (8-14) and (8-15) we can solve simultaneously for (n - l) 
prices and Outputs (as fonctions of market level shift factorsy and z) to derive: 
(8-16) x_j = £ i ( i 1 ) z ) y ) a A . , , c , , e J 
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Following Baker and Bresnahan's (1985) formulation, for each of the (n - l) providers 
j, the differential of Ej with respect to x/ is firm / s reaction function (to provider 1). 
Equation (8-16) defines a reduced form equation (for ¡ V I ) written in terms of provider 
1 's output (xi). These optimal demands can then be substituted into the inverse demand 
function to give the equation to be estimated: 
(8-17) jp, = hXx x ,E_Xx x , z ,y ;a ,X_i ,a^ ,Q^) ,y , ^ j o , ) 
or 
(8-18) pì = hìR(xi,z,y,y];a,X,aì,a,Q ) 
This function is the residual demand curve for product 1. The elasticity of hR with 
respect to X] teils us about the market power provider 1 has over its price, taking into 
account the adjustment of all other providers' prices and quantities (Bresnahan, 1988, 
pl049). Specifically, 
(8-19) 
which can be substituted directly into the optimal price function (8-13) and is a key 
component in determining price-cost margins. It remains to show how dhR/cbc, can be 
estimated. The stochastic form of (8-18) for provider i is (chosen to balance flexibility 
with parsimony): 
(8-20) Pi = b0 +b{i log*, +bì2xf +b2y + biyi +b4z + ui 
Natural logarithms are used to allow for a more general functional form (see chapter 6 
regarding the implications). To allow for the impact of (expected) demand on price-cost 
margins (i.e. dMjdx), a more general specification is: 
(8-21 ) pf =b0+bu log Xj + bux. + bnYxf + b2y + b^gi +b4z + b5Yi+ 
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which uses an interaction term with coefficient bn , and extracts contract type T, from 
vector >>, to leave g,. Therefore: 
(8-22) dp?/dxt = hx = bjl + 2bnxj + 2bnYxi 
xi 
Equilibrium price for provider i is given by the interaction of (residuai) demand (8-21) 
and the supply relation (8-13): 
(8-23) p, =c(znz; 0, )+({ acx + ^cx - ah* (xi, y, z; c r a , a , X, 0))x, (p,, , y, yi ; a , ) 
The stochastic counterpart is, 
(8-24) pi = a0 + alX/ + a2zj + a3z + ei =a0 + a]0xi + auxjYi + a2zi + a3z + e. 
and so the differential of the supply price is: 
(8-25) dp?/dxi =a, ={acx+\cx -ahx 
Estimating (8-21) présents a simultaneity problem because it is simultaneously 
determined by (8-13). Nonetheless, those factors in z, that are cost-only can be used to 
instrument x, in (8-21). Since conceivably some variables such as those describing a 
home's characteristics could enter both y, and z„ those variables would be unsuitable as 
instruments. Therefore only the subset of factors zi ci zi : z(. et yj are used to instrument 
demand. Similarly, when estimating (8-24) provider spécifié demand factors 
yi a y, : y, <Z z, can be used to instrument x,. The interaction is included to allow for 
différent values of hx(j) for each group Y. To account for possible shift effects supply 
(8-24) includes contract type in the vector z, i.e. Yj e z. Note also that since the vector 
z, contains dependency variables P we would not expect much of an effect of Y, alone 
because, as noted in the previous chapter, cream-skimming works through the réduction 
of p, i.e. c, =c(jc ; ,z:p ,p(y),z;0,) . 
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To be explicit about the instrumentation in the model suppose that factors common to y, 
and Zj form the vector Hi a yi : y, n z , . Then we can write: 
(8-26) p, = c(zj, Hi, z) + ( i acx + } c_t - a hR )x,. (y,, Hi, y) 
The above models provide estimâtes with which to calculate both potential and actual 
mark-up rates and Lerner indices. 
8.2.1.1 Marginal cost mark-up 
Re-arranging (8-11) gives the potential marginal cost mark-up rate - that is, the rate that 
maximises profits. 
(8-27) p^-c, =Mi=-hRxxi 
Actual mark-up rates are provided by estimation of the supply relation and are: 
(8-28) p° - c, = mj = (-jacx + }cT - ahRx )x. - cxxi = aixj - cxxi 
8.2.1.2 Average cost mark-up 
Since providers operate with économies of scale mark-up based on average variable cost 
is a better guide to profitability. Using (8-8), potential average cost mark-up is: 
c v 
(8-29) - ^L. = 0), = - c + ±cxx. = M, + ±cxx, 
xi 
and an actual average cost mark-up of: 
Cv 
(8-30) p'; = p«-c + jcxx, =m,+jex, = a]X, - jcrx, 
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8.2.2 Actual mark-up calculation 
The calculation of actual mark-up - either (8-28) or (8-30) - requires us to have 
estimâtes of at and cx. The former is directly estimated (8-24) but the latter is not and 
need to be inferred from using the supply price condition ~ acx + \ cx - ahx = a]. The 
estimation of the demand équation directly provides a value for h* . However, this stili 
leaves the unknown value of a to be estimated. 
The prédictions from the demand and supply équations regarding mark-up rates under 
the two contract types are made given equal values of he other variables, z and y. 
Therefore, costs c(z) and the derivative cx(z), which are fonctions of z will be equal 
for both groups. Note in this comparison we are assuming that both groups of providers 
treat the same types of clients. Cream-skimming effects on the price charged by the 
non-contingent contracts group will work through demand, in that purchasers believe 
they are getting a service for higher dependency people than is actually the case. 
Suppose that for both groups mean dependency of referred clients was the same. Where 
cream-skimming was occurring, the actual average dependency in the non-contingent 
contract groups would be lower (hence costs) although demand prices would stili be at 
the sample average level. By comparing supply prices where the dependency of 
residents is the same between the two groups implies the same costs but predicted prices 
for the non-contingent contract group that are above the sample average dependency 
level to reflect the extra profit associated with cream-skimming. The relevant point here 
is that when the two groups treat the same types of people their costs must be the same; 
cream-skimming works not by lowering costs given dependency but by lowering 
dependency - and so costs - given price. 
We can estimate the supply price differential of (8-24) for each sub-population by 
contract type - i.e. being explicit about the dependence on y - as: 
aj - JOLCx + jcx - ahx . It follows from the above (i.e. cx and a are not fonctions of Y) 
that a,y=1 + = \acx +\cx= a[=0 + a h Y x a (also noting that cxx = 0 by assumption) 
and therefore, that: 
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(8-31) a = 
and 
(8-32) c = 
a -ah! 
r<X + i 
In addition to these estimates, to calculate mark-up rates by contract type we need also 
to determine output level and prices for the two groups. We can solve for equilibrium 
(equal) pr in the non-stochastic demand (8-21) and supply (8-24): 
(8-33) b0 + bi, logx, + bi2xf + bnYxf + b2y + + b4z + b5Yt = a0 + a10x, + auxiYi + a2z(. + a3z 
for each Y. Solving the above equation for output and substituting back into the demand 
curve gives a reduced-form equation for each provider. 
(8-34) p. = hf (z, z,., y, y. ; a , X, a,., a , 0,., 0) 
In the reduced-form model we have: 
(8-35) P r - P r = 
However, the difference in mark-up rates is: 
(8-36) (p™ - c , ^ 1 ) - { p ! " ° ~cr-°)= ^ + c / (x J r = 0 ,z ) -c , ( jcr , ,z )« s + cx(x™-x^) 
Only therefore if providers are operating with Constant returns to scale (i.e cx = 0) will s 
be equal to the change in mark-up. Whilst the reduced-form is very useful in providing a 
way of estimating the motivation paramater with the marginai cost differential, the 
foregoing analysis does serve to highlight the limitations of reduced-form analysis for 
gauging the impact of contract choice on profits. The likely error is compounded with 
the size of economies or diseconomies of scale. 
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The advantage of a reduced-form model is that it avoids the need for identification of 
the endogenous variables in the structural équations. This requirement can be 
problematic in that the estimation can be quite sensitive to the spécification of the 
instruments used. Moreover, instrument spécification tests can support quite a wide 
range of spécifications. As a resuit, some expérimentation in required. 
8.2.3 The impact of contract choice 
The impact of contract choices on actual mark-up can now be calculated. At the margin, 
profit différence is 
(8-37) Am,. ={j<xcx - \ c x - a h ? ^ - ^ a c x ~ \ c x - a h ^ 0 
According to the theory, we would expect this différence to be positive; providers with 
contingent contracts derive more information rent from cost exaggerations than those 
with non-contingent contracts from cream-skimming. The theory indicates that with 
replacement costs cream-skimming (CS) is unlikely to be large-scale. 
The question of the size of CS rents is an empirical one. With cream-skimming actual 
dependency is less than average dependency of ali referred users: z° < z where the 
superscript refers to contract contingency type. Apropos (8-26) the corresponding 
supply relationship will be: 
(8-38) / ( z ° ) = c ( f ) + f l 1 0 ( x ° ) r 0 ( z 0 ) 
or 
(8-39) / ( z 0 ) = c ( z 0 ) + s + 4 x 0 ) x 0 ( z 0 ) 
with, by définition of CS, e < 0. The problem is that we observe actual'dependency z° 
not the 'pre-selection' or referred dependency z . For the contingent contracts group, 
were cost exaggeration (CE) is observed, actual dependency (but not reported 
dependency) is equal to referred dependency levels on average (proposition 1 of chapter 
7 rules out simultaneous CE and CS). In practice, there are empirical issues in using the 
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contingent contracts group as a benchmark for determining z since that group may 
have other exogenous characteristics, y and z, that affect, by chance, the mean referral 
dependency of users in that group. Below this problem is addressed by estimating the 
relationship between dependency and characteristics, y and z, and then cross-predicting 
dependency characteristics of contingent contract providers, given those characteristics. 
Then a like-for-like comparison can be made - see section 8.7.4. 
8.3 Estimation 
8.3.1 Spécification 
The PSSRU cross-sectional survey of residential care - as described in chapter 4 - is the 
main data source for price-cost margins estimations. The two structural équations to be 
estimated are (8-21) and (8-24) respectively. The residuai demand fonction is: 
AÎ\\ Pi =bo+bu + b\ixî + bnYxf + b2y + b3Si + B,Z + B^ + u, (ÌS-4U) 
= b0+bu logx, + b]2xf + buYxj + b2y + b3]y, + bi2Hj + b4z + b5Yj + u, 
and the supply fonction is: 
(8-41) 
pj =a0 + awXj + a, xxjYi + a2zi + a3z + ej 
= an+ a.nx; + a,.x,Y, + a-„zi + a^H. + a,z + a.Y, + e. 
Finally, the demand fonction on the sample including public sector providers is: 
(8-42) Pi =bn + bu logx, +bnYxf +b2y + b3lyj +bilHi +bAz + b5Yi + b(Lt +u, 
This fonction was used primarily to gauge the existence of cream-skimming. 
Empirical proxy variables for the demand and supply fonctions are given in Table 8-1 
and descriptive statistics are given in Table 8-2. Output, x„ is specified as the number of 
places sold in the home (number of places filled). Output information is supplied for the 
survey date by the home manager. On average 30.6 places were purchased with a range 
from 3 to 159. Capacity - i.e. the number of available places - averaged 34.4 for an 
occupancy of 88 per cent. 
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Table 8-1. Empirica! specification 
Variable definition Demand Supply Theory var. 
Output 
Output (number of filled places) 
Output x contingent contract 
Lin 
Log 
Sqrd 
Lin 
Sqrd 
Endog 
Endog 
Endog 
Endog 
Endog 
X, 
In x, 
x,2 
YjXj 
Yx2 
Output, lagged Lin Instr 
Sqrd Instr (*rì 
Log Instr 
Demand and supply shift factors 
Barthel score (inverse) Sqrd 
Cbd 
Struc 
Struc 
H 
H 
Staff with nursing qualification rate Lin 
Log Struc 
Struc H 
H 
Home has no en suite toilets Dummy Struc Struc H 
Home size/capacity Lin Struc H 
Home has modular layout 
Home has modular layout x size/capacity 
Lin 
Lin 
Struc 
Struc 
H 
H 
Home purpose built Dummy Struc H 
Business started from scratch w/ purpose built home Dummy Struc H 
Nursing home Dummy Struc Struc H 
Single home organisation Dummy Struc H 
Home makes specific EMI provision Dummy Struc H 
Demand only factors 
Resident Funding (% residents privately funded) Lin 
Sqrd Struc 
Instr 
Instr 
y, 
y, 
Resident Funding (% residents LA funded) Lin Instr v. 
Home flexible regime score Lin Struc Instr y, 
Home seif expression score Lin Struc Instr y< 
Home has no contracts with other LAs Dummy 
Home has no contracts with other LAs x LA list only Dummy Struc 
Instr 
Instr 
y> y, 
Home is planning to expand Dummy Instr y, 
Volunteers aid in organised activity Dummy Instr y, 
Supply only factors 
Provides meals on wheels 
Provides meals on wheels x Provides home care 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Instr 
Instr 
z. 
z 
Provides home care Dummy Instr Zj 
Price fails to cover cost 
Price fails to cover cost x Private sector home 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Instr 
Instr 
z, 
z. 
Home wage rate (basic), care staff Sqrd Instr z, 
Locai demand, supply chars f.not home specific) 
Wages: female, manual gross wage Lin 
Log 
Struc 
Struc 
z 
z 
Property prices Lin Struc y 
Area cost adjustment Lin Struc 2,y 
Contracts . •. 
Contingent price contract 
Contingent price contract x qualified staff ratio 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Struc 
Struc 
Struc Yi 
Y,d 
279 
Table 8-2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable définition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price Linear 276.07 69.01 139 705.26 
Output: number of filled places Linear 30.56 19.74 3 159 
Log 3.25 0.58 1.10 5.07 
Resident characteristics ^ 
Cognition: % moderate impairment 44.66 20.27 0 100 
Barthel score home average, inverse 8.86 3.92 0.45 18.20 
Resident Funding % residents privately funded 30.31 23.37 0 100 
% residents LA funded 35.96 27.82 0 100 
Home characteristics 
Nursing home 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Staff with nursing qualification rate Linear 0.13 0.14 0 0.63 
Log 0.11 0.12 0 0.49 
Purpose built home 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Business started from Scratch 0.48 0.50 0 1 
% of single rooms to total beds Linear 0.72 0.24 0 1.06 
Single home organisation 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Home has no en suite toilets 0.38 0.49 0 1 
No. care staff Dummy: over 40 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Dummy: less 15 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Number 27.19 19.15 2 170 
Home has own transport 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Flexible home regime 28.33 14.33 0 68.25 
Volunteers aid in organised activity 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Home is only on the approved list of its LA 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Home has no contracts with other LAs 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Home is planning to expand 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Provides meals on wheels 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Provides home care to non-residents 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Price fails to cover cost 0.56 0.50 0 1 
LA characteristics 
Wages: female, manual gross wage, LA linear 386.80 35.45 339.60 512.80 
squared 150865.80 28222.49 115328.20 262963.80 
Property prices 89468.99 26322.83 52613 169766 
Regional characteristics 
Prospcrity index (ACA), not London 0.90 0.32 0 1.10 
London LA dummy 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Contracts -.ml-, .. . ; ;• ; - .• 
Contingent price contract Any home 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Managers were also asked about the types of contracts they had with purchasers from a 
number of options that covered both eontingency with respect to quantity (i.e. block 
contracts) and also contingency relative to resident (needs-related) characteristics. Of 
the former, a very small proportion of providers indicated having quantity contingent 
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contracts (over 95% of providers in the sample had only case-by-case - spot -
contracts), an insufficient number for the Statistical analysis. As regards the latter the 
indicator was a response to the question of whether they operated with a price that was 
"pre-set by local authorities dépendent on the type of resident (e.g. level of 
dependency)". Some 38 per cent of providers indicated that they did have contracts that 
made allowance for the service needs in this way. It is important to underline that this 
variable is based on provider perceptions of the form of the contracts they had with 
councils. For example, in some cases the intake range of resident dependency of a home 
may be sufficiently small that even if the local authority operated with a limited tariff of 
prices related to dependency, that the intake range only falls into one category. Indeed, 
as noted in chapter 4, a legacy of the social security voucher system was that many 
authorities were operating only two prices for older people - a standard and an 
enhanced rate - but that the enhanced rate only applied to people with very significant 
co-morbidities e.g. not only physically frail, but also with substantial cognitive 
impairment. Furthermore, councils may not have a uniform policy for contract types so 
that contract contingency can vary by provider intra-LA. Figure 8-1 shows that in most 
local authorities a mix of contract contingency was reported by providers. Only for 
Haringey, Harrow, Newham and Sandwell did no provider report a contingent 
contract.55 
Ideally, we would like to use an indicator of contingency that clearly distinguished 
between contingency with respect to dependency-related cost i.e. parameter ß and 
contingency with respect to only the initial assessment. This is because we wish to 
identify the degree to which contingency rests on the private information of providers. 
In fact, because needs profiles change after initial assessment and follow-up is limited, 
even the later case still relies to some extent on provider-sourced information. In any 
case, this data does not exist and so in testing for information effects, the contract 
contingency variable defined above is noisy, embodying information that is partly 
common to both purchaser and provider. Whilst, this does make finding information 
effects more difficult, we should also note that for capturing risk and cost shock effects, 
55 However, sample sizes in these authorities were small (less than five in each) and so we cannot be 
certain that ail providers in these four authorities have zero contingency contracts. 
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we would not want to make the above distinction. In these cases any contingeney with 
respect to costs - stemming from private or common information - is relevant. 
Figure 8-1. Percentage of providers reporting contingent contracts 
A number of providers reported experiencing multiple contract types and in a small 
number of cases (16) providers simultaneously had contracts for residents that both did 
and did not make such an allowance. To avoid the problem of contaminating the 
contract effect, these cases were dropped. As a resuit 36 per cent of providers had 
contingent contracts. A dummy variable, y„ was generated to reflect this use of 
contingent contracts. This dummy variable was also used interactively with output as 
specified above. 
A range of resident level, home level and market level factors shift demand and supply 
and need to be accounted for in the price analysis. A number of these factors enter both 
the demand and supply estimation and form the vector //,. Characteristics such as the 
size and format of the home, whether it has en-suite facilities, its Staffing levels and 
qualification rates, whether it is organisationally part of a chain, its registration status 
(whether it is a nursing home) and whether it caters specifically for people with mental 
health problems are factors influencing the perceived quality/value of the home. These 
factors clearly also bear directly on costs. Resident characteristics, in particular average 
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levels of dependency, are also taken to influence demand in that they imply certain 
intensities and types of in-home services and thus differentiate homes. Home size as 
measured by the number of available beds, i.e. capacity, is closely related to the number 
of places filled. Consequently, this variable was removed from the vector z, and so out 
of the supply function to ensure that output variables do not appear in c, of supply 
relation (8-23). 
Factors that concern only demand for specific providers constitute the vector y i . As 
well as (a subset) entering the demand function, these variables are natural choices as 
instruments for the supply relation estimation. Ideally from an econometric perspective 
instruments ought to be highly correlated with demand but not supply and in practice 
with cross-sectional analyses these conditions are rather difficult to meet. Nonetheless, a 
number of proxies can be found that, at best, have only indirect, tenuous and ambiguous 
relationships with costs. First, resident funding source, here specified as the proportions 
of residents on the home that are privately funded (28%), and those that are local 
authority funded (38%) (as opposed to funding by social security, health authorities or 
other means). Second, two quality of life indicators - whether the home has adopted a 
flexible regime with respect to the organisation of the residents' day and whether 
residents have scope for self expression. These variables are part of the sheltered care 
environment scale (Moos and Lemke, 1992). It might be argued that a highly 
regimented lifestyle could reduce care costs, but this effect would be expected to be 
very small and far less than the impact on demand. Third is whether volunteers help in 
the organisation of resident activities. Again, volunteers may substitute for paid staff but 
this would normally just be a bonus, improving quality with little or no additional cost. 
The fourth and fifth variables are dummies reflecting whether, respectively, providers 
are on the approved list of the local authority and if they have contracts with local 
authorities other than their own. A sixth instrument concerns responses from home 
managers about their plans or otherwise to expand the home. Expansion plans here 
might indicate excess demand. To this list we also add lagged output as an instrument. 
The counterparts to the above are variables that shift only supply/costs and not demand 
for places, which form the set zi. The first group of such variables relate to economies 
of scope and are whether the home also provides a day care service, a meals-on-wheels 
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service and/or a home care service. These variables are anticipated as having minimal 
influence on the demand for residential care. Providers were also asked if their costs 
exceeded or not the price of care, which should be directly correlated with actual costs. 
Actual payment rates for minimum qualified staff for the home were also included. 
Lagged output was also used as an instrument for the endogenous demand price. 
The demand fonction (8-40) is a residuai or partial reduced-form demand fonction, that 
is, the influence of competitor homes is netted out using their reduced-form price 
fonctions. This process introduces (non-home specific) input cost and demand factors, 
i.e. z and y (as counterparts to z,- and y,) into home i demand. To capture these terms 
empirically we use variables measured at the local authority level (rather than at the 
home level). Using regional variables means avoiding an arbitrary aggregation of other 
providers' cost factors, an aggregation that would otherwise need to reflect cross-
demand elasticities. The relevant variables in the estimation are: local wage rates 
(female, manual gross weekly wage rates - New Earnings Survey), the Area Cost 
Adjustment (ACA), and local property prices (HM Land registry), which potentially 
enter the demand fonction as well as the cost (supply) fonction. 
8.3.2 Estimation methods 
Sample size and missing values 
The total sample of homes was 673 cases, which is disaggregated by home type in Table 
8-3. Since the focus of the current analysis is on independent sector providers, LA 
homes were (initially) excluded. The potential sample is therefore 506 cases. 
Information on price charged was available for 396 cases (78 per cent) and data on 
output was available for 505 cases (and for ali of the 396 cases with price data). Of the 
396 cases, only 366 had data on contract type. As noted above, a number of providers 
had multiple contracts with mixed incentives and these were dropped to reduce the 
sample to 350. A forther 4 cases were lost due to missing information on home 
characteristics (including whether the business was started from Scratch and home size), 
which reduces the sample to 346. Missing data on client dependency (i.e. Barthel 
scores) reduced the working sample to 343 cases (68 per cent of the potential sample). 
Two providers had 10 or more short-term residents. A priori, it is difficult to decide 
whether these short-term placements constitute (long-term) demand. Yet they do take 
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places which could be filled by long-term placements. In view of these difficultés, and 
the very small number of such cases, these two providers were dropped from the 
sample. The final working dataset therefore contained 341 observations (67 per cent). 
Local authority areas defined market level groups of which there were 21, given an 
average of 16.2 providers per group. The minimum was 2 providers and the maximum 
was 55 per group. 
Table 8-3. Home types 
Home type Number Per cent 
LA homes 167 24.81 
Nursing home 159 23.63 
Private dual registered 62 9.21 
Voluntary dual registered 15 2.23 
Private residential 148 21.99 
Voluntary residential 122 18.13 
Estimation procédures 
The data offer two main challenges for estimation. First, to accommodate the strong 
theoretical case for the endogeneity of price and output. The second to allow local 
authority level effects to work though to home level behaviour. The model spécification 
includes a number of fixed effects variables at the local authority level (i.e. the vector y 
and z), but given that the sample was drawn from a subset of ail local authorities in 
England, an allowance for random effects was made. 
An error components two stage least squares random effects model was used to 
simultaneously address these concerns. The implementation due to Baltagi was used on 
the basis of its good performance with unbalanced panel data sets (Baltagi, 1995; 
Baltagi and Chang, 2000). As indicated above there is an overwhelming theoretical case 
that price and output are endogenous in the demand and supply équations (8-42) and (8-
43). Tests support this hypothesis. Performing a Hausman spécification test (see 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981)) on the demand function (8-42) yielded test F statistic of 
6.74 (p = 0.0002). On the supply function, the test statistic was 2.20 (p = 0.11). Both the 
supply and demand models also demonstrated random effects (respectively the error 
component of the variance rho values 0.28 and 0.097, which were found even with the 
presence of strong fixed effects terms). 
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Three other estimation issues arise: the possible skewed and leptokurtic nature of the 
dependent variable, common in analysis of this type; the censoring of short-term 
demand at the home's current capacity; and, the possible endogeneity of contract type. 
As to the former, the dependent variable, price, showed a very slight rightward skew 
and was modestly leptokurtic (Skewness of 0.84 and Kurtosis of 3.93). Demand theory 
suggests that price demand relationships are not linear, but this can be, and is, addressed 
using power transformations of the output variables on the right-hand-side. Hence, un-
transformed price was used as the dependent variable for the demand and supply 
models. 
Regarding the issue of possible censoring, the cross-sectional nature of the data means 
that coefficient estimates relate to the long-term and hence capacity constraints should 
be less of problem. Some 16% of the sample were operating at capacity and had waiting 
lists. To cast light on the significance of censoring the demand model was estimated 
using a tobit, censored-normal estimator, with predicted values of the endogenous 
variables. The results of this procedure were broadly similar to the non-censored 
model.56 Hence, a non-censored model was employed, although home capacity was 
used as an independent variable in the estimation (partly to also reflect home size and 
format - see above). 
Given home and client characteristics, contract choice is hypothesised to not be a 
function of cost and price. All contracts are prospectively determined. Arguably, 
providers might attempt to negotiate for contingent contracts if they expect an intake of 
high cost residents. Purchasers, however, have a more balanced set of incentives; whilst 
they wish to keep expenditure down, they also have a concern for provider stability. 
Moreover, political and historical factors will also be important in contract choice. And 
it is market dominant local authorities that can impose contract choices on the market 
(Forder, 2001; Forder and Netten, 2000b). A priori, there is only a weak argument for 
the endogeneity of contract choice. This hypothesis was tested by instrumenting the 
contract contingency dummy. The Hausman test statistic was 0.12 (p > 0.5) rejecting 
endogeneity. 
56 Tobit models are problematic in assuming arbitrary distributions (regarding 'censored' observations), 
particularly with endogenous variables. 
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The error distributions give a good indication of the validity of inferences from the two 
models. The residuals of both models largely conformed to the normal distribution. The 
demand model error had a skew of 0.21 and kurtosis of 4.55. The supply model error 
had a very slight rightward skew of 0.42 but was less leptokurtic with a kurtosis value 
of 3.76. Given the normal distribution of the dépendent variable these findings indicate 
good spécification. 
Functional form choices for the output variable on the right-hand-side of the equation 
are not sensitive to these problems. Some experimentation was conducted to determine 
best fit functional forms. The final demand specification (8-40) produces an elasticity 
of: 
(8-43) = Pi 
dpi x, bu+2{bn+bnY)xf 
which we cannot sign a priori (below we characterise this fonction using parameter 
estimâtes). 
In the supply model a linear specification of Output as used. This specification implies a 
price elasticity of supply of : 
Í* AA\ - 5X< P> - PJ - + + (o-nH ) E — — —-, \ — 7 \ 
dp i x, (aI0 + a,, Y)x, (ö10 + a,, Y)x, 
which, ceteris paribus is decreasing with output. In other words, small output providers 
are more sensitive to price changes, a result with some intuitive appeal. 
8.4 Results and derived parameters 
Table 8-4 reports the main demand and supply structural models, respectively (8-40) 
and (8-41). Relevant model diagnostics and specification tests - as discussed above -
are reported at the foot of each table. A number of interaction effects and non-linear 
terms were used in the models. The interaction effects allow for factors such as contract 
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type to shift not only the model's intereept but also the slope of relationships between 
price and other variables. 
Table 8-4. Results - demand and supply models 
Variable defìnition 
Demand 
Co-eff t-stat 
Supply 
Co-efF t-stat 
Output 
Output (number of filled places) Lin 
Log 
Sqrd 
-54.42 -1.82 
1.04E-02 1.30 
0.25 1.69 
Output x contingent contract Lin x Lin 
Sqrd x Lin -0.03 -1.68 
1.01 1.65 
Demand and supply shift factors 
Barthel score (inverse) Sqrd 
Cbd 
4.90 4.95 
9.81E-03 5.36 
Staff with nursing qualification rate Lin 
Log 
98.79 3.45 
158.34 8.22 
Home has no en suite toilets Dummy -24.28 -4.02 -12.47 -3.38 
Home size/capacity Lin 1.76 2.97 
Home has modular layout Lin 54.02 1.93 
Home has modular layout x size/capacity Lin x Lin -1.30 -1.80 
Home purpose built Dummy -13.18 -2.10 
Business started from scratch w/ purpose built home Dummy 14.69 2.28 
Nursing home Dummy 33.25 4.31 33.83 6.43 
Single home organisation Dummy -4.72 -1.30 
Home makes spécifié EM1 provision Dummy 4.05 1.17 
Demand only factors 
Resident Funding (% residents privately funded) Sqrd 2.34E-03 1.76 
Home flexible regime score Lin 0.34 1.40 
Home has no contracts w/ other LAs x LA list only Dummy -8.28 -1.12 
Local demand, supply characteristics (not home 
specific) 
Wages: female, manual gross wage Lin 
Log 
0.27 1.77 
65.26 0.95 
Property prices Lin 7.49E-04 3.76 
Area cost adjustment Lin 298.66 3.11 
Contracts v-'-s r: .• 
Contingent price contract 
Contingent price contract x qualified staff ratio 
Dummy 
Dummy 
35.34 1.95 
45.97 1.13 
-23.64 -1.26 
Constant 
Constant -99.83 -0.89 -217.69 -0.55 
Model EC 2SLS EC 2SLS 
Dépendent variable form Linear Linear 
R-sq: within 0.50 0.68 
between 0.72 0.83 
overall 0.56 0.72 
Number of obs. (groups) 341 (21) 341 (21) 
Stat DF Stat DF 
Overall fit Wald 443.72 17 745.87 13 
Normality Bowman-Shenton 36.97 2 18.00 2 
Spécification Basmann-Sargan 4.80 6 16.28 11 
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Table 8-5 lists marginal effects where the point of departure is the sample mean value, 
unless otherwise noted. Clearly it is important to bear in mind that (a) estimated 
marginal effects as calculated from other points could be very différent, and (b) strictly 
estimation results apply to small changes around the sample average so that 
extrapolations significantly removed from the mean should be treated with caution. 
Table 8-5. Demand and supply - net marginal effects 
Variable Change Demand Supply 
Output 
Output 
Demand and supply shift factors 
Barthel score (inverse) 
Staff with nursing qualification 
Nursing home 
Home has no en suite toilets 
Home size/capacity 
Home has modular layout 
Home purpose built 
Home purpose built & started from scratch 
Business started from scratch 
Single home organisation 
Makes specific provision for EMI 
Demand only factors 
Resident Funding 
Flexible home regime 
Local demand, supply characteristics 
Wages: female, manual gross wage 
Property prices 
Area cost adjustment 
Contracts 
Contingent price contract 
+ 1 inverse score 
+1 staff with nurs. Quai. 
+1 beds 
+ 10% private payers 
+ 10% score 
+ 10% average gross wages 
+ 10% average property prices 
+ 10% ACA 
-1.77 
4.90 
3.30 
33.25 
-24.28 
1.41 
8.61 
1.32 
3.39 
10.25 
30.68 
14.87 
0.61 
2.53 
27.85 
33.83 
-12.47 
-6.03 
1.51 
4.91 
-4.72 
4.05 
6.53 
6.69 
7.85 
8.4.1 Demand and supply prices and elasticity 
The demand fonction produced the expected downwards-sloping demand curve. The 
elasticity of price with respect to changes in output was -0.23 for the sample average, -
0.20 for nursing homes and -0.25 for residential care homes. Conversely, the home-level 
supply curve was upward sloping with a price elasticity with respect to supply of 0.0028 
for the sample average. 
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The demand curve slope A*, from which these elasticities are calculated, is -1.77. This 
figure can be used in (8-27) to calcúlate a potential mark-up, M, or 'market power' for 
the average provider of £55. This result corresponds to a Lerner index of 19.5%. The 
demand curve was very slightly non-linear, although according with the usual shape, 
characterised by positive second order price effects on demand; at the mean xpp is 0.01. 
8.4.2 Shift effects 
The various demand and supply shift factors produced the expected signs and 
magnitude of effect. In particular, the results suggest that purchasers are willing to pay 
more for homes catering for more dependent people, requiring a more intensive service, 
as measured by the Barthel physical dependency, the ratio of nursing qualified staff, and 
the nursing home dummy variable. These services are also more costly and therefore 
have a higher supply price. Homes without en suite toilets were less attractive to buyers, 
but cost less and so have lower supply pnces ceteris paribus. 
Homes with modular architecture, that is where homes are divided into a number of 
functionally separate living units, are also more appealing to buyers. A number of 
potential demand and supply factors were found only to demónstrate a supply side 
effect. Purpose built homes have lower costs, but those starting the business from 
scratch had higher pnces, probably reflecting the lingering effect of a lack of initial 
expertise. Single home organisation were not less appealing to purchasers, but were 
associated with higher costs. Homes making specific provisión for older people with 
mental health problems were similarly more costly, but with demand not significantly 
affected. 
Some factors only shifted demand. For example, homes with a greater proportion of 
more lucrative prívate payers had higher pnces, as did homes that offered a more 
flexible living regime, a quality indicator. Supply (cost) only factors include, for 
example, home specific labour costs. However, also included in the model were 
regional (non-home-specific) input cost factors: the price of labour and property in the 
local authority area. A high degree of multicollinearity resulted in using these sets of 
variables together. The regional level variables were found to offer a far better fit and so 
supply only factors were dropped from the model. The impact of non-home-specific 
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input costs is exemplified by the calculation that a 10% increase in average wages 
(extrapolating from the margin) would push supply prices up by £6.53. For a 10% 
change in property prices, supply price on average increased £6.69. Regional input 
prices also appear in the partial reduced-form (or residuai) demand fimction (to account 
for the influence of competitor prices). In the demand model an average wage increase 
corresponded with a demand increase of £10.25. Also included was a locai authority 
cost index - the Department of Health area cost adjustment (ACA) - which is derived 
from labour and capital prices. Ten per cent increases in the ACA were associated with 
prices some £30.68 higher at the margin. These findings accord with expectations. From 
(8-16), dx_Jdz = ôE_Jdz < 0 : higher input prices mean higher supply prices and so 
lower demand . Also, from (8-17), since dpjdx^ = dhJdE< 0 (service 1 prices are 
inversely related to the output of Substitutes as an increase in S u b s t i t u t e s reduces the 
demand for produci 1 ), it follows that dp] ¡dz = 5/z, /8E_ì • ôE_j/ôz> 0 . 
8.4.3 Demand prices and Outputs by contract type 
The marginal effect of a change in contract type on price in the demand function is 
£14.87 (see Table 8-5). This figure is derived holding constant other factors in the 
demand function, including actual client dependency (as measured by the Barthel score) 
and output. It is statistically significant with a derived t-stat of 2.44. 
8.4.4 Supply price-dependency relationship 
What are the effects of dependency on costs? The supply équation can be used to 
ascertain the impact of dependency on marginal costs. With reference to (8-26) for 
given x the marginai effect of a change in dependency on the supply price estimation is 
équivalent to c ß . We use the estimation without home type indicators (including staff 
qualification ratios) since we are concerned to estimate the total underlying cost 
response to changes in client dependency. Table 8-6 reports the results of this 
estimation. Adapting (8-24), we estimate 
(8-45) Pi =a0+ ai0Xi + a, + ö2,t(. + a 2 2 i ß , + am ß / + aìz + ei 
291 
where x, is the sub-vector of z, with home- type and Barthel score r emoved . This 
alternative spécification of the supply func t ion accounts for the h igh collinearity of the 
nursing qualified staff ratio and (inverse) cl ient dependency score (corrélat ion p < 0 .01) 
by dropping the former . The net effect at the m e a n of changes in ( inverse) Barthel on 
supply price, a22 = a22X + a 2 2 2 / ß , is £8 .54 per point . 
Table 8-6. Results - Supply models, n o home- type indicators 
Supply 
Variable définition Co-eff t-stat 
Output : 
Output (number of filled places) Lin 0.34 2.00 
Output x contingent contract Lin x Lin 0.90 1.32 
Demand and supply shift factors 
Barthel score (inverse) Lin 11.18 7.00 
Log -24.48 -2.13 
Confusion: % with moderate and severe confusion Lin 0.20 1.73 
Home has no en suite toilets Dummy -12.35 -2.89 
Home has modular layout Lin -0.20 -0.04 
Home purpose built Dummy -27.22 -3.77 
Business started from Scratch w/ purpose built home Dummy 27.25 3.63 
Nursing home Dummy 
Single home organisation Dummy -2.76 -0.65 
Home makes spécifié EMI provision Dummy 7.41 1.83 
Local demand, supply characteristics (not home specific) 
Property prices Lin 9.22E-04 5.70 
Contraéis . > . 
Contingent price contract Dummy -24.80 -1.19 
Constant 
131.53 6.28 
Model EC 2SLS 
Dépendent variable form Linear 
R-sq: within 0.57 
between 0.79 
overall 0.60 
Number of obs 341 
Number of groups 21 
Stai DF 
Overall fit Wald 458.22 13 
Normality Bowman-Shenton 24.48 2 
Spécification Basmann-Sargan 12.50 9 
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8.4.5 Demand and supply slope by contract type 
The slope of the demand curve is given by the differentiation of (8-40) i.e. 
dpjdxi s A* = bn/xj + 2bi?xt + 2 bi2Yxi. Differentiating (8-41) gives the slope of the 
supply curve dpjdxi = aì0 +anYr Using the estimâtes reported in Table 8-4, these 
slopes are calculated for the whole sample and for the two contract groups, and are 
reported in Table 8-7. 
Table 8-7. Slopes of demand and supply 
Slope Whole sample Contingent 
contracts 
Non-contingent 
contract 
Demand -1.77 -2.94 -1.11 
Supply 0.61 1.26 0.25 
Bootstrapping was used to calculate the standard errors of these derived estimâtes, with 
1000 répétitions. This technique draws repeated samples from the data. In this case, it 
runs the model on that drawn sample calculating the b coefficients as normal. It also 
dérivés the mean values of the * and Y factors for the sample and stores these and the 
coefficients for each répétition. The slopes are derived for each répétition and 
summarised using central tendency and variance (standard error) statistics for the 1000 
répétition sampling distribution. Because this sampling is unbiased the derived slopes 
tend to the values as given in Table 8-7. The estimated standard errors are used to 
calculate 90% confidence intervais (normal values are used). These results are given in 
Table 8-8. Both the demand and supply slopes are significantly différent from zero at 
the 90% (and also the 95%) level. The supply slope is especially precisely estimated. 
Table 8-8. Slopes of demand and supply - confidence intervais 
Slope Coefficients Standard 
error 
't-stat' Confidence intervais 
Positive Negative 
Demand -1.77 0.62 -2.86 -2.78 -0.75 
Supply 0.61 0.02 30.32 0.58 0.64 
8.4.6 Equilibrium prices and Outputs 
Demand and supply prices can be calculated for a range of possible output levels using 
the relevant régression model results from Table 8-4 for the two cases where the 
contract type variable Y is equal to zero and where it is equal to one, with ail other 
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exogenous variables at their mean values. Equilibrium output for the two groups, x*y is 
where the predicted demand and supply prices are equal, i.e. drawing on (8-33), 
(8-46) b0+bu l o g / ' + (bn + 613 )(x*' J +b2y + byg + bAz + b5 
= a0+{al0 + au )x*' + a2z + a^zh 
for contingent contracts and 
(8-47) b0+bu l o g / 0 + bì2 (x*° J +b2y + b3g +b4z + b5 = a0+ aI0x*° + a2z + a}zh 
for non-contingent contracts. In these expressions the bar embellishment indicates the 
sample mean value of the relevant variable. Note also that zh is sample average across 
the local authority level variables. The résultant equilibrium values (using point 
estimâtes), ail other things being equal, are given in Table 8-9. These values are 
calculated by solving for x Y in the above two fonctions with ali the shift variables at 
their sample mean and using the corresponding estimated parameter. Demand for 
contingent contract providers is more price inelastic than for non-contingent contract 
providers meaning that they optimise at relatively lower outputs and higher prices, ail 
other things being equal. 
Table 8-9. Equilibrium prices and outputs - by contract group 
Ali contract 
types 
Contingent 
contract 
Non-contingent 
contract 
Equilibrium price (£s) 281 297 272 
Equilibrium output 31 27 39 
The values of x*Y are dépendent on the slopes and shapes of the demand and supply 
curves, as well as many shift variables. To explore the sensitivity of these estimâtes, 
solution values were re-calculated for the case where the slopes of the demand and 
supply curves respectively take their plus and minus confidence interval values - see 
Table 8-8. For the contingent contracts case, the résultant output range was: 27.0 to 30.3 
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places per week. For the non-contingent contracts the output range was: 30.7 to 36.5 
places per week.57 
8.4.7 Motivation 
The actual price mark-up over intercept costs as given by (8-13) i.e. a\ (see (8-24)) can 
be compared with potential mark-up rates - h* to give an indication of provider 
motivation. As noted above, the complicating factor is the possibility of économies of 
scale, that is, cx < 0 . To overcome this problem we compare the potential and actual 
mark-up différences for the two contract-type groups. Since they both operate by 
définition with the same value of cx, this value drops out and we are left with (8-31). 
This function is then used to estimate the motivation parameter a . Our estimâtes 
generate a point value of the motivation profit weight a of 0.55, which would imply that 
on average providers only take 55% of the potential maximum amount of profit that the 
current market would sustain. 
It is worth noting that we cannot say unequivocally that providers would make the 
current potential level of profit if ail decided to maximise profits. The prevailing market 
conditions might then lead to a différent set of maximising prices. It is clear however, 
that providers are not taking as much profit as they could given their current 
circumstances, and without hyper-rational expectations about the response of all other 
providers if the individuai provider decided to attach more weight to profit making. 
The nature of the underlying model and the available data mean that we are unable to 
test whether providers with différent contracts operate with différent profit weights. 
However, given that there are not substantial différences between the groups in terms of 
home and business characteristics (see Table 8-10 for mean comparison t-tests), we 
assume that motivation does not differ by contract type. Moreover, the comparison of 
mark-up by contract type is made assuming ail other exogenous factors are equal. Since 
it is not an onerous assumption to make that the underlying motivation function does 
57 There is no particular reason why these values should correspond very closely with those in the above 
tables since we are looking simultaneously at the upper and lower confidence intervais of both demand 
and supply and because these functions are non-linear. 
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not vary with contract type, then for purposes of this comparison both contract-type 
groups of providers have this value for profit weight. 
These results provide some insight to the sensitivity of the motivation parameter to the 
estimated coefficients. We can also explore more directly the degree of sensitivity. First, 
we used combinations of the demand and supply slope plus and minus 90% confidence 
interval values. Second, proportional sensitivity was conducted using +/- 20% of the 
relevant point estimate. The former produced a range of values from 0.41 to 0.93, the 
latter from 0.37 to 0.70 - see Annex 8-1. 
Table 8-10. 'Motivation relevant' home characteristics 
Différence in means (p-value) 
Single home organisation 0.68 
Home size/capacity 0.18 
Proportion LA funded 0.72 
8.4.8 Marginal costs and scale économies 
Scale effects on costs are measured by the size of the derivatives of marginal cost with 
respect to output i.e. ^ ^ ' = = cx. They, in other words, indicate downwards or 
dxt ck, 
upwards sloping marginal cost fonctions. The spécification of the supply relation (8-24) 
is such that scale effects on costs, cx, only appear in the marginal effect of output 
changes on supply price as indicated by i.e. }otcx +jcx -ah* = a, (see (8-13)). This 
spécification precludes the need to find proxies for scale (which could appear in the 
vector c, ) that are not correlated with output. We should caveat however, that this 
spécification does assume that scale effects are captured adequately by output variations 
rather than, say, capacity variations (although of course these two variables are highly 
correlated (Pearson corrélation of 0.90). 
Equation (8-32) can be used to derive cx (with these caveats in mind). The estimation 
results produced a point value of cx o f -0 .47 . In other words, marginal costs reduce by 
47p for every extra place sold (at sample average output). This is a modest value given 
that output averages around 30 places and price nearly £300 per week. Using the 
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respective confidence intervals of the determining parameters, cx ranged from 0.30 to -
1.24, which is still modest in the context of average prices. 
The impact on average variable cost is smaller as it is spread over the range of places 
d(cv /x ) 
already sold, being • 1 >> = ±cx. However, the impact on average total costs is 
dxj 
d(c, /*,) = i c _ ^ which is greater in absolute terms (more negative) than . 
dx, x, Sx. 
We have assumed that the underlying cost structure of the home does not vary by 
contract type. Therefore, our ceteris paribus comparison of mark-up by contract type 
utilises the same estimate of cx for both groups of providers 
8.5 Results: mark-up rates and costs 
8.5.1 Price-cost margins 
Section 8.2.1 provides a number of different specifications of mark-up. Table 8-11 gives 
the estimated actual mark-up rates per week by cost type. The table gives the equation 
from which the respective mark-up estimate is derived and lists mark-up in pounds per 
week and as a percentage of the equilibrium price (the latter as given in Table 8-9). 
Table 8-19 in Annex 8-2 provides details about how the mark-up rates in Table 8-11 
(and Table 8-12) are calculated. Cost type refers to whether mark-up is taken over 
marginal or average variable cost. The table also reports derived 'confidence intervals', 
which are calculated by using all determining parameters respectively at their upper and 
lower confidence interval value. 
Table 8-11. Actual mark-up rates - £s per week and % of average weekly price 
Non-
Mark-up (£s per week) Deriving All contract Contingent contingent 
over... equation types contract contract 
Actual, average 
variable cost 
Point 26.29 9.4% 40.94 13.8% 18.98 7.0% 
+ CI (8-30) 15.43 34.81 4.11 
- C I 37.15 49.96 30.44 
Actual, marginal 
cost 
Point 33.59 12.0% 47.37 16.0% 28.21 10.4% 
+ CI (8-28) 10.84 30.33 -0.42 
- C I 56.35 66.68 53.03 
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Marginal cost mark-up is the cost per week of serving one more user (assuming that 
there is spare capacity) and as such does not depend on fixed costs (which are already 
sunk). However, since in many cases marginal costs are falling with output - homes 
have économies of scale as suggested by the data - mark-up over marginai cost does not 
indicate actual profit, only profitability. Mark-up relative to average costs is a better 
indicator. We specifically use average variable costs (8-8) (which avoids a need for an 
estimate of fixed costs). Average variable costs fall at half the rate of marginai costs 
(with constant scale économies, cxx = 0), and therefore at the margin, mark-up is lower 
than in the marginai cost case. This indictor of mark-up is a good indicator of market 
stability since it is these costs that must be covered for providers to stay in business, at 
least in the short term. As is clear fxom the results reported in the table, actual mark-up 
over average cost is relatively modest; non-contingent contract providers, for example, 
can expect only 7% mark-ups. Moreover, if there are any true fixed costs that are not 
amortised into variable costs, then subtracting their net present value away from average 
variable costs mark-up will give an even lower result. 
The derived confidence intervais are only a guide, but do give some idea of the possible 
range the estimâtes cover. The différences between upper and lower values regarding 
average cost mark-up are not particularly big; moreover, the ranges for contingent and 
non-contingent contracts do not overlap. 
The low level of average variable cost mark-up partly reflects providers' apparent 
choice not to take more profit from the business. Suppose that the observed pattern of 
demand and supply in the data was actually produced by transactions between 
purchasers and profit maximising providers. In other words, observed motivation is a = 
1. Then as given by (8-27) and (8-29) mark-up over marginal and average costs, 
respectively, would be at levels given in Table 8-12, levels that are considerably higher 
than rates based on a = 0.55, as estimated. These rates are not, however, those we 
would find if providers had a = 0.55 motivation but decided to increase prices to the 
level of profit maximisers. It is difficult to know whether in times of increased pressure 
on profits, providers would try to take more profit or simply quit the market, if with 
current motivation, they were unable to cover costs. Nonetheless, it is important to be 
clear that if sample prices were based o n a = 0.55, then in order to increase profits, 
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providers would have to raise prices beyond these sample values, which would mean 
réductions in demand relative to sample values. The maximum amount of profit that 
could be made would therefore be lower than the rates given in Table 8-12. 
Table 8-12. Observed profit maximising mark-up rates 
Mark-up (£s per week) 
over.. . 
Deriving 
équation 
AH contract 
types 
Contingent 
contract 
Non-
contingent 
contract 
Observed a = 1, marginal 
cost 
(8-27) 55 19.5% 91 30.8% 34 12.7% 
Observed a = 1, average var 
cost 
(8-29) 48 16.9% 85 28.6% 25 9.3% 
8.5.2 Costs 
Marginal and average variable costs are inferred directly from the estimation results. 
The above mark-up estimâtes can be subtracted from the equilibrium prices for each 
group (Table 8-9) to give the relevant cost. In particular, using (8-26) we have: 
(8-48) c = p]Y - acx + 1 cx - ah* ^ = p. - axx*Y, V Y 
where * indicates equilibrium prices. By construction c is not a function of price or 
Output, and therefore when we infer it f rom equilibrium price and Outputs of each 
contract type group, other things (the exogenous variables) being equal, we will find the 
same value for each group. This resuit follows from our dérivation of equilibrium prices 
and Outputs for each contract group, which as is clear from (8-46) and (8-47) share the 
same supply curve whose origin is c when others things are equal. The estimated value 
of c is £262 per week. 
Table 8-13. Costs per week 
Cost (£s per 
week) 
Deriving 
équation 
AH contract 
types 
Contingent 
contract 
Non-
contingent 
contract 
Marginal Point (8-5) 247.39 249.14 243.54 
+ CI 270.15 269.93 270.04 
- C I 224.64 229.60 217.87 
Average variable Point (8-8) 254.70 255.57 252.77 
+ CI 265.56 265.45 265.50 
- C I 243.84 246.32 240.45 
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Marginal costs are a function of output (8-5) and so do differ by contract group to the 
extent that equilibrium output differs by contract group. Similarly, average variable 
costs (8-8) are a function of output. Table 8-13 lists the respective point estímate valúes. 
There will be some variation of these valúes within the 90% confidence intervals as 
shown in the table. 
Average costs (8-7) are dependent on the size of fixed costs, which could cover capital 
costs (mortgage), tax, maintenance, etc. The first is the predomínate factor. Whilst we 
do not have any specific information on capital it is nonetheless worth speculating a 
little as to impact of fixed costs on to average costs and so overall profitability. In 
particular, we use Laing and Buisson figures of approximately £20000 per place (1996 
prices) for capital costs. At this rate the sample average 34.9 bed home would have a 
capital cost of £697,537. Amortising this figure over 25 years at 7% produces a fixed 
cost per week o f F = £1138 or per week per head, F/x = £37. Assuming the same 
capacity to output ratios, F/x = £37 regardless of contract group. As 
C, /x¡ = C j /x j + F j X j , mark-up over average cost will be lower than it is over average 
variable cost. Note that since we assume that satisficers break-even with respect to 
average variable costs, then the motivation parameter a and the change in marginal cost, 
cx, remain unchanged. In this case, average provider mark-up over full average cost 
would be negative at £-10.38. 
Suppose however that satisficers sought to break-even over full average costs instead of 
average variable costs. Then a and cx are functions of F¡. In particular, in this case the 
data would give valúes of a of 0.43, and cx o f -1 .15 (which are lower than the above 
estimates). The corresponding mark-up over full average cost for the sample average 
motivation of 0.43 (i.e. comparable with the above) would be £0.14 at the mean. We 
cannot test the exact motivation of satisficers, but it is clear that mean mark-up is cióse 
to zero or even negative. The difference between mark-up rates by contract type does 
not change very much (by about £4) in this case. 
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8.6 The implications of contract choice 
What are the implications for contract choice? The above sets of estimâtes underpin the 
main empirical indicators with which to assess our theoretical hypotheses. First, we 
look at the impact on prices, and then on mark-up rates of moving between contingent 
and non-contingent contracts, other things equal. 
8.6.1.1 Effects on prices 
The marginai effect of contract choice on price (of £14.87, significant at the 5% level, 
see section 8.4.3) indicates that purchasers are willing to pay more for the same care 
package purchased under a contingent contract. Hence, although the (average) price for 
the non-contingent contract group may embody an element of cream-skimming, the 
effect of cost exaggeration in the contingent contracts group is greater. We can use 
Figure 8-2 to explain this result. 
Figure 8-2. Interpreting contracting results: demand and supply effects 
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The figure depicts (stylised) demand curves for the two contract groups. It also shows 
the corresponding supply relationship i.e. marginai cost. Since this function is calculated 
on the same home and user eost characteristics, z = z , and contract choice does not 
affect costs given these characteristics, there is no cost différence between the contract 
groups. The marginai impact of contract choice on demand prices (i.e. £14.87) is the 
différence Ap in the figure, that is, the différence between prices: /?'(z'(z),x), where the 
1 superscript denotes contingent contracts and p°(z '(z),x), where the 0 superscript 
refers to non-contingent contracts. 
These are prices calculated at sample average values of z and x, and need not correspond 
to actual prices for the two contract type groups. Since contingent contract providers do 
not select users with lower cost characteristics, user cost characteristics in this group 
should average the same as mean referrai level i.e. ß1 = ß7 (where ß are the user cost 
characteristics elements of z). Non-contingent contract providers, if they cream-skim 
will have users with lower cost characteristics i.e. ß7 > ß > ß° . Absent cream-skimming 
and with ail other relevant characteristics at their means, the non-contingent contract 
group price would be: />°(z°(ß)). In practice, the equilibrium value of ß of non-
contingent (NC) contract providers will be below the sample average value of ß 
(because they cream-skim) i.e. ß > ß° with a price is /?°(z°(ß0)), which is less than 
p°(z°(ß)). The NC provider equilibrium price is simply the NC contract price set by the 
purchaser and therefore must be at this level i.e. /?°(z0(ß°))= p°(z'). Hence the 
différence between the notional price and the actual price: /?°(z0(ß))-/?°(z7)> 0 is an 
indication of cream-skimming rents. With reference to the figure, the demand and cost 
functions for NC providers at the sample average values of z are shifted up from their 
actual values at z° (the dashed demand and cost functions). 
Given the possibility that non-contingent contract providers are cream-skimming 
however, the différence Ap is not the total size of the CE effect. For contingent contract 
holders: px ( f ' (ß) )< p(z (ß' ))= px (z (ß7 )). Hence, other things equal, 
/?'(ß7,jc)— p0(ß°,3c)> /?'(ß,x)— /?°(ß,x)= Ap. Moreover, as the two groups have 
differently sloped demand curves their equilibrium output levels (where supply price 
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equals demand price) will differ (from each other and the sample mean output level). 
The différences in prices at these two equilibrium Outputs is not Ap as it clear from 
Figure 8-2. Moreover, scale effects on costs will introduce a further adjustment. Price 
différence between providers with différent contracts is not sufficient. However, mark-
up rates as given by m0 and rn are the same regardless of the actual position of the 
demand and cost functions. So the différence in (price-cost) différence is more 
informative. 
8.6.1.2 Effects on mark-up 
In section 8.5.1 mark-up rates over various cost measures were given for each contract 
type. Here we are interested in the différence in mark-up between contract types. Table 
8-14 lists the différences as derived from Table 8-11. The actual mark-up différences 
are most relevant, the change in motivation mark-up différences are mainly for 
information. The choice of contracts therefore has ramifications for mark-up of around 
7% of average weekly price. In terms of the above figure, the actual marginal cost 
différence is equal to m - m = Am. Change in mark-up accounts for both différences in 
demand elasticity and scale effects on costs. 
Table 8-14. Mark-up rates, différence by contract type 
Mark-up type différence (£s per week) différence (£s per week) 
Actual, marginal cost 19.16 6.82% 
Actual, average variable cost 21.96 7.82% 
8.7 Mark-up: information, risk and shocks 
Différences in mark-up by contract type can, according to the theory of the last chapter, 
be due to differential information effects, risk premiums or within-financial-period cost 
shocks. Added to this list is the alternative hypothesis that higher mark-up with 
contingent contracts is due simply to higher payment rates. 
8.7.1 Higher payment rates 
The most plausible payment arrangement that corresponds to this hypothesis is where, 
in addition to the standard rate paid for low dependency users under contingent and non-
contingent contracts alike, contracts pay a premium rate for high dependency users. 
Homes with a relatively greater proportion of high dependency users will be paid more 
on average. Furthermore, for this arrangement to replicate our results, additional 
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payment must more than cover the extra costs of serving higher dependency users. Here 
we look directly at mark-up rates for différent levels of dependency by contract type. 
The demand fonction (8-40) was re-estimated with an additional dependency interaction 
on the output (squared) by contract type variable: 
(8-49) pj =b0 + bu logx, + bi2xf + bm$"Yxf + bmYxf + b2y + bì[yi + bnHi + b4z + biYl + u, 
where J$f is the proportion of users that are in the top 20% of dependency scale within 
the home. Under the higher payment hypothesis the différence in mark-up between 
contingent and non-contingent contracts should be higher for home with many high 
dependency users than a home with mostly low dependency users. 
In terms of (8-49) to support this hypothesis we should see bjsi to be significantly 
negative: the greater the proportion of high dependency users within contingent contract 
homes, the greater the inverse demand elasticity, and so mark-up rate. Table 8-15 
provides the results of this estimation, showing that b m is not significant. 
This resuit is perhaps not surprising; for higher payment to be consistent with the data, 
we would need to fìnd contingent contracts that have to reward providers of high 
dependency clients at a rate proportionately higher than changes in marginai costs for 
high dependency users. Or, we would need to find that contingent contracts only 
partially compensate for high dependency related costs but also that payment is higher 
under contingent contracts even for low dependency users. This latter is inconsistent 
with our définition of the higher payment hypothesis. 
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Table 8 -15 . D e m a n d price - m a r k - u p , b y dependency 
Demand, full sample 
Variable definition Co-eff Co-eff 
Output 
Output (number of filled places) Log -50.26 -1.90 
Sqrd 8.80E-03 1.21 
Output x contingent contract -2.36E-02 -0.87 
Output x contingent contract x high dep % Sqx Ln x Ln -4.15E-04 -0.62 
Détnaiid and supply shift factors 
Home has no en suite toilets -25.70 -4.16 
Nursing home 41.45 5.00 
Staff with nursing qualification rate 85.58 2.06 
Staff with nursing qualification rate x contingent contract Ln x Ln 81.34 1.29 
High dependency % 0.36 1.25 
Inverse Barthel score 20.95 2.49 
Home size/capacity 1.93 3.26 
Home has modular layout x capacity Ln x Ln -1.28 -1.93 
Home has modular layout 51.94 2.03 
Demand only factors 
Flexible home regime 0.24 0.91 
Home has no contracts with other LAs x LA list only Ln x Ln -6.92 -0.90 
Resident Funding (% residents privately funded) 0.13 1.13 
Local demand, supply characteristics 
Wages: female, manual gross wage 0.27 2.38 
Area cost adjustment 318.04 4.18 
Contracts 
Contingent price contract 35.85 1.84 
Constant 
Constant -144.41 -1.57 
Model EC 2SLS 
Dependent variable form Linear 
R-sq: within 0.47 
between 0.73 
overall 0.53 
Number of obs 341 
Number of groups 21 
Stat DF 
Overall fit Wald 431.45 19 
Normality Bowman-Shenton 54.16 2 
Spécification Basmann-Sargan 3.01 6 
8.7.2 Risk premiums 
Aceording to the theory, contingent contracts have m o r e at tractive risk proper t ies than 
non-cont ingent contracts - proposi t ions 5 and 7 in chapter 7. G iven our results 
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therefore, if risk premia are available they are more than offset by the other effects on 
mark-up rates. 
8.7.3 Cost shocks 
Cost shocks could account for some of the total différence in mark-up. In particular, 
where client dependency has risen over the contract period ahead of expectations then 
costs will have also risen. For contingent contracts the rise in costs would be (partially) 
compensated for by an increase in prices on average across the contract period, and so 
the relative réduction in profits would be smaller than for the non-contingent contracts 
group. On average, profits would be higher with contingent contracts in this case, a 
resuit consistent with our findings. Would cost shocks explain ail this différence? 
Suppose that at the beginning of the contract period average expected mark-up is no 
différent, other things equal, between the contract groups. Forder and Netten (2000a) 
show that in the 10-year period before 1996 dependency levels for the residential and 
nursing care market for older people did indeed increase. However, the total change in 
that period was 2.37 (inverse) Barthel points. 
To exemplify the extreme case suppose that contingent contract providers are fully 
compensated. Suppose also that demand levels remained constant i.e. that whole 
population dependency rises. Then the impact of dependency increases on non-
dx contingent contract provider costs is cp = cp + cx — = cp = a21 = am + a222/fi in (8-45), 
that is £8.54 per point. If non-contingent contract prices were revised on average only 
every 3 years (which is probably again an overestimate) then for comparison with the 
contingent contract case, we might apply 30% of the 10-year dependency change i.e. 
0.71 Barthel points to give Àc of £6.07. Non-contingent contract mark-up should then 
be différent by £6.07 compared to the fully-compensating contingent contracts. Even 
assuming circumstances that maximise the effects of cost shocks, they are not 
sufïiciently large to account for the mark-up différences we estimate. 
8.7.4 Cream-skimming 
The existence of cream-skimming cannot be inferred from our results on profit 
différences by contract type. Instead, cream-skimming of low dependency clients (rather 
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than specifically, low cost clients) is directly investigated. We can assume that the 
dependency characteristics of referred clients (referrals made by purchasers) are a 
fonction of the characteristics of the home, including its price: 
(8-50) ß r = ß r U . a r . * , r ) 
where ß ' r is the initial referral dependency ß7 for home i with contract Y. Also, g, are 
home demand characteristics and z, are home cost characteristics. We also Substitute in 
the reduced-form fonction for price to give: 
(8-51) V? =V?(g!,yr,zJ,zr) 
We do not have a direct observation of referral dependency, ß ' . We lean on the theory 
- proposition 1 of chapter 7 - and our finding of cost exaggeration to assume that 
contingent contract providers do not cream-skim. Therefore, the actual dependency of 
clients of contingent contract providers is equal to the referred dependency. For this 
group and this group alone, we can estimate (8-50), i.e, 
(8-52) ß,71 =ßi1(g ( ' ,y,z1 l ,z1) 
The relationships between the variables of this fonction and dependency should 
themselves be unaffected by the type of contract under which the home operates. As 
such this fonction can be used to cross-predict the referral dependency levels of homes 
with non-contingent contracts, i.e., 
(8-53) ß i / 0 =P i / I (g l 0 , / , z I 0 , z ° )+e 
with a mean error e of zero. In this context we can advance the following hypothesis: 
homes with non-contingent contracts are cream-skimming if ß,/0 > ß°, that is, if 
predicted referral dependency is greater than actual dependency. The null hypothesis is, 
specifically, that the sample mean différence is equal to zero: — ^ ]T (ß™ - ß" )= 0 . 
N ,e{r=o} 
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Table 8 -16 . D e p e n d e n c y (Barthel score) est imation 
Variable definition 
Barthel Score 
Co-eff t-stat 
Demand and supply shift factors 
Home has no en suite toilets 
Nursing home 
Home has no contracts with other LAs x LA local list 
Home is only on the approved list of its LA 
Home has no contracts with other LAs 
Home size/capacity 
Home size/capacity 
Home size/capacity x nursing home 
Home purpose built & business started from scratch 
Home purpose built 
Single home organisation 
Business started from scratch 
Demand only factors 
Resident Funding (% residents privately funded) 
Resident Funding (% residents LA funded) 
Volunteers aid in organised activity 
sqrd 
0.13 
5.91 
6.18 
0.67 
-6.46 
0.06 
5.78E-04 
-0.06 
0.20 
-0.92 
-0.18 
-0.03 
-1.12E-02 
3.40E-02 
0.22 
0.22 
2.71 
2.42 
0.85 
-2.75 
0.68 
0.50 
-1.11 
0.16 
- 0 . 8 8 
-0.30 
-0.05 
- 0 . 6 2 
2.98 
0.27 
òuppiy only factors 
Provides home care 1.11 0.91 
Provides meals on wheels -1.38 -1.37 
Provides meals on wheels -1.85 -0.90 
Home wage rate (basic), care staff 3.16E-02 1.14 
Home wage rate (basic), care staff sqrd -3.89E-05 -1.28 
Local demand, supply characteristics (not home specific) 
Property prices sqrd 1.16E-10 1.46 
Wages: female, manual gross wage sqrd -1.55E-05 -1.05 
Constant 
Constant 0.23 0.04 
Model Pooled OLS 
Dependent variable form Linear 
R-sq: 0.50 
adjusted 0.38 
Number of obs 122 
Stat DF 
Overall fit F 4.44 22, 99 
Normality Bowman-Shenton chi2 6.27 2 
Specification Ramsey's RESET F test 2.03 3, 96 
Heteroskedasticity Cook-Weisberg chi2 0.01 1 
Table 8 -16 repor t t he results of t h e es t imat ion of funct ion (8-52) i.e. a r educed- fo rm 
est imation o f cl ient dependency us ing h o m e characteristics. Cross-predic t ion f o r the 
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non-contingent contracts sub-sample produced a mean predicted (inverse) Barthel score, 
ß, i0, of 9.80. For comparison, the sample average value for that population, i.e. ß®, is 
9.40. A paired t-test was performed and rejected the null hypothesis (p = 0.087). A 
paired test was used since we are comparing the actual dependency of each home in the 
non-contingent contracts group with the value predicted on the basis of its 
characteristics had it the referral pattern of the contingent contracts group. Looking 
instead at differences of median values, median actual dependency was 8.95 compared 
with median cross-predicted dependency of 9.83. 
This evidence of (modest) cream-skimming can be expressed in terms of the impact on 
marginal cost. We have an estimate of the marginal effect of a change in dependency on 
marginal cost, holding output constant: ^ = ^ . Since we are only considering 
cream-skimming with regard to our dependency score, inverse Barthel, we use the 
estimation without confounding variables, that is (8-45). The marginal effect is 
therefore £8.54 per point. Applying this estimate to the différence between actual and 
referred dependency, we have estimâtes of the effects of cream-skimming on mark-up 
(prices being unaffected by cream-skimming) of £3.44 for the mean différence and 
£7.52 for the median différence. 
Overall, we do find statistically significant cream-skimming behaviour by non-
contingent contract providers. However, the point estimâtes suggest that cream-
skimming is modest in size (only 1.2% and 2.7% respectively of average weekly price). 
It implies there are barriers that limit free-replacement of users - proposition 3 of 
chapter 7. Any estimate of cost exaggeration from comparative mark-up rates ought to 
be increased by this amount of cream-skimming because contingent contract providers 
could always cream-skim and secure this amount if they so wished. 
8.7.5 Cost exaggeration 
The theory developed in the last chapter suggested that for relatively low contingency 
contracts the benefits to the provider of cream-skimming might outweigh the benefits of 
cost exaggeration. This proposition hinges on the actual degree of contingency and also 
the barriers to selection/re-placement of users involved in cream-skimming. Where the 
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latter are high, cost exaggeration will be comparatively attractive for providers even 
with minimal contract contingency. 
Since the other explanations are unlikely to account for the mark-up premium observed 
for contingent contracts, we therefore have some support for the cost exaggeration 
hypothesis. Even assuming away the cost shocks and risk premium effects, the 
différence in mark-up rates is not an estimate of the total size of cost exaggeration since 
cream-skimming is possible for providers with non-contingent contracts, despite the 
existence of barriers to re-selection, unless the later are very high. If cream-skimming 
effects amounted to around 2% of average weekly price, then adding this amount on to 
the size of cost exaggeration effects would put the latter at getting on for 10%. 
Moreover, this figure could be further increased if contingent contract providers were 
discounting prices in return to the favourable risk properties of their contracts. 
8.8 Transaction costs 
Above we have considered the behavioural conséquences of the use of différent contract 
contingencies and so have a view of the relative transaction benefits of these contract 
choices - see section 3.4 of chapter 3. But for a rounded view we also need to consider 
the transaction costs conséquences. In other words, are contingent contracts more 
expensive to operate than non-contingent contracts? 
Data from the commissioning survey - see chapters 1 and 4 - was used to test this 
proposition (in broad terms). The commissioning survey indicated whether pricing was 
typically, first, contingent, and second whether it was contingent on client dependency 
for each LA in the sample for the purchase of care home services from the independent 
sector (see section 4.5.2 of chapter 4). Expenditure data for each LA gives aggregate 
transaction costs for older peoples services (see chapter 6). The approach adopted here 
is to determine whether any association exists between typical contract contingency and 
transaction costs. To this end a model was estimated at the locai authority level with 
total transaction costs for older people's service as the dépendent variable. The 
dépendent variable was somewhat skewed and leptokurtic as is usuai for cost data, but 
not to a limiting degree, so that simple OLS régression was sufficient. A dummy 
variable for each LA was created taking a one value if the LA did typically relate prices 
to client dependency in a systematic way. In addition a second dummy was used that 
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took a one value if the LA used a pricing arrangement such that a price that can vary by 
(publicly-funded) client/resident (and so can vary by provider) i.e. option 3 of the 
survey question about pricing behaviour - see figure 4-5 of chapter 4 for descriptive 
information. These data were only available for the year after the expenditure data and 
so we assume that local authorities did not make wholesale changes to their 
commissioning arrangements in that period. 
A number of contract factors were used including the scale of an authority's service 
activity and prevailing inputs costs (wage rates). The régression model demonstrated 
reasonable fit and satisfied the usuai diagnostics. The results are shown in Table 8-17. 
The dependency contingent contract dummy was signifïcant and positive and so 
supports our hypothesis. Local authorities that typically use contingent contracts of this 
type appear to have greater transaction costs other things being equal. Indeed, it accords 
closely with intuition that a contract with a single fiat rate - generally set on an 
historical basis - is less costly to operate. 
Table 8-17. OLS régression - Older people care transaction costs (total) 
coeff t-stat 
Dependency contingent contract 384.78 1.96 
Contingent pricing 142.63 0.59 
Supported indie residential homes 1.07 2.69 
Supported LA homes 2.26 2.97 
Supported indie nursing homes 2.23 3.48 
Home help hours 908.27 1.99 
Wage rates (log) 3,706.22 4.39 
Year 221.94 1.18 
Constant -22,318.60 -4.45 
Observations 179 
R-sqd 0.57 
Het. Test 57.10 
Spécification: Ramsey Reset 0.83 
Normality: Bowman-Shenton 18.12 
8.9 Conclusion 
The empirical investigation of contract arrangements as used for the purchase of 
residential care for older people largely supports the theoretical hypothesis of the 
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chapter 7. Contingent contraet providers have higher mark-up rates than non-contingent 
providers, and whilst there is a range of possible explanations for such a resuit it seems 
clear that information rents from cost exaggeration play a part. 
The dérivation of mark-up rates requires a number of parameters and these are 
estimated from the empirical models. The dérivations use point estimations of these 
parameters, and although sensitivity analysis is used, there remains a degree of 
uncertainty about the derived estimâtes. Nonetheless, the focus here is not prédiction but 
rather hypothesis testing. And although the estimâtes fall into confidence intervais, 
these confidence intervais do not encompass the nuli hypothesis position (usually zero) 
- in other words, ali the relevant estimâtes are statistically significant. 
Overall then the data support the main theoretical hypothesis: that providers with 
contingent contracts secure greater mark-up than those with non-contingent contracts, 
other things equal; and that satisficing providers do operate in the market, and in doing 
so secure lower mark-ups than profit maximising providers. Are there any immediate 
implications? Contingent contract providers appear to charge the purchaser more than 
non-contingent contracts, and they secure greater profit mark-ups. In part, this entails a 
redistribution of rent from purchaser to provider, which from a societal perspective is 
far less onerous than the deadweight losses that constitute the remaining part of the 
différence in mark-up we see. Moreover, there may be unmeasured benefits from using 
contingent contracts, especially for example in regard to the long-run stability of the 
market. Since prices are heavily regulated by the purchaser (at least through its 
monopsonist buying position) prices are likely to respond slowly to failing supply. At a 
time of significant income squeeze on providers, the modest flexibility offered by 
contingent contracts could be the différence between market contraction and wholesale 
fallout. 
Furthermore, providers with contingent contracts have higher dependency users than 
non-contingent contract providers (see above). As discussed in section 3.5.2.1, and 
supported by the results of this chapter, the serving of higher dependency clients is a 
valued outcome for purchasers. Contingent contract providers will also have higher 
utility, possibly impacting positively on quality of care. Contingent contracts therefore 
have lower cost to outcome efficiency (i.e. higher mark-ups), but also outcomes of 
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higher value to purchasers. This latter benefit also has to be set against the higher 
transaction costs contingent contract incur. 
A number of other conclusions can be drawn. First, providers do appear to exploit to 
some extent the complex interplay of information that characterises social care 
transactions (by exaggerating costs and skimming clients). Second, that cost 
exaggeration dominates rents from cream-skimming, where the latter, although 
appearing to happen, does so on a very small scale. Third, that the potentially beneficial 
risk properties of contingent contracts do not show up as price discounts, or at least are 
not as large as information rents. This finding does not imply that contingent contract 
providers gain no utility from reduced risk, or indeed that the utility they gain is modest. 
It only suggests that any risk effect does not translate substantially into compensatory 
risk premiums for non-contingent providers. Of course, where mark-up rates are very 
low, the opportunity for such premiums to restore utility equilibrium between providers 
with different contract types, ceteris paribus may be limited. Fourth, that not all 
providers are motivated solely by profit making. Finally, that marginal cost is falling at 
sample average outputs. 
Annex 8-1. Sensitivity of the motivations parameter 
The following table shows different calculated values of the a, for combinations of 10% 
and 20% deviations from point estimates. 
Table 8-18. Proportional sensitivity analysis of a 
Demand and supply slopes by contract type Values of a 
Contingent contract Non-contingent contract +/- CI +/-20% 
Supply Demand Supply Demand 
+ 0 + 0 0.55 0.66 
0 + 0 + 0.46 0.46 
- 0 - 0 0.55 0.44 
0 - 0 - 0.69 0.69 
+ - + - 0.69 0.83 
- + - + 0.46 0.37 
- - + + 0.93 0.70 
+ + - - 0.41 0.50 
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Annex 8-2. Calculating mark-up 
Table 8-19. Derivation of mark-up rates 
Estimate Function Ref Contract type Diff 
Cont 
Non-
cont 
Y Y= 1 y = o 
Demand 
price slope hf (8-22) -1.77 -2.94 -1.11 
Supply price 
slope " I (8-25) 0.61 1.26 0.25 
Equilibrium 
price 
*y 
P 
(8-46) 
for Y = 
1 & 
(8-47) 
for Y = 
0 
280.99 296.51 271.75 24.76 
Equilibrium 
Output 
*Y 
X 31.03 27.31 39.21 -11.89 
Motivation (8-31) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0 
Marginal 
cost slope 
al -ahf 
c = — (8-32) -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 0 
Intercept 
marginal 
cost 
- *Y ? *Y 
c = p - ö, X (8-13) 262.00 262.00 262.00 0 
Marginal 
cost 
Y — *Y c = c + cxx (8-5) 247.39 249.14 243.54 5.60 
Average 
variable cost 
(cr ] 
{ X J 
Y 
= c+\cxx*Y =cY -\cxxY (8-8) 254.70 255.57 252.77 2.80 
Potential 
p - c pb'V -C
r =Mr =-h*r x r (8-27) 54.82 91.37 34.45 56.92 
Actual p-c aY Y Y Y *Y *Y p -c =m = ax x -cxx (8-28) 33.59 47.37 28.21 19.16 
Pot p - C/x 
(cvY 
p (a= i)Y = & = M y + \ c x x y (8-29) 47.51 84.94 25.22 59.72 
Actual p -
C/x 
P«Y-
f r v Y 
1 Y Y i *Y = 9 =m +^cxx 
[x ) 
(8-30) 26.29 40.94 18.98 21.96 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
9.1 Context and subject 
This thesis is concerned with questions of (economic) organisation, particularly those at 
a strategic level. It has attempted to model and analyse the broad organisational options 
that apply in the social care system in England. These are options about the processes 
and activities that facilitate the provision of services like social care. The way in which 
these enabling processes are structured and configured impacts significantly on how 
well services can be levered to address people's care needs. 
There are broad organisational questions, a key one being the relative merits of adopting 
market-like arrangements in social care as opposed to using bureaucratic or hierarchical 
arrangements (or indeed hybrids, like 'networks'). Some might argue that network 
arrangements are sufficiently distinct as to warrant a third category in this comparison. 
Section 3.3.3.2 in chapter 3 considers this argument but rejects it here for two main 
reasons. First, all forms of organisation are embedded in social environments and are 
lubricated by trust - networks are not unique (Granovetter, 1985). Second, the treatment 
of markets and hierarchies is slightly different from the treatment in the networks 
literature (e.g. Rhodes, 1997). The market governance archetype is centrally constructed 
around the idea of bilateral (rather than hierarchical) relationships and reduces the 
distinctiveness of networks. There are also more specific questions that concern the 
comparative benefits of different contracting arrangements in markets. These questions 
are highly relevant to the policy debate, but have not been comprehensively addressed, 
particularly as regards the social care system in England. 
This work adopts a transaction cost perspective. The main research hypotheses are as 
follows. First, that the transaction costs generated by (public sector) hierarchies in social 
care are lower than those generated in (quasi-) markets. Second, that production costs in 
hierarchies are greater than in markets. Third, that the choice between contract type 
(contingency) under market governance has a significant impact on provider behaviour. 
Specifically, contingent contracts are associated with higher prices and mark-up rates 
(and potentially lower transaction benefits) and also greater transaction costs. A 
corollary to the first and second hypotheses is that the difference in total public 
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expenditure on residential care for older people i.e. production and transaction costs 
between hiérarchies and markets, will be less than the différence in production 
costs/expenditures alone. This corollary is especially relevant because much of the pro-
market rhetoric has been justified on the basis of the différence in the latter i.e. in (unit) 
production costs alone between markets and hiérarchies. 
9.2 The motivation 
The motivation and hoped-for contribution of this research thesis in attending to these 
questions is two-fold. The first is to address perceived limitations in the current body of 
organisational économies theory as it applies to questions of comparative public sector 
organisaiional choice. The second, and greater priority, is to inform the empirical and 
policy debate on social care reform (this work is applied in its nature - the primarily 
point of the first contribution is to underpin the development of the second). 
9.2.1 Theoretical questions 
As described in chapter 2, économies of organisation theory was used to develop the 
model. This theory as currently developed in the literature provides a sound foundation, 
but it does have some limitations here. First and foremost, whilst this body of theory is 
inherently comparative with regard to governance choices, and where the comparison is 
between feasible alternatives, the theoretical treatment of how hiérarchies work, and in 
particular how public sector hiérarchies work is not well developed. The literature 
concentrâtes on private hiérarchies in the form of capitalist firms (operating in markets). 
Second is the issue of the treatment of stakeholder motivation and the influence of 
social context on transactions, as outlined in section 2.4.2 of chapter 2. In social care the 
relevance of non-profit motivations is high (even for private providers profit seeking 
appears to be only part of the story - see Le Grand, 1997; Kendall, 2001; Forder, 2000). 
There are a number of spécifié limitations to address. In particular, how to specify 
individuals' objective functions, and especially how to move away from assuming profit 
maximisation. There is also the treatment of individual's expectations about the 
behaviour of others, and especially how much individuals are willing to trust each other. 
Finally, incomplete contract theory leans heavily on the concept of bounded rationality, 
but is somewhat selective in applying it. Essentially, bounded rationality raies out some 
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behaviour e.g. the forming of complete contracts, but is absent in respect of other 
behaviour. 
9.2.2 Policy questions 
The policy reforms that have shaped the welfare state in England - including the social 
care system - have concerned, in signifícant part, decisions about system organisation. 
Many commentators see reform of the welfare state as resulting from an eclipsing of the 
social democratic tradition by neo-liberalism (Le Grand, 2003). The characteristic 
difference between these doctrines is not so much about the goals of the system58, but 
rather the means employed to achieve them. Neo-liberalism advocates choice and 
competition amongst providers - government steering but not rowing - rather than 
municipal bureaucratic means (see chapter 4). Moreover, neo-liberalism is not just 
about a more diverse supply side, but instead an active push for the textbook model of 
competitive markets and entrepreneurial behaviour wherever possible (Forder, 2002). 
And as outlined in chapter 4, social care is no exception, and indeed has gone further 
than most areas of the English welfare state in embracing markets. New Public 
Management (NPM) - the applied face of neo-liberalism - was in the ascendancy in 
social care from the 1980s. As fuelled by the availability of income support to fund 
independent sector care home placements, the use of markets was fírmly established by 
the early 1990s. From then on the importance of gwas/'-markets has increased. In the 
care homes sector there has been a steady decline since 1993 of the proportion of 
placements made to in-house providers under public hierarchical means. 
Furthermore, where markets have been adopted, at least in social care, they have tended 
to be modelling on the textbook market. There is, for example, still a signifícant reliance 
on short-term, fíxed price spot contracts. Serious questions can be raised about whether 
markets are not only appropriate in general, but also more specifícally, whether textbook 
markets are the best model. 
A change in the means of securing services is consistent with a change in governance 
structure as outlined in chapter 3 (see Table 3-1). The NPM approach involves a change 
58 Although neo-liberalism places more emphasis on individual freedom than social justice. 
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in ownership and control over provision from government to private auspices. Choice 
and diversity is accommodated by dévolution of responsibilities away from the centre. 
The approach emphasises formai contract use, and high-powered incentives. The 
literature review of chapter 2, however, indicates a paucity of comparative economic 
évaluation of organisational changes of these kinds in social care. 
9.3 Methods 
The methodology employed here has strong analogies with that used in the mainstream 
économies literature (see Friedman, 1953). In brief, a model (of social care governance 
choices) was developed. The modelling produced a number of testable hypotheses. 
Empirical counterparts of the theoretical hypotheses were then developed. Finally, 
régression analyses were used to estimate the empirical spécifications and test the 
relevant hypotheses. 
There are a number of salient methodological points. To begin with, the broad 
methodological approach used here includes having strong theoretical foundations, both 
to develop précisé theoretical hypotheses and also to support a well-specified empirical 
analysis. This approach helps to avoid circularity or tautology i.e. letting function lead 
form, or in other words to allow spécifications to anticipate and accommodate the 
expected empirical findings. 
A bespoke theoretical model was developed for this purpose, building closely on the 
contract theory literature as reviewed in chapter 2. The model focuses on transactions 
between a public sector, publicly-funding purchaser and a provider, assuming that 
whilst each strive to make optimal décisions, they are heavily constrained by the 
transaction costs of measurement and contracting/bargaining. In addition, providers can 
have non-profit motivations to balance their profit-seeking goals. 
The model is multi-period with uncertainty, allowing for réputation effects to modify 
behaviour, particularly in the presence of asymmetric information. One of the main 
features of the model (see chapter 5 in particular) is the treatment of production 'effort ' 
in both quasi-markets and public sector hiérarchies. In the former, the product contract 
has a key place in inducing 'directed' effort from providers. In hiérarchies, effort is 
fortheoming to the extent that employees are willing to follow the instructions of 
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managers. But the model explicitly recognises that managers may knowingly allow 
some 'shirking' on effort (in addition to 'hidden' shirking) in certain circumstances. In 
order to produce unambiguous hypotheses concerning transaction costs in quasi-markets 
and public sector hiérarchies respectively (reasonable) assumptions were required about 
the shape the transactions cost function. 
The theory underpins a systematic empirical analysis of care home services - at local 
authority and care home level - for older people. A broad définition of transaction cost 
was deemed appropriate. Total expenditure/cost, data available for older people, is the 
sum of transaction and production costs. Since, the latter are also available, transaction 
costs are then found by subtraction (implying that ail other non-production expenditure 
is transaction cost). Transaction costs, as used here, are those that apply to the local 
authority. For hiérarchies, this définition means that ail transaction costs are included. 
For markets, providers may also incur (unmeasured) transaction costs that would be 
added to (local authority) purchaser transaction costs to give a total. Nonetheless, it 
follows that if purchaser transaction costs in markets exceeds hierarchy transaction 
costs, then the same must apply for total transaction costs (see section 5.7 of chapter 5 
and section 6.2.2 of chapter 6). In addition, although this residuai définition of 
transaction costs may include some expenditure that stretches a stricter définition of 
transaction cost, this analysis is comparative, and requires only a consistency if 
définition as it applies to both market and hierarchy arrangements. 
The main empirical task in this study is the attribution of total transaction costs to 
governance alternatives. The empirical indicator for 'governance archetype' in the local 
authority level analysis - as described in chapters 5 and 6 - was based on ownership 
distribution. A placement was made under hierarchical arrangements if ownership of the 
means of purchasing and provision were integrateci (i.e. both public sector), and market 
if ownership was dispersed. Although this focus is only on one element of 
organisational structure (see table 3-1 in chapter 3), synthetic régression using data on 
control and incentives, as well as ownership, at local authority level - but with a smaller 
sample size - supported the use of ownership distribution as a summary statistic. In 
practice, local authorities use a mix of governance arrangements. Exploiting this 
variation, the relationship between supported placement mix by governance type and 
total transaction costs was modelled (see chapter 6). 
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As regards contract contingency (chapters 7 and 8) the data were more straightforward -
homes were asked with which contract types they typically operated, and a dummy 
variable was created on that basis. The contingent contract analysis explored how 
transaction and production costs differ by contract type. In addition to a comparison of 
prices - as an indicator of production cost - between différent contract types, the 
analysis also compared mark-up rates. If the underlying efficient relationship of cost to 
outcome is a technological relationship that is the same for ail homes, then mark-up 
describes the cost of securing this relationship i.e. is a better indicator of transaction 
benefits. 
The attribution of transaction costs to governance structures at the local authority level 
may incur the problem of 'ecological fallacy'. Methodologically, the régression 
analyses and also diagnostics, especially the spécification tests, minimise this risk by 
allowing multiple simultaneous explanatory factors to be included in the estimation. 
Conceptually, moreover, décisions about governance archetypes - market or hierarchy -
are local authority-level strategie choices and apply equally to ail transactions with the 
authority. 
The theoretical model provides a general foundation on which to base the empirical 
spécification of the régression model. As regards the transaction cost analysis two 
spécifié functional forms were estimated. The first was a flexible functional form, 
specifically a generalised translog cost function. The second specified transaction costs 
as a function of the ratio of places by governance archetype. 
The home level analysis of contract contingency estimated a demand and supply system 
with contract type able to both shift demand and affect the slope of the demand curve. 
Various régression techniques were used to interrogate the data. They were chosen to 
address both the characteristics and usuai nuances of the data e.g. skewed cost data and 
panel data, and also, a priori considérations such as endogenous variables e.g. in the 
demand and supply analysis. 
The applied econometrics literature has developed considerably in recent years. Whilst, 
most have been incorporated in this analysis - e.g. generalised linear models with panel 
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data - one interesting development not included is the spatial econometric approach. 
This approach explicitly allows for some un-specified correlation of behaviour to exist 
between neighbouring areas e.g. neighbouring authorities tending to adopt similar 
governance arrangements. Further analysis may be of merit along these lines. 
Generally, support or rejection of theoretical hypotheses could be reduced to the 
checking of the statistical signifícance and sign of the relevant estimated parameter. In 
other places statistically signifícant differences in parameter estimates were important. 
In these cases, in particular, sensitivity analysis was carried out. There were no cases 
where the fíndings of the sensitivity analysis materially changed our understanding of 
the relationships in question. Furthermore, we need to recognise that the estimates, 
although derived whilst accounting for many relevant control factors, can still mask 
some heterogeneity - henee the actual market and hierarchy costs will differ between 
authorities (Stevens and Normand, 2004). So we need to be cautious in making too wide 
a generalisation. Overall, regression analysis is at least part 'art ' as well as science. 
The general positivist methodology used in economics and largely mirrored in the 
present study has been criticised. Whilst this is not the place for a methodological 
debate, it is worth noting the criticisms that have been made in the context of the 
institutional economics literature. In particular, Hodgson (1988) argües that empirical 
analysis and theoretical hypothesis generation cannot be fully divorced. This can be 
interpreted as saying that empirical testing is not atheoretical - that we look for what we 
expect to fínd. Hodgson does not have a compelling alternative manifestó in 
methodological terms, but does argüe that we need to synthesise according to the weight 
of evidence. Little comparable work to the current study has been undertaken — as 
outlined in chapter 2. In Hodgson's terms, this work can therefore be seen as a 
contribution to the weight of evidence. 
9.4 Local authority level markets and hierarchies analysis 
9.4.1 Results 
The estimation results were highly consistent between the different empirical models 
and they all supported the theoretical hypotheses. For both transaction and production 
cost estimations the outputs ratio indicator of governance archetype was signifícant with 
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the expected sign. The translog models suggest that marginai transaction costs for 
hierarchical placements are low: the point estimate was £6 per place per week with 
estimated confidence intervais including zero. Formarkets, the point estimate was £41 
per place for market places and this was significantly différent from zero. The results 
suggest that fixed transaction costs are sizeable. Further analysis found that average 
transaction costs were £21 and £56 per place per week respectively. For production 
costs, a significant différence was found in the other direction: £89 for hierarchy and 
£55 per place per week for markets at the margin. Overall, the total (production + 
transaction) costs model could not find a significant différence between market and 
hierarchy, which is consistent with the findings for the individuai costs. 
The results are given in Figure 9-1 with prices inflated for the 2002/3 financial year. 
Using point estimâtes from the empirical analysis, average transaction costs per 
placement per week in markets were £39 per place per week higher than in hiérarchies. 
Production cost estimâtes were derived from home level regression analysis of the 
PSSRU residential care survey (see Netten et al., 1998). These analyses controlied for 
différences in home input costs, user characteristics and outcome indicators. 
Figure 9-1. Production and transaction costs - residential care for older people 
(2002-3 prices) 
Total budget 
Market: £63 
Hierarchy: £24 
Commissioning 
Process 
£289 (adj.) 
£358 (adj.) 
Diff: 
£353 
£382 
£29 
Compare 
unadjusted 
prod. costs 
£279 
£361 
Diff:£82 
The costs reported in the figure are the predicted costs for market and hierarchical 
providers holding constant ali other variables in the regression; the resulting différence 
of £69 in the figure is due only to provider (i.e. governance) type. Adding these values 
together gives total costs, with a différence of £29 higher in hiérarchies than markets. 
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The same residential care survey provided unadjusted 'production costs' with a 
différence of £82. Much of the marketisation (NPM) literature has focussed on this 
latter différence as a justification of the comparative effìciency of market-based 
provision. 
Overall, the results support the view that after accounting for the full range of costs, the 
effìciency shortfall associated with hierarchical organisational arrangements may be far 
less than often imagined. Indeed, the findings of chapter 6 indicate that total costs may 
not be significantly différent. 
9.4.2 Policy implications 
There are direct policy implications from this analysis concerning organisational 
arrangements in publicly funded care home services in England. There are also 
implications looking at the wider markets-versus-hierarchies debate for public services. 
9.4.2.1 Implications for care homes sector 
The immediate implication of these results is that policy makers should take a pause in 
continuing to shift the organisation of social care to market auspices. Central to the 
community care reforms o f the early 1990s, as outlined Chapter 4, was the explicit 
séparation of purchaser and provider and use of market arrangements (see section 
4.2.2). Figure 4-2 shows the steady decline in the number of local authority places and 
so decline of the use of hierarchical arrangements - to less than 10% of the total by 
2003. The analysis above suggests that the total cost savings from doing so, have been 
modest at best. 
The analysis suggests that local authorities need to downwardly revise any cost saving 
they expect from using markets. At the veiy least, councils should drop any pre-
conceptions that markets are automatically more efficient, as implied by much of the 
New Right/NPM and, indeed, current Labour rhetoric. The analysis highlights the 
importance of a comprehensive account of total (gross) cost/efficiency différences. 
Comparative total cost has certainly not been the only criteria that bears on the décision 
to out-source provision to the market (which is why we cannot read the observed 
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marketisation trend as implying that markets are more efficient). Aside from the many 
politicai and other factors, we need to also be clear that the total cost of publicly 
supported placements is not equal to the net cost that local authorities have to meet from 
their own budgets (because there are service co-payments - see section 4.4.2.2). 
Moreover, because there have been différences between the charging and income rules 
for people in local authority care homes compared to private care homes, the net impact 
on local authority budgets of market or hierarchy choices has differed from the gross 
cost impact. 
The now abolished (in 2003) residential allowance is an important example. Other 
things equal, this social security benefit subsidised the local authority for placements in 
the independent sector care homes. Public sector rules on capital expenditure also affect 
the markets and hiérarchies cost comparison. Institutional public sector accounting rules 
can in some cases artificially increase the costs of investment in hiérarchies as discussed 
in section 5.5.2 (although there are methods to address this issues - see below). In any 
case, central policy makers need to look carefully at any practice which subsidies the 
net total cost of market-based (or conversely hierarchical) placements. 
The analysis suggests that any efficiency advantage of markets will be highest when 
markets are competitive, i.e. where the purchaser has a good choice of potential 
providers. Purchasers do, nonetheless, need to be careful about over-zealous use of 
monopsony market power. Moreover, there is evidence (in healthcare) of an inverse 
relationship between quality and competitiveness (Propper, Burgess, and Green, 2004). 
Excessive downward pressure on prices from significant monopsony market power 
could reduce the overall sustainability of market supply. The analysis of chapter 8 (also 
see below for a summary) suggested that profitability has been very low in the care 
homes market, and particularly low in the period to which the data here apply (Laing, 
2004). The contention has been that market prices were artificially low, and indeed the 
prices that local authorities have paid in the market has increased (in real terms) in the 
recent period (Laing, 2004, chapter 1). For example, between 2000/1 to 2003/4 
residential care prices (unadjusted production costs in terms of the analysis above) 
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increased by over 10% in real terms59. These figures are unadjusted for client 
dependency mix, but the implication is that if market prices at the time of the analysis 
were lower than their long-run stable values - and that hierarchical unit costs were not 
similarly depressed - then actual total cost différences may be even less than those 
reported in Figure 9-1. 
The production costs used in the comparisons above are adjusted for case mix, local 
input prices and some process aspects of service quality at the individuai level. But this 
is someway short of a full adjustment for différent outcomes - of individuai users and at 
system level. There is little systematic comparative evidence of user outcomes between 
care home sectors. But anecdotally, users favour in-house/hierarchical care service 
providers. A large scale user satisfaction survey of over 18,000 home care users 
reported service quality that was significantly greater for in-house providers (p < 0.001) 
(Netten et al., 2004). If these results were carried over to the care home sector, it would 
add further weight to the normative efficiency case for hiérarchies. It should be noted 
that any comparative evaluative implications only strictly apply for small changes in the 
mix of market and hierarchical provision. For example, even if hiérarchies did have a 
total cost advantage after accounting for the above factors, this certainly need not 
suggest a wholesale return to in-house provision. At the very least we would expect 
some fringe compétition effects to work across sectors, which would have only minimal 
effect if the market sector were small. 
Aside from the question of the appropriate balance between markets and hiérarchies, the 
analysis also suggests a number of ways to improve performance under either 
governance arrangement. Responsiveness, productivity and perhaps, innovation - or 
together in the terms of the analysis above, effort shirking - are weaknesses of 
hiérarchies, especially public hiérarchies, but can also affect quasi-markets. 
Some part of this problem is on the purchaser side and holds for both provider hierarchy 
and quasi-market (indeed it is a problem with hierarchical purchasing, not with the 
supply side arrangements). In social care, the local authority is the purchaser and so 
59 Personal Social Services expenditure and unit costs: England: 2000-2001 and Personal Social Services 
expenditure and unit costs: England: 2003-2004, Department of Health. Comparison of unit cost indicator 
2.6, table 6. 
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needs to anticípate the range of preferences of users. If this is not done well, then poor 
outcomes are likely, either in markets via a poor product contract specifícation, or in 
hierarchies via a poor effort instruction set. 
The other part of this problem is on the supply-side. In markets, providers have the 
incentive to lead innovation and create new markets, pushing these innovations up to the 
purchaser. In hierarchies, providers have the incentive to do the opposite. And 
hierarchical managers will be concerned not only with purchasing but also with the 
functioning of their provider units. 
Strengthening the responsiveness of the purchasing fimction around user needs is a main 
objective of the system (Department of Health, 2005, 1998), and it is a particular 
problem where provision is also hierarchically arranged. Since purchasing is all about 
ascertaining needs and securing services on behalf of users, this in turn requires the 
organisation to have a user focused corporate culture. With regard to public services, 
instilling this culture can be by influence, consensus management, a reliance on 
'champions' such as the National Directors, and most directly, better leadership (Plsek 
and Wilson, 2001). Forcing structural change can also help instil this culture. In this 
case, structural change is about making a stronger purchaser-provider distinction and 
empowering the purchaser function. In hierarchies, it can be achieved by putting 
purchasing functions (e.g. care management) in hierarchical superiority to providing 
functions. Ultimately, a purchaser provider distinction can be forced by separating 
ownership, out-sourcing provision, or in other words, implementing a (quasi) market. 
Whilst distinctive and empowered purchasing is important, there remains the question 
of how to motívate purchasers. In relation to public services, this is primarily a task for 
Government. The analysis above has compared social care hierarchies and quasi-
markets and so concerns the (principal-agent) relationship between purchaser and 
provider. Motivating purchasers is about the (principal-agent) relationship between 
government and purchaser, which is in practice hierarchically configured (whilst it 
might be possible to out-source social care purchasing to a market, this would require 
primary legislation). The nature of this latter relationship need not differ as between 
(supply-side) hierarchies and quasi-markets and to date has not, with purchasing 
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residing with the social services department (or PCT).60 It is therefore outside the scope 
of this work - although measures to improve hierarchical fianctioning between 
purchaser and provider, which we tum to below, also largely apply to the government 
purchaser relationship. In particular, performance management via the use of targets 
and selective incentives applies in this relationship (see below). 
In the conventional model of hiérarchies, purchaser managers direct the production 
activities of providers. These are often undertaken in an adaptive and iterative way until 
the desired result is achieved. Moreover the provider employee accepts these activity 
instructions (to a point) and carnes them out, ultimately motivated by the sanction of 
dismissal. In markets, a product spécification and being residuai claimant (high-
powered incentives) motivâtes provider effort. 
Improvement in productivity (i.e. effort) in hiérarchies is possible from the introduction 
of the high-powered incentives. The internai market model involves the widespread 
introduction of these incentives in hiérarchies (this model falls short of a full market in 
that providers - being public sector organisations - are not absolute residual claimants). 
But a more selective introduction could improve effort/productivity without requiring a 
negotiated and verifíable product contract, henee limiting the extra transaction costs. A 
straightforward example is to link employees' salaries to target achievements, such as 
process targets - e.g. from key performance indicators, including user satisfaction 
surveys results, réductions in delayed discharge, reduced user waits for assessment or 
care packages and so forth (Commission for Social Care Inspection, 2004) - or even 
changes in user outeome if a robust measure can be found (Netten et al., 2002). 
The performance assessment framework (PAF) for councils - that culminâtes in the star 
ratings system - is an example relevant to the government (DH and CSCI) and 
purchaser (council) relationship. In practice, the financial incentives for councils in this 
regard are limited, and this system tends to be more of a minimum performance 
60 But this is changing now with the growth of user commissioning via direct payments or personalised 
budgets. In this case, users take on some of the purchasing function and because they are private 
individuáis, they can only have a bilateral i.e. market relationship with formai providers, not a 
hierarchical bureaucratie relationship. 
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assurance mechanism with zero-rated councils subject to direct intervention by external 
management teams. 
'Targets' in hiérarchies have analogy with the product contract in markets in that they 
are explicit and (somewhat) verifiable, and relate to the output of the organisation. To a 
certain extent, transactions costs can be kept down because the purchaser manager 
unilaterally décidés these targets and their achievement. However, the greater the 
proportion of provider employee's incomes that is contingent on performance, the more 
they are likely to (a) bargain and negotiate with the purchaser manager over targets and 
(b) challenge, and demand vérification of target achievement. In other words, the 
widespread use of performance incentives will incur market équivalent transaction 
costs. 
The selective use of incentives to augment a basic (low-powered i.e. salary) income 
could lead to net benefits, but there are further caveats. A main one is that selective 
targets might lead to partial and misdirected effort (in the same way as incomplète 
product contract spécifications - see section 5.5.3 in chapter 5) (Propper and Wilson, 
2003). 
The concept of devolved management structures resonates with the above. Rather than 
having the top of organisation provide a stream of effort instructions to lower levels, the 
organisation could adopt a more decentralised structure. Each division is tied back to the 
top using arrangements that are more like product contracts than effort instructions, but 
without the high-powered (residual claimant) incentives. To keep transaction costs 
down, these stratégie agreements need not be fully specified. To keep production 
directed, residual claimant incentives to eut costs are softened. The benefits are more 
efficient information-instruction flows. In social care terms, this can mean either 
functional or géographie décentralisation of the social services department. 
Care home providers in ail sectors are subject to inspection by government regulators 
(see chapter 4). There are 38 National Minimum Standards (NMS) that apply - with 
remedial action such as loss of registration status or légal action taken in the case of 
(gross) failure to achieve the standards. These régulations add to, and overlap with the 
direction of provider activity that cornes from either purchaser instructions in 
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hierarchies or product contracts in markets, and clearly add transaction costs.61 In the 
past, in-house providers were exempt from such inspections, and that is indeed more 
consistent with the implications of the analysis above (i.e. hierarchical providers have 
few incentives to cut quality unless higher quality requires higher productivity). The 
planned move to 'lighter touch' regulation would address this issue since providers 
meeting standards (i.e. more in-house providers?) would be subject to fewer inspections. 
Other elements of market governance can be incorporated into the hierarchical model, 
with potential net benefits. An example is public and private partnership (PPP) schemes 
in relation to investment. In terms of the model above, they involve investment being 
outsourced to the market, but production undertaken by hierarchical means, i.e. publicly 
operated. There is a significant literature on the relative merits of these arrangements, 
but this is out of the scope of the current work (for example Dawson, 2001, Propper and 
Wilson, 2001). Nonetheless, an immediate observation is that PPP and PFI schemes do 
involve very significant transaction costs that would only be justified if public 
investment opportunities were highly constrained (see section 5.5.2). 
Turning to market arrangements, a major source of transaction costs is the product 
contract. The analysis of chapter 5 suggests that poorly specified product contracts in 
relation to complex services can lead to misdirected effort. Nonetheless, in frequently 
repeated, long-term contractual relationships, it is reasonable to suppose that purchasers 
and providers will have become well acquainted with what constitutes directed and 
misdirected effort. Detailed product contract negotiation and specification could then be 
scaled back with purchasers more trusting of providers to produce directed efforts. 
Providers could benefit if some of the savings on transaction costs were available as 
income. These so-called relational contracts (Dore, 1983; Sako, 1992) can be effective 
and low cost (see chapter 5, especially section 5.3.1.2 and chapter 2). They rely on on-
going trust in relationships and the alignment of motivations between purchaser and 
provider that comes from each sharing the same social networks. 
Attempts to move toward a higher trust, lower cost relationship have been attempted (as 
noted in chapter 4). For example, the Government's 2001 Building Capacity and 
61 Which at the time was included in local authority transaction costs as used in the analysis above. 
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Partnership in Care (BCPC) charter, which called for working that "promotes mutual 
trust" (see page 89 above). The aim was to form an 'agreement ' between statutory and 
independent sector. BCPC provided a checklist of appropriate behaviours and therefore 
offered guidance to the sector. However, it did not come with specific powers or 
incentives to prompt councils to adopt a more relational stance with independent sector 
providers. Nonetheless, the Department 's Change Agent Team (CAT) has worked on 
the ground with councils to promote this style of working, and has developed a toolkit, 
Commissioning and the Independent Sector, which checks compliance with BCPC 
(Change Agent Team, 2004). 
In recent years, relationships in the sector have improved, but can hardly be described as 
relational — see for example the demands of the English Community Care Association 
(of independent providers). There has been a decade of very tight financial settlements 
for care homes (see chapter 8 and below) and provider turnover is significant, limiting 
long-term relationships (Netten, Darton, and Williams, 2003). Without good levels of 
trust, the use of relational contracts would result in adverse outcomes. 
Markets also potentially suffer 'hold-up' problems as described in chapter 5, section 
5.3.1.1. The most obvious example is under-investment in specialised physical assets -
e.g. purpose build nursing homes in low-income areas that have limited private pay 
demand. Another related example is staff training, which benefits the user (and so 
purchaser), but where the provider expects a chance to lose the newly trained staff to 
another provider. In both cases, cost-sharing (CS) contracts can offer benefits - see 
section 5.2.1.1. They could involve local authority purchasers sharing or matching a part 
of the investment cost. Currently there are few examples in the field of these kinds of 
arrangements. There would be further transaction costs in agreeing a matching contract 
on investment, training etc., but these could be relatively modest. At the very least, 
recognition of this problem would lead to improvements in performance. 
9.4.2.2 General implications 
The more general implication of the results is to question whether there is some inherent 
inverse relationship between the size of transaction and production costs. For example, 
do measures to promote competition necessarily increase contracting and monitoring 
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costs? Can providers be made more responsive without increasing the power of the 
financial incentives they face? The empirical analysis is not designed to address these 
trade-off questions, although it does support the theory that can be used more directly to 
cast light on these issues. Up to a point, some trade-off must occur, although the model 
does suggest that the trade-off will be less pronounced in a high trust environment rather 
than a low trust one. Trust or réputation effects appear to work well when stable; but 
when trust breaks down the adverse conséquences - in the absence of any safeguards -
can be severe. 
9.4.3 Theoretical and methodological implications 
As regards the wider body of theory, this thesis has focused on the working of public 
hiérarchies. Significant scope remains for further theoretical development however. 
Indeed this focus is both a strength and a weakness of this work. In terms of the theory, 
a number of spécifié issues have been explored. First, a non-profit utility term was used 
in the objective function. This changed predicted behaviour in the model, although quite 
often the effect was just an amélioration of the strength of profit seeking behaviour. As 
a basis for empirical work, where this profit seeking intensity is an empirical question, 
the value added is not absolutely clear-cut. Second, although there is a large literature 
on trust, relatively little interfaces with the comparative governance literature. David 
Kreps' work on réputation is an important exception, and these ideas have been used 
extensively in this work e.g. in the way that (care) workers trust their managers 
sufficiently so as to cede significant control to managers. Furthermore, réputation, being 
a dynamic concept, allows for people's expectations to change, which is also an 
empirically appealing feature. Third, the treatment here is to assume that people are 
rational but constrained by the transaction costs of undertaking relevant activities. 
Hence, people do not write complete contracts because the transaction costs are 
prohibitively high. It is in this sense that people are boundedly rational. 
The empirical strategy has been to directly measure behaviour and infer outcomes (and 
so efficiency) on that basis. Ideally, empirical work should compare net outcome for 
stakeholders (weighted appropriately), but this is difficult for usuai reasons (e.g. 
measuring outcomes) (Knapp, 1984). A focus on behaviour rather than outcomes is 
arguably the next best approach. 
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9.5 Contracts 
9.5.1 Results 
Différences in price and mark-up by contract contingency type can be due to differential 
information effects, risk premiums, and within-financial-period cost shocks, according 
to the theory of chapter 7. The information effects include exaggeration by providers of 
cost-relevant factors - e.g. the costs of services for users with particular needs - in order 
to secure higher payment, and also cream-skimming. The theory indicates that these 
factors produce differential effects on behaviour in markets, including the level of 
prices, outputs, and mark-up rates. 
The homes in the sample had a mix of contract types: just under two-fifths reported 
operating with contingent contracts. There was also a mix within authorities; typically 
around a third of sample providers within each authority reported contingent contracts. 
The main hypothesis - that cream-skimming and risk effects will be limited, and that 
cost-exaggeration and upward cost pressures effects for contingent contracts would 
dominate - was supported by the empirical analysis. Prices were statistically 
significantly higher for contingent contracts compared with non-contingent contracts, by 
over 5% of the sample average price, ail other things equal. This price différence is 
calculated when holding constant différences in underlying costs drivers, some of which 
are under the control of providers via selection behaviour. For providers that cream-
skim, these cost factors will be lower than for other providers. By controlling for i.e. 
equalising cost drivers, we are generating predicted prices for this group than are higher 
than the observed prices. If we did not control in this way, price différences would be 
greater, but would over-estimate the information effect (because cream-skimming 
affects costs, and this is not observed unless prices are adjusted for cost différences). 
The above price différence is calculated holding output the same between contract 
groups. However, because a différent contract type means différent provider demand 
fonctions, equilibrium outputs should also change, bringing, in turn an output-related 
price adjustment (along the demand curve). Accounting for this output adjustment 
increases the différence in price (at the margin) due to contract contingency to nearly 
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9%. Output changes also affect marginal costs (because the marginal cost function is 
downwards sloping). This effect can be estimated by comparing estimated price-cost 
margins. When this output-related adjustment to costs occurs, the adjusted price 
difference becomes just under 7% relative to marginal costs or 8% relative to average 
variable costs (see Table 8-14 in chapter 8). 
Overall, whatever particular comparison we make, total 'production cost' to the 
purchaser (i.e. the price it pays) is higher under contingent contracts. 'Production cost' 
as defined in this thesis is the price paid (under different governance arrangements) to 
secure identical services, net of transaction costs i.e. it is concerned with the 
comparative efficiency of production. In practice, however, not all the characteristics of 
a service are observable, including, in particular, some client characteristics. Providers 
with non-contingent contracts would be catering for lower dependency users on 
average, something that implies lower value for purchasers (but is not reflected in 
production cost/price differences). Contingent contracts providers have higher 
production costs than non-contingent contracts to provide an identical service, but also 
support people with comparatively higher needs, and in a more appropriate fashion. In 
other words, contingent contracts are comparatively less cost-effective but provide a 
more highly valued or a more effective service. 
There is also a question about provider sustainability under non-contingent contracts. 
Although information rents may be limited, providers with contingent contracts should 
be (a) compensated for facing more risk and (b) be at a disadvantage in a climate of 
service cost increases (due, for example, to lower need users making greater use of 
home care, a policy actively promoted by Government). Where these compensations are 
not forthcoming - for various reasons - providers may be absorbing short run net 
income shortfalls, a position not sustainable in the long run. 
The analysis showed that mark-up rates in the industry were very low at the time of the 
survey (see also Laing, 2004). The average for the sample was a mark-up over average 
variable cost of £26 per place (within a confidence interval of £15 to £37) or just over 
9% of average revenue. At the margin, mark-up was slightly higher (12%) because 
marginal costs were falling (see Table 8-11 in chapter 8). Part of the reason for this low 
rate is that, on average, providers were not making as much profit as demand conditions 
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would allow. Point estimates suggested that only 55% of maximum mark-up was taken. 
This finding is important because it means that providers are either not solely motivated 
by profit, or are not hyper-rational (profit) optimisers, or indeed, both. Further pressure 
on prices may force providers to become more profit orientated in order to survive. 
The mark-up analysis has focused on marginal and average variable costs because these 
are most telling with regard to (short-run) market profitability. Providers also have fixed 
costs, most predominantly in the form of property capital costs. Whilst, only a portion 
of these capital costs is a sunk cost (i.e. the property can be sold), providers still need to 
service this debt to remain in business. When these costs are figured in, mark-up rates 
fall to zero or even less. 
With either contract type, purchasers could increase prices, and have done so since the 
survey (see above). This action will improve sustainability under non-contingent 
contracts as underlying costs increase. But it will not lessen the risk exposure of 
providers with non-contingent contracts. And, although the distribution of user 
dependency/need within homes may be narrowing (as lower level needs cases are more 
likely to be supported in their own home), variability remains significant. 
9.5.2 Policy implications 
The analysis suggests that in practice cream-skimming is relatively modest. In this case, 
the cost-effectiveness shortfall of contingent contracts is the most important 
comparative disadvantage. Moreover, although risk is affecting providers, it does not 
appear to be attracting an overwhelming degree of compensation. In addition, as 
expected, transactions costs were found to be lower under non-contingent contracts. 
Taking these together, this analysis suggests that non-contingent contracts - having 
higher net transaction benefits than contingent contracts - are the preferred choice. This 
implication is, however, conditional on either limited cream-skimming and/or on 
purchasers ascribing only a modest increase in the value of services for high needs 
people rather than low need people. The latter, is unlikely given the way that Fair 
Access to Care eligibility criteria work in social care on the principle of greater attention 
to those in greatest need (see chapter 4). Furthermore, any policy conclusion about the 
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continued use of low- or non-contingent contracts should only apply within client group 
- it does not apply for any placement regardless of registration status of the care home. 
A non-contingent contract might be use for potential placements to a nursing home, but 
not the same contract (price) for placement to a care home without nursing. 
The main concern with non-contingent contracts (within client group) is provider risk. 
A small interview survey of care homes in the late 1990s found that just under half of 
providers reported 'excess risk' (Forder et al., 2000). And yet price premiums are not 
apparent in non-contingent contracts. Some form of extreme 'stop-loss' provision could 
be introduced alongside non-contingent arrangements for the majority of service users. 
This would pass some of the cost of very high need cases back to the purchaser. It 
would need to interface with NHS continuing care arrangements as people with very 
extensive service needs may already be eligible for NHS care, which pays a (much) 
higher rate than local authority social services. 
Overall, contracting is a core part of the commissioning activities of local authorities. 
There has been some practical policy development in this regard. The Department of 
Health Change Agent Team and its Learning and Improvement Network (LIN) on 
commissioning has made an important contribution (Change Agent Team, 2004, chapter 
3). The Audit Commission has also produced some relevant analysis and toolkits (e.g. 
Audit Commission, 1997a, 1997b). But there is scope for Government to go further in 
supporting commissioning and contracting performance in local authorities 
At the time of the analysis, mark-up rates in the care homes market were low by almost 
ail standards. Market demand has been falling as alternatives to care homes become 
more readily available (see chapter 4) and with a contraction of a competitive market we 
would expect to see low mark-up rates and home closures (Netten, Darton, and 
Williams, 2003). However, because the prices local authorities will pay are now rising 
again (see above), there is some indication that prices at the time were inefficiently low. 
In any case, commissioners will need to become much more adept at understanding 
demand and supply dynamics in their local markets if they are to avoid 'stop-go' like 
cycles of market capacity. Information on prices, analysis of closures and a mapping of 
local input prices are important components in this task. A part of this task is also to 
appreciate that not all providers by any means are purely motivated by profit. Having 
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this characteristic underlined will help purchasers in developing their relationships with 
providers. 
9.5.3 Theoretical and methodological implications 
The main methodological contributions of the contracts analysis are two fold. The first 
is the use of residual demand elasticities to calculate mark-up rates by contract type. 
This approach avoids the difficult task of estimating marginal costs from accounting 
cost data. It instead infers mark-ups from actual provider behaviour. The second 
contribution is the attempt to incorporate non-profit motivation into the empirical 
analysis, and indeed to estimate the average propensity of providers to seek maximum 
profits. This extends the approach of Forder (2000), and suggests that providers are not 
always maximising profits. It was not possible, however, to differentiate this motivation 
propensity between providers with different contracts. 
9.6 Final comments 
This work has been concerned to promote a research agenda in long-term care that has 
three key components. First, to focus on the organisational aspects of the delivery of 
services to people with care needs (rather than just looking at different care production 
technologies). In doing so, to undertake a comparative analysis o f f eas ib le alternative 
organisational arrangements, not just comparisons with textbook ideal-types. Second, 
for the analysis to have strong theoretical foundations and therefore to provide a 
systematic basis on which to address the data. Third, to undertake a rigorous, 
quantitative empirical analysis that is relevant to, and able to directly inform policy-
making. 
Word count (excluding only references): 98692 
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